Philosophical zombies

[rskovride]

Is his argument about conceivability = possible a popular one? Are there no examples of things I can conseive that could not possibly exist?

[purplepurpose]

It struct me recently that "time is money", because I really need it right now. I feel like I have no time for non productive chatter.

What is it with you coming into threads just to say, “your thread is stupid”?  If time is money, why did you waste yours by commenting in a post you have no interest participating in?

That phrase helps me to focus partially when I get distracted by pointless thoughts. Just wanted to share my thoughts.

[Edwardo Piet]

The hard problem of consciousness is the fact that philosophical zombies are indeed very possible, and our brain didn't need to produce consciousness in order to produce intelligent and well functioning beings that respond to threats and rewards as if they were conscious. "Why is anyone conscious at all?" is the hard problem of consciousness.

Dennett side steps this by saying that P-Zeds aren't possible. And he is wrong because he never actually addresses consciousness.

I think his multiple drafts theory and the notion that consciousness is fame in the brain makes sense. But to then say that it all makes sense from a third person perspective, and that there is no first person perspective, and that consciousness is an illusion, and philosophical zombies are impossible.... none of that makes any sense.

If consciousness is just the workings of the brain (as I believe they are) then the consciousness we experience from the first person perspective is those workings of the brain from our first person perspective. That qualia is very real, and in fact it's the only thing we know for sure to be real..... we can't know for certain that when we investigate the brain scientifically that investigation isn't as unreal as the rest of reality. But even if reality is an illusion the fact we are experiencing that illusion is NOT an illusion. Phenomena are the only things in the universe that we know for sure are real, it's objective reality that there is a possibility of not existing. Science itself, after all, studies phenomena. The third person perspective may be an illusion.... but the first person isn't. So he has theories about how the brain works that I agree with.... but then he concludes a complete non-sequitur from it and talks a load of spooky nonsense like "we're all zombies" and "consciousness is an illusion."

Actually, none of us who are conscious are zombies. Because zombies aren't conscious. And consciousness isn't an illusion.... because seeming to seem... is seeming.

Dennett argues that things merely seem to seem and don't really seem. And that... makes no sense whatsoever.

[Neo-Scholastic]

So if physicalism/monism is true, philosophical zombies cannot exist ... or we are all philosophical zombies....
If spiritualism/dualism is true, philosophical zombies can exist.

There are a few other alternatives in-between, from epiphenomenalism to dual-aspect.

(Interestingly, the mind-body problem only exists in modern analytic philosophy. In Scholasticism it's a non-issue.)

[The Grand Nudger]

I think, Rob..that you may be more dissatisfied with the sort of consciousness dennet describes than disagreeing with him, fundamentally.  I actually think that happens alot with dennet and multiple drafts.

[Edwardo Piet]

"The sort of consciousness Dennett describes".... isn't consciousness. That's the problem.

Now I'm not saying that consciousness isn't multiple drafts or isn't the fame in the brain. I think it is. I think that's the part where he actually makes sense.

But when he talks of consciousness being an illusion and us being zombies... that makes no sense whatosever. Zombies aren't conscious, we are conscious. Consciousness is first person, not third person. Consciousness can't be an illusion because seeming to seem is seeming.... and he pretends like there isn't really any seeming to us it just seems like there is. Which makes absolute zero sense. For something to seem to seem to us seeming has to exist!

And the irony of it all is that the entirety of science is dependent on the reality of consciousness and science ultimately only ever studies the conscious experience of reality and not reality itself. And yet he calls the very experience that scientists have when they study the reality he gets all his evidence from 'an illusion'. If consciousness is an illusion then reality as we know it is an illusion. They key part being as we know it.

He redefines free will and he redefines consciousness. He very much engages what Kant correctly called a "wretched subterfuge". He's good at talking about facts.... now he just needs to use those facts to actually address what he's supposed to be talking about... and draw correct conclusions rather than non-sequiturs. And if he can't do that, he needs to stop pretending he can.

And philosophical zombies are very possible... but we are NOT zombies. And THE only thing we know 100% for an absolute fact besides tautologies is: We are not zombies. Other people might be zombies.... but each of us who is conscious, knows that they are conscious.

---

So if physicalism/monism is true, philosophical zombies cannot exist ... or we are all philosophical zombies.

Physicalism and monism are both true. Philosophical zombies very much can exist... and we can't possibly be zombies. That is, I know I can't at least. And if you are conscious you know you can't be a zombie either. Perhaps other people are zombies, but it's a long shot right?

But yes, they are very possible. Consciousness is a useless epiphenomenon that need not have evolved.

[Amarok]

Were over this again 

What's next another thread about morality will pop up .

[robvalue]

Is his argument about conceivability = possible a popular one?  Are there no examples of things I can conseive that could not possibly exist?

It seemed to be a rather empty argument to me, too. When you're dealing with facts about the state of reality right now, "possible" is irrelevant. Something exists, or is true, if and only if it's possible that it exists / is true. Possible is only relevant with regard to future events.

He just seemed to be saying that if something isn't internally inconsistent then we can't rule it out; or that if something hasn't been shown to be impossible, then... it can't be discounted as possible. That just sounds like a pointless tautology to me. I don't see how we can learn anything through that. A "square circle" is an abstract concept anyway, and one we say is impossible by our definitions. We also haven't learnt anything about reality by noting that. What we're really saying there is that something we identify as a circle, we wouldn't also identify as a square. But even then, that depends on the geometry we're using. In topology, they are the same.

[Edwardo Piet]

Philosophical zombies are possible because it's possible that a being could behave conscious without being conscious.

There could be alien species out there that are as advanced or even more advanced than us.... but who aren't conscious. We are simultaneously lucky and unlucky that our brain feels pain and pleasure and doesn't just react as if we feel it... but there's no reason to believe that evolution had to take the path of consciousness.

It's not just that philosophical zombies are possible... it's that we're not zombies, but we easily could have been. They are VERY possible.

The "either we're all zombies or zombies are impossible" thing is just completely backwards and couldn't be more wrong. Us all being zombies isn't no different to none of us being zombies, it is a huge difference. It's the difference between the lights being off and on.

The truth is we're not zombies, but we could have been, and there could be lifeforms out there that are indeed zombies, and yet have all the intelligence that we do.

[robvalue]

I find it rather ironic that the only thing any of us could ever know for sure, that we're having an experience, is the one thing we can never ever demonstrate to anyone else. That makes me suspicious of the whole thing.

I had a weird idea before that consciousness is reality experiencing itself, somehow. The experience is everywhere and simultaneous, but it feels individual to any particular point of reference. It's compartmentalised, somehow. That's just nuts, I know. But it makes as much sense as anything else at this point.