Trying to simplify my Consciousness hypothesis

[bennyboy]

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Okay.  How does it work, and why is it there?

Asking the question over and over again won't make any answer you've already been given, or the wide field of study you know exists...... disappear.

Saying this again and again won't change the fact that the "wide field of study" you're talking about is founded on a question-begging assumption. It is very much NOT known how/why qualia exist.

 

An explanation by brute fact would be to say "why does it exist" - because it exists"....which, ofc, isn't what I said, so?  I gave you a mechanism which is know to exist, and known to be capable of actualizing what is possible.  I thought you'd appreciate it.  Personally, I think the question is malformed....I'm just trying to meet you in the middle.

If I say "Why do waves exist?" you'll say "Water and wind!" and point to the oceans. But that's not actually answering the question-- you are giving the proximate cause, when the distal cause is what matters.

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I don't believe that you experience qualia. Convince me that you do. As far as I You're just a biological automata.

Yeah, I like this answer best. I'd never attempt to do this, as I already know I cannot provide evidence that I experience qualia without demanding question-begging assumptions be made.

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To me, this is the most honest answer.  However, it seems that since qualia can't interact with anything, there would be no mechanism for it to evolve, even by chance.

You say it's the most honest answer but you're entirely missing my point about evolutionary by-products.

There doesn't need to be a reason for qualia to evolve. It's purposeless and useless, a side effect. A side effect of having complex brains that ARE useful.

A moth doesn't have an evolutionary reason for suiciding itself into a hot lamp either. It's an evolutionary by-product and side effect of its flight mechanism that is useful.

All those other by-products are related to something.  Qualia is not derived from anything else, or related to anything else, like all other evolutionary "by products" are.  In your example, the fire and the moon share some physical properties-- they give off light.  The moths have evolved to travel by light, and this ends up in their demise.  But nothing is like qualia.

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And since it's by no means certain even that 'I' exist as I subjectively infer I do. . .

eh?  Who's doing the inferring?

[The Grand Nudger]

Saying this again and again won't change the fact that the "wide field of study" you're talking about is founded on a question-begging assumption.

Here I thought that neither of us had a problem with that field? I can never figure out what question you think that I, or science in general is begging, when you say that..by the way, lol.

 It is very much NOT known how/why qualia exist.

-and yet not a complete mystery.  As I said, bit of an overstatement on your part.  Full knowledge is not a requirement of knowledge, that would be an irrational request regardless of the subject. / shrugs 

 
If I say "Why do waves exist?" you'll say "Water and wind!" and point to the oceans.  But that's not actually answering the question-- you are giving the proximate cause, when the distal cause is what matters.

But why would I give you that explanation regarding waves, and what does it have to do with any explanation I'd give you regarding qualia?  Hint: I wouldn't...and nothing.  So?

This though....

All those other by-products are related to something. Qualia is not derived from anything else, or related to anything else, like all other evolutionary "by products" are. In your example, the fire and the moon share some physical properties-- they give off light. The moths have evolved to travel by light, and this ends up in their demise. But nothing is like qualia.

LOL..what the actual fuck? If it's "not like" anything else though...running with that, does that bode well for the idea that it's intrinsic to the universe? If it;s not related to or derived from anything else, does that bode well for your acceptence of it having something to do with the brain?

[bennyboy]

 It is very much NOT known how/why qualia exist.

-and yet not a complete mystery.  As I said, bit of an overstatement on your part.  Full knowledge is not a requirement of knowledge, that would be an irrational request regardless of the subject. / shrugs 

Again, you are looking at proximal cause, and I'm interested in the distal cause. Given a material monist reality, why would something like qualia be part of it?

[The Grand Nudger]

Why don't we try something.  Why don't -you- try to answer that question from within a material monist framework?  Let's see if that helps..because I'm tired of answering it over and over only to be asked again. Same with the opener, I'm tired of giving you possible material monist distals. Can you think of any?

[bennyboy]

Why don't we try something.  Why don't -you- try to answer that question from within a material monist framework?  Let's see if that helps..because I'm tired of answering it over and over only to be asked again.  Same with the opener, I'm tired of giving you possible material monist distals.  Can you think of any?

What you are asking me to do is difficult, since one of my reasons for not being a materialist is the hard problem of consciousness.

That being said, you already KNOW my view: I don't believe that subjective experience can supervene as a property of objects unless there's something intrinsic to the universe, at the core, which allows for it.  Only a material panpsychism, if I may be permitted possibly to coin a term, makes sense; otherwise, you need some non-arbitrary critical mass at which there is no mind, but mind spontaneously erupts from the processing of a physical system.

In other words, mind like gravity or any other fundamental aspect of reality, is a brute fact.

[emjay]

And since it's by no means certain even that 'I' exist as I subjectively infer I do. . .

eh?  Who's doing the inferring?

I was just expressing my own confusions; if you want to believe in a homunculous, knock yourself out, but for me it's not a given... all that's given is there's an apparent homunculous. That apparent homunculous is the subject of experience, ie if there is experience there is something to experience it... apparently... but that focal point, of which our senses revolve around, could, in my view, be just another implicit representation in the network, not above and beyond, as a homunculous would be, but the natural inference the network would make when it finds all sensory information, pointing as it were to the same thing. Even if that 'thing' doesn't exist, the network would still create an inferred representation for it, which is what I think it is, just as it does for the inferred essences of any other objects. In other words a neural stereotype; stereotypes are an NN's bread and butter... finding and representing the common features of something... so in my opinion it's not that big of a leap to think that the ultimate stereotype in the brain could be the self. As far as I'm concerned that's far less of a leap than to think that the self is a separate system... like a black box... different from the network that feeds into it. So in answer to your question in my opinion it's not a question of who's doing the inferring, but what, and the answer I'd give is it's the network. And you already know how I see the mind... with neural active representations and phenomenal active representations being two sides of the same coin, so that view includes the activation of that self stereotype whenever I am experiencing, just by definition.

[The Grand Nudger]

Why don't we try something.  Why don't -you- try to answer that question from within a material monist framework?  Let's see if that helps..because I'm tired of answering it over and over only to be asked again.  Same with the opener, I'm tired of giving you possible material monist distals.  Can you think of any?

What you are asking me to do is difficult, since one of my reasons for not being a materialist is the hard problem of consciousness.

It shouldn't be difficult, I'm not asking you to agree that anything -is- a distal cause of qualia, only asking you to identify candidates -as- a distal cause in a material monist framework.  Your view is irrelevant to the question you asked me to answer.

Laying aside brain itself as a proximal cause, as you asked me to do, does the process which led to that brain qualify as distal, how about the chemistry that supports that process, how about the physics beneath that?  In the vast amount of explanatory space between the brain and quantum mechanics...all of it a material monist explanation..is there -anything- that strikes you as a candidate to be a distal cause?

If not...then just what are you asking for, exactly? In a material monist framework..the distal cause...or more accurately -causes- of qualia are less "mysterious" and more numerous than the proximate one.

[bennyboy]

eh?  Who's doing the inferring?

I was just expressing my own confusions; if you want to believe in a homunculous, knock yourself out, but for me it's not a given... all that's given is there's an apparent homunculous. That apparent homunculous is the subject of experience, ie if there is experience there is something to experience it... apparently... but that focal point, of which our senses revolve around, could, in my view, be just another implicit representation in the network, not above and beyond, as a homunculous would be, but the natural inference the network would make when it finds all sensory information, pointing as it were to the same thing.

So you're saying the self is. . . an idea?

Do you anticipate a tough sell here?

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What you are asking me to do is difficult, since one of my reasons for not being a materialist is the hard problem of consciousness.

It shouldn't be difficult, I'm not asking you to agree that anything -is- a distal cause of qualia, only asking you to identify candidates -as- a distal cause in a material monist framework.  Your view is irrelevant to the question you asked me to answer.

What's the distal cause of the existence of matter?  The Big Bang?  Whatever quantity/principle/process allowed for it?

Whatever that is, then that is my view of the distal cause of the capacity for material systems to experience: it has been intrinsic to the fabric of the Universe from the very start.

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Laying aside brain itself as a proximal cause, as you asked me to do, does the process which led to that brain qualify as distal, how about the chemistry that supports that process, how about the physics beneath that?  In the vast amount of explanatory space between the brain and quantum mechanics...all of it a material monist explanation..is there -anything- that strikes you as a candidate to be a distal cause?

The process you describe led to the capacity for a particular organism to experience things in a particular way. As I said, we don't "get" what it's like to do echolocation because we're not built like that. But we get what it's like to be able to know what something is like, and so do bats, worms (I think), and I suspect there's no magical critical mass at all-- that it runs right down the scale spectrum to QM.

[emjay]

I was just expressing my own confusions; if you want to believe in a homunculous, knock yourself out, but for me it's not a given... all that's given is there's an apparent homunculous. That apparent homunculous is the subject of experience, ie if there is experience there is something to experience it... apparently... but that focal point, of which our senses revolve around, could, in my view, be just another implicit representation in the network, not above and beyond, as a homunculous would be, but the natural inference the network would make when it finds all sensory information, pointing as it were to the same thing.

So you're saying the self is. . . an idea?

Do you anticipate a tough sell here?

Probably best not to use the word idea as you said it's a term that's easily conflated... to the point where I haven't got a clue what you mean by it

But if it means a representation, then yeah, I think it's an idea.

Anyway, I wasn't trying to sell anything... just thought dumping my own confusions... which helps me to clarify them. We're probably both too far gone down our respective rabbit holes to ever sell each other anything

Those confusions still remain; what existence means when it is judged in reference to something that may not itself exist as we think it does... and all the rest. And what I really meant to say, but somehow it never really came out in that whole post, was how something could both exist and not exist... in the sense that I don't think of qualia as 'stuff' but at the same time there is change and difference in consciousness... so I just can't get my head around what that implies, especially in an enclosed system, the centre of which (the self) is itself dubious (to me). Basically I'm asking (myself) the question, does qualia exist as the term is defined? And I don't know the answer.

[Angrboda]

Laying aside brain itself as a proximal cause, as you asked me to do, does the process which led to that brain qualify as distal, how about the chemistry that supports that process, how about the physics beneath that?  In the vast amount of explanatory space between the brain and quantum mechanics...all of it a material monist explanation..is there -anything- that strikes you as a candidate to be a distal cause?

The process you describe led to the capacity for a particular organism to experience things in a particular way.  As I said, we don't "get" what it's like to do echolocation because we're not built like that.  But we get what it's like to be able to know what something is like, and so do bats, worms (I think), and I suspect there's no magical critical mass at all-- that it runs right down the scale spectrum to QM.

It seems that qualia, as in the case of the bat, is tied to the type of sensory systems that an organism has. It makes no sense to extend that insight into organisms and systems that have no sensory apparatus. It is a leap to suggest that you can have qualia without senses. What evidence are you drawing upon to suggest that qualia can exist without senses? It makes as much sense to suppose that a bat doesn't have qualia for sonar, the link between senses and qualia is that strong.