Russia and Ukraine

[Anomalocaris]

I think the Ukrainian operation was primarily a conventional military operation.  

special forces was deployed to support it, such as by capturing key road junctions, bridges, unprotected headquarters and depots, unprotected air fields, etc.  possibly the special forces were also slated to assault Ukrainian government centers had russian conventional forces manage to come up close enough to kyiv to link up with the special force after the special forces had secured government centers. 

But the conventional ground force has to break through defenses,  engage large regular enemy formations, take and hold grounds, establish and protect supply lines.

special forces can’t bail out conventional forces in large mobile field maneuvers such as these.    special forces can sort of bail out conventional forces in stationary fire fights such as in assaulting built up areas, but that waste special forces by reducing them to mere elite infantry.

the failure of the russian invasion seems primarily a failure of the field army.    failure of infantry, failure of armor, failure of organization, failure of reconnaissance, failure or interdiction of enemy communication and supply, failure of coordination and logistics, and failure of strategic planning.

i think some aspects of how the russians conducted this operation, such as the infamous 40 mile long truck convoy aimed to revive the offensive towards kyiv,  is echoed in past russian military operations under superficially similar circumstances.   such the logistic effort organized by Georgy Zhukov to successfully salvage the stalled soviet counterattack against the japanese at Nomenhan in 1939.    The multi-prone attack also echo many of the successful battles the soviets conducted by Zhukov amongst others against the germans in 1943-1945.

it seems vaguely to me like the russian operation was run by a command staff that read some military history about successful russian campaigns of the past, but didn’t fundamentally understand the conditions that made them successful, and just tried to replicate their outcomes by copying their key features.

This also vaguely recall the abysmal performance of soviet high command during the winter war with Finland in 1939-1940, and during the early years of Russo-german war in 1941 to mid 1942, both in the aftermath of stalin’s purge of the soviet military officer corp in 1936-1938.   The stench may not be be quite as strong, but the smell seems to be similar.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

I think the Ukrainian operation was primarily a conventional military operation.  

special forces was deployed to support it, such as by capturing key road junctions, bridges, unprotected headquarters and depots, unprotected air fields, etc.  possibly the special forces were also slated to assault Ukrainian government centers had russian conventional forces manage to come up close enough to kyiv to link up with the special force after the special forces had secured government centers. 

But the conventional ground force has to break through defenses,  engage large regular enemy formations, take and hold grounds, establish and protect supply lines.

special forces can’t bail out conventional forces in large mobile field maneuvers such as these.    special forces can sort of bail out conventional forces in stationary fire fights such as in assaulting built up areas, but that waste special forces by reducing them to mere elite infantry.

the failure of the russian invasion seems primarily a failure of the field army.    failure of infantry, failure of armor, failure of organization, failure of reconnaissance, failure or interdiction of enemy communication and supply, failure of coordination and logistics, and failure of strategic planning.

i think some aspects of how the russians conducted this operation, such as the infamous 40 mile long truck convoy aimed to revive the offensive towards kyiv,  is echoed in past russian military operations under superficially similar circumstances.   such the logistic effort organized by Georgy Zhukov to successfully salvage the stalled soviet counterattack against the japanese at Nomenhan in 1939.    The multi-prone attack also echo many of the successful battles the soviets conducted by Zhukov amongst others against the germans in 1943-1945.

it seems vaguely to me like the russian operation was run by a command staff that read some military history about successful russian campaigns of the past, but didn’t fundamentally understand the conditions that made them successful, and just tried to replicate their outcomes by copying their key features.

This also vaguely recall the abysmal performance of soviet high command during the winter war with Finland in 1939-1940, and during the early years of Russo-german war in 1941 to mid 1942, both in the aftermath of stalin’s purge of the soviet military officer corp in 1936-1938.   The stench may not be be quite as strong, but the smell seems to be similar.

And now that the Russians are repositioning to concentrate on eastern Ukraine, is there anything that makes you think that they won’t re-employ the same failed playbook of ‘Well, this strategy strategy worked 80 years ago…let’s do it again!!’ ?

Boru

[The Grand Nudger]

It needs to be pointed out that russia emphatically did not attempt anything that might harken back to the soviet union of old. It's not just that they can't, they know that they can't - which is why they selected the btg as interim organization in the first place.

I strongly suspect that there was no actual plan for this conflict as it happened. You can add a failure of pre conflict intel - they brought their parade uniforms. The operation they were trying to mimic happened not but a few years ago - but relied completely on a ready force of local paramilitary troops. I strongly suspect that russian planners...such as they are...saw those paramilitary troops as not just expendable, but as offering less of a contribution to their previous success. All of a piece I suppose. If you think they're filthy local bullet sponges, you're unlikely to credit them with the win - and that might be consequential if you end up, just a few years later, high on your own supply and some intense, immediate, and still unexplained need to invade a neighbor.

I'll probably have to wait until the end of my life, if ever, to read exactly what prompted this bit of adventurism. Was it that they felt their window of opportunity for holding onto or gaining more territory was closing, and, if so, that would suggest they understood more about the militarization of ukraine than their eventual operations would seem to imply - and still. Is there some back-of-shop ticking clock in russia known only to the most obscure and obscured layer in civil administration, that they needed x before so and so time entirely aside from whether or not they secured that in ukraine or elsewhere? Or, maybe it's the simplest and most routine explanation and I'll be super disappointed. A pirate ship full of bilge rat pricks ordering a hallowed out clown army to throw themselves down for somebody's doomed vanity project.

[Anomalocaris]

And now that the Russians are repositioning to concentrate on eastern Ukraine, is there anything that makes you think that they won’t re-employ the same failed playbook of ‘Well, this strategy strategy worked 80 years ago…let’s do it again!!’ ?

Boru

well, now that their plans and leadership qualities have all been harshly tested by reality, there should be a weeding out process in progress throughout the ranks where those who succeeded in their roles, or at least failed less badly, should be given more responsibility at the expense of those who failed more miserably.    So I expect the average command performance of the Russian military leadership will improve in the upcoming weeks.

however, there could be offsetting factors.   For example,  would senior russian national leadership now recognize the new improved military leadership needs to be given room to formulate plans that better fit new found appreciation of the limitations of capabilities of the forces under their command?   or will they think now that they have officers with better track record in charge, they can push their military twice as hard to achieve more?

if the russians really appreciate the urgency of situation, and still have good organizers in their military, they should also be doing some emergency reorganization of the  forces they pulled out of the line from around Kyiv into something more effective and better able to conduct deeper mobile operations, and also do a crash reindoctrination of low to mid level field officers to account for experiences gained and avoid the detects of their battalion tactical group doctrine.

[The Grand Nudger]

Unfortunately, that's not how the soviet military™ works under putin. It's been and is still being intentionally defenestrated so as to present less of a threat in a coup. Oligarchs gotta oligarch, after all.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

And now that the Russians are repositioning to concentrate on eastern Ukraine, is there anything that makes you think that they won’t re-employ the same failed playbook of ‘Well, this strategy strategy worked 80 years ago…let’s do it again!!’ ?

Boru

well, now that their plans and leadership qualities have all been harshly tested by reality, there should be a weeding out process in progress throughout the ranks where those who succeeded in their roles, or at least failed less badly, should be given more responsibility at the expense of those who failed more miserably.    So I expect the average command performance of the Russian military leadership will improve in the upcoming weeks.

however, there could be offsetting factors.   For example,  would senior russian national leadership now recognize the new improved military leadership needs to be given room to formulate plans that better fit new found appreciation of the limitations of capabilities of the forces under their command?   or will they think now that they have officers with better track record in charge, they can push their military twice as hard to achieve more?

Funny how that ‘weeding out’ process has never worked in the last 80 years, innit? Maybe the Russians should stick to attacking tiny countries. The larger ones (Afghanistan, Ukraine) seem to give them nothing but grief.

Boru

[The Grand Nudger]

It did, the current situation goes back to something like 2004 (although it's been suggested that it began earlier, something like 96). That, for keen observers, was putins second term.

[Anomalocaris]

well, it did work out reasonably well in 1941 and 1942, after enough army, corp and divisional commanders have been shot, they started to not lose battles by 1943.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

well, it did work out reasonably well in 1941 and 1942, after enough army, corp and divisional commanders have been shot, they started to not lose battles by 1943.

And yet they’re still employing old tactics in a new age of warfare. Simply because something worked in Germany in the mid-40s is no justification for using it in Ukraine in 2022z

Boru

[The Grand Nudger]

They're not, this is just what happens to a convo after being based on an utterly false premise. In this case, specifically, trying to spin enormous russian losses as anything other than what they are.