Why God doesn't stop satan?

[R00tKiT]

They can't both be true in the same world, but they can be consistent with many things and they are both consistent with many possible worlds (God exists in all possible worlds).   P1 and not-P1 are not consistent with each other, but both are consistent with her having a free choice.   Free will necessarily entails that a proposition and its negation both "could be true", not that they are both true.  It simply says that both P1 and not-P1 are possible.  But if not-P1 is possible, then P2 and P3 are possibly false.  But that's not possible, because P2/P3 are necessarily true.  There's your inconsistency.  

Well I think you're misstating P1 to begin with. Here it is as I presented it in the argument :

P1 : Daughter D is going to choose flavor F of her ice cream today

which isn't the same as :

Q1 :  Daughter D could choose flavor F

P1 means that D effectively made a choice and went for F. It's not a statement about free will, it's a statement about the outcome of her free will. That's why I said P1 entails free will, but its content is more than just asserting D has free will, it gives us the result of her choice, which is flavor F.

Q1 means that D may or may not choose F, which is not the premise of my argument. So, you changed the premises of my argument....

P1       == Daughter D could choose flavor F
not-P1 == Daughter D could choose a flavor other than F

Actually your negation is false. P1 (in your formulation) entails alone that D may not go for F, that's what "could choose" means...
not-P1 would be : daughter D cannot choose flavor F, which doesn't mean she can choose other flavors, it may or may not be the case.

[Angrboda]

They can't both be true in the same world, but they can be consistent with many things and they are both consistent with many possible worlds (God exists in all possible worlds).   P1 and not-P1 are not consistent with each other, but both are consistent with her having a free choice.   Free will necessarily entails that a proposition and its negation both "could be true", not that they are both true.  It simply says that both P1 and not-P1 are possible.  But if not-P1 is possible, then P2 and P3 are possibly false.  But that's not possible, because P2/P3 are necessarily true.  There's your inconsistency.  

Well I think you're misstating P1 to begin with. Here it is as I presented it in the argument :

P1 : Daughter D is going to choose flavor F of her ice cream today

which isn't the same as :

Q1 :  Daughter D could choose flavor F

P1 means that D effectively made a choice and went for F. It's not a statement about free will, it's a statement about the outcome of her free will. That's why I said P1 entails free will, but its content is more than just asserting D has free will, it gives us the result of her choice, which is flavor F.

Q1 means that D may or may not choose F, which is not the premise of my argument. So, you changed the premises of my argument....

P1       == Daughter D could choose flavor F
not-P1 == Daughter D could choose a flavor other than F

Actually your negation is false. P1 (in your formulation) entails alone that D could choose a flavor other than F, that's what "could choose" means...
not-P1 would be : daughter D cannot choose flavor F, which doesn't mean she can choose other flavors, it may or may not be the case.

P1, as you've stated is that she is going to choose F at some later point. I don't care what you call them, at that point--prior to her choice--it's possible that she could choose flavor G (or any other flavor than F). But if it's possibly true that she chooses G (or any other flavor than F), then P2/P3 are possibly false--which they can't be. The only way to avoid that is if it is necessarily the case that she will choose F in the future, but if it's necessarily the case, then the choice of F isn't free. There has to be some point prior to her choice where she possibly could choose F and at which time she possibly could choose something else; that's the definition of free will. So either her choice isn't free, or P2/P3 are possibly false (a contradiction).

Is there ever a point where she could have chosen G?

[R00tKiT]

P1, as you've stated is that she is going to choose F at some later point.  I don't care what you call them, at that point--prior to her choice--it's possible that she could choose flavor G (or any other flavor than F).  But if it's possibly true that she chooses G (or any other flavor than F), then P2/P3 are possibly false--which they can't be.  

No, miss. You're literally attempting a strawman now. My argument doesn't rest upon the premise of possibly choosing F or G, but on effectively choosing F, not G, thanks to free will. These assertions aren't the same. So your objection above, while true, is irrelevant to my argument.

So no, if P1 is true (as I initially formulated it), then it's not possible that D chooses G, because she already chose F at the particular moment when P1 took place.

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Is there ever a point where she could have chosen G?

Of course there is, that is before she chose F, duh..

[Angrboda]

Is there ever a point where she could have chosen G?

Of course there is, that is before she chose F, duh..

If it was possibly true, then it's possibly true that P3 will be false (at that point). P3 cannot be possibly false by definition. Therefore, at that time, you have a contradiction with P3 being necessarily true. QED.

[R00tKiT]

If it was possibly true, then it's possibly true that P3 will be false (at that point). 

This doesn't follow. God knows the outcome of D's free will, as a result of his omniscience.

Also, P1 is necessarily true, but it states an outcome of free will. One can't choose other than what they already chose (duh.)

[Angrboda]

If it was possibly true, then it's possibly true that P3 will be false (at that point). 

This doesn't follow. God knows the outcome of D's free will, as a result of his omniscience.

Also, P1 is necessarily true, but it states an outcome of free will. One can't choose other than what they already chose (duh.)

If it's possibly true that P1 will be false, then it doesn't follow that P3 is possibly false? That's basic logic, Klor, of course it follows. I realize you don't like it, but it definitely follows.

P1, by stipulating that her choice is free logically entails that at some point the truth of P1 was in doubt. If the truth of P1 is in doubt, the truth of P3 is in doubt.

That violates God's omniscience.

P1 can only be the result of free will if it is contingently true. If it's necessarily true, then it wasn't a result of free will. Think about it. If its necessarily true that the sun will rise in the east, it's not a free event.

[The Grand Nudger]

Worshipping a deity is an entirely separate issue. But if a deity exists and instructs us to worship it, we can safely assume it's also a moral authority, which means worship is a good moral imperative by definition.

You can assume whatever you like, I..otoh, have concluded that trash god isn't a moral anything.

Just another bad sales pitch.

[Astreja]

And your rejection of non-empirical evidence (inferential arguments, deductive arguments, analogical arguments, etc.) is a sheer display of your dishonesty towards the religious case.

Dishonesty? There is nothing dishonest about recognizing that from a very, very early age the "religious case" has always registered in my mind as fiction. I owe it no more respect than I owe to a comic book.

You didn't say that verbatim -of course, I just mentioned the underlying assumption you're too cowardly to tell us more about...

Thank you for acknowledging that you did in fact lie about what I said.

As for your libel against my character, that says far more about you than me -- and says even more about how worthless your beliefs are.

[The Grand Nudger]

In his defense, he may not be capable of doing anything else. This is the script that the author of creation wrote for him, in a world maintained by that authors will, where every jot and tittle of your conversation was known before the first keystroke.

[The Architect Of Fate]

And your rejection of non-empirical evidence (inferential arguments, deductive arguments, analogical arguments, etc.) is a sheer display of your dishonesty towards the religious case.

Dishonesty?  There is nothing dishonest about recognizing that from a very, very early age the "religious case" has always registered in my mind as fiction.  I owe it no more respect than I owe to a comic book.  

You didn't say that verbatim -of course, I just mentioned the underlying assumption you're too cowardly to tell us more about...

Thank you for acknowledging that you did in fact lie about what I said.

As for your libel against my character, that says far more about you than me -- and says even more about how worthless your beliefs are.

No no, it's "dishonest" to not let them invent their own standards that conveniently support their opinion.