(August 11, 2009 at 8:14 pm)Rhizomorph13 Wrote: So personal experience AND the cosmological argument for the existence of god? Ok, I think I understand what you are saying. Everything appears to have a cause so there must be a first cause. What is wrong with "The Big Bang" as a first cause? Why the extra step of a non-contigent being starting it all?

First, there is no one "cosmological argument"; rather, that is a whole class of arguments. Second, I have several arguments, only one out of which might be called in the class of cosmological arguments. Third, any such arguments are irrelevant to this thread, since this is about what we can know on a foundational level, that is, properly basic beliefs, not propositionally evidenced beliefs, so please reserve that to the already-existing threads about it.

(August 11, 2009 at 6:01 pm)Jon Paul Wrote: I did.. I'll quote my reply

Ok sorry, I didn't see it - and I looked too. My bad.

(August 10, 2009 at 7:49 pm)Jon Paul Wrote: Philosophical zombies is not a claim which requires evidence on the point of minds, in contradistinction to the claim that we do have minds.

1. If p-zeds are really behaviorally indistingusible then so is their brain activity, they are behaviorally indistinguisble in every way, so they must have consciousness too, so they're not p-zeds, and therefore they can't actually exist.

2. If they are in any way different, if they are more dumbed down and 'zombie like' then they're an exception I would require evidence for of course. But I assume that's not what you're claiming. You claim they are behaviorally identical, therefore they can't actually exist according to '1.'

Quote:For everything that philosophical zombies predict of human behaviour is verifiable and holds true.

Including what goes on in the brain. If I had my consciousness stripped off I would not be identical to a p-zed, therefore if they are identical, they must have consciousness and therefore not actually be p-zeds.

Quote:Whereas, the idea that others have minds is an unverifiable presupposition based on personal inclination to that generalisation.

They are more or less behaviorally indistinguisble, so this is evidence they have minds. Because brain behavior is still behavior.

Quote:Of course it doesn't prove it, because it's not a claim which needs to be proven, as it is readily verifiable that what philosophical zombies does predict does occur. That does not prove the exclusion of mind; but it proves that postulating mind in others is unnecessary, is to claim more than needed to explain the same fact, and the only really important thing - is unverifiable.

Philosophical zombies are behaviorally distingusible from humans, so that includes the brain. So the whole concept of a p-zed is incoherent.

If p-zeds weren't conscious then they wouldn't be indistinguisble. Because I only have evidence of my consciousness, not that it's in anyway a seperate phenonmenon that has no effects on anything else. If I lose my consciousness, I'm unconscious, and if I'm unconscious then I'm not behaviorlly the same. If p-zeds don't have consciousness, then they can't possibily be behaviorally indistingusble, so by their definition they can't exist.

Quote: And importantly, it is externally unverifiable, and only an internal surprise.

It's externally unverifiable because it's not there. It's a mere assumption that consciousness is a separate property that you can 'find'. There's no self-evidence for that. I only have self-evidence of consciousness. Not that it's 'my' consciousness, conciousness is the 'me'.

There's nothing to search for. There's no reason to believe consciousness is any more than the workings of the brain or part of it, etc. When I get knocked out cold, my consciousness is effected. There's no reason to believe consciousness is anything more than this physical stuff. It's a mere assumpiton, an illusion - that consciousnes is somehow 'more than that.' There's not only no external evidnece of 'consciousness' being a thing in itself an extra layer...there's not even any self evidence!.

There's self-evidence of consciousness. Not that it's seperate in itself. Not that it can be stripped off from the rest of the brain. So p-zeds are incoherent.

Daniel Dennet doesn't address the points I've raised, and I have already read much of what he has to say about consciousness and qualia, which largely adds absolutely nothing to our understanding of these phenomena[/quote] Because there is no evidence of such phenomena. Not even self-evidence.

There's self-evidence of consciousness, but not as it existing as a seperate phenomena to your brain. When you get knocked unconscious, this shows that consciousness is effected when your brain is. But there is no evidence of the existence of consciousness or qualia as a seperate phenomena. Not even self-evidence. Only the belief in such. There's no evidence - not even self-evidence - of any 'extra thing' 'called consciousness'.

EvF

(August 12, 2009 at 1:02 pm)EvidenceVsFaith Wrote: 1. If p-zeds are really behaviorally indistingusible then so is their brain activity, they are behaviorally indistinguisble in every way, so they must have consciousness too, so they're not p-zeds, and therefore they can't actually exist.

To conclude this, you must first prove the hidden (and unverifiable) premise: that brain activity causally necessitates consciousness in a brain whose proposed consciousness is outside of your empirical observational ability and conscious experience.

(August 11, 2009 at 6:00 pm)Rhizomorph13 Wrote: JP is right in his assertion that solipsism is a simpler reality than an actual physical universe because it does not accept that anything is real except the "mind" which is a disembodied thing, in the solipsist reality, that has no nead of a brain to perceive anything. No interactions, no system, and no OS because not even the brain that contains the mind is considered provable.

No he's not ... it doesn't matter in the slightest what the solipsist claims (we all know that making a claim means sod all unless it's supported by evidence), this is about a real comparison.

Kyu

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(August 11, 2009 at 4:28 pm)Jon Paul Wrote:

(August 11, 2009 at 4:15 pm)Kyuuketsuki Wrote: I am NOT INTERESTED in arguing any of your crap about solipsism ... it wasn't necessary to argue when we were discussing virtualisation/dreaming/real vs. unreal before, it isn't necessary now! You are using it as a shield!

In short, you are not interested in dealing with the fact that solipsism is much simpler than realism, and proposes much less complexity, yet is empirically the same.

No it is not for reasons already outlined and that you have repeatedly sidestepped.

Kyu

(August 12, 2009 at 2:49 pm)Jon Paul Wrote: To conclude this, you must first prove the hidden (and unverifiable) premise: that brain activity causally necessitates consciousness in a brain whose proposed consciousness is outside of your empirical observational ability and conscious experience.

My consciousness gets effected when my brain does. If I get hit on the head hard enough I get knocked unconscious. There's no evidence of anything further so there's no reason to beleve consciousness is separate to the brain.

I have no self-evidence that I have the property of conscious, only that I'm conscious. There's no reason to believe in the property of conscious, that it's something in itself, there's no reason to believe that it's anything more than the workings of my brain - IOW there's no reason to believe it's anything extra, that it's an extra phenomenon seperate to htat. I already know that my consciousness gets effected when my brain does. There's no evidence to anything further.

EvF

(August 11, 2009 at 7:32 pm)Jon Paul Wrote:

(August 11, 2009 at 6:53 pm)Rhizomorph13 Wrote: Do you assert that God exists because you have had personal, unverifiable, experience with him?

If you mean exclusively, then no. I believe I have two kinds of knowledge of God.

One is verifiable, rational propositional evidence that establishes the existence of God as highly probably, regardless of other kinds of knowledge. In other words, rational arguments for Gods existence.

These do not qualify as verifiable evidence because the same system of reasoning has been used to argue for other things that you do not believe in (would reject) and also the exact opposite ... it is therefore pointless!

(August 11, 2009 at 7:32 pm)Jon Paul Wrote: But I also believe that belief in God wholly aside from the propositional evidence is warranted by properly basic belief.

Basic beliefs are another word for foundational beliefs. Basic beliefs are beliefs that are believed without being inferred from any other belief or evidence. But they are only properly basic if the belief is either self-evident or incorrigible for the person who holds them. "I think therefore I am" is an example of a basic belief, because it is not inferred from any other belief or evidence, and properly basic belief, because it is both incorrigible and self-evident to the person who holds it.

So because someone believes, for no apparent reason (absolute bullshit BTW), it counts as evidence ... that's just a variation on the fallacious argument from popularity.

(August 11, 2009 at 7:32 pm)Jon Paul Wrote: That is essentially the same kind of belief, as the belief that you have or are a conscious mind, and is properly basic, though externally unverifiable because philosophical zombies are externally and empirically equivalent and no means of demonstration exist to distinguish a conscious person over a philosophical zombie. The belief that reality exists is properly basic, though internally unverifiable, because solipsism fits the same empirical data and with less complexity. The belief that God exists is properly basic, though externally unverifiable, because no means of demonstration exist to externally determine whether you have had a revelation from God, except an equivalent revelation from God.

No it's not because, whilst reality is an assumption, everything so far gleaned about it hangs together, makes sense, operates from consistent rules etc. etc. etc. everything about your god (and the thousands upon thousands of others) doesn't have any real logic or consistency to it at all.

Kyu

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(August 12, 2009 at 2:49 pm)Jon Paul Wrote:

(August 12, 2009 at 1:02 pm)EvidenceVsFaith Wrote: 1. If p-zeds are really behaviorally indistingusible then so is their brain activity, they are behaviorally indistinguisble in every way, so they must have consciousness too, so they're not p-zeds, and therefore they can't actually exist.

To conclude this, you must first prove the hidden (and unverifiable) premise: that brain activity causally necessitates consciousness in a brain whose proposed consciousness is outside of your empirical observational ability and conscious experience.

Brain activity is directly related to physical brain function as demonstrated by thousands of medical conditions/damage scenarios ... when physical brain activity is affected (through damage or positive change ... brain function (mind) changes as well.

There is absolutely no evidence supporting the idea that mind is in some way separate from body/brain.

Kyu

(August 12, 2009 at 4:01 pm)Kyuuketsuki Wrote: it doesn't matter in the slightest what the solipsist claims (we all know that making a claim means sod all unless it's supported by evidence),

That is a non-argument. It doesn't matter in the slightest what the realist claims.

Because in fact, the realist claims more than the solipsist.

(August 12, 2009 at 4:08 pm)EvidenceVsFaith Wrote: I have no self-evidence that I have the property of conscious, only that I'm conscious.

It's immediately self-evidential that you are conscious. There is no evidence that it is a property of anything; there is only the conscious experience of it as a state, and the knowledge that it depends on the brain. On the other hand, there is absolutely no evidence that the brain depends on consciousness, or that the brain causally necessitates consciousness.

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(August 12, 2009 at 4:15 pm)Kyuuketsuki Wrote: These do not qualify as verifiable evidence because the same system of reasoning has been used to argue for other things that you do not believe in

The arguments all reach the conclusion of a transcendent God, who transcends the universe and everything in it, including space, time, and matter, which I do believe in, as a theist. The arguments cannot be used to support anything other than this, nor are they intended to do so. For instance, no where does the argument support the notion of FSM or pink unicorns.

(August 12, 2009 at 4:15 pm)Kyuuketsuki Wrote: So because someone believes, for no apparent reason (absolute bullshit BTW), it counts as evidence ...

No, that is not what it states. It states that a basic belief is a belief which is not inferred from any other belief, like "I think therefore I am", and a properly basic belief is a belief which is not inferred from anything else, and is self-evident and incorrigible to the person who holds it, again like, "I think therefore I am". Unless you are willing to dispute the truth of "I think therefore I am", you have no reason to dispute proper basicality.

(August 12, 2009 at 4:27 pm)Jon Paul Wrote:

(August 12, 2009 at 4:01 pm)Kyuuketsuki Wrote: it doesn't matter in the slightest what the solipsist claims (we all know that making a claim means sod all unless it's supported by evidence),

That is a non-argument. It doesn't matter in the slightest what the realist claims.

Yet in point of fact it does ... for the many reasons I have already given:

(August 10, 2009 at 4:10 pm)Kyuuketsuki Wrote: You think I care if it's complete different from what *you* said???? You think I give a rats arse about your metaphysical posturing? Seriously? You and I don't speak the same language, we talk past each other and the only reason I keep on at you is, I suppose, because I can ... I don't understand your mind and genuinely don't want to, you think in ways that make absolutely no sense to me (not in the sense that I can't understand it, more that I don't get it ... in a philosophical sense if you wish). Oh, don't make the mistake of thinking that implies you are right, it doesn't I'm advancing the only point that matters to me ... that a virtual universe opf any description would necessarily be more complex than one that was real and judging from your continued retreat into hyper-bollocks I consider my point well made, you don't appear to be able to deal with it.

Let me say it to you again, since you are apparently having some problems understanding (I'll list it point-wise to make it a little clearer):

• If you have a scenario (and I likened this to a computer and it's operating system) it has two basic layers of complexity, the real universe (physical or hardware) and my view of it (my mind or an OS). That is 2 levels of complexity.
  
• If that scenario is virtualised it needs, somewhere, something or someone to host it (to run the scenario, to make it work correctly etc. etc.) and that support has to have its own operating system or mind PLUS its own physical support. That's another 2 levels ... even if you assume (as I'm sure you would) that it is unsupported it's still 1 level.

In other words, in order to virtualise our universe, either as a dream or a simulation (regardless of whether we can detect anything or not) someone or something has to be or to build something more complex ... a 4 (at best for you a 3) layer model because, even if the support layers were less complex in themselves they are still supporting the exact same level of complexity of our universe therefore IN TOTO, we have a more complex scenario.

As I said before the whole virtualised system must necessarily be more complex than the basic physical universe because it not only has to run the simulation it has to run itself!!!!!!

IOW, bringing it back to my original point, a physical universe is simpler therefore an assumption that I the universe is real is more logical than not.

Kyu

(August 12, 2009 at 4:37 pm)Kyuuketsuki Wrote: Yet in point of fact it does ... for the many reasons I have already given:

(August 10, 2009 at 4:10 pm)Kyuuketsuki Wrote: You think I care if it's complete different from what *you* said???? You think I give a rats arse about your metaphysical posturing? Seriously? You and I don't speak the same language, we talk past each other and the only reason I keep on at you is, I suppose, because I can ... I don't understand your mind and genuinely don't want to, you think in ways that make absolutely no sense to me (not in the sense that I can't understand it, more that I don't get it ... in a philosophical sense if you wish). Oh, don't make the mistake of thinking that implies you are right, it doesn't I'm advancing the only point that matters to me ... that a virtual universe opf any description would necessarily be more complex than one that was real and judging from your continued retreat into hyper-bollocks I consider my point well made, you don't appear to be able to deal with it.

Let me say it to you again, since you are apparently having some problems understanding (I'll list it point-wise to make it a little clearer):

• If you have a scenario (and I likened this to a computer and it's operating system) it has two basic layers of complexity, the real universe (physical or hardware) and my view of it (my mind or an OS). That is 2 levels of complexity.
  
• If that scenario is virtualised it needs, somewhere, something or someone to host it (to run the scenario, to make it work correctly etc. etc.) and that support has to have its own operating system or mind PLUS its own physical support. That's another 2 levels ... even if you assume (as I'm sure you would) that it is unsupported it's still 1 level.

In other words, in order to virtualise our universe, either as a dream or a simulation (regardless of whether we can detect anything or not) someone or something has to be or to build something more complex ... a 4 (at best for you a 3) layer model because, even if the support layers were less complex in themselves they are still supporting the exact same level of complexity of our universe therefore IN TOTO, we have a more complex scenario.

As I said before the whole virtualised system must necessarily be more complex than the basic physical universe because it not only has to run the simulation it has to run itself!!!!!!

IOW, bringing it back to my original point, a physical universe is simpler therefore an assumption that I the universe is real is more logical than not.

Rhizomorph sufficiently answered your vain allegories.

(August 11, 2009 at 6:00 pm)Rhizomorph13 Wrote: But Kyu,

Dagda birthed his idea about the non-existence of the universe, I labeled it solipsism, and here we are talking about that very thing.

JP is right in his assertion that solipsism is a simpler reality than an actual physical universe because it does not accept that anything is real except the "mind" which is a disembodied thing, in the solipsist reality, that has no nead of a brain to perceive anything. No interactions, no system, and no OS because not even the brain that contains the mind is considered [im]provable.

I think we all agree that it is not a valuable reality and certainly proves nothing.

Rhizo

(August 12, 2009 at 4:53 pm)Jon Paul Wrote: Rhizomorph sufficiently answered your vain allegories.

And I answered him BEFORE you posted this!

Kyu