I find it easier to think of the lack of free will in this way.
Every decision you make is based on who you are and how you handle things (personality) and the world around you (environment).
When you were born you had no part in choosing either of these.
Everything you do is a reaction.
To believe in free will is to believe that if you could go back into the past, it would not be like a rewind button as some people would do different things for no reason.

Personally, I believe that my sub-conscious is me. Just because it's in action ten seconds before I consciously make a decision doesn't mean that it wasn't thinking like I think I would think.
I make more one second decisions then I can count in a day.
That includes emotions.
It doesn't take me ten seconds to decide whether I'm happy, sad or angry about something.

(July 6, 2016 at 4:07 pm)Ignorant Wrote: This illustrates how unhelpful the artificial boundaries of the determinist/compatibilist argument have become.

It's very simple. Compatabilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism by defining free will in such a way that it is.

Quote:1) This is the case if a person is actually in the presence of determining conditions. I am asking you to consider the potential of a human agent in the hypothetical abstract, free-from-condition sense. If you care to engage in that thought exercise, then we can move on to:

The only potential within a deterministic universe is one physically possible future.

Quote:If that is true, either action(a) or action(b) IS ABLE to obtain through the agency of person(I), depending on the surrounding conditions. If that is true, the agency of person(I) IS ABLE to bring about action(a) or (b) depending on the circumstances. In other words, person(I) is the sort of thing able to do action(a) or (b).

That means that person (I) can do either (a) or (b) (they have the intrinsic power to do so) but the ACTUAL doing of one or the other depends on circumstances. Given circumstances(x), action(a) obtains WHILE THE POTENTIAL FOR ACTION(b) REMAINS WITHIN THE PERSON.

The agent is capable of engaging in any of those options but only one of the options will be taken. The option that will be taken, whichever one it is, is the option that lays ahead in the one possible future of determinism.

Quote:So why is it not so evidently and trivially true in the moment only one button is pressed? When a person presses a red button, did they lost the ability to press a blue or green one?

They didn't of course. After the button is pressed they have two other buttons left to press, again one is an illusory option and one is a real option, within determinism. In determinism there is only one physically possible future at any given moment.

You may imagine alternative possible futures, but within determinism there are no alternative possible futures there is only one possible future at any given moment.

Quote:1) Suppose X => Y in a way which is not conditioned by any external influence. If that is the case, then there is no set of circumstances in which X does not => Y. If that is the case, then X => Y happens necessarily.

In determinism everything happens necessarily, and alternative possibilities are just within the imagination. It's all cause and effect.

Quote:2) Now suppose that X => Y in a way which is conditional upon the simultaneous Z => X. If that is the case, then in the absence of Z, X does not => Y. If that is the case, then X => Y happens contingently. 

Yes but then we're not dealing with whatever the one possible future is that is within determinism. Then we're dealing with hypotheticals.

Quote:If human action is more like 2, then any determined human action (it doesn't matter by what/who the action is determined) happens in BOTH in a determined AND in a contingent manner.

We have to be talking about some actual defined circumstances. In determinism there is one future Y. And that future is caused by the one past X. Everything is contingent upon that. What do you mean both a determined and contingent manner? There is no in-between here, either determinism is true or it is false, either we are determined like the rest of the universe or we are not.

Quote:Does this say anything about the nature of 'willing' or its place in determining action? No. You can't even begin to approach that question until there more fundamental distinctions are made.

If determinism is true then our will is determined like everything else is. Our will wills and determines our actions in the small picture but in the big picture it is ultimately fully determined by prior causes outside of it. This is why ultimately we cannot be self-willing or self-determining.

Quote:Necessity as distinguished from determinism

I defined determinism as the view that there is only one possible future. So there are no alternative futures, the one future that exists is necessary and determined. Have you not agreed to that definition?

Quote:Determinism means that everything but you determine human actions.

No, that would be fatalism. Humans still determine and choose as normal it's just that their choices and will is ultimately not free because any actions humans determine is ultimately determined by prior causes outside of themselves and outside of their will.

Quote:Indeterminism means that nothing determines human actions.

Indeterminism means that nothing determines anything. It means that there is no real cause and effect... it's all correlation/probability/randomness that seems like cause and effect.

Better still:

Quote:If I am able to do A or B, I may do A even while retaining the 'ability' to do B.

in general. I'm not talking about people's general abilities to opt for option A or B. I'm talking about whether alternative possible futures actually exist that we can steer ourselves to opt for -- the answer is no, either we are determined and there are no alternative possibilities, or we are not determined and hence can't steer or determine anything... because it's all down to probability or randomness.

Quote:If I am able to will A or B, I may will A while retaining the 'ability' to will B. <= Still contingency, irrelevant to determinism/indeterminism

Irrelevant to any of this actually because you're talking about the human ability in general to opt for option A or B as opposed to questioning whether one of those options are predetermined or not. Of course we can in general do A or B, the question is when we opt for one of them, was it predetermined?

Quote:[I am saying that the compatibilism vs. determinism discussion inherits and ignores conflations and equivocations which ultimately perpetuate the discussion indefinitely. The concept of necessity is rolled into determinism and the concept of contingency is rolled into choice and freedom. An action cannot occur as necessary and contingent at the same time. An action CAN occur as determined and contingent at the same time. See the problem?

Determinism is about a future that necessarily is the only future. Why are you talking about 3 things here, necessary contingent and determined?

Determinism means one possible future which means no other possible futures. That means the future is necessary or in other words determined, same thing. It's all contingent upon prior causes.

It's not compatabilism vs determinism. Compatabilism is a determinist view. It's the view that we can have free will even if we are determined.

I need to know if you are a compatibilist because I need to know if you think free will is compatible with determinism or if you think that if determinism is true it means free will is impossible.

(July 7, 2016 at 8:36 am)Drich Wrote:

(July 6, 2016 at 6:17 pm)wallym Wrote: I'm not talking about the bible at all.

So Christianity (that which is based on the bible) is not a Religion?

Quote:  I'm talking about the idea that people aren't responsible for their actions, and how most religions that I'm aware of are based on the idea people are responsible for their actions.

Again according to what we learned from the likes of Jesus and Paul we are all slaves to sin. Meaning we are not responsible for our actions/We may not be the source of desire, origin for our acts, but yet we are still held to account for them Unless we have obtained the atonement in which Christ offers.

If we're not in control of our actions, how do we choose to follow Christ?

(July 7, 2016 at 9:19 am)Little lunch Wrote: Personally, I believe that my sub-conscious is me. Just because it's in action ten seconds before I consciously make a decision doesn't mean that it wasn't thinking like I think I would think.
I make more one second decisions then I can count in a day.
That includes emotions.
It doesn't take me ten seconds to decide whether I'm happy, sad or angry about something.

Out of curiousity, if your sub-conscious is being altered, lets say through excessive alcohol, or involuntarily through drugs, or disease, or maybe Prozac type mood altering brain chemical changing stuff, do you still consider the things done under those circumstances to be 'you'?  Is there a scenario where you'd feel "That wasn't me" due to manipulations of your mind?

(July 7, 2016 at 11:12 am)wallym Wrote:

(July 7, 2016 at 8:36 am)Drich Wrote: So Christianity (that which is based on the bible) is not a Religion?

Again according to what we learned from the likes of Jesus and Paul we are all slaves to sin. Meaning we are not responsible for our actions/We may not be the source of desire, origin for our acts, but yet we are still held to account for them Unless we have obtained the atonement in which Christ offers.

If we're not in control of our actions, how do we choose to follow Christ?

Were slaves in the 17th century Americas free to peruse their own wills? No. Does this mean they never were given choice?No again, as they were indeed given to limited choice/freedom.

Remember the bible never said we have 'free will' that is a 2000+ year old Greek philosophy that has been adopted by the christian religion in the last few hundred years. So in truth none of the rules of 'free will' apply to biblical Christianity (Christianity described by the bible.) The bible only ever identifies us as slaves. Meaning our will is anything but free, but like slaves we have been given over to make a few choices for ourselves.

The ablity to 'choose salvation' is one of them if God puts in a position to be called...

(July 7, 2016 at 2:39 pm)Drich Wrote:

(July 7, 2016 at 11:12 am)wallym Wrote: If we're not in control of our actions, how do we choose to follow Christ?

Were slaves in the 17th century Americas free to peruse their own wills? No. Does this mean they never were given choice?No again, as they were indeed given to limited choice/freedom.

Remember the bible never said we have 'free will' that is a 2000+ year old Greek philosophy that has been adopted by the christian religion in the last few hundred years. So in truth none of the rules of 'free will' apply to biblical Christianity (Christianity described by the bible.) The bible only ever identifies us as slaves. Meaning our will is anything but free, but like slaves we have been given over to make a few choices for ourselves.

The ablity to 'choose salvation' is one of them if God puts in a position to be called...

A choice is a choice.  You say God gives us the ability to choose in this situation, but if they were able to show nobody is every choosing anything, it still screws up your religion.

Alasdair Ham Wrote: It's very simple. Compatabilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism by defining free will in such a way that it is.

Right. It's not that I misunderstand that. I am trying to show that the categories and terminology offered by that sort of discussion are ultimately inadequately equipped to describe reality. If you adopt the language and terminology of that debate along with its reluctance to adequately distinguish, then you handicap yourself from the beginning.

Quote:The only potential within a deterministic universe is one physically possible future . . .  In determinism there is only one physically possible future at any given moment. You may imagine alternative possible futures, but within determinism there are no alternative possible futures there is only one possible future at any given moment . . . In determinism everything happens necessarily, and alternative possibilities are just within the imagination. It's all cause and effect . . . I defined determinism as the view that there is only one possible future. So there are no alternative futures, the one future that exists is necessary and determined. Have you not agreed to that definition?

Remember when I said that this debate fails to distinguish well, and I specifically mentioned necessity and determined as two different concepts which are readily conflated? Allow me to offer a 'higher resolution' view of the discussion.

Necessary thing/act: This thing/act exists/obtains in any and every possible world. In any and every possible world, it cannot NOT exist/obtain. Its not existing/occurring is NOT a real possibility.

Determined thing/act: Only this thing/act exists/obtains according to the relevant determining factors of its particular world. In some possible worlds it exists/obtains while in other possible worlds it does not exist/obtain. Its not existing/obtaining is a real possibility, and its actual existing/obtaining is determined relevant causal factors.

Determinism:

If each moment in a cosmic causal history is determined by the cosmic moment immediately preceding it, then that cosmic history is a determined one. 

a) If some other/different cosmic causal history impossible, then this determined cosmic history is also a necessary cosmic history.

b) If some other/different cosmic causal history is possible, then this determined cosmic history is also a contingent cosmic history.

Do you think the causal history of our cosmos is the only possible one, or is it one actualized possibility out of several?

Quote:The agent is capable [1] of engaging in any of those options but only one of the options will be taken. [2]

The agent is both capable [1] of different options, but is determined to only one of them [2]. 

So when someone asks, "Could the agent have taken a different option?"

How do you choose which sense to answer the question? 1 or 2? If you go with (1), then the answer to the question is 'yes'. If you go with (2), then the answer is 'no'. Unless you distinguish between contingency (the sense of 1) and determination (the sense of 2), then you will enter into a fruitless back and forth based on equivocation like you recorded in a previous post (notice how necessity can't enter a discussion unless the answer to the sense of (1) is 'no').

If an agent is capable of different action in the sense that said agent could be determined to that action given the requisite circumstances, then self-determination and freedom may still be on the table (if they could be shown to play a part in the determination of action). 

If, however, an agent is NOT capable of different action in the sense that said agent could not be determined to that action given the requisite circumstances, then any determination at all, much less self-determination have ceased to be factors in the action itself, and with them, freedom.

So until you can adequately speak about those distinctions, you can't even begin to talk about self-determination, will, freedom, or whatever else.

Quote:In determinism there is one future Y. And that future is caused by the one past X. Everything is contingent upon that. [1] What do you mean both a determined and contingent manner? [2] There is no in-between here, either determinism is true or it is false, either we are determined like the rest of the universe or we are not. [3] 

1) Yes, but if it is contingent on that, then the future Y does not happen by necessity (necessity being the contradiction of contingent). If it is contingent upon that, then that means other possibilities are REAL and not illusory.

2) See above (b).

3) I agree, but like I said, your reluctance to distinguish between "determined" and "necessary" and "contingent" is preventing you from accounting for all of the details. Determinism is true, i.e. the conditions of the present(X) determine the future(Y). Different conditions in present(X) would determine a different future(D). If that is the case, X => Y does not happen necessarily, instead, X => Y is contingent upon a particular set of conditions in present(X).

(July 7, 2016 at 10:01 am)Alasdair Ham Wrote: I need to know if you are a compatibilist because I need to know if you think free will is compatible with determinism or if you think that if determinism is true it means free will is impossible.

Those terms (as used in the compatibilism debate) can't adequately account for my position. I can't answer your question as stated according to your understanding of the terms because what you mean by compatibilism is based also on your understanding of determinism and necessity which I do not find adequate (and we haven't even begun to tease out the details about freedom, self-determination and will).

(July 7, 2016 at 2:39 pm)Drich Wrote: The bible only ever identifies us as slaves. Meaning our will is anything but free, but like slaves we have been given over to make a few choices for ourselves. The ablity to 'choose salvation' is one of them if God puts in a position to be called...

"Ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall set you free." - John 8:32

@ Ignorant

You're overcomplicating things hugely. It's not necessary to talk about other possible determined universes, we are talking about the universe we do live in and are asking if it is predetermined, and then asking what that says about free will. There is a reason that the philosophy debate falls into four positions: Hard Determinism, Soft Determinism/Compatabilism, Libertarian Incompatabilism and Hard Incompatabilism

Unless you agree these are the four possibilities regarding "free will" we are at an impasse:

1. There is at any given moment one physically possible future in this universe and for this reason we don't have free will. (Hard Determinism)
2. There is at any given moment one physically possible future in this universe but we still have free will. (Soft Determinism/Compatabilism)
3. There is more than one physically possible future in this universe and for this reason we have free will. (Libertarianism Incompatabilism)
4. There is perhaps more than one physically possible future in this universe but we still don't have free will. (Hard Incompatabilism)

I'm a Hard Incompatabilist. But I believe this world is determined, and I take the hard rather than soft determinist position.