Arguments Against Thomistic philosophy

[Neo-Scholastic]

Sorry for being late to the party. As the resident Thomist (I think) I'd like to pick-up on the thread but it will take me some time to read through it. In the meantime, you might want to review this debate between two AF members from some time ago: WOOTERS vs. MENTIS

[Whateverist]

Sorry for being late to the party. As the resident Thomist (I think) I'd like to pick-up on the thread but it will take me some time to read through it. In the meantime, you might want to review this debate between two AF members from some time ago: WOOTERS vs. MENTIS

How close is this formation to the that which you defend, Neo?

I don't think it can specifically establish Christianity over any of the other monotheistic religions. Just that it can establish theism and thus refute atheism.

For the actual argument, it is basically:

1. Change involves a potential being actualized
2. A potential must be actualized by something already actual
3. Some things do not exist necessarily and require their potential for existence to be actualized
4. If the thing doing this actualizing has potentials, it would also require another actual thing to actualize it
5. Therefore the chain of actualization must conclude in some purely actual thing
6. Since this thing would be  purely actual it would be unchanging and eternal
7. There could only be one such being as there would be no unactualized potentials to differentiate one such being from another
8. Since it caused all non purely actual things it would be omnipotent
9. (EDIT Forgot to include.) Since all non purely actual things, including intelligent beings, came from this Pure Actuality, it would neccessarily be both intelligent, since a cause cannot give something it does not at least possess virtually, and all knowing since the attributes of all things flow from it
10. And that is basically the monotheistic God

This is very bare bones. The article I linked presents an alternative argument that gets to the same conclusion. If you are worried about bugs just Google "Edward Feser Avicenna" and it should be the first to come up.

If so I wonder if you can tell me why you think that an eternal, unchanging, unaffected and we might as well add unobservable 'something' is required as to account for everything that we can experience. Why must the undetectable precede the detectable? Also, why suppose an unaffectable can affect anything detectable?

Wouldn't it be simpler (and more modest) to say that current conditions are always preceded by necessary earlier states, and just not jump to the assumption that there ever was a blank slate to account for? One hears concerns regarding endless regressions but why then is a word such as "eternity" unproblematic?

[Mystic]

You ask good questions.

One problem with infinite effects is that by definition a chain of effects is an effect, and hence, even the infinite chain of effects asking for a cause.

And to make you realize, every single effect is saying it's not going to exist unless another cause effects it.

God is the living, he is the definition of life and existence by which all things get hues of existence from, there is no need of anything outside of himself causing him to exist, because he is eternal.

Now some people understanding the infinite chain problem and say well the first cause never came to be, always was, then changed to the universe. There is many problems with this. And I have shown it in the past.

1st if we go backwards, surely for it have changed to now, it would the first point of time. And if spans eternity (infinite absolute past and future), it makes no sense, it would become limited and finite but rather the first point of time like all points of time is a state of change in the universe. The first change like all others changes needs a cause.

In short the first moment of time didn't always exist. It came to be. The question is what caused it.

Both no first moment in time and first moment of time is eternal are both irrational.

Something beyond this universe and it's constant flux of change caused it.

And among the reasons no first moment of time makes no sense, is because you always have to go back to a point with time from a time, but you are saying there is no point to go back to.

God is not subject to time, but he constantly does create the present. Nothing but God and the present exists, past is gone, future is ahead.

Another way to look at this is if anything could cause an infinite chains of effects with no beginning and end, it's God. God cannot create past, present, and future all at the same time with no beginning and no end. Neither can he make it that the present is linked to an endless past set of events.

These are both impossible for God. There is first moment in time. Change doesn't go infinitely back.

Every effect is also saying, I won't come to be unless the effect next to me say I Will come to be, and so with this condition, none of them can come to be except if there is something that is, without that requirement.

That is the eternal life, the source of all things.

[Jehanne]

Hello,

I am a devout Catholic with an interest in philosophy. I am posting here in an attempt to find good articles/books/blogs that challenge my personal views. I personally see Thomism, especially as put forward by philosophers like Edward Feser, as the best method of rationally establishing Theism. However, I would like to challenge my personal views and see what others think. Do any of you know of any good replies to the traditional arguments for the existence of God? Especially as argued by Edward Feser in his books and posts such as this (http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/05/...gency.html) ?

Thank you for your time.

I am an ex-Catholic (see above); with the Catholic Church contradicting itself so much and so often, why do you take it and Catholicism seriously?

[Neo-Scholastic]

Let me first say that even Thomists disagree about exactly what Thomas Aquinas meant at every step of the way. This is not unusual. Kantians have internecine debates with other Kantians, as do existentialists, etc. I have had a chance to correspond with Feser about some finer points of his approach and have to say that I take issue with some finer points, such as the example he used (cup of water on a table) for the 2W.

1. Change involves a potential being actualized
2. A potential must be actualized by something already actual
3. Some things do not exist necessarily and require their potential for existence to be actualized
4. If the thing doing this actualizing has potentials, it would also require another actual thing to actualize it
5. Therefore the chain of actualization must conclude in some purely actual thing
6. Since this thing would be purely actual it would be unchanging and eternal
7. There could only be one such being as there would be no unactualized potentials to differentiate one such being from another
8. Since it caused all non purely actual things it would be omnipotent
9. (EDIT Forgot to include.) Since all non purely actual things, including intelligent beings, came from this Pure Actuality, it would neccessarily be both intelligent, since a cause cannot give something it does not at least possess virtually, and all knowing since the attributes of all things flow from it
10. And that is basically the monotheistic God

Okay, I will critique this formulation. I see a couple of interesting places where, I believe, he diverges significantly from Aquinas. For example, Feser appears to have blended discrete demonstrations by Aquinas into one demonstration. Line 3 belongs in the demonstration for a necessary being, not the unchanged changer. Line 7 isn’t in the 5W at all; it comes from Question 3 regarding the simplicity of God. For me, Line 9, doesn’t clearly follow any of the prior and seems, in some ways at odds with Aquinas in two important ways.

First, these demonstrations are not about attributes of God as such; but rather, His effects used in place of a definition. (Question 1, Article 7, Reply to Objection 1). So while we call God the ‘Prime Mover’ that is actually an effect of our God who is Himself incomprehensible. It’s a very subtle but important thing to keep in mind. Similarly, to say that God is intelligent is easily misunderstood since His intellect is completely unlike ours and we can ponder it only by comparing it with the deficiencies of our own.

Secondly, line 9 is also just restating a general principle of Scholasticism, i.e. that a thing cannot give what it does not have. While I agree with the principle, it takes a lot to unpack for people who are not familiar with what it’s all about. Throwing it into the mix seems more confusing than clarifying.
In Feser’s defense, I would say that Ways 1, 2, and 3 are very closely related and mutually supporting. I fully understand the impulse to make those connections explicit. Thomistic philosophy is much bigger than the 5 Ways and rests in an even bigger classical tradition. Often time the so-called refutation of one of the 5W is dispensed with in another or is dealt with elsewhere in the Summa.

Anyway, enough prologue…

I can only restate that a "prime mover" does not require the attibutes the faithful insist upon, and that no amount of positing a "first event" that then becomes the antecedent for all subsequent events is tantamount to your..or any, "god".

As noted earlier, the demonstrations of the 5Ws tacitly assume Aristotelian notions of causality (material, efficient, formal, and final). The common charge is that modern theories of causality have replaced them or at least rendered them irrelevant. That simply is not true. They are complimentary at best or at least parallel.
Khem’s objection 1W & 2W are based on the causal theory of Hume, i.e. that causality consists of temporal sequences of events that habitually one after the other. But none of the first 4 Ways have anything to do with time, only the 5W does, and then only incidentally to it.

Here's the thing: at best, Aquinas argues for a god

Yes and so what. Aquinas demonstrates the existence of to the extent it can be revealed by natural reason. For him, and for me, showing that a perfect correspondence exists between the nature of the God of the Philosophers and the God of Christian faith, as revealed by special revelation, is sufficient.

The 4th way, for example, is about the nature of degrees.  That, in order to be able to use qualitative statements, there must be some ultimate standard with which to compare to…But, why isn't the epitome of evil also god?  And, aren't a lot of qualities - including good and evil - subjective?  Yes, a circle has an area of pi*(r*r), but what is the perfect value of r?  What is the perfect line thickness/boundary for this circle?  Or color of the stroke

Basically, Kevin is arguing against the intelligibility of reality with a naïve understanding of Neo-Platonism. Then he throws out a bunch of red herrings – having a specific area is not essential to the perfection of circles, nor its color, etc. The whole notion of positive evil is just silly. It’s like saying there is a perfect kind of non-circle. There are an infinite number of ways to be a non-circle but only one way to be circular.

The 5th way seems to be about deriving purpose, and thus intelligence, from results.  The purpose of an acorn is to grow into an oak tree, not sea lion.  But what about emergent phenomena?  Why must intention be the cause of movement?  There are non-sentient causes all over the place... why must the first be different?

Not exactly. The 5W is about dispositional properties and positing a reason for the regularity of changes, e.g. when struck glass shatters instead of folding or turning into butterflies. Hume, from whom modern notions causality come, believed that nothing essentially links prior events to a subsequent ones. To me such a universe is an absurd cartoon universe that only has the appearance of order.

Well, for one, Aristotle thought that any movement (which he regarded as any change at all) requires a force. We now know that isn't true: motion thorugh space doesn't require a force--a *change* of direction or speed does.

Talk about straw man! Philosophy 101, my friend. The 1W has nothing to do with Newtonian physics. It’s about change.

As for contingency, a unicorn isn't something that 'possibly exists' but simply fails to do so. It is something that *doesn't* exist. There is no modifier on existence. Something either exists or not.[/i]

&

…change is just that: change. It isn't a 'potential' that is 'actualized', it is simply a change… Things either exist or they do not. A non-existent thing doens't have properties like potentiality.

It is quite possibly the case that unicorns cannot possibly exist in all possible worlds. Things either exist or they don’t. Sure. But both points are irrelevant.

The distinction between act and potency is necessary to resolve the dilemma between Parmenides and Heraclitus of how things can change while preserving their being. It’s difficult to argue that things don’t have a range of potentials into which they could change. An acorn has the potential to grow into a mature tree, but no potential to become a puppy. At the same time, the acorn is the same oak as the mature tree. It’s an actual thing manifesting its potential.

I don't believe in any First Cause or Prime Mover. I don't think anything was/is ultimately caused. Everything is just is.

Grandizer says it’s a brute fact so it must be…not. The principle of sufficient reason applies.

Anyways, that’s enough for today.

[The Grand Nudger]

Causal sequence should no be confused, at least in my objection...with temporal sequences in some general sense.  By "first cause" I only mean antecedent in the chain of causality, not in time.  We generally assume the two together...but it's not necessary. More an artifact of how we experience antecedent causes and temporal sequence than a binding treatise on some "first cause". I think that here even you would agree. If there were a god -or- a first cause, theres no reason to assume that it would experience or be bound by time as we are. The hypothetical higher dimensional being or cause could..from some general future, both view and effect itself as a cause in our temporal past.

My objection was far more simple than that. To whit...nothing at all about a first cause has anything to do, necessarily, with the god you or anyone else believes in. You believe in jehovah and jesus..not a nebulous first cause..or even a "god of the philosophers" - though it does sound awfully nice. The "God of the Philosophers", at least anymore....is not an A-T theology god. That your god has been defined, somehow, to explain this...does not mean that your god is actually the explanation..or that it shares anything more than a trivial semantic similarity with a first cause. None of the things that are important to you, about a god..even in the general, are synonymous with "antecendent A" or.. "the first cause".

[KevinM1]

You're right in that I don't know jack about Neo-Platonism.

That said, why are we assuming that things related to god are only positive. In other words, if there's an epitome of evil, why isn't it also associated with god? Why is there a distinction that says "well, the ur-version of these traits belong to, and point to, a god, but the ur-version of those traits do not?"

I'm sincerely asking, BTW. Because from the outside it makes no sense. It seems to be backwards. There's a definition of the Christian god, and among its attributes is goodness, and so because it is god, it must contain or exhibit the most goodness.

I'm also still not convinced that the 5th way is actually saying anything meaningful about intent. That a smashed piece of glass doesn't turn into butterflies doesn't mean that an intelligence made it so. Then again, like I freely admit, I'm probably not understanding what you or Aquinas are actually saying.

[GrandizerII]

I don't believe in any First Cause or Prime Mover. I don't think anything was/is ultimately caused. Everything is just is.

Grandizer says it’s a brute fact so it must be…not. The principle of sufficient reason applies.

Anyways, that’s enough for today.

Thats your rebuttal? If a logical cosmos is necessary, then it exists necessarily. You argue the same about God. And you keep bringing up the principle of sufficient reason as if thats not debatable, and as if my proposition violates it in a way that your God does not.

[The Grand Nudger]

You're right in that I don't know jack about Neo-Platonism.

That said, why are we assuming that things related to god are only positive.  In other words, if there's an epitome of evil, why isn't it also associated with god?  Why is there a distinction that says "well, the ur-version of these traits belong to, and point to, a god, but the ur-version of those traits do not?"

I'm sincerely asking, BTW.  Because from the outside it makes no sense.  It seems to be backwards.  There's a definition of the Christian god, and among its attributes is goodness, and so because it is god, it must contain or exhibit the most goodness.

I'm also still not convinced that the 5th way is actually saying anything meaningful about intent.  That a smashed piece of glass doesn't turn into butterflies doesn't mean that an intelligence made it so.  Then again, like I freely admit, I'm probably not understanding what you or Aquinas are actually saying.

You know...that's a good question..I'll let Neo handle the response from A-T...but...from a modal standpoint, if the maximally great premise holds then so too would the maximally evil.  This..however, is an argument for polytheism, not an objection to theism. You could repeat this for the maximally -anything-. Talk about a plurality of the divine. It would hold, ofc, for maximally great islands and maximally great bikinis as well......but...I think you might be able to find both of those things in the same place.

[KevinM1]

You're right in that I don't know jack about Neo-Platonism.

That said, why are we assuming that things related to god are only positive.  In other words, if there's an epitome of evil, why isn't it also associated with god?  Why is there a distinction that says "well, the ur-version of these traits belong to, and point to, a god, but the ur-version of those traits do not?"

I'm sincerely asking, BTW.  Because from the outside it makes no sense.  It seems to be backwards.  There's a definition of the Christian god, and among its attributes is goodness, and so because it is god, it must contain or exhibit the most goodness.

I'm also still not convinced that the 5th way is actually saying anything meaningful about intent.  That a smashed piece of glass doesn't turn into butterflies doesn't mean that an intelligence made it so.  Then again, like I freely admit, I'm probably not understanding what you or Aquinas are actually saying.

You know...that's a good question..I'll let Neo handle the response from A-T...but...from a modal standpoint, if the maximally great premise holds then so too would the maximally evil.  This..however, is an argument for polytheism, not an objection to theism. You could repeat this for the maximally -anything-.  Talk about a plurality of the divine.  It would hold, ofc, for maximally great islands and maximally great bikinis as well......but...I think you might be able to find both of those things in the same place.

(Bolding mine)

And isn't that one of the classic problems with the good 'ole "maximally great" ontological argument? You know, the one Randy (I think it was Randy... the dude with the bee avatar) used to trot out every week?

Because, without relying on the biblical definition of god, I can claim that maximal evil also points to such a creature. Same with maximal lust, or greed, or anything else, for that matter. Especially if the being is the Prime Mover (like you imply, we could be dealing with a class of entities that are themselves Prime Movers). That god can only be or exhibit good is begging the question. We're right back down to god is good because the bible says it is.