Theists: What do you mean when you say that God is 'perfect'?

[Brian37]

I think it is a blank check.  God is perfect .. whatever that turns out to be.  Of course they don't know because only god is perfect.

I think the correct word would be "ambiguity".

[Whateverist]

I think it is a blank check.  God is perfect .. whatever that turns out to be.  Of course they don't know because only god is perfect.

I think the correct word would be "ambiguity".

Ambiguous indeed.  Just the most ultimate mega-omni thing ever, the gold standard for every good quality - power, wisdom, goodness.  Hell, I'll bet he even tastes better than anything else.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Good topic, Jor. I would have to refer back to Question 3 of the Summa Theologica, but as I recall Divine Perfection has more to do with completeness than anything else. God is perfect in the sense that He is complete in Himself in need of nothing outside Himself. I don't remember purpose, as in Final Cause, having anything to do with it so I don't want to go out on a limb.

In the case of God we also talk about components. It just so happens that the components are all perfect (part of the definition of God) so it is handy and appropriate to say God is perfect.

How does that square with Divine Simplicity? I think you meant to say attributes (and even then all that can be said of God's nature is what He is not.)

[SteveII]

In the case of God we also talk about components. It just so happens that the components are all perfect (part of the definition of God) so it is handy and appropriate to say God is perfect.

How does that square with Divine Simplicity? I think you meant to say attributes (and even then all that can be said of God's nature is what He is not.)

You're right. 'Attributes' would have been a better word. I will go back and correct it while I can.

[The Grand Nudger]

Hell, I'll bet he even tastes better than anything else.

Simultaneously chocolate...and...vanilla.

In any case, I find the notion of "perfect justice" as some other guy getting what everyone else deserves just a -bit- off the mark, lol. OTOH, a perfect failure is still perfection of a sort, eh?

[SteveII]

 (and even then all that can be said of God's nature is what He is not.)

Do you mean in the sense of a complete description is impossible because we cannot adequately describe the infinite with a finite mind/vocabulary? However, a fair effort can be made to describe God's positive attributes -- however incomplete that might be.

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In any case, I find the notion of "perfect justice" as some other guy getting what everyone else deserves just a -bit- off the mark, lol.  

It is obvious from the context of the entire Bible that perfect justice does not entail everyone getting what they deserve. The only point that is abundantly clear is that a price has to be paid to restore a sinner to holiness. You are just applying your concept of justice to things you barely have a grasp of and then whining that God's justice does not align with yours. Oh well.

[The Grand Nudger]

You realize that you're not speaking to a person who uses the context of the bible to tell them anything about justice...right? I find that, when believers speak of some thing "x", it very often bears little or no relation to whatever I'm talking about when using that same term "x".

You do you, tiger. Just a commentary.

[Angrboda]

In a recent conversation with a theist, I asked what makes something 'perfect'.  Their response was that something is perfect if it is "maximally ideal for its intended purpose."  I see this as basically correct.  What makes something a perfect coffee maker would make that same thing a lousy microwave oven, and vice versa.  It seems that to be perfect, a thing must be in some relation to a purpose or an end or a goal such that it maximally fulfills that end.  But here we come upon a problem, because God doesn't have such.  There is no end or purpose or goal which is defined for God.  It would seem at first glance then, that the word simply doesn't apply to God.  If I had a nondescript object on my kitchen counter which had no purpose, what would it mean for me to say that it is 'perfect'?  The best that could be said is that I'm using the word 'perfect' as a superlative, like saying that something is 'super' or 'awesome'.  Yet theists continually assert that their God is 'perfect' and seem to want to mean something more by it than just a superlative, but what do they mean?  Some take the lazy way out and claim that God's perfectness applies to "everything" -- God has all possibilities in the maximal degree, but this is clearly incoherent.  An object which contained all perfections (whatever that means) would include perfect justice and perfect mercy. Since justice consists in giving people what they deserve, and mercy consists in giving people less than they deserve, the two can't be perfectly fulfilled at the same time.  So the 'everything' answer is ruled out.

So what do you mean when you say that God is 'perfect'?

For a something  to be described as 'perfect', I did say "maximally ideal for its intended purpose." You have very good examples of that above. 

I think for a someone, it simply won't work to discuss purpose. We don't say someone is 'perfect' period. We talk about components--ideal attributes, characteristics, abilities, etc. For example, a perfect husband, a perfect gentleman, a perfect friend, a perfect student, perfectly innocent, has perfect pitch, is perfect for the job. No human is perfect in all attributes, characteristics or abilities. 

It seems that you are suggesting that to be perfect, as a being, is to fulfill to the highest degree a standard or model of function, role, behavior, or being, and that such standards must be capable of failing to be met. This is fine as far as it goes, but it raises some more intriguing questions. One such question is what it means for a classless being to meet a standard. Since God is the only exemplar of his kind, it does not seem sensible to apply a standard permitting of degrees to a class which does not vary in degree. But a more important question is from where do the standards which God meets come from, and by that I am not speaking of human institutions, but the metaphysical question of what defines the desirable perfections which God meets? It makes no sense to suggest that God meets all standards for reasons already alluded to, so the question becomes what defines what are the desirable standards for God to meet? As with the Euthyphro dilemma, there is the question as to whether the standards for love and justice and so forth lie outside himself, or derive solely from God in and of himself. If they lie outside himself, then God becomes in some sense superfluous, as we can derive our standards for love and justice from this independent source. If they come from within God himself, then that makes them somewhat arbitrary and trivial. To say that God meets the standards he sets for a being such as himself makes God and his standards seem rather trite, and appealing to them as a standard we are obligated to follow seems peurile. (And the question of God's assigning our meaning and purpose, of his providing those things for us, becomes dependent on this arbitrarily derived set of values. God becomes just another being with a self-interested point of view. When evolution provides us with biases and values such as the desire for life, theists typically criticize this sourcing of our values, meaning, and purpose as being "arbitrary" and therefore meaningless. It's hard to see how a God who considers himself the best thing in the world, independent of any external standards, is any less arbitrary and meaningless.) As you will recall, the euthyphro dilemma was (allegedly) resolved by appealing to the perfection of God's moral nature. However, in this instance, such an appeal is futile as it occurs in the context of defining just what it would mean for God to be perfect, so appealing to God's perfection in this case would be an example of circular reasoning.

(ETA: It also raises the spectre of just what the deeper meaning of saying that God is, by nature, and necessarily, morally perfect is. If the standard of moral perfection is satisfied by God simply being what God happens to be, morally, then his morals indeed are metaphysically arbitrary, and appeals to the alleged 'perfection' of God's moral nature is again, reasoning in a circle. It makes little rational sense to justify God's morals by effectively saying that, "God is moral because his nature meets the standard of being what its own definition of what it means to be good happens to be.")

In the case of God we also talk about attributes. It just so happens that the attributes are all perfect (part of the definition of God) so it is handy and appropriate to say God is perfect. 

Ignoring for the moment the implications of your stance for divine simplicity, this really doesn't answer the question. You assert that whatever 'perfection' happens to be, then God has it. That really doesn't address the question of what perfection happens to be.

Regarding perfect justice and perfect mercy, I think there are two problems with your argument 

1. Justice is an application of objective standards so if applied without error, you can have perfect justice. But mercy is not the same thing. First, I don't think mercy is an essential attribute of God like justice or holiness is. I think rather that mercy flows from another essential attribute: Love. Second, as only a product of an essential attribute, it is qualified and limited by all the essential attributes (the nature of God) as well as his free will to make choices consistent with that nature.

Well, again, ignoring aseity, the complaint that perfect justice and perfect mercy could not be simultaneously met was asserted in the context of the hypothesis that God exhibits all possible perfections. Once you start picking and choosing which are necessary attributes of God and which are not, you've abandoned the context upon which the complaint was based. You can't consistently maintain that God exhibits all possible perfections and then assert that God has primary and secondary attributes. Beyond that, I'm sure other examples could easily be derived, such as Hammy's observation that God cannot be both perfectly good and perfectly evil. The main thrust is that if God has perfections, they are selective and not a consequence of God simply possessing "all the marbles."
 

2. When God shows mercy (like salvation), it is not instead of justice. Justice was satisfied--the price paid by Christ.

I think it's fairly reasonable to assert that many times in the old testament, God showed mercy toward the Israelites. God made trade-offs between mercy and justice when dealing with his people. While it might be argued that God does not dispense mercy "in place of" justice in the post-resurrection era, it's simply a fact that this was not always the case. So, no, I think you're wrong here.

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Good topic, Jor. I would have to refer back to Question 3 of the Summa Theologica, but as I recall Divine Perfection has more to do with completeness than anything else. God is perfect in the sense that He is complete in Himself in need of nothing outside Himself. I don't remember purpose, as in Final Cause, having anything to do with it so I don't want to go out on a limb.

Well, I think that mutatis mutandis, my reply to Steve could function adequately as a response to you with a few caveats. The first is that, in line with your response that it has to do with completeness, completeness seems equivalent to the standards discussed in my reply to Steve. If perfection consists in being in some sense 'complete', what is it that defines what it means to be whole and complete. [ETA: There are also mereological concerns as well.] I would suggest however that introducing the notion of completeness may introduce confusions. You suggest that his completeness consists in Him being essentially self sufficient in and of himself. I think you're alluding to aseity here, and I would have to say that I think introducing this form of self-sufficiency as a form of completeness which might be described as a perfection is in some sense introducing a concept that is alien to our intuitions about perfection and so amounts to essentially redefining perfection to be something that it is not. God's aseity, as much as I understand it, revolves around the question of God's dependence or independence in relation to things outside himself. (I realize it is much more, but this much seems fundamental.) We don't normally think of completeness or perfection as being a question of a things relationship toward other things. So I think the introduction of the idea that, "He is complete in Himself in need of nothing outside Himself," actually gets us off the path of perfection and onto a completely different topic. But I could be wrong. If you disagree, please explain how your notion of completeness as you presented it relates to our ordinary intuitions about perfection. (Possibly, too, one can be complete in the sense you describe without actually being 'perfect'. Maybe.....)

(ETA: And in line with my observations above, resolving the Euthyphro dilemma with reference to the notion of 'completeness' which you introduce here poses additional problems for the apologist looking for a defense of God's moral goodness.)

[Whateverist]

God sounds like a tool.

[Neo-Scholastic]

God sounds like a tool.

He does tend to fix things every now and then.