On Hell and Forgiveness

[The Grand Nudger]

Either you have to show why the mathematical analogy doesn't apply or you have to admit your argument is nonsense.

The correct analogy considers one the largest number because it represents the highest degree of unity possible.

---

Some of us don't have a belief that needs servicing or maintenance.

Yeah, its easier to never examine one's convictions.

I'm not sure what conviction of mine you think needs reexamining or hasn't been continuously reexamined, or how that comment is at all relevant to the quoted text.

Examining ones convictions and compartmentalization aren't the same things.  You compartmentalize the dumb shit and assume there must be some explanation for dumb shit, somewhere.  I note that it won't matter if there is, because it's still explaining dumb shit.  

OFC there are reasons that the various authors of magic book said dumb shit.  OFC some of the reasons that the various auithors of magic book said dumb shit is because the other authors of magic book also said dumb shit.   

-And?

[Angrboda]

@Steve:

There's a Vikings football game tonight, and between that and other matters, I doubt I will get around to replying to your latest replies tonight.

In the absence of such, I'll simply make two quick notes. First, my hypothetical about God appearing to the world was a straightforward POE argument, not simply "if I were God." Any response to it then needs to be on those terms. Second, you still do not seem to understand either that the question of there being an objective basis for greater than judgements is not an epistemological problem, as well as providing no objective basis for your belief that such things as what a conscious being would find preferable are not subjective criteria. Where things become epistemological is that lacking an argument for an objective basis of any of these preferences, you could equally as effectively disprove my claim that there are no objective greater than relationships by providing one counter-example. Then it does become an epistemological as well as a practical question. As of yet, you haven't provided any that appear to withstand scrutiny. You assert that certain things are greater than other things, but beyond the assertion, you haven't given any reason supporting your assertion. Assertions by themselves are not sufficient.

As to the God that kills babies, both you and Neo seem to be misunderstanding my intent. I'm not in any way suggesting that Yahweh kills babies for no reason. In fact, just the opposite. I am conceding that Yahweh does not do this, ex hypothesi. The challenge is to provide an objective basis for saying that Yahweh is greater than a God that does. In order to do that, you need to do (at least) two things. First, show that it is objectively wrong to kill babies for no reason, and my god is therefore immoral, and second, that being moral is objectively greater than not being moral. In the absence of either of those, you've failed to show that Yahweh is greater than the god who kills babies for no reason. I haven't fully thought it through, but upon first glance, any attempt to argue that morality has an objective basis because God is objectively moral would seem to be circular and begging the question. (I think, anyway. If you disagree, then we can discuss it.)

Anyway, I'll try to respond more fully, especially concerning why your counter-examples of great-making properties don't, at another time. In the meantime, I'll just offer the following for your consideration. In seeking to establish that something has an objective basis, it seems a misstep to appeal to what a conscious being would want, as that appears to lead you into subjectivity. To properly demonstrate that this is greater than that, you would need to show that the sun, the moon, and the stars would rather that any god have this rather than that. However, since the sun, the moon, and the stars have neither wants nor preferences, proving that would seem impossible.

Anyway, until then.

[The Grand Nudger]

In seeking to establish that something has an objective basis, it seems a misstep to appeal to what a conscious being would want, as that appears to lead you into subjectivity.

Is it impossible for a subjective being to want or be aware of things that are objectively good or greater than?  If I have a choice between one strawberry or two strawberries for $1...I pick two strawberries, that's the better deal. 2 is greater than 1. 2 for 1 is a greater deal than 1 for one and that's why I want it. If not, then noting the desires of some being does not necessarrily lead into a meaningful subjectivity.  Yes, those beings subjectively desire this or that thing, but if the "why" of their desire is objective..that would be it's basis, not their desires.  They want it because it is good, because it is greater than..it is not good or greater than because they want it.  

Not all subjective beings desire the objectively good, anyway.  Additionally, the above doesn't preclude the fact that some judgements are meaningfully subjective. Maybe I pick the 1 for 1 because I like one of the strawberries better than the other.

 To properly demonstrate that this is greater than that, you would need to show that the sun, the moon, and the stars would rather that any god have this rather than that.  However, since the sun, the moon, and the stars have neither wants nor preferences, proving that would seem impossible.

Anyway, until then.

The impossibility of that proof might be the operative function..but why a person would have to show that at all is unclear.

(I figured I'd drop that before our resident nubbins trip all over their dicks again)

The problems of god and his greats and greater thans and greatests are his own problems, not objectivities problems. Your babykilling god may be something that a christian can't answer for without slipping into a meaningful subjectivity....but it's fairly easy for a neutral objectivist to accept that the skill and depth of ones ability to kill for no reason is something that can be measured...that we can rank babykilling gods by the babykilling metric and determine that the greater babykilling god is greater at babykilling. We may decide that this is something we don't want to be great at (or that we don't want our gods to be great at) - and hey..fine, but that in and of itself eradicates the claim that the god we desire is the omni-greatest possible. At least one other possible god is greater in at least one other thing.

[Angrboda]

In seeking to establish that something has an objective basis, it seems a misstep to appeal to what a conscious being would want, as that appears to lead you into subjectivity.

Is it impossible for a subjective being to want or be aware of things that are objectively good or greater than?  If I have a choice between one strawberry or two strawberries for $1...I pick two strawberries, that's the better deal.  2 is greater than 1. 2 for 1 is a greater deal than 1 for one and that's why I want it.  If not, then noting the desires of some being does not necessarrily lead into a meaningful subjectivity.  Yes, those beings subjectively desire this or that thing, but if the "why" of their desire is objective..that would be it's basis, not their desires.  They want it because it is good, because it is greater than..it is not good or greater than because they want it.  

Not all subjective beings desire the objectively good, anyway.  Additionally, the above doesn't preclude the fact that some judgements are meaningfully subjective.  Maybe I pick the 1 for 1 because I like one of the strawberries better than the other.  

 To properly demonstrate that this is greater than that, you would need to show that the sun, the moon, and the stars would rather that any god have this rather than that.  However, since the sun, the moon, and the stars have neither wants nor preferences, proving that would seem impossible.

Anyway, until then.

The impossibility of that proof might be the operative function..but why a person would have to show that at all is unclear.

(I figured I'd drop that before our resident nubbins trip all over their dicks again)

The problems of god and his greats and greater thans and greatests are his own problems, not objectivities problems.  Your babykilling god may be something that a christian can't answer for without slipping into a meaningful subjectivity....but it's fairly easy for a neutral objectivist to accept that the skill and depth of ones ability to kill for no reason is something that can be measured...that we can rank babykilling gods by the babykilling metric and determine that the greater babykilling god is greater at babykilling.  We may decide that this is something we don't want to be great at (or that we don't want our gods to be great at) - and hey..fine, but that in and of itself eradicates the claim that the god we desire is the omni-greatest possible.  At least one other possible god is greater in at least one other thing.

Just a quick note. No, it's not impossible that one may have a subjective awareness of an objective fact, but ultimately one has to appeal to the reasons why that awareness is of an objective fact, not simply the possibility that it is. Remember, they are trying to prove the positive assertion that these subjective impressions have an objective basis, not simply that it's possible that they are not entirely subjective. That argument requires appealing to the reasons themselves. An appeal to subjectivity in the absence of reasons simply doesn't feed the bulldog.

Second, the claim is that the theist cannot prove that their god is greater than the baby killing god, not that I can prove that the baby killing god is greater. (Rereading your second point, I'm not sure I understand how being great at something that it is not great to be great at would make the baby killing god greater than the supposed omni-greatest god Yahweh. I guess I don't understand your point.)

[The Grand Nudger]

Second, the claim is that the theist cannot prove that their god is greater than the baby killing god, not that I can prove that the baby killing god is greater.  (Rereading your second point, I'm not sure I understand how being great at something that it is not great to be great at would make the baby killing god greater than the supposed omni-greatest god Yahweh.  I guess I don't understand your point.)

Why isn't babykilling a metric that can be assessed to see which god is better at it?  A neutral objectivist would tell you that it is, even if it's not a metric we subjectively value.  You're falling into the same cognitive trap they are with the question above..but it's not a problem for objectivism.

Some bad people are better at being bad than others, and most bad people are better at doing bad shit than good people. In short, there are truly great villains. Invoking godwins law, was Hitler one of histories greats? Emphatically, yes, there are very few metrics that he would score lower on than the average joe on the street - even if he was also a terrible ass like your hypothetical babykilling god.

The hypothetical babykilling god is or at least could be greater than christer god in at least one thing (laying aside that christer god actually is a babykilling god for the simple reason that christers don;t like to think of it that way). Christer god, therefore..cannot be the greatest at everything. The best they can do is tell you that in the metrics they subjectively select, and ignoring their own gods failures to meet those conditions....christer god is better than babykiller god.

Now apply that to an identical god to the christer god..except for one thing..hypothetical babykiller god has killed -more- babies than christer god. Who's greater now? They're equals by christer metrics....but babykiller god has that extra plus-1 on his stats by objective metrics.

[Silver]

Why isn't babykilling a metric that can be assessed to see which god is better at it?  A neutral objectivist would tell you that it is, even if it's not a metric we subjectively value.  

Some bad people are better at being bad than others, and most bad people are better at doing bad shit than good people.

In short, the hypothetical babykilling god is greater than christer god in at least one thing (laying aside that christer god actually is a babykilling god for the imple reason that christers don;t like to think of it that way).  Christer god, therefore..cannot be the greatest at everything.

Baby killing is fine so long as a supposedly superior being who condemns murder with one breath yet condones it in the next for his agenda is considered fine by those who cannot properly reason between fantasy and morality.

[Angrboda]

Second, the claim is that the theist cannot prove that their god is greater than the baby killing god, not that I can prove that the baby killing god is greater.  (Rereading your second point, I'm not sure I understand how being great at something that it is not great to be great at would make the baby killing god greater than the supposed omni-greatest god Yahweh.  I guess I don't understand your point.)

Why isn't babykilling a metric that can be assessed to see which god is better at it?  A neutral objectivist would tell you that it is, even if it's not a metric we subjectively value.  

Some bad people are better at being bad than others, and most bad people are better at doing bad shit than good people.

There's something in what you say, perhaps in the general case. However, in the specific case, if being greatest at being something for which being great at is actually great (such as being moral) is not possible for the being that is great at baby killing, it would seem to be impossible to be greater than the non-baby killing god (ignoring the very real issues which Polymath raises about resolving multiple criteria). Thus while that doesn't prove that Yahweh is the greatest god, it does prove that the baby killing god isn't. (But again, Poly's objections screw everything up. Regardless of what Steve may think, an abstract problem involving multiple criteria does not become irrelevant or a category error simply because the problem is illustrated using mathematical relationships. The objections relate to ordering properties generally, not simply as they relate to numbers, and greatness is an ordering property which necessarily depends upon multiple criteria. So, no, Steve is simply incorrect in claiming that Poly is guilty of a category error.)

[robvalue]

It's easy to show it's possible that there is no greatest being, using whatever metric you like, with the maths we have already used.

Let's say it so happens that there are an infinite number of beings that exist, numbered 1,2, and so on. We've numbered them so that there "score" according to this metric is equal to their number. So score(being 1) = 1, score(being 2) = 2, and so on.

Which being has the greatest score? There isn't one.

This is just one possible scenario, out of infinitely many, in which you end up with no greatest being. I expect the counter will be that there cannot be infinitely many beings. Scrabbling around with science isn't going to help you. Science can never be used to definitively discount any possibilities entirely, it just gives us a "best guess" as to what is going on. We certainly can't reliably extrapolate what we know outside of whatever section of reality we inhabit, let alone even assume what we think we know applies to everything within it.

Just stating things are impossible because they don't seem logical to you isn't evidence either. He who lives by pure philosophy dies by it. If we're interested in our "best guess" then we use science, and this produces zero gods due to zero evidence.

[Angrboda]

It's easy to show it's possible that there is no greatest being, using whatever metric you like, with the maths we have already used.

Let's say it so happens that there are an infinite number of beings that exist, numbered 1,2, and so on. We've numbered them so that there "score" according to this metric is equal to their number. So score(being 1) = 1, score(being 2) = 2, and so on.

Which being has the greatest score? There isn't one.

This is just one possible scenario, out of infinitely many, in which you end up with no greatest being. I expect the counter will be that there cannot be infinitely many beings. Scrabbling around with science isn't going to help you. Science can never be used to definitively discount any possibilities entirely, it just gives us a "best guess" as to what is going on. We certainly can't reliably extrapolate what we know outside of whatever section of reality we inhabit, let alone even assume what we think we know applies to everything within it.

Just stating things are impossible because they don't seem logical to you isn't evidence either. He who lives by pure philosophy dies by it. If we're interested in our "best guess" then we use science, and this produces zero gods due to zero evidence.

I think you make a good point. I will note, however, that Steve categorically rejects the possibility of an actual infinity.

[The Grand Nudger]

Why isn't babykilling a metric that can be assessed to see which god is better at it?  A neutral objectivist would tell you that it is, even if it's not a metric we subjectively value.  

Some bad people are better at being bad than others, and most bad people are better at doing bad shit than good people.

There's something in what you say, perhaps in the general case.  However, in the specific case, if being greatest at being something for which being great at is actually great (such as being moral) is not possible for the being that is great at baby killing, it would seem to be impossible to be greater than the non-baby killing god (ignoring the very real issues which Polymath raises about resolving multiple criteria).  Thus while that doesn't prove that Yahweh is the greatest god, it does prove that the baby killing god isn't.  (But again, Poly's objections screw everything up.  Regardless of what Steve may think, an abstract problem involving multiple criteria does not become irrelevant or a category error simply because the problem is illustrated using mathematical relationships.  The objections relate to ordering properties generally, not simply as they relate to numbers, and greatness is an ordering property which necessarily depends upon multiple criteria.  So, no, Steve is simply incorrect in claiming that Poly is guilty of a category error.)

A great killer is still great.  Ask a Joe.

What you and Steve are both doing, is subjectively limiting greatness. That's fine...but it is being done. Polys objections screw it all up for the same reason that mine do. I'm including killing as a metric for greatness...why wouldn't I..just because I don't like it? Doesn't change the fact that the guy who tallies up more cracked infant skulls is the better babykiller..and if a gods supposed to be the greatest in every set, that would have to be one them - objectively.

Does it become difficult for any x to hold the greatest in every set simulataneously? Sure, but thems the breaks when a person builds their god ideas out of incoherent nonsense. They can only make the claim by excluding sets (even as they ignore those moments that their god doesn't fit their own sets)