History thread [split] from "New Rule - Promoting Terrorism"

[The Grand Nudger]

Gen. Anami didn't think the first bomb was as bad as reports said. His second in command had to visit both cities and report back before he understood what a "rain of ruin" really meant. One plane, one bomb, one city. 

I read a great account of the first bombing put together by interviews with japanese first responders.  I'll see if I can track it down for the thread.  No one could really accept that a single bomb had caused that much devastation.  Absolute communication blackout contributed to what amounted to mass confusion.  The world had ended in the blast zone and no one (there) knew exactly how it had happened, or how it even could happen. The first report sent...was that a fuel car had exploded. It seems strange, but this was at the fringe of the em pulse. People came in from aide stations out in the rural sticks to help with what they thought would be an industrial fire.

[Gawdzilla Sama]

We could have dropped two more bombs on Japan in the next few weeks, and then the production schedule called for three a month after that. If they weren't needed for tactical use (meaning no invasion at that time) they could have been used strategically.

The Japanese estimate of US resources from their own War Production Office was that we could produce seventy-four times the material Japan could produce. The head of the office was advised that he could be assassinated for "defeatist talk."

And yes, "Yamato", the spirit of Japan was the end-all and be-all for the militarists. More rational minds thought that you had to HAVE a country before you talk about it being great.

[Anomalocaris]

We could have dropped two more bombs on Japan in the next few weeks, and then the production schedule called for three a month after that. If they weren't needed for tactical use (meaning no invasion at that time) they could have been used strategically.

The Japanese estimate of US resources from their own War Production Office was that we could produce seventy-four times the material Japan could produce. The head of the office was advised that he could be assassinated for "defeatist talk."

And yes, "Yamato", the spirit of Japan was the end-all and be-all for the militarists. More rational minds thought that you had to HAVE a country before you talk about it being great.

74 times might apply to some commodity, like oil. But overall it probably was way too passemestic. In terms of actual munition and armament production it was probably more like 10 - 15 times

[Gawdzilla Sama]

We could have dropped two more bombs on Japan in the next few weeks, and then the production schedule called for three a month after that. If they weren't needed for tactical use (meaning no invasion at that time) they could have been used strategically.

The Japanese estimate of US resources from their own War Production Office was that we could produce seventy-four times the material Japan could produce. The head of the office was advised that he could be assassinated for "defeatist talk."

And yes, "Yamato", the spirit of Japan was the end-all and be-all for the militarists. More rational minds thought that you had to HAVE a country before you talk about it being great.

74 times might apply to some commodity, like oil.  But overall it probably was way too passemestic.   In terms of actual munition and armament production it was probably more like 10 - 15 times

The most conservative estimate after the one I mentioned was twenty-four times. These are Japanese estimates, not mine.

[Anomalocaris]

74 times might apply to some commodity, like oil.  But overall it probably was way too passemestic.   In terms of actual munition and armament production it was probably more like 10 - 15 times

The most conservative estimate after the one I mentioned was twenty-four times. These are Japanese estimates, not mine.

Military aircraft: 324,000 to 64,484, roughly 5:1
Carriers: 124 to 18, roughly 7:1
Battleships: 10 to 2, 5:1
Cruisers: 48 to 9, roughly 5:1
Destroyers: 349 to 63, roughly 5:1
Tanks: 108,000 to 4,500, roughly 20:1
Cargo ship tonnage: 34,000,000 to 4,150,000, roughly 8:1
Iron ore:  396,000,000 to 21,000,000, roughly 18:1
Crude oil:  833,000,000 to 5,100,000, roughly 160:1

[Gawdzilla Sama]

As I said, these are the numbers the Japanese came up with. Tell them they're wrong.

[Minimalist]

Until Nagasaki the Japanese were not going to surrender.

The Japanese were trying to get Russia to broker a settlement with the Allies.  The Russians attacked Manchuria the same day as the Nagasaki bomb fell.  Double-crossed by the Russians the Japs knew it was over.

The firebrands still had to be brought to heel and there was an abortive attempt at a coup to try to prevent the broadcast of the Imperial Rescript on the 15th but it failed.

[Anomalocaris]

Until Nagasaki the Japanese were not going to surrender.

The Japanese were trying to get Russia to broker a settlement with the Allies.  The Russians attacked Manchuria the same day as the Nagasaki bomb fell.  Double-crossed by the Russians the Japs knew it was over.

The firebrands still had to be brought to heel and there was an abortive attempt at a coup to try to prevent the broadcast of the Imperial Rescript on the 15th but it failed.

Not a double cross.  The Russians gave 3 month advanced notice to the Japanese of their intention to withdraw from the nonaggression pact between the two countries entered into in the aftermath of the 1939 Nomenhan incident.   That’s a lot more courtesy than the Russians ever received from the Nazis in 1941.

Tokyo clung so hard onto the make belief straw that russia would prefer to have japan as a buffer state against the US in the pacific and that Russia would broker a peace and bail japan out of its strategic dead end that they can not bring themselves into admit what the most probable reasons would be for the Russians to withdraw from the nonaggression pact.

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Until Nagasaki the Japanese were not going to surrender.

The Japanese were trying to get Russia to broker a settlement with the Allies.  The Russians attacked Manchuria the same day as the Nagasaki bomb fell.  Double-crossed by the Russians the Japs knew it was over.

The firebrands still had to be brought to heel and there was an abortive attempt at a coup to try to prevent the broadcast of the Imperial Rescript on the 15th but it failed.

The Japanese never had any hope for "good offices" from the Russians. Their ambassadors were all trying to get instructions as to what they could say and promise, and Gaimu Daijin was silent.

[Minimalist]

When people are desperate they reach for any straw they can find.  That's not news.