Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[Thumpalumpacus]

"A person might think" is the clue here.

I'll need more clues.  People think alot of things, some of them are untrue.  That a math problem refers to more than one value is not generally taken to mean that the solution is subjective.  Amusingly enough, in most other fact assertions commonly accepted as fact assertions, and objectively true ones, the greater the number of referent facts and values the more compellingly true said statement is.  

To wit, while help and harm get you alot, you'll probably need even more values to refer to in order to make compelling fact-alike statements about moral desert.  I say compelling here in a metaethically neutral sense, where a statement can be true but not objectively so.  A subjectivist will refer to more than just one of their opinions.  A relativist will refer to more than just one of their societies' decrees.  An objectivist will refer to more than just one (purported) fact of the matter in question.

When you refer to human moral opinion, you abandon moral objectivity. That's because opinions aren't facts.

[The Grand Nudger]

Opinions can, in fact, be facts. Both in common usage and in analytical metaethics. All cognitivist positions purport to report facts. Subjectivism reports on a fact of the subject. Relativism reports on a fact of the subjects group. Objectivism reports on a fact of the object. The fact of a persons opinion is the truthmaking property in subjectivist metaethics. Not any specific fact assertion (or that assertions objective truth-value), we can plug anything in there. Not because society says so. Not facts of the matter in question. Those are irrelevant facts to metaethical subjectivism. That's not what morality is about, according to metaethical subjectivism.

It is my opinion that evolutionary biology is true. Does that being my opinion make evolutionary biology false, not objective, relative, or subjective? This is why I say "I have opinions, you have opinions, we all have opinions". OFC we do. What those opinions are grounded in determines the accurate classification of the assertion in general and in moral systems or assertions, in the semantics I'm using.

[Sheldon]

@Sheldon

You should stop saying that the Bible comes from "Bronze Age Bedouin societies" because this is factually incorrect.

Missing the point rather, and I said "derived" from. I'd also appreciate it if you didn't tell what to say, or what not to say. Did you have a point about moral subjectivity? If not perhaps best not to derail this one.

[Sheldon]

It's debatable not incorrect

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bedouin

https://academic.oup.com/yale-scholarshi...m=fulltext

[Thumpalumpacus]

It is my opinion that evolutionary biology is true.  Does that being my opinion make evolutionary biology false, not objective, relative, or subjective?  

This is a fancified false-dichotomy. Of course an opinion can be correct or incorrect, when we are actually able to compare it to relevant facts. The problem occurs when you have nothing factual for comparison -- which is clearly the case here. Where are these factual morals stored? What library? It's nice that you have an opinion. But it is only your opinion unless and until you demonstrate its factuality with appealing to word salad.

This is why I say "I have opinions, you have opinions, we all have opinions".  OFC we do.  What those opinions are grounded in determines the accurate classification of the assertion in general and in moral systems or assertions, in the semantics I'm using.

You can use your semantics all you want. If you're claiming that objective facts can be based o subjective feelings, you're abusing the language.

I'll return to this discussion when you shitcan the word-games. This shit bores me.

[Sheldon]

One moral worldview is only better than the other, if one accepts the subjective assertion that caring about others and how they're treated is moral, and not caring immoral. 

When a moral assertion makes a claim to facts and satisfies that claim to facts in the same way that other statements which make claims to facts satisfy those claims to facts and are considered true, then we are going to need some compelling reason not to consider the moral assertion true in the same way, by the same means. 

I would agree, but none of the examples appear to do this? The conclusion that X is moral / immoral remained subjective, even when it was preceded with a fact that Y led to X. 

 The homefield advantage of moral realism in logical discussions (rightly or wrongly). It treats moral assertions of truth like any other assertion of truth.

Well I find the "idea that moral claims are true if they accurately describe objective features of the world" dubious. Since we saw you offer examples that contained true statements, or partially true, and yet the moral conclusions were still subjective, or required further subjective assertions. 

Relativism and subjectivism are not interchangeable.  

Well, in as much as they are distinct concepts yes, but both moral relativism and subjectivism deal with the idea that morality isn't absolute, and on that point at least I agree. 

If there is such a thing as moral relativism then not all moral statements are subjective.

Though they will ultimately rest on a subjective moral assertion. For example we can say it is true that murder causes harm, if we then accept the subjective assertion that causing harm is immoral, then the assertion that murder is immoral would be objectively true. The problem is that the first subjective claim is also relative, what if the harm were considered necessary? Then the statement murder is immoral is not objectively true, no? 

Your specific reasons do not matter, consequences do not matter, the wellbeing of human beings in any number does not matter, the anachronistic nature of morals does not matter, whether there are any rules and any circumstance of history does not matter, problematic does not matter...if morality is subjective. 

Isn't that a subjective claim as well? If it matters to me, it informs my morality, subjective or not. Though I accept my subjective notions of morality need not matter to anyone else. 

Moral objectivity and moral absolutism are not interchangeable. 

Well they share the idea that morality is universal, and that there is a single set of rules that apply to everyone all the time in all places. I'd assumed at least, that a moral absolute would have to be objectively true? 

We're not perfect or ideal agents 

How could our moral disinctions be found flawed in the absence of facts of those matters.

I drew the inference that since we are not infallible, no idea we create can be infallible, hence flawed or imperfect. It seemed a reasonable inference to me.

[The Grand Nudger]

I would agree, but none of the examples appear to do this? The conclusion that X is moral / immoral remained subjective, even when it was preceded with a fact that Y led to X. 

Remained subjective in some way not described by metaethical subjectivism, and subjective in some way that other mechanically equivalent assertions are not, or remained subjective in some way that any assertion of any type or kind or quality about anything whatsoever..is subjective?  

Well I find the "idea that moral claims are true if they accurately describe objective features of the world" dubious. Since we saw you offer examples that contained true statements, or partially true, and yet the moral conclusions were still subjective, or required further subjective assertions. 

That is, very quickly and dirtily speaking, the way other truth assertions which you consider to be objective are determined to be so.  By accurately reporting whatever fact they purport to report.  

Well, in as much as they are distinct concepts yes, but both moral relativism and subjectivism deal with the idea that morality isn't absolute, and on that point at least I agree. 

Subjectivism, relativism, and objectivism all deal with moralities that are not absolute.  Objectivism perhaps the least so, as it does not contend that there is any moral truth statement which, once true in a given set of factual circumstances must then be true forever, everywhere, and always., in other and different factual circumstances.  

Consider the set of things that we do which used to cause an immense amount of harm, which we now do in other ways that cause less or even no harm.  It was true at one point that it would be immoral to do x by this understanding of morality.  It is no longer true by that same understanding.  Objectively speaking.

Though they will ultimately rest on a subjective moral assertion. For example we can say it is true that murder causes harm, if we then accept the subjective assertion that causing harm is immoral, then the assertion that murder is immoral would be objectively true. The problem is that the first subjective claim is also relative, what if the harm were considered necessary? Then the statement murder is immoral is not objectively true, no? 

An emotivist morality rests on emotivist assertions.  Relativist moralities rest on relativist assertions.  Objectivist moralities rest on objectivist assertions.  Necessary harms are still harms.  Necessary evils are still evil. It's right there on the tin.  We have or imagine all sorts of reasons to do good and bad things....but the difference between these isms and ists is the truth making property in a given system or assertion.  

 

Your specific reasons do not matter, consequences do not matter, the wellbeing of human beings in any number does not matter, the anachronistic nature of morals does not matter, whether there are any rules and any circumstance of history does not matter, problematic does not matter...if morality is subjective. 

Isn't that a subjective claim as well? If it matters to me, it informs my morality, subjective or not. Though I accept my subjective notions of morality need not matter to anyone else. 

No, it's a descriptive claim about truth making properties in metaethical analysis. Things mattering to you is actually emotivist.  Just that experience of caring.  When I say they do not matter to subjectivist metaethics I mean they are not the truthmaking properties in subjectivist metaethics.  It's not even the specific fact assertion that a metaethical subjectivist makes that's the fact making property.  It's their posession over whatever fact assertion they make.  That they genuinely believe x it is all it takes or means for a thing to be subjectively true.  As a consequence, if other people believe not x, not x is also true - in a metaethically subjective universe, despite how that sounds to us as practical objectivist in a seemingly objective universe. In their universe, our situation seems absurd.

Well they share the idea that morality is universal, and that there is a single set of rules that apply to everyone all the time in all places. I'd assumed at least, that a moral absolute would have to be objectively true? 

No, they do not share this....and fwiw I think that moral absolutism has a long history of showing just how divorced from objectivity it can be.  

I drew the inference that since we are not infallible, no idea we create can be infallible, hence flawed or imperfect.

Math is flawed.  Math is imperfect.  Science is flawed.  Science is imperfect.  Logic is flawed.  Logic is imperfect.  In the fullest sense, an objectivist morality can never be complete because we lack access or lack detail even if we were not specifically or generally incompetent.  Every relevant fact of every matter with any moral import would have to freeze and remain in state everywhere and forever for us to even catch up the the event horizon of ideal truth.

[The Grand Nudger]

It is my opinion that evolutionary biology is true.  Does that being my opinion make evolutionary biology false, not objective, relative, or subjective?  

This is a fancified false-dichotomy. Of course an opinion can be correct or incorrect, when we are actually able to compare it to relevant facts. The problem occurs when you have nothing factual for comparison -- which is clearly the case here. Where are these factual morals stored? What library? It's nice that you have an opinion. But it is only your opinion unless and until you demonstrate its factuality with appealing to word salad.

It should sound like that if the belief or position it's modeled after is a fancified false dichotomy.  It's worth going over explicitly, though..because for some people, and in many cases, the statement "that's your opinion" or "that's subjective" does seem to come down to that.  

I have a stubbed toe and a corpse for comparison.  Throw in cooing at babies.  When I put on my moralizing hat and say that murder is more harmful than stepping on toes and cooing at babies is less harmful than both I'm purporting to report a fact about murder, toe stepping,  cooing at babies, and harm.   Not me. Not my society. Not my non cognitivist impulses. I hate cooing at babies and I can't stand watching other people do it. Just a tic.

You can use your semantics all you want. If you're claiming that objective facts can be based o subjective feelings, you're abusing the language.

I'll return to this discussion when you shitcan the word-games. This shit bores me.

Metaethically subjectivist facts -are- "objective facts" in other casual usages.  In that a metaethically subjective assertion...accurately reported (that is to say not covering itself in the glory of objectivist semantics) is "I believe that x" - and they may, in fact, believe in x.  This is why subjectivism relativism and objectivism are cognitivist theories.  They all make truth alike claims.  There's some fact expressed or hiding in the assertion...the difference being what those facts are about. Kind, not quality.

I use this language because it's expressive, granular, and accurate.

[Angrboda]

[The Grand Nudger]

It may not be, things may not work the way we think they do, but it's how we say it works - we do construct our truth claims....moral or otherwise, in these ways.

We can use any words we like, or we can agree or disagree with any moral theory (or truth theory) we like - but for myself, if I object to subjectivity in a moral statement I don't want to miscommunicate that as objecting to the content of their opinion on the grounds of it being their opinion, ala whatever someone says is an opinion. I'm saying, very exactly, that there's some fact about the reporting subject explicitly and exclusively that accounts for this moral justification, however it expresses itself. Not some fact of the matter in question..in the case that it expresses itself as an objectivist assertion, as they so very often do.