That is a common criticism of compatibilism set aside say, hard determinism, that the difference is semantics.  It may often be the case, depending on which compatibilist and which determinist we have in mind......but it isn't necessarily or -always- the case.  Which is why clarification is required, and not confused.   

Quote: A person who acts on his will, without coercion, is in my view acting freely. You will probably assert that the genetic and environmental factors that shape a person's will are coercive but I rather find it more useful to draw a distinction between influences and compulsions, the latter negating free will in the sense that a person has no choice, real or imaginary, whereas the former allows for a decision to be made in accordance with the reasons and desires that the person themselves find most pleasant.

A useful distinction -for discussion- does not necessitate or demonstrate an -actual distinction- in the thing being discussed, though, eh?  That one allows you the convention of conversation to then -say- that a person has "free will" as distinct from not having it...is not actually any indicator of the reality of the situation.

For example, I could say "all of the girls I'm willing to call pretty will be group A, and all of the girls I am not will be group B" works -fine- for conversation....but it doesn't extend to "because I was willing to put a girl in group B in order to form a handy term for our discussion, this establishes that she is not pretty"

In considering this topic, I'm not interested in creating a conversational distinction in order to -allow- for something.  I'm looking to see whether or not the thing is actually present.  So, the difference between you and I, for example..if you're the compatibilist in question and I'm the determinist in question...is not semantics, it is in my abject disinterest in creating a definition for free will -based- upon semantics.  

Quote:   Take the terrorist who shot up the church in South Carolina, for example. We can diagnose him with mental illness and explain his behaviors as a result of his personal history, all of which is legitimate in tracing causes back to their roots. That doesn't change the fact that he acted of his own volition

The question is whether or not his volition is free...so I'm not sure how this declaration is supposed to further our understanding of free will, or each others positions?

Quote: ---no one strapped a bomb to his chest and forced him to behave in the way that he did.

Sure, no one (and maybe not even himself)........but did -some thing-?

Quote: Like Schopenhauer said, "I can do what I will: I can, if I will, give everything I have to the poor and thus become poor myself—if I will! But I cannot will this, because the opposing motives have much too much power over me for me to be able to.

Which seems to express a situation in which free will is absent. "I could totally do something...if only I could do it" -yeah, no shit..so...-can- you do it?

Quote:On the other hand, if I had a different character, even to the extent that I were a saint, then I would be able to will it. But then I could not keep from willing it, and hence I would have to do so."

See above.

Quote: He willed it, and as a result, acted upon it. He did not choose to will what he willed, but he chose to do what he willed, as in nobody else coerced him to do it.

-and my position doesn't dispute that people have a will(in fact, my position is comfortable granting will to a great deal more than just people and other animals)......though I could mount that case.....so telling me about all the things that people will does not help to answer my question.  Are the things that people will, -freely willed-?  Il;m comfortable with many, many limitations to will, coercive factors, and still, some core, some nugget, some unmoved mover.  I just don't see it.  

Quote: Perhaps you think that he could not have chosen otherwise, that the spindles of necessity do not allow for real possibility; I would only be inclined to agree if it was granted that he had no notion of right and wrong,

My position on will and free will is not a position on morality, as we have morality (or not) regardless of whether will is free....or not.

Quote: but I think even the most hardened sociopaths usually have something of a conscience, however distorted it may be. That's the nature of rationality, which separates us from brutes, even if it only exists in some minds to a depressingly small degree. And though some proclaim knowledge to be power, what they really mean is freedom.

It doesn't take any free will to leverage reason..and it may separate us from brutes, but it doesn't seem to separate us from things we don't traditionally describe as having a will at all, let alone a free one......I'm really not sure where you're going with this?  Computers have knowledge, they leverage the principles and relationships that we call "reason" when -we- express them....and as I said before, I'm actually fine with will, maybe computers have will too, just as they can reason......but....are they - or we- able to do so freely -why call this possession of knowledge freedom...in what way does possessing knowledge make a human being free - if it does not make a computer free...and if both are free....whats wrong with the computers free will, why is it malfunctioning?  We understand the operation of a computer to be a bit like tumblers in a lock.  Step 1, step 2, step 3, repeat.  It seems more and more, that this is just as true of ourselves.  Just what is free about this...beyond a distinction of utility, made to allow for the conversational convenience...of calling something "free will" while conversely not addressing the actual question...or simply asserting an answer in the affirmative?

To sum this whole post up much more succinctly. "Well, he did it, and no one else, so that's his free will" is more than a little bit vapid when the very question at hand is whether or not he -has- free will in the first place...to do anything with. I'm not disputing that people do things, I'm questioning the -manner- in which this is achieved.

Is it "step 1, step 2,...then magic happens...repeat"
or is it more like "step 1, step 2, step 3, repeat" ?

Does free will actually -exist-...or is it just a term you're using out of convenience for whatever we happen to be doing? Are you describing a situation where -an attribute or ability we have- is compatible with determinism...or or you describing a situation in which -language we may choose to use-....... is compatible with determinism, regardless of whether or not we possess the actual ability or attribute? I have to ask this, because a compatibilist might just be redefining the term, or he may believe that something about our minds gives us the ability to "bootstrap" ourselves, with regards to causality.

(June 19, 2015 at 5:41 pm)Rhythm Wrote: A useful distinction -for discussion- does not necessitate or demonstrate an -actual distinction- in the thing being discussed, though, eh?  That one allows you the convention of conversation to then -say- that a person has "free will" as distinct from not having it...is not actually any indicator of the reality of the situation.  I am not, in considering this topic, interested in creating a conversational distinction in order to -allow- for something.  I'm looking to see whether or not the thing is actually present.  So, the difference between you and I, for example..if you're the compatibilist in question and I'm the determinist in question...is not semantics, it is in my abject disinterest in creating a definition for free will -based- upon semantics.

I think both camps would agree that a definition of free will should be based on the empirical data. From my perspective, compatibilists think that hard determinism is too restrictive, and hard determinists think that free will is too overreaching. The difficulty is created by our experience of freedom, the nature of causality and the physics of the world, and the moral problems that arise from treating all destructive thoughts and actions as virtually tantamount to miniature brain tumors---which, if it was the case, would eliminate any rational basis for moral outrage or blame to be had on the part of offenders. 

Quote:The question is whether or not his volition is free...so I'm not sure how this declaration is supposed to further our understanding of free will, or each others positions?

I don't see a difference between volition and freedom so much as I do between conscious and unconscious volition, the latter more excusable when it commits harm. 

Quote:Sure, no one (and maybe not even himself)........but did -some thing-?

Per hard determinism, then yes... every time a person does something there is a mitigating excuse that lies outside the domain of the person themselves.

Quote:

Quote:Like Schopenhauer said, "I can do what I will: I can, if I will, give everything I have to the poor and thus become poor myself—if I will! But I cannot will this, because the opposing motives have much too much power over me for me to be able to.

Which seems to express a situation in which free will is absent.

Quote:On the other hand, if I had a different character, even to the extent that I were a saint, then I would be able to will it. But then I could not keep from willing it, and hence I would have to do so."

Which seems to express a situation in which free will is absent.

That's where we disagree. If someone were to intervene and restrain Schopenhauer from doing what his will compelled him to do, then he would no longer be free to do as he willed. Short of that, he is free to do as he wills (free will) even though his will is determined (compatibilism).

Quote:My position on will and free will is not a position on morality, as we have morality (or not) regardless of whether will is free....or not.

Actions that we determine---per our morals---to be wrong, on your view are no different than ill-health, which it would be absurd to hold any person responsible or to express outrage at them, rather than the sickness, considering a lack of choice in the matter.

Quote:I think both camps would agree that a definition of free will should be based on the empirical data

Okay...and that empirical data would also contain some clarification as to whether or not free will actually existed in the first place.  We're not talking about simply -defining- something into existence here, neither of us, right?

Quote:. From my perspective, compatibilists think that hard determinism is too restrictive, and hard determinists think that free will is too overreaching. 

I don't think it's over-reaching...I think it's non-existent as described.

Quote:The difficulty is created by our experience of freedom, the nature of causality and the physics of the world, and the moral problems that arise from treating all destructive thoughts and actions as virtually tantamount to miniature brain tumors---which, if it was the case, would eliminate any rational basis for moral outrage or blame to be had on the part of offenders. 

So what?...We should just accept it to be true not because it -is- true or that anyone can demonstrate it to be true...but to avoid some consequence that may or may not -actually- be relevant, or even..itself..existent...is this not the implication you're making?  Whether or not we have free will isn't even -capable- of touching our moral outrage...we have it, rational or not, free will or not, either way.  

Quote:I don't see a difference between volition and freedom so much as I do between conscious and unconscious volition, the latter more excusable when it commits harm. 

Then perhaps you're not actually -capable- of answering the question I'm asking? This sentence though, seems to suggest that "volition" actually isn't synonymous with freedom, that you do understand the difference, as things unconsciously done can hardly be said to be chosen or free...and yet you still call it volition.

Quote:Per hard determinism, then yes... every time a person does something there is a mitigating excuse that lies outside the domain of the person themselves.

Excuse....wtf are you talking about?  I thought we were discussing cause?

Quote:That's where we disagree. If someone were to intervene and restrain Schopenhauer from doing what his will compelled him to do, then he would no longer be free to do as he willed. Short of that, he is free to do as he wills (free will) even though his will is determined (compatibilism).

There would simply be -yet another- restriction placed upon him.  That sentence, though, Nestor...it isn't even mechanically workable. It ....makes..... no..... sense. If your will is determined by factors other than yourself...you aren't freely doing anything. If your self is, itself, determined by factors other than itself....even if you -were- determining things yourself...they still aren't free.

Quote:Actions that we determine---per our morals---to be wrong, on your view are no different than ill-health, which it would be absurd to hold any person responsible or to express outrage at them, rather than the sickness, considering a lack of choice in the matter.

We -do- express outrage at ill health and while we may not have a rational basis for that outrage the basis of that emotion -does- have a rational explanation...but I;m not sure how it's relevant.  Are we planning a ski trip....down some particularly slippery slope...Nestor?

You know what...correct me if I'm wrong, but you don't seem to be establishing the existence of free will as an attribute or ability so much as opining upon the utility of free will as a concept.  On this point (assuming the point) you and I are in complete agreement.  The concept has obvious utility.  I would, however, suggest that the sort of utility which we both appreciate in the concept is not unique to that concept, and that we could accomplish whatever it is that you think free will -as a concept- provides, while simultaneously leveraging a more robust justification for our actions. It may even be that a -more- useful and agreeable system can be designed -without- this idea of free will.

I probably could point to the problems that we run into, in grasping for this utility by leveraging the concept of free will.....but it's not like we don't (or couldn't) make specific considerations if and when those issues cropped up. After all, we already do.

Nestory, I'll avoid the quote wall, but I have a question:

How, exactly, would you define the difference between influences and compulsions? Does it really matter if the subtle waft of baked goods, barely noticed by me, inevitably causes me to buy some bread, or if my wife threatening to divorce me if I forget to buy fucking bread again inevitably causes me to buy some bread? Unless someone phsycially controls me, like with a brain implant or something, it seems that both purchases are an expression of my self-- specifically an expression of the self as it seeks to function well in its environment.

(June 19, 2015 at 7:00 pm)Rhythm Wrote: You know what...correct me if I'm wrong, but you don't seem to be establishing the existence of free will as an attribute or ability so much as opining upon the utility of free will as a concept.  On this point (assuming the point) you and I are in complete agreement.  The concept has obvious utility.  I would, however, suggest that the sort of utility which we both appreciate in the concept is not unique to that concept, and that we could accomplish whatever it is that you think free will -as a concept- provides, while simultaneously leveraging a more robust justification for our actions.  It may even be that a -more- useful and agreeable system can be designed -without- this idea of free will.  

I probably could point to the problems that we run into, in grasping for this utility by leveraging the concept of free will.....but it's not like we don't (or couldn't) make specific considerations if and when those issues cropped up.  After all, we already do.

I think we may have reached agreement! It seems like it's been awhile! 

But after further consideration of the arguments I was making in the previous post, I retract some of the statements I made as pig-headed. For one, even if we experience something we call freedom (which is something worth expanded discussion), out of ignorance of the determinants and the necessity involved, free will even as I would like to defend it (perhaps overreaching a bit myself) wouldn't alter the implications that determinism (hard or soft) has with regards to morality or personal responsibility. On the one hand, I find the concepts of "self" and "free will" difficult (or really impossible) to defend as (meta-)physical realities that coincide with the nature and physics of the world per empirical scrutiny, yet on the other hand the human experience, at least from a subjective point of view, seems to only make sense in light of them. So, I concede that you are probably right in this debate, and I'm probably incorrect in how I'm going about it (arguing for moral agency/responsibility and choice on the one hand, all the while conceding the "self" (as I've argued elsewhere) to be a useful imaginary construct, and determination of the will to be largely outside any choice of the individual). Perhaps "will" is too broad of a term as it encapsulates a variety of competing reasons, desires, and instincts.... and "wills" would be more proper... and only through a sort of internal dialogue in which the thought designated as "I" seems to reach a satisfactory conclusion, the concept of freedom emerges. Still, I'm a bit troubled by the idea of treating behaviors we deem destructive as akin to diseases induced by one's genetics or environment... but perhaps that's a bias I'd be better off to overcome?

(June 19, 2015 at 7:03 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Nestory, I'll avoid the quote wall, but I have a question:

How, exactly, would you define the difference between influences and compulsions?  Does it really matter if the subtle waft of baked goods, barely noticed by me, inevitably causes me to buy some bread, or if my wife threatening to divorce me if I forget to buy fucking bread again inevitably causes me to buy some bread?  Unless someone phsycially controls me, like with a brain implant or something, it seems that both purchases are an expression of my self-- specifically an expression of the self as it seeks to function well in its environment.

Yeah, that's something I kind of realize I waffled on a bit... the thing is, maybe there isn't a difference in reality other than the proximity and strength of the cause in relation to the present action, and yet, human beings seem entirely reasonable (don't they?) in making such distinctions when making moral judgments. Take A) a person who grows up in a fractured household in which they suffer physical, mental, emotional abuse and then later becomes an alcoholic sociopath, B) a person who grows up in a loving, affluent home and enjoys all the privileges a stable environment can supply but has an inflated sense of entitlement, and C), a person somewhere in between the lives of A and B but who unfortunately contracts a brain tumor in which they experience blackouts involving erratic behavior, and all three end up partaking in the gang rape and murder of a woman, are they all equally responsible...? ....and for which part? The crime itself? But if it was inevitable, how could they be? And if it wasn't inevitable, isn't that where free will should be inserted?

I wouldn't know if it would make you better off, but perhaps understanding the alternatives would -at the very least- isolate the most important portions of the framework to which you currently hold and to which we both give value, even if we don't both give it -truth value-.  Truth be told.....and I'm hoping to see just one more head pop up in this joint because the best comments on the matter always come from that corner (imo) the only "difference that makes a difference" between our current framework and it's attendant infrastructures (like prison systems) and one that does not contain the idea of free will, are those issues of morality and personal responsibility - and even there.....the effect isn't always so pronounced.  The difference, largely, is desert.  Getting what we deserve is just, and not getting what we deserve, is not.  

What, however, is the practical difference between incarcerating a criminal because it's "the punishment he deserves", and incarcerating a criminal so that he is not capable of repeating the offense with a new victim?  To my mind, very little....but to a person with a deep-seated adherence to the idea of desert (not that you're such a person, only as an example)...I understand that the difference seems a -fair bit larger-.  Because I value preventing a repeat of the crime more than I value ensuring that some one "gets what they deserve"...and because I see how wrong we can go, and how often we go that route when we really sit down and ferment in our juices about what some "bad guy" deserves......again, provided that I have an alternative structure which can -at least- provide the effect valuable to me and present in the current system...I start to wonder (and I've got a utilitarian streak myself you'll notice) whether or not it might be a better idea to structure our prison systems in a way that does not not defer to the notion of  notion of desert...even if we do have free will and hard moral responsibility.  I see it as erring on the side of caution, in a situation where an error would cost me/us nothing, practically speaking.  

It's not all doom and gloom, of course.  Susie deserves praise because she applied herself, of her own free will, to her history exam and aced it.  Now, without desert (and free will, responsibility, volition, etc) it may seem strange...what are we praising?  Oddly enough, I would ask a similar question.  -Why- are we praising? Recognition, encouragement?  I don't have to  refer to her free will or her volition to recognize that she has done -precisely what she did.  She aced that test.  Similarly, it doesn't actually matter whether or not Susie is a freely acting agent or simply happens to be a "historobot" model of human being...I'm going to want to encourage that application of her talents.  She isn't -just- a historobot, after all.....and if we want to see her achieve (and potential enrich herself and the rest of us immeasurably with her ability someday) -something- has to keep applying her to that task...rather than some other one.  Praising a person -works- to keep them achieving, to keep -them- working, even if some of the underpinning concepts have been misidentified or misapprehended (not saying they have been...just noticing that it;s efficacy is not necessarily tied to it's justification).

Just for starters.

(I think that people seem entirely reasonable when they make these distinctions because our brains are reasoning organs, biological universal machines....what else would we be -but- reasonable, insomuch as our architecture allows? Couldn't help but insert myself here, lol. Just because something -isn't- inevitable, that doesn't mean that we have a say in how events play out, so no, I wouldn't insert anything there - though an empty space accomodates just about anything, so I'm sure we could -fit- free will there.)

Re Nestor and his team of rapists:
I think you hit on why this is a somewhat important subject.  If it is inevitable, then how could they be indeed?  We've created this vast system of judgement based on a possibly make believe idea.

It seems as though people are catching on to it as well.  We see the identity stuff in the news.  Louis CK's SNL monologue on child molesting.  The studying of brains of psychopaths.  

All these things are pointing towards the same idea that we are much more at the mercy of our own biology than we would like to think.

Free will. Temptation and action towards that temptation are one side. Bad. The brain can rationalize things in the moment and you will be completely on board with that rational. You trick yourself, lie to yourself, and justify to ones self in distorted ways. Inner evil.
The ability to spot temptation, or self manipulation and rectify it either after putting thought into it, or instantaneously as in instinct, or even after the fact is the inner good. A complete lack of regard towards an outcome outwardly or in ones self is chaos. We can know that something is absolutely horrible and do nothing about it. We can observe a possible benefit and not act on it with no real justification.

So those are three sides to our will.
Is it free? Yes. Only people that are actively fooling themselves would think otherwise in order to falsely justify there life actions or the lack there of.

No offence to anyoneatall meant.