Russia and Ukraine

[Anomalocaris]

well, it did work out reasonably well in 1941 and 1942, after enough army, corp and divisional commanders have been shot, they started to not lose battles by 1943.

And yet they’re still employing old tactics in a new age of warfare. Simply because something worked in Germany in the mid-40s is no justification for using it in Ukraine in 2022z

Boru

well, the approach at operational, not tactical, level they selected for this war was actually successful in 1943-1945.   they just forgot how to apply it right, or they may have lost the professional acumen to know technology has progressed and old doctrine no longer works.

the 1939 Nomenhan campaign was actually the one highly successful pre-1942 champaign the soviets conducted amidst many other dazzling failures. Nomenhan set the star of Georgy Zhukov on its rise, 3 years later Georgy Zhukov’s star will rise to the very top of new corp of successful soviet commanders to rise out of the weeding out process of 1941-1942.

But this is 2022,  the big corp of highly capable officers that emerged from the weeding out process of 1941-1942, as well as their direct protégés, are all long dead. 

so clearly the standard of command performance as well as clarity oh operational and tactical thinking have fallen very far since then.

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It needs to be pointed out that russia emphatically did not attempt anything that might harken back to the soviet union of old.   It's not just that they can't, they know that they can't - which is why they selected the btg as interim organization in the first place.  

I strongly suspect that there was no actual plan for this conflict as it happened.  You can add a failure of pre conflict intel - they brought their parade uniforms.  The operation they were trying to mimic happened not but a few years ago - but relied completely on a ready force of local paramilitary troops.  I strongly suspect that russian planners...such as they are...saw those paramilitary troops as not just expendable, but as offering less of a contribution to their previous success.  All of a piece I suppose.  If you think they're filthy local bullet sponges, you're unlikely to credit them with the win - and that might be consequential if you end up, just a few years later, high on your own supply and some intense, immediate, and still unexplained need to invade a neighbor.

I'll probably have to wait until the end of my life, if ever, to read exactly what prompted this bit of adventurism.  Was it that they felt their window of opportunity for holding onto or gaining more territory was closing, and, if so, that would suggest they understood more about the militarization of ukraine than their eventual operations would seem to imply - and still.  Is there some back-of-shop ticking clock in russia known only to the most obscure and obscured layer in civil administration, that they needed x before so and so time entirely aside from whether or not they secured that in ukraine or elsewhere?  Or, maybe it's the simplest and most routine explanation and I'll be super disappointed.  A pirate ship full of bilge rat pricks ordering a hallowed out clown army to throw themselves down for somebody's doomed vanity project.

on a tactical level, the russians embraced smaller and theoretically flexible deployable units.  but on an operational level, I think they tried to reproduce the kinds, on a smaller scale,  the breakthroughs they achieved in 1943-1945.    Deep battle remains the official russian operational doctrine.

[The Grand Nudger]

That may be an official doctrine, but that would simply mean that yet another official thing - like the official numbers of tanks and infantry they have, that's been grossly misrepresented.
What the conflict in ukraine has shown - and not just now, going all the way back to the start of hostilities in ukraine, is that russia is incapable of deep battle for any number of reasons.
Some understandable, others....upside down shit.

I'm not sure why they'd try to do again what they failed to do in the circumstances of a fractured ukraine with no meaningful international response. Desperate acts speak to desperate motivations.

[Anomalocaris]

I think russia’s end games is a multi-year war that wrecks Ukraine by driving most of its educated profession urban population out of the country as refugees.    I believe 4 million refugees have left in barely a month already.

they might agree to various ceasefires along the way for respite and redeployment, but they will continue to lob missiles and do other things that encourage civilians to flee and discourage them from returning, and periodically invest and attack cities to emphasize just what a bad ideal it is for ukrainian urbanites to remain.

I think they are going to do what they’ve done in Chechnya from 1994-circa 2004.

[Thumpalumpacus]

[...] they should also be doing some emergency reorganization of the  forces they pulled out of the line from around Kyiv into something more effective and better able to conduct deeper mobile operations [...]

As pointed out above, their organic logistics train per division aren't structured or tailored to provide deep mobile ops. Even the peacetime ToE would limit their divisions to about 90-100 miles from the railhead, and that's before they got a bunch of stuff shot up in the last six weeks.

[Anomalocaris]

[...] they should also be doing some emergency reorganization of the  forces they pulled out of the line from around Kyiv into something more effective and better able to conduct deeper mobile operations [...]

As pointed out above, their organic logistics train per division aren't structured or tailored to provide deep mobile ops. Even the peacetime ToE would limit their divisions to about 90-100 miles from the railhead, and that's before they got a bunch of stuff shot up in the last six weeks.

Ukraine is only about 300 miles wide.    If they can improve that by 50% they can do pincer movements that can cut Ukraine in 2.   

They will need to merge divisions and reorganize their deployable formations.   The key is do they have people with the organizational skill to pull that off, and how long will it take?

[Thumpalumpacus]

well, it did work out reasonably well in 1941 and 1942, after enough army, corp and divisional commanders have been shot, they started to not lose battles by 1943.

Probably more a result of T-34s and Il-2s hitting the battlefield in numbers rather than leadership genius, I think. (Don't get me wrong, they had some great leaders such as Chuikov or Rokossovsky). Look at the loss ratios in soldiers between the Wehrmacht, the British, the Americans, and the Soviets. That didn't improve much throughout the war in terms of KIA.

Of course, early-war Soviet POWs subsequently killed in camps probably skews those ratios too. But surrenders on the battlefields are mission-kills anyway, and the Soviets presided over several of the largest surrenders in history in the early stages. Given the brutal camp conditions, that probably inflated the Wehrmacht kill-ratio against them.

The Russian soldier has historically been a pretty stout soldier, but we're definitely not seeing that in the last twenty years or so.

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As pointed out above, their organic logistics train per division aren't structured or tailored to provide deep mobile ops. Even the peacetime ToE would limit their divisions to about 90-100 miles from the railhead, and that's before they got a bunch of stuff shot up in the last six weeks.

Ukraine is only about 300 miles wide.    If they can improve that by 50% they can do pincer movements that can cut Ukraine in 2.   

"If". Remember, they're out a couple of hundred tanks, a few hundred more AFVs, and still don't have air superiority to a reliable degree, not to mention a logistics train that by now must be taxed beyond belief, given the losses they've suffered.

They will need to merge divisions and reorganize their deployable formations.   The key is do they have people with the organizational skill to pull that off, and how long will it take?

Amalgamated divisions generally don't project the combat power of divisions trained and operated as units until quite some time after conjoining. The term that comes to mind is "scratch force"; numbers aren't everything. Esprit de corps can't be infused by an IV injection of manpower, generally. And while organizational talents are obviously required, leadership matters as much if not more in getting disparate troops from shattered units to work with unit cohesion.

[Anomalocaris]

well, it did work out reasonably well in 1941 and 1942, after enough army, corp and divisional commanders have been shot, they started to not lose battles by 1943.

Probably more a result of T-34s and Il-2s hitting the battlefield in numbers rather than leadership genius, I think. Look at the loss ratios in soldiers between the Wehrmacht, the British, the Americans, and the Soviets. That didn't improve much throughout the war in terms of KIA.

Of course, early-war Soviet POWs subsequently killed in camps probably skews those ratios too. But surrenders on the battlefields are mission-kills anyway, and the Soviets presided over several of the largest surrenders in history in the early stages. Given the brutal camp conditions, that probably inflated the Wehrmacht kill-ratio against them.

The Russian soldier has historically been a pretty stout soldier, but we're definitely not seeing that in the last twenty years or so.

The T-34 didn’t have as much effect on the course of the war as often attributed to them.  some of the attribution came from post war german accounts design to explain why the germans didn’t do better, as their boasts of the superior tactical skills of the germany army imply they should. 

When the T-34 had a decisive superiority over german tanks, which is in 1941 and early 1942, there were very few of them.   Maybe 5% it the russian tank forces were T-34s.  By mid 1942, they were still superior to vast majority of germany tanks, but by a much smaller margin as the germans have introduced better tank guns and heavier armor on their existing tanks.  yet T-34 still only made up a small part of the Russian tank force.    By mid 1943, the germans have largely caught up in the technical quality of tanks by further upgrades of existing model as well as new models that were considerably superior to the T34.   Yet even then, T34 still made up less than half of the strength of each soviet tank division. The other half were still made up of light tanks that were not competitive with even the German tanks of 1941.    

Yet by autumn of 1943, the russians have beaten the germans in stalingrad, at Kursk, and  have completely seized the strategic and tactical initiative from the germans, and further have driven the germans largely out of much of ukraine.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Probably more a result of T-34s and Il-2s hitting the battlefield in numbers rather than leadership genius, I think. Look at the loss ratios in soldiers between the Wehrmacht, the British, the Americans, and the Soviets. That didn't improve much throughout the war in terms of KIA.

Of course, early-war Soviet POWs subsequently killed in camps probably skews those ratios too. But surrenders on the battlefields are mission-kills anyway, and the Soviets presided over several of the largest surrenders in history in the early stages. Given the brutal camp conditions, that probably inflated the Wehrmacht kill-ratio against them.

The Russian soldier has historically been a pretty stout soldier, but we're definitely not seeing that in the last twenty years or so.

The T-34 didn’t have as much effect on the course of the war as often attributed to them.  some of the attribution came from post war german accounts design to explain why the germans didn’t do better, as their boasts of the superior tactical skills of the germany army imply they should. 

When the T-34 had a decisive superiority over german tanks, which is in 1941 and early 1942, there were very few of them.   Maybe 5% it the russian tank forces were T-34s.  By mid 1942, they were still superior to vast majority of germany tanks, but by a much smaller margin as the germans have introduced better tank guns and heavier armor on their existing tanks.  yet T-34 still only made up a small part of the Russian tank force.    By mid 1943, the germans have largely caught up in the technical quality of tanks by further upgrades of existing model as well as new models that were considerably superior to the T34.   Yet even then, T34 still made up less than half of the strength of each soviet tank division. The other half were still made up of light tanks that were not competitive with even the German tanks of 1941.    

Yet by autumn of 1943, the russians have beaten the germans in stalingrad, at Kursk, and  have completely seized the strategic and tactical initiative from the germans, and further have driven the germans largely out of much of ukraine.

The T-34 excelled in numbers, which I specifically mentioned in my post. If you look at Soviet tank production (by 1943, the Soviets were cranking out 1,300 T-34s per month), you'll see German tank production in the rear-view mirror. The Soviet tank also had much better mobility and somewhat better reliability than any German tank fielded in the war (needless to say, in much smaller numbers). Of course it was inferior to some German tanks, but how many of those did the Germans field? I'll let you look up those numbers yourself. You'll get a rude shock, I think.

The T-34 didn't win the war for the Russians, but the numbers of them sure helped. Between 1940 and 1945 the Soviets turned out almost 58,000 T-34s of various stripes. Now throw in 36,000 Il-2s, and you'll see that operational art isn't really needed, which, again, is shown by the Russian casualty rates. Compare those numbers to total German tank production, or total Stuka production, and see for yourself.

So, where are these factories nowadays pumping out thousands of tanks and planes a month? Oh, that's right, there are none. It follows therefore that using the WWII strategy of throwing masses at a problem and swamping it will not work nowadays with a smaller and weaker Russian army which seems to have forgotten some of the basic rules of warfighting, like cover your flanks, defend your supply lines, and combined arms operations.

[Anomalocaris]

The T-34 didn’t have as much effect on the course of the war as often attributed to them.  some of the attribution came from post war german accounts design to explain why the germans didn’t do better, as their boasts of the superior tactical skills of the germany army imply they should. 

When the T-34 had a decisive superiority over german tanks, which is in 1941 and early 1942, there were very few of them.   Maybe 5% it the russian tank forces were T-34s.  By mid 1942, they were still superior to vast majority of germany tanks, but by a much smaller margin as the germans have introduced better tank guns and heavier armor on their existing tanks.  yet T-34 still only made up a small part of the Russian tank force.    By mid 1943, the germans have largely caught up in the technical quality of tanks by further upgrades of existing model as well as new models that were considerably superior to the T34.   Yet even then, T34 still made up less than half of the strength of each soviet tank division. The other half were still made up of light tanks that were not competitive with even the German tanks of 1941.    

Yet by autumn of 1943, the russians have beaten the germans in stalingrad, at Kursk, and  have completely seized the strategic and tactical initiative from the germans, and further have driven the germans largely out of much of ukraine.

The T-34 excelled in numbers, which I specifically mentioned in my post. If you look at Soviet tank production (by 1943, the Soviets were cranking out 1,300 T-34s per month), you'll see German tank production in the rear-view mirror. The Soviet tank also had much better mobility and somewhat better reliability than any German tank fielded in the war (needless to say, in much smaller numbers). Of course it was inferior to some German tanks, but how many of those did the Germans field? I'll let you look up those numbers yourself. You'll get a rude shock, I think.

The T-34 didn't win the war for the Russians, but the numbers of them sure helped. Between 1940 and 1945 the Soviets turned out almost 58,000 T-34s of various stripes. Now throw in 36,000 Il-2s, and you'll see that operational art isn't really needed, which, again, is shown by the Russian casualty rates. Compare those numbers to total German tank production, or total Stuka production, and see for yourself.

So, where are these factories nowadays pumping out thousands of tanks and planes a month? Oh, that's right, there are none. It follows therefore that using the WWII strategy of throwing masses at a problem and swamping it will not work nowadays with a smaller and weaker Russian army which seems to have forgotten some of the basic rules of warfighting, like cover your flanks, defend your supply lines, and combined arms operations.

The T-34 did not excel in numbers in the sense of being actually encountered in greatly superior numbers by the Germans until late 1943 or early 1944 despite consistently greater production figures compared to the German industry since around mid 1942.   There are several reasons for this:

1. The Soviets were on the defensive and retreating for much of 1942, and again for early parts of 1943.  So immobilized vehicles are permanently lost behind advancing German lines while germans retain possession of their own damaged and immobilized vehicles for potential recovery. 

2. The Soviets did not develop a sound system of damaged vehicle recovery until late 1943 or later,  so few recoverable damaged or immobilized vehicles were systematically recovered.  the germans had a highly efficient system for recovering, repairing and returning to service vehicles damaged in battle.   There are accounts of a single german tank having many crews being killed inside it, but the being recovered each time and repaired and returned to service each time.

3. Soviet tank crews and low level unit support elements through late 1943 were mostly undertrained to perform routine vehicle maintenance, so vehicle breakdowns were much more frequent than they should be, and vehicles are often abandoned after minor malfunctions that a better trained crew or low level logistic support could easily deal with.  there are many accounts of soviet tanks being discovered abandoned with minor mechanical issues that in the german army would have resulted in severe discipline for the crew to abandon. 

4. Soviets also had underdeveloped system of buddy recovery techniques and approaches. So vehicles immobilized by being stuck is also often abandoned rather than towed out by a buddy.   one observation germans made is stuck german tanks that can’t be pulled out is usually missing their tow cables.   stuck russian tanks usually still have their tow cables stowed. 

The result is while Soviet tank production had greatly surpassed German tank production by early 1943, the balance of strength actually on the battlefield did not begin to show it until we’ll after summer of 1943.

[Thumpalumpacus]

The result is while Soviet tank production had greatly surpassed German tank production by early 1943, the balance of strength actually on the battlefield did not begin to show it until we’ll after summer of 1943.

Well, there were enough to reject Hitler's fanatical insistence on taking a destroyed city. That helped.

So, again, and do try to pay attention this time, explain to us how this paradigm of numbers winning the war in Ukraine can happen when the top two Russian tank factories are stilled by sanctions? Take your time and think this through. Quit the red-herring thing.

In addition to Uralvagonzavod, one of the largest tank manufacturers in the world with reportedly 30,000 employees last year, the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant has also run out of foreign-made parts.

“The specified companies specialize in the manufacturing and repair of tanks, as well as other armored equipment needed by the Russian Federation armed forces,” the General Staff wrote in its Facebook post.

https://fortune.com/2022/03/22/russian-t...raine-war/

So, without large numbers of tanks and trained troops to overwhelm Ukraine, how would you apply the Soviet "operational art" from WWII to the modern circumstances? Please don't dissimulate any more. Answer a direct question directly. How can Russia flood Ukraine with numbers that they simply don't have? Because that's what they did in WWII against Germany.

Oh, remember: there's no Lend-Leases available nowadays either.