Philosophical zombies

[WinterHold]

In what way is a zombie really different though? This seems to me to be a difference without a distinction. Defining what an "experience" is, seems to be hugely problematic. I have no way of telling, for example, that anyone has any experiences other than me. I ponder the idea of what it even means for me to have an experience.

I would point my sight at the [1) results 2) conditions] if I want to compare experiences.
An experience is nothing but the amount of time you spent at doing something.
-If I analyze the results alone; then I'm judging the quality of the experience (or time spent doing that thing in question).
-If I analyze the conditions alone; then I'm judging the justification of the experience's quality.
As for zombies; they can't generate proper results because the conditions fail them every time; but they are the cause of this failure. In other words; they corrupt their own minds by their own hands.
We are all equal; but the conditions around the experience's generation lead to different results, one of the results is the doomed zombie state.

[bennyboy]

There are a lot of differences between me and between an Android. 

Sure, but the p-zombie proposition is explicitly designed to refer to just one, regardless of it;s ability to cogently comment upon it.  I propose that there are alot of differences between you and I as well.  Between both of us and an android, and between both of us, an android, and some other species of biological intelligence.  We likely agree on each item.  Different things are, well..different.  That's part of what makes the p zombie prop a cognitive trap.  It proposes a difference...with no difference.

It proposes no discernible difference. Unless we know what causes any material system to have subjective experience, then we cannot say whether an indiscernible difference may be responsible for one system having full experience of qualia, and another seeming to.

You can either know that or not..but if you cannot know that, then you cannot know that your own consciousness isn't "just complex programming" to make so and so appear so and so..either.  Because it;s a problem for your criteria of knowledge, it is a problem for all relevant categories of knowledge equally, or none equally.  I can appreciate where you'rte coming from, but, I extend a certain criteria to human beings day in and day out.  It wopuld make very little sense for me to come up with some other criteria for extension just because the hand I'm shaking is made of carbon fiber.  I doubt I'll see it in my lifetime, I hope my children do.  It's a lonely universe, after all, eh?

No, it's a fair philosophical question. I suspect than in maybe 100 years, this question could be taken quite seriously.

---

Absolutely not, unless you define "self-aware" in those terms.

But the problem is this: I have a particular type of self-awareness that allows me to know what it feels like to watch a sunset or to drink a cup of hot chocolate.  I do not believe this to be the same as a robot that can determine the chemical composition of fluids it has taken in and then verbalizing that composition.

Unless, that is, the Universe is panpsychic.  Then it's all bets off.

We aren’t talking about robots or machines though.  In this hypothetical we’re talking about humans; humans who are biologically identical; indiscernible from any other human walking the earth.  I can say with a reasonable degree of certainty that I am able to recognize consciousness in a human being.  If that human tells me about the awe he feels when watching a sunset, or how hot cocoa just isn’t the same with out those tiny, smushy marshmallows, because that’s how his mom used to make it, then that person is conscious.  Yeah, robots can mimic consciousness, but AI is not the subject of the p-zombie thought experiment.  Am I missing something here?

If it can't experience subjectively, is it human at all?

I think what we need is a litmus test-- by what criteria can a given system, human or otherwise, be determined to have the capacity for true subjective awareness rather than the mimicry of it?

Right now, I have solipsism and then some "pragmatic philosophical assumption"-- i.e. that I think other people are conscious without knowing why I think so.  It is, bluntly, a feeling.  But we are about to have our instincts completely tricked by machines of our own making: androids may soon make us laugh or cry, or have personality quirks that we find endearing. Where then are my pragmatic assumptions?  Should I hold to them still, saying "I know that the Camustron-2100 model is real, simply because she seems so"?

[polymath257]

I don't subscribe to the idea that "robots can't be conscious". I think that any scientific definition for what it means for an entity to be conscious could apply to a robot, in theory. The only way it couldn't is to insist that it's some purely organic phenomenon. I don't know why there is a need to do that, but if you do so, then of course robots "can't be conscious"; but you haven't actually said anything.

I think it's more of an emotional reaction/argument, personally.

Emotions? What emotions? I haven't seen emotions on display here.

[The Grand Nudger]

It proposes no discernible difference.  Unless we know what causes any material system to have subjective experience, then we cannot say whether an indiscernible difference may be responsible for one system having full experience of qualia, and another seeming to.

If there is no discernible difference between them then we are not justified in asserting there is a difference between them in the first place, making the question moot.  

No, it's a fair philosophical question.  I suspect than in maybe 100 years, this question could be taken quite seriously.

Sure, I didn't say it wasn't a fair question..just that it's not a question fundamentally limited to consciousness.  You're circumscribing what knowledge you can possess - that will extend to other things not related to consciousness.  

Wouldn't it be ironic if, in 100 years..we decide that no "just programming" life form or machine will be considered conscious or have rights in response to the rise of smart machines...but that this criteria then get's leveraged against societal undesirables who fail to properly express metric satisfying levels of activity which designate them as "just programming" non-persons?

[Angrboda]

His inner-fundamentalist is peeking through.

Says someone who doesn't understand modal logic. But then, you're in good company... Khem doesn't understand it either.

Just so ya know, hyperbole and capslock doesn't equate fundamentalism. I thought maybe if I make the text real big some of it will actually go into his dense little brain. All he fucking does is strawman people.

lol.

[bennyboy]

It proposes no discernible difference.  Unless we know what causes any material system to have subjective experience, then we cannot say whether an indiscernible difference may be responsible for one system having full experience of qualia, and another seeming to.

If there is no discernible difference between them then we are not justified in asserting there is a difference between them in the first place, making the question moot.  

This is the problem with solipsism vs. pragmatic assumption with regard to consciousness. I believe I have an instinct, that if another person behaves in certain ways, I think they are also aware in the same way I am. But looking at the behavior of infants, I'm not 100% even this is an instinct.

No, it's a fair philosophical question.  I suspect than in maybe 100 years, this question could be taken quite seriously.

Sure, I didn't say it wasn't a fair question..just that it's not a question fundamentally limited to consciousness.  You're circumscribing what knowledge you can possess - that will extend to other things not related to consciousness.  

Wouldn't it be ironic if, in 100 years..we decide that no "just programming" life form or machine will be considered conscious or have rights in response to the rise of smart machines...but that this criteria then get's leveraged against societal undesirables who fail to properly express metric satisfying levels of activity which designate them as "just programming" non-persons?

"Your kid is on the Android spectrum.  He shouldn't be in my precious daughter's class."

Yeah, can't see that one coming, hey?

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CONSCIOUSNESS IS FUCKING CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE. PERIOD. EXPLAINING THAT CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE DOESN'T WORK HOW WE THINK IT DOES DOESN'T MEAN THAT CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE IS NOT THE CORRECT FUCKING DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS. IF YOU ADDRESS SOMETHING OTHER THAN CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE YOU'RE NOT FUCKING ADDRESSING CONSCIOUSNESS. PERIOD. NUMBNUTS.

I think you're on the Android spectrum. I don't want you communicating with us normal people in these here forums anymore. You're just using all-caps and insults to make us think you're an obnoxious human teen, rather than a cool-minded, carefully calculating Android.

[The Grand Nudger]

This is the problem with solipsism vs. pragmatic assumption with regard to consciousness.  I believe I have an instinct, that if another person behaves in certain ways, I think they are also aware in the same way I am.  But looking at the behavior of infants, I'm not 100% even this is an instinct.

Solipsism is either a problem or it is not.  Either knowledge is accessible or it is not.  This has nothing..specifically, to do with whether or not you have an instinct.

For what it's worth, I'm sure we both have many.  They may not be what we think they are, they may not be what they report themselves as, but we could certainly tease some meaningful description of what an instinct was that could allow for a broad range of underlying fundamental truths...if ofc, there were such a thing and it were accessible.

I'd love to see how you calculated your percentage of knowledge. Got math?

Seriously though, I've always wondered how that;s quantified. Is the possibility that you don;t know 1 thing 1% uncertainty? Would the possibility of not knowing ten things be 10% uncertainty? Is it possible that one hundred unknown things are irrelevant to the matter at hand, and so would present 0% uncertainty if discovered? Could it be that not knowing 200 things could only amount to 1% uncertainty if they were discovered? Is there any knowledge you -would- considere 100%..and if there is not, does it then make sense to require that anything called knowledge possess an attribute that no thing called knowledge possesses? What sort of objection would it be to state that this knowledge a is entirely similar to this other piece of knowledge b in the percent of knowledge, but I find that reason to doubt it while affirming the other; a being some undefined x and b being the sun rising?

"Your kid is on the Android spectrum.  He shouldn't be in my precious daughter's class."

Yeah, can't see that one coming, hey?

"Meaningfully Conscious Persons Only" water fountains anyone?

[Amarok]

Solipsism  is self refuting

[The Grand Nudger]

Well, whether or not it is, a solipsist and a "pragmatist" can still hold an intelligible discussion on some item x.  We can allow that, fundamentally, some item of knowledge may be inaccessible.  That may be true.  They can allow that, were they to accept the underlying axiom of all rational thought..they ,ay have no specific objection to any given item of knowledge x on it's own grounds.  

Neither of us should have trouble understanding each other, and hey..if knowledge is inaccessible and informed opinions are the highest achievable standard..we still have something to talk about don't we?  We've changed nothing regarding the discussion of any specific item. Pretty much just jogging in place.

[robvalue]

I don't subscribe to the idea that "robots can't be conscious". I think that any scientific definition for what it means for an entity to be conscious could apply to a robot, in theory. The only way it couldn't is to insist that it's some purely organic phenomenon. I don't know why there is a need to do that, but if you do so, then of course robots "can't be conscious"; but you haven't actually said anything.

I think it's more of an emotional reaction/argument, personally.

Emotions? What emotions? I haven't seen emotions on display here.

I wasn't referring to people in this thread specifically. I meant the fact that most people will deny point-blank that robots can be conscious, and I think this is because they find the idea uncomfortable. That's just my opinion.

---

In what way is a zombie really different though? This seems to me to be a difference without a distinction. Defining what an "experience" is, seems to be hugely problematic. I have no way of telling, for example, that anyone has any experiences other than me. I ponder the idea of what it even means for me to have an experience.

I would point my sight at the [1) results 2) conditions] if I want to compare experiences.
An experience is nothing but the amount of time you spent at doing something.
-If I analyze the results alone; then I'm judging the quality of the experience (or time spent doing that thing in question).
-If I analyze the conditions alone; then I'm judging the justification of the experience's quality.
As for zombies; they can't generate proper results because the conditions fail them every time; but they are the cause of this failure. In other words; they corrupt their own minds by their own hands.
We are all equal; but the conditions around the experience's generation lead to different results, one of the results is the doomed zombie state.

If you have a zombie and a non-zombie in front of you, how do you tell which is which? To know that "corruption" has gone on, you'd have to know how a person is supposed to be acting before the corruption.