Philosophical zombies

[Edwardo Piet]

But there is clearly a sense in which a p-zombie *would* know a great deal. They would be able to recall facts. They would be able to relate 'experiences'. They would be able to go on and on about how beautiful a painting is. They would be able to talk coherently about consciousness, etc.

None of that is relevant. Again, whether they're conscious or not is whether they have a first person perspective. Whether they have qualia. The fact that they can behave like a conscious person from the third person perspective (from other people's perspectives) is wholly irrelevant.

Someone could act and behave exactly like a conscious person.... and not be conscious at all. And we'd have no way of telling the difference. If you don't think that's me saying that P-Zeds are possible then I don't know what you think I'm saying. Yes their brains would be slightly different, but no we would not be able to tell because all brains are slightly different and we don't have any way of testing who is and isn't conscious.

They would act *in every way* as if they were conscious, including long discussions about consciousness where they insist they are conscious!

Yes. And this is not impossible. And no, they don't have to have identical brains. Does that make them not P-zeds? Okay, fair enough. But then.... P-zeds aren't possible but people who aren't conscious but seem like normal conscious people to everyone else are still possible. And I think they're equally as interesting as P-zeds, for the exact same reasons, except without the stupid non-physicalism.

So, it is clear (to me) that a physically identical zombie that acts in *every* way the same as a conscious person is, in fact, conscious. They have an internal state. They know and feel.

Yes. Physical brains produce consciousness.... so if you have two physically identical people... either they're both conscious or they're both unconscious. One can't be conscious and the other not be.

However, it is possible for two almost identical people to be identical in every way except the parts of the brain that makes them conscious. So you have one person who is conscious and the other who isn't, and science isn't able to tell which one is conscious and which one isn't because they behave exactly the same and science has no idea which parts of the brain is producing consciousness, so although their brains are different... one is a P-Zed and the other isn't and science has no idea which is which. This is still a hard problem of a kind, as far as I am concerned.

You are missing the point by allowing for the consciousness center of their brain to be removed. That is CERTAINLY not allowed for a p-zombie. The whole point is that they are physically identical in every way and they don't have consciousness. The question is whether *that* is possible.

No, you are missing the point because there is no consciousness center. And the whole reason P-zeds are interesting is because the notion of a normal healthy human being who functions exactly like a normal conscious person, but isn't conscious, and science can't tell the difference.... that is interesting and a hard problem. If their brains were slightly different and it's accepted that non-physicalism and dualism is of course retarded... that doesn't make the interestingness of P-zeds or the hard problem go away.

The fact you could have two people with almost identical brains and one is conscious and the other isn't and science can't tell the difference.... is a hard problem. And the one that isn't conscious, if you wouldn't call them a P-zed just because their brain wasn't identical to the other, what would you call them?

The hard problem exists and people who seem conscious to other people but aren't are still possible... all without the stupid non-physicalism part that isn't worth debating anyway. You may as well be debating about whether an imaginary friend who created the universe exists. Which I think everyone should rightfully grow rather tired of because either you're logical enough to at least eventually realize supernaturalism is bullshit or you're not.

[The Grand Nudger]

No, you are missing the point because there is no consciousness center.

-and yet that's how consciousness seems...to us.

[Edwardo Piet]

No, you are missing the point because there is no consciousness center.

-and yet that's how consciousness seems...to us.

No it isn't. That's the user illusion.

It seems to us that we are conscious... and we are.

Dennett seems to think that because we're mistaken about the nature of our consciousness we're mistaken about the fact we know we're conscious at all. And he can't seem to tell the difference.

You can say what you like about the workings of X, but how X works is different to if X is.

[polymath257]

But there is clearly a sense in which a p-zombie *would* know a great deal. They would be able to recall facts. They would be able to relate 'experiences'. They would be able to go on and on about how beautiful a painting is. They would be able to talk coherently about consciousness, etc.

None of that is relevant. Again, whether they're conscious or not is whether they have a first person perspective. Whether they have qualia. The fact that they can behave like a conscious person from the third person perspective (from other people's perspectives) is wholly irrelevant.

Someone could act and behave exactly like a conscious person.... and not be conscious at all. And we'd have no way of telling the difference. If you don't think that's me saying that P-Zeds are possible then I don't know what you think I'm saying. Yes their brains would be slightly different, but no we would not be able to tell because all brains are slightly different and we don't have any way of testing who is and isn't conscious.

Yes, I get that. But what I am saying is if they can relate 'experiences' and 'feelings' with coherency, then it is clear they *do* have 'experiences' and 'feelings', otherwise what would elicit those responses?

If they are reacting *exactly* the same, that is sufficient evidence of an internal state. In fact, there is nothing that could elicit a consistently coherent set of responses to questions of consciousness except for consciousness itself. Without an internal state, they wouldn't respond as if they had one.

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-and yet that's how consciousness seems...to us.

No it isn't. That's the user illusion.

It seems to us that we are conscious... and we are.

Dennett seems to think that because we're mistaken about the nature of our consciousness we're mistaken about the fact we know we're conscious at all. And he can't seem to tell the difference.

You can say what you like about the workings of X, but how X works is different to if X is.

And it clearly seems to a zombie that it is conscious, so it is.

[Edwardo Piet]

Yes, I get that. But what I am saying is if they can relate 'experiences' and 'feelings' with coherency, then it is clear they *do* have 'experiences' and 'feelings', otherwise what would elicit those responses?

Well not consciousness.

Remember, I said I am an epiphenomenalist. So asking me that question doesn't make a lot of sense. Consciousness doesn't do anything. Which is exactly why P-Zeds are possible.

If they are reacting *exactly* the same, that is sufficient evidence of an internal state. In fact, there is nothing that could elicit a consistently coherent set of responses to questions of consciousness except for consciousness itself. Without an internal state, they wouldn't respond as if they had one.

It's evidence of an internal brain state, and a complex one yes. But it's not evidence of a conscious one.

And it clearly seems to a zombie that it is conscious, so it is.

A conscious P-zed is an oxymoron like a square-circle.

Conscious people know they are conscious/aware because being aware is being aware of awareness. Being conscious is being conscious of consciousness.

There is no seeming to a p-zed. The fact a p-zed seems conscious to other conscious people... doesn't mean anything seems anything to the P-zed. Come on, you'll have to do better than that.

[The Grand Nudger]

-and yet that's how consciousness seems...to us.

No it isn't. That's the user illusion.

.......and -that's- exactly what dennet was referring to when he described the illusory nature of consciousness.  See how easy it is to clear that all up?

It seems to us that we are conscious... and we are.

Unless, ofc, the way you are using the term is to conform to some traditional view that asserts the accuracy of the user illusion.  Then we aren't..by that description, but not because nothing's going on..because the description was wrong.  

Dennett seems to think that because we're mistaken about the nature of our consciousness we're mistaken about the fact we know we're conscious at all. And he can't seem to tell the difference.

That's your misconception, it's a common one, read his footnote.  He thinks that we are not conscious in the way that we think we are, or the way that we have traditionally described ourselves to be.  

You can say what you like about the workings of X, but how X works is different to if X is.

And how x works is also..often, different from how x seems.  He..again, is trying to explain how consciousness works.  That strongly implies that he thinks it's a thing that needs explaining..don't you think?

[polymath257]

Yes, I get that. But what I am saying is if they can relate 'experiences' and 'feelings' with coherency, then it is clear they *do* have 'experiences' and 'feelings', otherwise what would elicit those responses?

Well not consciousness.

Remember, I said I am an epiphenomenalist. So asking me that question doesn't make a lot of sense. Consciousness doesn't do anything. Which is exactly why P-Zeds are possible.

If they are reacting *exactly* the same, that is sufficient evidence of an internal state. In fact, there is nothing that could elicit a consistently coherent set of responses to questions of consciousness except for consciousness itself. Without an internal state, they wouldn't respond as if they had one.

It's evidence of an internal brain state, and a complex one yes. But it's not evidence of a conscious one.

And it clearly seems to a zombie that it is conscious, so it is.

A conscious P-zed is an oxymoron like a square-circle.

Conscious people know they are conscious/aware because being aware is being aware of awareness. Being conscious is being conscious of consciousness.

There is no seeming to a p-zed. The fact a p-zed seems conscious to other conscious people... doesn't mean anything seems anything to the P-zed. Come on, you'll have to do better than that.

OK, I think we just disagree here. It seems clear to me that this level of complexity is the same as having an internal state that is conscious. They would have *seeming*.

That p-zombies would then be conscious is a proof of their impossibility.

[The Grand Nudger]

@ The above...do you really think that your being an epiphenomenalist makes p-zeds possible, Ham...is that how that works, lol? 

[robvalue]

Interesting discussion, thanks guys! I'll add more thoughts if they come to me.

It still seems to me that finding a difference between two physically identical things requires some form of dualism.

[Edwardo Piet]

No it isn't. That's the user illusion.

.......and -that's- exactly what dennet was referring to when he described the illusory nature of consciousness.  See how easy it is to clear that all up?

My point is the user illusion does NOT make consciousness itself an illusion. And he can't tell the difference.

Unless, ofc, the way you are using the term is to conform to some traditional view that asserts the accuracy of the user illusion.

No, unless NOTHING. It seems to us that we are conscious and we are because the seeming is consciousness.

Dennett can make up a new definition if he likes, but it doesn't magically erase the known truth of the original definition. The truth of our own consciousness is more certainly known to our conscious self than any fact in science could even come close to. You can't even have science studying anything without consciousness! Science studies phenomena!

  Then we aren't..by that description, but not because nothing's going on..because the description was wrong. 

You and Dennett are very very confused.

For the trillionth time, the fact that what appears to be the case to us is not how it is doesn't make the fact that something appears to us false! That's insane!

That's your misconception, it's a common one, read his footnote.  He thinks that we are not conscious in the way that we think we are, or the way that we have traditionally described ourselves to be. 

No, no NO. He never even fucking addresses consciousness and that's the problem. He makes the exact same mistake with free will, and he's already said he takes the same approach in both cases. And that approach is to try and deal with problems by not even bothering to address them.

His approach is to notice the nonexistence of free will and the inability of science to explain consciousness and to try and solve that by saying "free will exists it just isn't what you think it is" and "consciousness can be explained... because it isn't what you think it is."

And he's said he's made a career out of that. Yes he's made a career out of failing to address things.

If you still fail to see how silly his approach is notice how it's completely analagous with pantheism.

He's unable to explain consciousness, so he redefines it into something that science can test. That doesn't solve or achieve ANYTHING. He's just playing word games. It's like attempting to prove God exists by saying "God exists it's just that God is the universe." He's as silly as pantheism.

And how x works is also..often, different from how x seems.  He..again, is trying to explain how consciousness works.  That strongly implies that he thinks it's a thing that needs explaining..don't you think?

He CLAIMS to be explaining consciousness but by redefining X you are no longer addressing X and that's just a fact.

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@ The above...do you really think that your being an epiphenomenalist makes p-zeds possible, Ham...is that how that works, lol? 

No because that's not what I claimed now is it?

I'm starting to realize why Mathilda put you on ignore... it's because you strawman people so much.

And the fact you got voted the best debater is rather hilarious. You're one of the most illogical and unskilled debaters on AF.

---

OK, I think we just disagree here. It seems clear to me that this level of complexity is the same as having an internal state that is conscious. They would have *seeming*.

That p-zombies would then be conscious is a proof of their impossibility.

And I don't see what information processing has got to do with it. Like I said, we don't know what it is that makes matter conscious. And we should stop pretending to know. We know we're conscious, and we can use inductive reasoning to believe that apes and primates and mammals that are closely related to us are perhaps conscious to a lesser and lesser extent the further we go back through our evolution, but we can't know what it is about us that makes us conscious or why. We know it lies somehwere in the brain, but there's no reason to believe it's "information processing" or that if you get a super computer that's super enough and can process enough information it suddenly has qualia lol.

P-zombies can't be conscious.

The only interesting sense of a P-Zed is a person who is unconscious but science has no way of telling.

Like I said, if you get two people who are identical twins except each of their brains are slightly different, and one of them has a conscious brain and the other doesn't... and science is unable to tell which is conscious and which isn't.... then you still have a hard problem of consciousness and you still have a P-zed in the way that P-zeds are actually interesting. They're unconscious beings that we are unable to tell are unconscious. If you want to go ahead and say they're not P-zeds just because their brains aren't physically identical, then fine they're not P-zeds. But I can then deem them pseudo-P-zeds and their pseudoness doesn't even matter because they're interesting for the exact same reason that a P-zed would be, except without the stupid dualism or non-physicalism. Obviously physicalism is true so obviously if you get a brain that is indentical to another brain physically either they're both conscious or both not. That is all obvious and uninteresting. The interesting part is that there's no reason to believe consciousness is anything more than an epiphenomenon and thus... it's very possible to conceive of two people who behave and act exactly the same way but one of their brains is only slightly different so as to remove them of consciousness.... and yet science is unable to tell which is which. Beings that behave exactly the same way despite no consciousness ARE possible, and if a being that looks and acts conscious but isn't and we can't tell they're not conscious isn't classified as a zombie... then I don't know what the hell you would classify them as. Consciousness doesn't appear to actually do anything or have any function, and that does make the possibility of zombies in the sense I described interesting.