(LONG) "I Don't Know" as a Good Answer in Ethics

[The Grand Nudger]

I am familiar with the businessman example. These sorts of problems plague every iteration of ethical monism, and it causes me to consider pluralism. I find myself seeing value in each and every one of the monistic theories, and I can't help thinking that each one says something important about ethics.

Agreed.  If there is some unifying moral theory, if you don't mind me using the phrase loosely....then I would expect it to draw from the separate monistic theories just as any other unifying theory brings together sub-disciplines in an overall field.  

 As far as monistic theories go, I really like utilitarian hedonism and virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is SO compelling, but also problematic. This isn't to say that desire satisfaction and others aren't appealing as well. If I had to pick one at gunpoint, I suppose utilitarianism would be the one. Otherwise, I'd have to put myself in the undecided category.

Same, my answer to the question of which one I find the most compelling is the same as my answer to the question of the happy businessman's life.  I don't know.  I can say, though, that the confluence between virtue ethics and utilitarianism..where doing some good thing x is both adhering to a rule or duty of a moral system -and- has a beneficial outcome shows that they aren't necessarily in competition with each other.  I don;t feel any particular need to choose, except so much as I would choose a flat head or a philips depending on the job in front of me.

In meta-ethics, I tend toward moral objectivism but I've yet to hear a satisfying response to error theory, so nihilism haunts me with its nightmares. How about you? What theories do you find most attractive?

So do I, and as far as a response towards error theory goes;  Firstly, in a great many examples of moral error theory, the dispute appears to be semantic.  A moral realist and a moral skeptic are not actually disagreeing, just arguing over the proper terms to couch their often shared positions in.   Another is the sense of trivial objection.  Skepticism applied to moral realism sometimes takes the form of simply objecting to words.  Not in the semantic sense, above, but in the propositional sense.  If we can demonstrate that we're talking about some objective thing x, and cogent propositions regarding that thing x can be arranged into a valid syllogism...then the conclusion is just as true as any other..including whatever logic is required to mount some skeptical argument or -any- hypothetical. Sure, we could still be wrong, but that's never not true. I, personally, consider objective meta-ethics a hedge against the ever present of objection "but what if we're wrong about that/are you sure that's what we're talking about". As above.."well, okay, IDK, I think we have good reason to think so, what do you think?". Like the other examples we were discussing, I apply skepticism and error theory to moral statements constantly. It seems as necessary as any of the rest to get an accurate picture..or as accurate a picture as we -can- get. In general...social contract, super-rationality, and blind construction seem to offer a good mix of deontology and consequentualism through objective meta-ethics.

As far as moral nihilism..that's a non starter to me. Literally, lol. It's the least impressive objection, in my view...and a constant source of pitched straw.

[vulcanlogician]

Firstly, in a great many examples of moral error theory, the dispute appears to be semantic.  A moral realist and a moral skeptic are not actually disagreeing, just arguing over the proper terms to couch their often shared positions in.

Cultural relativism is SO guilty of this. Individual relativism has something resembling merit, though. It's not so much that I feel the need to argue FOR moral nihilism, it's just that it says to that little Occam's razor in my heart: "Here's something to cut." Specifically the argument from the scientific test of reality (I will post it if you don't recall it from memory) does raise some reasonable concerns for me, and I don't think they can be boiled down to semantics. If you can refute error theory convincingly, then I owe you one.

[brewer]

---

Also my view, the development of ethics may be very simple and rooted in biology. The ethics of survival, of self, then family, then herd, then society.

I agree with you that natural selection is the most likely culprit in the formation of our moral sense.

Assuming that the development of ethics is rooted in biology, I'm interested in your opinion of how we should proceed with developing our ethical thinking. Should we, in the development of our ethics, continue to prioritize survival/self/family/herd/society, or should we (now that we are civilized and rational) proceed with an ethical development based on principles?

Are not civilization, rational thought and principles the evolved product of survival? We have evolved to the point where ethics should be based on principles. But I don't think that any principles will probably ever win out over survival. 

If faced with regional/global catastrophe won't our ethics change in our quest for survival? I'm quite sure we'd devolve.

[vulcanlogician]

Are not civilization, rational thought and principles the evolved product of survival? We have evolved to the point where ethics should be based on principles. But I don't think that any principles will probably ever win out over survival. 

If faced with regional/global catastrophe won't our ethics change in our quest for survival? I'm quite sure we'd devolve.

I agree, though "revert back to instinct" might be more apt than "devolve." There is hardly any time to work out ethics when Mad Max is trying to bust a cap in your ass. In a way, ethics is kind of a luxury granted to us by civilized society.

I'm glad that you concur that in civilized society we ought to embrace principle over instinct.

[The Grand Nudger]

Thus the value of deontological ethics.  No need to work anything out in the heat of the moment.  Refer to the list.

@refuting error theory, give us the specific formulation to work with.

---

Are not civilization, rational thought and principles the evolved product of survival? We have evolved to the point where ethics should be based on principles. But I don't think that any principles will probably ever win out over survival. 

People already choose principle over survival, though,granted..it takes indoctrination.

If faced with regional/global catastrophe won't our ethics change in our quest for survival? I'm quite sure we'd devolve.

Why?  Suppose that after the initial and inevitable viscious looting and sectarian violence...we embraced a deeply green humanist ethic as a response to said catastrophe?  Would that be devolving?

[brewer]

Thus the value of deontological ethics.  No need to work anything out in the heat of the moment.  Refer to the list.

@refuting error theory, give us a specific formulation to work with.  

---

Are not civilization, rational thought and principles the evolved product of survival? We have evolved to the point where ethics should be based on principles. But I don't think that any principles will probably ever win out over survival. 

People already choose principle over survival, though,granted..it takes indoctrination.

If faced with regional/global catastrophe won't our ethics change in our quest for survival? I'm quite sure we'd devolve.

Why?  Suppose that after the initial and inevitable viscious looting and sectarian violence...we embraced a deeply green humanist ethic as a response to said catastrophe?  Would that be devolving?

bolded the operative word

The after would be the ethics evolving. What happened during (inevitable viscious looting and sectarian violence) sounds like ethics devolving.

[The Grand Nudger]

Not really, it's already in that state today. Somewhere in the world..right now (I guarantee this) someone is violently stealing somebody else's shit. It doesn't take a catastrophe to diminish our moral agency or competency....and just as often a catastrophe can bring out the best in us.

[vulcanlogician]

Thus the value of deontological ethics.  No need to work anything out in the heat of the moment.  Refer to the list.

@refuting error theory, give us a specific formulation to work with.  

I don't get what deontological ethics has to do with metaethics. Anyway, here is Russ Shafer-Landau's rendition of the argument from the scientific test of reality:

(from The Fundamentals of Ethics)

1. If science cannot verify the existence of X, then the best evidence tells us that X does not exist.
2. Science cannot verify the existence of objective moral values.
3. Therefore, the best evidence tells us that objective moral values do not exist.

Logic is sound. The only argument against premise 2 that I was shown is moral naturalism. I reject moral naturalism. It's an extremely hard sell for me. I might have some budge-room with premise 1. What do you think of the argument?

[The Grand Nudger]

Describe moral naturalism as you see it, and why you reject it?

(I would alter the initial premise, if I wanted to make a -strong- case in the same vein, but more easily justified..to: "If science cannot verify the existence of x, then we do not have good reason to believe x exists".)

[vulcanlogician]

Describe moral naturalism as you see it, and why you reject it?

(I would alter the initial premise, if I wanted to make a -strong- case in the same vein, but more easily justified..to:  "If science cannot verify the existence of x, then we do not have good reason to believe x exists".)

Give me some time. I came up with my own refutation, which I will share, but G.E. Moore's refutation of moral naturalism puts mine to shame. Look that up if you're impatient.

---

Describe moral naturalism as you see it, and why you reject it?

To ensure charitability I will simply quote the definition offered by Shafer-Landau: "The view that moral features are natural (i.e. not supernatural) features, whose existence can be confirmed by means of the natural sciences."

So, happiness can be gauged by the instruments of science. A scientist can measure the levels of serotonin and dopamine present in the brain. These are indicators of happiness. Therefore, a hedonist (for example) has a scientific observable thing to measure with its moral meterstick. Since the hedonist is measuring a natural phenomenon, that refutes premise 2.

The problem is: science fails to supply value here. Can science even supply value? Science can only verify if happiness exists or not. Science cannot verify that happiness is good.