Hypothetically, science proves free will isn't real

[Foxaèr]

Free will is very real.

I cannot understand the aversion to it.

Free will is just the ability to choose from left or right.

Free will is the individual's choice between one option or another, so long as two or more options are available.

[Edwardo Piet]

Do you believe free will is real because you believe the future is not predetermined or do you believe free will is real even if it isn't?

[Foxaèr]

Do you believe free will is real because you believe the future is not predetermined or do you believe free will is real even if it isn't?

That has nothing do do with free will.

Free will is the decision made in the moment.

[Edwardo Piet]

Nothing to do with it... meaning you think we have free will even if we are predetermined by cause and effect no matter what?

If yes then that means you're a compatibilist because you believe free will is compatabile with determinism.

I believe in that free will, it's trivially true and nothing special. Still means we can't will otherwise.

[Ignorant]

@ Ignorant

You're overcomplicating things hugely. It's not necessary to talk about other possible determined universes, we are talking about the universe we do live in and are asking if it is predetermined, [1] and then asking what that says about free will. [2] There is a reason that the philosophy debate falls into four positions: Hard Determinism, Soft Determinism/Compatabilism, Libertarian Incompatabilism and Hard Incompatabilism [3]

Unless you agree these are the four possibilities regarding "free will" we are at an impasse: [4]

1. There is at any given moment one physically possible future in this universe and for this reason we don't have free will. (Hard Determinism) [4]
2. There is at any given moment one physically possible future in this universe but we still have free will. (Soft Determinism/Compatabilism) [4]
3. There is more than one physically possible future in this universe and for this reason we have free will. (Libertarianism Incompatabilism) [4]
4. There is perhaps more than one physically possible future in this universe but we still don't have free will. (Hard Incompatabilism) [4]

I'm a Hard Incompatabilist. But I believe this world is determined, and I take the hard rather than soft determinist position.

1) 'Predetermined' by what? If one state of things X determines a new state of things Y, and had X been different, so would Y, then you are not talking about a necessary causal history. You are talking about a contingent and determined causal history which you are irrationally proposing as a necessary and determined one. If that is the case, then your discussion about the details of determination (e.g. what role, if any, does the personal will play in determining Y?) will import this false premise and prevent you from approaching anything resembling an adequate depiction of reality.

If however, you maintain that the state of things X determines a new state of things Y, and a different X is a logical impossibility (not merely a historical impossibility), then you ARE talking about a determined AND necessary causal history. If that is the case, then your discussion about the details of determination (e.g. what role, if any, does the personal will play in determining Y?) will inevitably be confusing to people who hold to the above sort of determinism. Unless you distinguish between the two... then you are bound for frustration and the ever common equivocating and poor dialogue.

2) I don't see how you can discuss well the role free will might play in determining action when we can't even discuss well the details of determining action in general.

3) Yes, there are many reasons for this, that doesn't mean those reasons are good for philosophy.

4) In determinism, what determines the one physically possible future from among the several metaphysically possible futures? Are there metaphysically possible futures? Doesn't that seem like an important question to ask?

If some things determine the next set of things, then the human will, if it exists, MIGHT be one of those determining things, or not. If it is, then either it determines contingently or necessarily. Whether contingently or necessarily, you can finally consider whether or not it determines freely. 

If all things, together, determine the next set of things, then the human will, if it exists, is DEFINITELY contributing to the determination of the next set of things. If it is, then either it determines contingently or necessarily. Whether contingently or necessarily, you can finally consider whether or not it determines freely.

This distinguishing questions make a difference for the final conclusion of the will's free vs. non-free determination or its determination at all.

[Edwardo Piet]

1) 'Predetermined' by what?

By the one causal chain of prior causes in this one possible universe. Predetermined by causality.

If one state of things X determines a new state of things Y, and had X been different, so would Y, then you are not talking about a necessary causal history. You are talking about a contingent and determined causal history which you are irrationally proposing as a necessary and determined one.

What do you mean irrationally? The future is determined from the past, cause and effect. That makes sense if there is only one possible future.

If there is only one possible future then that future is necessary. If that future is fully predetermined by prior causes then that future is indeed contigent upon those prior causes. But that's what it means to have one physically possible predetermined future predetermined by prior causes.That's what it means to have one existential reality of cause and effect.

If however, you maintain that the state of things X determines a new state of things Y, and a different X is a logical impossibility (not merely a historical impossibility), then you ARE talking about a determined AND necessary causal history.

I'm not talking about logical possibility or impossibility. That's why I said I define determinism as "in any given moment there is exactly one physically possible future".

2) I don't see how you can discuss well the role free will might play in determining action when we can't even discuss well the details of determining action in general.

None of it is relevant if you think free will is something beyond causality and special and something that isn't compatible with determinism. And it's not relevant if you think free will is compatible with determinism either: because then we're in an agreement, I also think a free will compatible with determinism exists. I just don't think it's worth calling "free will". So that would be another conversation.

rememberWhen I say "determinism" I am talking only about the definition of determinism that I defined for you. All this talk about other ways to define it isn't doing either of us any favors because I am still trying to get a simple "yes" or "no" to my question "Do you accept my definition that determinism is the belief that "in any given moment there is exactly one physically possible future".

And also, everytime you say "free will" or "determinism" it makes no sense to me until I actually know what kind of free will you are talking about and until I know if you accept my definition of determinism.

When I make a premise that is where I am starting. If I don't know if you even accept that premise then when you talk about all these details I don't even know if you have agreed to define them the way I have or not.... and if you haven't and you haven't defined your own premises and definitions then we're both just talking past each other.

4) In determinism, what determines the one physically possible future from among the several metaphysically possible futures? Are there metaphysically possible futures? Doesn't that seem like an important question to ask?

Not really it's still just avoiding the basic question.

Okay here's two things in response to it though, I'm not going to ignore it:

1. What would a "metaphysically possible future" even mean opposed to a physically possible one?

2. As far as I know metaphysics is about ontology, it's about being and it's also about "physics beyond physics", it's about the philosophy of physics.... I'm literally saying there is only one physically possible future in every physical way. This includes metaphysical. If you believe in immaterial non-material reality I am saying there is only one immaterial non-physical possible future too. I'm simply saying that there is ONE reality with one unbroken causal chain that connects causes and effects leading to THE..... one possible future.

Look, if my own words suck at explaining I'll give you Wikipedia:

Determinism is the philosophical doctrine that all events transpire in virtue of some necessity and are therefore inevitable. Traditionally, the view relies on strict notions of causality, and most philosophical arguments in its favor have attempted at clear definitions of cause and effect as a basis for the belief that determinism is true. Notably, the idea that the past choices of seemingly rational agents could have been performed differently - or even the idea that the future decisions of such agents will turn out to be other than what they will - is usually challenged under this view. Thus, the "problem" of free will - or the idea of free will as being an "illusion" - often arises as a result of the main claim made by determinism, that is, that the past, present, and future is identifiable with an essentially unbreakable chain of circumstances of which no single link in such a chain could possibly be avoided or altered.

So do you believe free will is compatible with determinism or not?

[henryp]

Free will is very real.

I cannot understand the aversion to it.

Free will is just the ability to choose from left or right.

Free will is the individual's choice between one option or another, so long as two or more options are available.

Options appear available from our perspective, but theoretically, they may not be.  

Like a stone rolling down a hill towards a tree.  It appears it may hit the tree, or miss the tree.  But the reality is that based on physics, it may be impossible for it to hit the tree.  

That's the same idea with humans.  We think we are choosing from left or right.  But the physics of the little neurons firing in our brains says that in this situation, we could never choose left.

[Edwardo Piet]

Very well explained.

And again:

Determinism is the philosophical doctrine that all events transpire in virtue of some necessity and are therefore inevitable. Traditionally, the view relies on strict notions of causality, and most philosophical arguments in its favor have attempted at clear definitions of cause and effect as a basis for the belief that determinism is true. Notably, the idea that the past choices of seemingly rational agents could have been performed differently - or even the idea that the future decisions of such agents will turn out to be other than what they will - is usually challenged under this view. Thus, the "problem" of free will - or the idea of free will as being an "illusion" - often arises as a result of the main claim made by determinism, that is, that the past, present, and future is identifiable with an essentially unbreakable chain of circumstances of which no single link in such a chain could possibly be avoided or altered. Some determinists deny the idea of any true "possibility" or "randomness" within reality altogether, even asserting that such ideas are only a creation of the mind and/or merely the result of imagination - ultimately a result of ignorance in the face of real explanations for such phenomena - which could otherwise, in principle, be discovered by either reason or empirical experimentation.

(my bolding)

[LivingNumbers6.626]

Actually, that would make me a believer, perhaps an adherer to predestination, as this would affirm a higher pattern in the universe, as all choices have already been made for me, time to relax, I'm damned either way...(kidding of course.)

[Drich]

Were slaves in the 17th century Americas free to peruse their own wills? No. Does this mean they never were given choice?No again, as they were indeed given to limited choice/freedom.

Remember the bible never said we have 'free will' that is a 2000+ year old Greek philosophy that has been adopted by the christian religion in the last few hundred years. So in truth none of the rules of 'free will' apply to biblical Christianity (Christianity described by the bible.) The bible only ever identifies us as slaves. Meaning our will is anything but free, but like slaves we have been given over to make a few choices for ourselves.

The ablity to 'choose salvation' is one of them if God puts in a position to be called...

A choice is a choice.  You say God gives us the ability to choose in this situation, but if they were able to show nobody is every choosing anything, it still screws up your religion.

Again Slaves were given limited choice from time to time. So does that mean they had free will?

A choice or several choices from time to time is not the same as free will.