Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[Sheldon]

I think for clarity we can say that the assertion that using crack is objectively bad for your health, is a different assertion to using crack is immoral. I see how the first rests on objective evidence, but not the second assertion. 

I get that you don't think that they're the same claim, but the various objectivist positions refer to systems which explicitly premise them as the same type of of claim, attempt to form their moral assertions in that way, and succeed or fail (in their own estimation) by whether or not they satisfy that criteria.  The evidence their claims rest on can be objective,

Great, what is the objective evidence that the harm using crack on oneself causes, is immoral? 

It doesn't matter whether moral statements actually can be like other objective statements because the whole objective statements thing (or some fundamental component of objectivity) is exactly what we get wrong.  The world isn't like that.  We aren't doing what we think we're doing.  

Well we can objectively demonstrate that the world is not flat, I am not sure we can do this when we claim X is immoral, without using subjective a priori claims. 

I also I see harm as an expedient metric for moral discourse, I don't see the  fact that moral discourse among humans, generally uses it, as translating to it is objectively true that causing harm is immoral.  Theological and religious arguments claim objective moral absolutes exist, yet set harm aside as a metric, a deity that commits cats of genocide, or tortures a newborn baby to death, or endorses slavery for example, is considered perfectly moral.

Theological and religious arguments (at least here in the west) generally posit subjectivist moral absolutes.  The opinions of their god as the rules.  How their god feels about a thing.  If it likes torturing babies and the smell of burning flesh.....tough luck suckers.

Subjectivist absolutes? When I suggested earlier these moral philosophies might overlap in some areas, you asserted that metaethical objectivism and metaethical subjectivism were mutually exclusive. It seems clear that subjectivism cannot allow for moral absolutes, and yet theological morality claims they exist. On what basis then are you labelling their claims for moral absolute "subjectivist"?

Go easy, I am drunker than a professor of drunkenness, teaching a course in drinking at Oxford. 

Sheldon: I don't see those facts as demonstrating the conclusion that causing harm is objectively immoral. 

They demonstrate that my including harm is objectively premised, 

As I said I found that claim circular, since while it may be true true that an assertion contains a fact, it need not necessarily make the conclusion in the assertion a fact. So on what objective evidence do we assert: causing harm is immoral? That it is the most commonly used metric seems (to me)a bare appeal to numbers. 

Sheldon: This (underlined) is rather circular don't you think? 

I include blood pressure in consideration of health because blood pressure really is one of the things we're talking about when we discuss health.  Is this circular?

No, but that's a false equivalence, unless we equate immoral with "bad for our health". 

Is eating chocolate (even to excess) objectively immoral? 

Sheldon: I include harm in moral discourse, as the consequences of not doing so seem undesirable.  FWIW theists who claim objective moral absolutes exist, don't use harm as a metric, how many religious philosophers are there, is this a mountain of evidence that a deity is an essential or objective part of our moral discourse? Lets test the claim and see:
I include god in moral consideration because when we moralize we are considering god.  
I only hanged one word.

 

I think that claim is false, there are no gods....but there's no fundamental reason why gods can't be considered in moral discussions.  We have used them as vehicles for moral exploration and moral explication.  For example, the god who makes the moral rules by it's whims and desires isn't an objectivist god, morally speaking.  It may exist, and it may really have a shitlist, but that in and of itself is not relevant to objective moral theories, just like facts and science not being relevant to relativist or subjectivist moral theories. 

I don't know if there are any deities, and since I cannot base belief on a lack or absence of knowledge, or more accurately: belief for me would become meaningless if I did so, then I must withhold belief, and this makes me what we currently define as an atheist. Yes we can use Batman, or Superman et al for moral discussions, this does not help argue for moral objectivism though. And yes I agree, that subjective claims on behalf of a deity's subjective moral claims, don't represent moral objectivism. I also agree this in and of itself does not disprove moral objectivism, only makes a specific argument for it weak. Science helps increase our collective knowledge, and understanding of objective reality, it can only help us make more informed choices, but how moral or not those choices are, seem to rest on a subjective worldview.

Sheldon: I agree, but have to ask myself why? Is there anything beyond subjective assertion, an appeal to subjective consensus, or reasoned consequentialism?

We can be harmed.  If we couldn't be harmed, maybe we wouldn't - but we would be wrong.  Similar to how we don't include harmful things that we don't know are harmful or refuse to accept are harmful.  

 How does any of that objectively demonstrate why harming others is immoral?

Sheldon: For me personally yes I'd agree, but even if every person agreed,  all I see here is a universally shared subjective opinion. though of course even among objectivists and those who believe in moral absolutes, this isn't true, theists defer to god before worrying about harm, though one could of course argue that they are simply projecting harm onto anything that doesn't defer to their deity's moral diktat. 

1Objectivism is not absolutism.  2Objectivism is not theological subjectivism.  3Absolutism is a further claim that can be made or omitted from any of the cognitivist positions. 4 IDK if it can be included in emotivism because our emotional states aren't exactly stable.  Your favorite color today may not be your favorite color tomorrow, or twenty years from now.  Doesn't stop people from making claims like that though, lol.

1I never said it was? 2 I never said it was? 3 I agree, but this doesn't seem to address my point. 4 This means that the claim "my favourite colour is red"  contains an objectively true assertion, but also a subjective inference, since it tells us nothing objective about the colour in relation to other colours beyond my subjective preference, and as you point out it is also relative, and likely emotive, since it can change, and yet the objective truth in the assertion remain, which is also my point about trying to claim the philosophical positions are mutually exclusive, when they share some ideas. 

I don't believe theistic claims, but I cannot in a generic sense know they are ultimately wrong, unless the claims are falsifiable, and have been falsified. For me, it's the epistemological difference between withholding belief from a claim (atheism), and making a contrary claim (which whilst it might include atheism, is not in and of itself atheism). 

Sheldon: Well is they think they've done nothing morally wrong, then the we here comes to a matter of opinion surely? Not everyone who causes harm is simply content to do wrong, some have formed the opinion their actions are in fact moral. I suspect that you would accept it is not an absolute claim that causing harm is immoral? Just as I do. So who decides when and where and how? What objective facts determine this?

If they think they've done nothing wrong then they've done no evil to be described by and excused by it's alleged necessity.  Anyone who tells you they've done a necessary evil thinks they've done an evil, and that they were committed or compelled to do it.  It's an opinion in the way that everything is an opinion 

Except not everything is solely an opinion, facts and evidence rest on well defined epistemological limitations. 

 Some people do evil things because it is expedient and excuse themselves by objectively incorrect necessities.  The objective facts that would determine if their claim were true even just in it's own context would be facts of necessity.  You won't be surprised to find that I think many allegedly necessary evils are no such thing. A pacifist would suggest that killing people is never good or necessary, not even when they're trying to kill you, for example. What do we think about that?

That it is subjective opinion, unsurprisingly. 

You keep returning to the idea that "who decides" is itself a demonstration of subjectivity. 

No I don't think this is true at all, if 99.999% of people think a deity exists, but have no objective evidence, this tells me nothing, but if 99.999% of elite scientists in a particular field of study agree, then I know this is necessarily based on a methodology that requires objective testable evidence, that is falsifiable, replicable, and has been repeatedly tested and peer reviewed, and is never ringfenced from critical scrutiny.  
I only think it is subjective opinion, when that is all that is offered. For example: "Causing harm is immoral"
I recognise my subjective desire for an ordered safer world, and how curtailing unnecessary harm is objectively beneficial to achieving that, over a violent dystopia. I don't see how it is objectively true. 

Things aren't subjective merely because a person decides them,

I agree, nor I hope did I suggest this was the case, I have for example decided to believe the world is not flat, yet I have also decided that the "best" existence for most people can be achieved by avoiding causing and where possible preventing unnecessary harm, but that second claim is subjective, or at least, based on other subjective ideas. 

The claim that something is immoral is generally pregnant.

I think this perhaps is closer to the core of my problem with objectivism than anything that's been said. How do we remove subjective bias from what we perceive moral claims to mean? 

About when it is socially permissible to do some bad thing, not about whether or not the thing is bad.

I have clipped this as I agree, but the problem remains we can't say that X is objectively bad, if we could then laws across human history, places and cultures should be the same or at least contain a consistent metric (like your example of harm) no? Yet they are demonstrably not. 
Sorry for my tardiness, I was forced to deal with life's necessary banalities.

[The Grand Nudger]

Great, what is the objective evidence that the harm using crack on oneself causes, is immoral? 

Well we can objectively demonstrate that the world is not flat, I am not sure we can do this when we claim X is immoral, without using subjective a priori claims. 

Here's something that might help.  Is "flat" a subjective a priori claim?  Why is flat?  Is flat just what you say it is?  Is flat flat because you say it's flat? Is flat not flat if people can't agree it's flat?  Immoral is an adjective.  It's descriptive.  In whatever moral system we're discussing... subjectivist, relativist, objectivist - immoral will have the same inter-contextual meaning.  These systems disagree with each other (and then have internal disagreements with themselves) but immoral always means the rejection or antithesis of the truth making properties in a given system.  Standing opposite to moral, distinguishable from amoral.

Emotivist "yuck!" is "immoral", for example.  An emotivist thinks that's what moral assertions are about, and in the strongest sense that this is also the underlying metaethical reality which explains the phenomena.  

Subjectivist absolutes? When I suggested earlier these moral philosophies might overlap in some areas, you asserted that metaethical objectivism and metaethical subjectivism were mutually exclusive. It seems clear that subjectivism cannot allow for moral absolutes, and yet theological morality claims they exist. On what basis then are you labelling their claims for moral absolute "subjectivist"?

In principle...subjectivist assertions report on some fact of the reporting subject, whereas objectivist assertions report on some fact of the object in the subjects apprehension.

If a person believes that the moral truth making properties are god properties then they may also believe that moral assertions, and specifically their gods moral assertions... are absolute.  They'll tell you this themselves six ways to sunday if you ask.  That is to say those assertions are good or bad for all people in all times without any respect for specific facts of the matters.  This is not tenable for moral objectivism, explicitly premised (or purported, if we prefer) on exactly those facts of those matters.  Not the unchanging shitlist of an almighty god.

I describe them as subjectivist because they are explicitly premised in gods nature as moral truth maker.

As I said I found that claim circular, since while it may be true true that an assertion contains a fact, it need not necessarily make the conclusion in the assertion a fact. So on what objective evidence do we assert: causing harm is immoral? That it is the most commonly used metric seems (to me)a bare appeal to numbers. 

I include blood pressure in consideration of health because blood pressure really is one of the things we're talking about when we discuss health.  Is this circular?

No, but that's a false equivalence, unless we equate immoral with "bad for our health". 

Is eating chocolate (even to excess) objectively immoral? 

That would be the strong implication of a great number of moral and medical theories.  Harming yourself is bad.

I don't know if there are any deities, and since I cannot base belief on a lack or absence of knowledge, or more accurately: belief for me would become meaningless if I did so, then I must withhold belief, and this makes me what we currently define as an atheist. Yes we can use Batman, or Superman et al for moral discussions, this does not help argue for moral objectivism though. And yes I agree, that subjective claims on behalf of a deity's subjective moral claims, don't represent moral objectivism. I also agree this in and of itself does not disprove moral objectivism, only makes a specific argument for it weak. Science helps increase our collective knowledge, and understanding of objective reality, it can only help us make more informed choices, but how moral or not those choices are, seem to rest on a subjective worldview.

-and we're right back to the beginning again.  What abut emotivist worldviews they might be premised on?  What about relativist worldviews that they might be premised on?  What about objectivist worldviews they might be premised on?  

 I agree, but have to ask myself why? Is there anything beyond subjective assertion, an appeal to subjective consensus, or reasoned consequentialism?

We can be harmed.  If we couldn't be harmed, maybe we wouldn't - but we would be wrong.  Similar to how we don't include harmful things that we don't know are harmful or refuse to accept are harmful.  

 How does any of that objectively demonstrate why harming others is immoral?

You agreed that my inclusion of harm consideration, at least as a matter of descriptive ethics, was (or could be) objectively premised.  I assumed you were asking why I thought we considered it as a matter of fact, why we do it.  If you're looking for something deeper...?  We consider harm for control.  For risk analysis.  To navigate in what seems to be a real world where we can really be harmed...and not just harmed in my opinion, harmed in fact.

1I never said it was? 2 I never said it was? 3 I agree, but this doesn't seem to address my point. 4 This means that the claim "my favourite colour is red"  contains an objectively true assertion, but also a subjective inference, since it tells us nothing objective about the colour in relation to other colours beyond my subjective preference, and as you point out it is also relative, and likely emotive, since it can change, and yet the objective truth in the assertion remain, which is also my point about trying to claim the philosophical positions are mutually exclusive, when they share some ideas. 

Cognitivist positions... subjectivism, relativism, and objectivism, all share at least one idea.  That moral assertions are truth-alike.  The different cognitivist metaethical positions are mutually exclusive in that they posit competing moral truth making properties among the subset of truth alike assertions.  Are the real™ or valid truth making properties facts about reporting subjects, or facts about the societies or places or times the subject comes from, or are they facts about the object of the subjects report?  If the moral properties are our emotional reactions to objects - then none of them are true or false strictly speaking.  They are not truth-alike....and so, all cognitivist metaethical theories are false.    

The notion that an assertion (moral or otherwise) needs to tell you something about the object.....is an objectivist one.

Except not everything is solely an opinion, facts and evidence rest on well defined epistemological limitations. 

That's exactly what objectivist would tell you.  

That it is subjective opinion, unsurprisingly. 

.............solely?  Is it ever really necessary to kill?  I mean, you could just die, right?  Even if somebody has to die that day you don't have to be the killer, do you?  

No I don't think this is true at all, if 99.999% of people think a deity exists, but have no objective evidence, this tells me nothing, but if 99.999% of elite scientists in a particular field of study agree, then I know this is necessarily based on a methodology that requires objective testable evidence, that is falsifiable, replicable, and has been repeatedly tested and peer reviewed, and is never ringfenced from critical scrutiny.

Moral realism, objectivity, is the majority opinion of academic philosophy.  

I only think it is subjective opinion, when that is all that is offered. For example: "Causing harm is immoral"
I recognise my subjective desire for an ordered safer world, and how curtailing unnecessary harm is objectively beneficial to achieving that, over a violent dystopia. I don't see how it is objectively true. 

Moral realists are saying that things are some way whether you/me/we recognized them or not, whether our society accepts or rejects them or not.  You're thinking about your own agency.  Your personal ability and drive to be moral, however you see it.  If you didn't want a more ordered and safer world, would that change anything about harm..or would all of the harmful things still do whatever harm is specified?  If you wanted a disordered and violent world, would crack addiction be less harmful?  Would that chemical compound suddenly have a different effect on or in human beings?  Would their addictions begin to improve them in some way?

I think this perhaps is closer to the core of my problem with objectivism than anything that's been said. How do we remove subjective bias from what we perceive moral claims to mean? 

The same way we do insomuch as we can with any other truth claim.  That's the central contention of moral objectivity.  That's what I mean when I say it's a non novel theory.  

I have clipped this as I agree, but the problem remains we can't say that X is objectively bad, if we could then laws across human history, places and cultures should be the same or at least contain a consistent metric (like your example of harm) no? Yet they are demonstrably not. 
Sorry for my tardiness, I was forced to deal with life's necessary banalities.

We have all sorts of reasons not to do the things we think are moral, to do the things we think are immoral, and to write our laws accordingly.  So, no, that there was or could be a correct answer™ doesn't mean that everyone would have the same answer, or that our laws would reflect that even if there were and we did all have it.  Laws are their own thing.  However, if that sort of commonality persuades you...you'll find a great deal of shared moral content between human societies.

I think we can say that things are objectively bad. I think we can say that murder is objectively bad. I also think..as a consequence, we can say that things aren't objectively bad...which is the side I'd start pruning our laws from. Let them go on record saying they can't decriminalize this or that because prison labor would dry up, or they'd lose social control.

[Sheldon]

Great, what is the objective evidence that the harm using crack on oneself causes, is immoral? 

Well we can objectively demonstrate that the world is not flat, I am not sure we can do this when we claim X is immoral, without using subjective a priori claims. 

Here's something that might help.  Is "flat" a subjective a priori claim?  Why is flat?  Is flat just what you say it is?  Is flat flat because you say it's flat? Is flat not flat if people can't agree it's flat?  Immoral is an adjective.  It's descriptive.  In whatever moral system we're discussing... subjectivist, relativist, objectivist - immoral will have the same inter-contextual meaning.  These systems disagree with each other (and then have internal disagreements with themselves) but immoral always means the rejection or antithesis of the truth making properties in a given system.  Standing opposite to moral, distinguishable from amoral.

Emotivist "yuck!" is "immoral", for example.  An emotivist thinks that's what moral assertions are about, and in the strongest sense that this is also the underlying metaethical reality which explains the phenomena.  

It seems like you're suggesting that moral arguments, even from objectivists, are presuppositional? Apologies if I have misunderstood, but if not then I agree, we must base our moral worldview on some axiom, even if it is subjective. Then we can make objectively true claims about how best to be "moral", but the word moral then defines a subjective position at it's core. I have already said for example, that I have no problem encompassing harm into moral discourse, as it is expedient to do so. Though this I think remains a subjective view. 

If a person believes that the moral truth making properties are god properties then they may also believe that moral assertions, and specifically their gods moral assertions... are absolute.  They'll tell you this themselves six ways to sunday if you ask.  That is to say those assertions are good or bad for all people in all times without any respect for specific facts of the matters.  This is not tenable for moral objectivism, explicitly premised (or purported, if we prefer) on exactly those facts of those matters.  Not the unchanging shitlist of an almighty god.

I describe them as subjectivist because they are explicitly premised in gods nature as moral truth maker.

If I've understood you, then I think we concur on this, but given we both are atheists that's perhaps not a surprise here. So even though they claim god X has made objectively moral claims, and these are absolutes, they are simply wrong, as the claims are subjective absolutes that are not supported by objective facts? It becomes more problematic for theists when the immutable moral truths are contradictory of course, either in some indirect way, or in an unequivocal way. 

Quote:
As I said I found that claim circular, since while it may be true true that an assertion contains a fact, it need not necessarily make the conclusion in the assertion a fact. So on what objective evidence do we assert: causing harm is immoral? That it is the most commonly used metric seems (to me)a bare appeal to numbers. 
Quote:
I include blood pressure in consideration of health because blood pressure really is one of the things we're talking about when we discuss health.  Is this circular?

No, but that's a false equivalence, unless we equate immoral with "bad for our health". 

Is eating chocolate (even to excess) objectively immoral? 
That would be the strong implication of a great number of moral and medical theories.  Harming yourself is bad.

I think this then would the kind of subjective axiom I am talking about. A basis for objective claims about morality, that is itself subjective. 

You agreed that my inclusion of harm consideration, at least as a matter of descriptive ethics, was (or could be) objectively premised.  I assumed you were asking why I thought we considered it as a matter of fact, why we do it.  If you're looking for something deeper...?  We consider harm for control.  For risk analysis.  To navigate in what seems to be a real world where we can really be harmed...and not just harmed in my opinion, harmed in fact.

I think this leads down to why we bother with morality at all, leaving aside the precursors are likely in our evolved past, societal cohesion without some understanding, or some ability to learn what is and is not acceptable behaviour to the group. This would explain why we find including harm in a morality expedient, though I think it is still a subjective axiom when we examine the reason, or go deeper as you say. When I asked earlier you said that without including harm in moral discourse, morality would be meaningless. So in a way we form a priori subjective opinion we use as a moral axiom, on which to base our moral worldview. 

Cognitivist positions... subjectivism, relativism, and objectivism, all share at least one idea.  That moral assertions are truth-alike.  The different cognitivist metaethical positions are mutually exclusive in that they posit competing moral truth making properties among the subset of truth alike assertions.  Are the real™ or valid truth making properties facts about reporting subjects, or facts about the societies or places or times the subject comes from, or are they facts about the object of the subjects report?  If the moral properties are our emotional reactions to objects - then none of them are true or false strictly speaking.  They are not truth-alike....and so, all cognitivist metaethical theories are false.    

The notion that an assertion (moral or otherwise) needs to tell you something about the object.....is an objectivist one.

They overlap in their conclusions of course, most human societies no matter how disparate they appear, tend to have some moral moratorium on certain behaviours. I am just not sure that this makes labelling them wrong objectively true, with an a priori subjective moral axiom. I would suggest they stem emotionally from our evolved past, we have evolved the ability to reason, and to make objective claims about the world, and these all combine to form our moral worldview, which is ultimately based a subjective view we consider a moral axiom, perhaps for expedience, or because it is emotionally intuitive. Hearing a child or baby cry is almost unbearable, and it's not hard to see why this trait evolved. 

Except not everything is solely an opinion, facts and evidence rest on well defined epistemological limitations. 

That's exactly what objectivist would tell you.  

Yes but the reason we consider X an objective fact, and y an entirely unsupported subjective opinion is because of those epistemological limits. I am not a scientist, but if I can see that there is universal consensus among elite biologist that evolution is objectively true, then I am inclined to accept this, as they are best placed to understand the evidence, and the methodology is designed to expose and discard subjective bias as much as is possible. 
No amount of consensus will sway me, in the absence of sufficient objective evidence, it's simply a bare appeal to numbers. 
Anyway I have to go out now, so thanks, I will catch up later if anyone still wants to discuss this.

[The Grand Nudger]

It seems like you're suggesting that moral arguments, even from objectivists, are presuppositional? Apologies if I have misunderstood, but if not then I agree, we must base our moral worldview on some axiom, even if it is subjective. Then we can make objectively true claims about how best to be "moral", but the word moral then defines a subjective position at it's core. I have already said for example, that I have no problem encompassing harm into moral discourse, as it is expedient to do so. Though this I think remains a subjective view. 

I was asking you if the moralizers use of the term immoral was equivalent to the round earthers use of the term flat.  I'll come back to this later in the post. I think you're wrong about expediency, btw. I think it takes a hell of alot of time and effort to fully consider harm. Time and effort we often don't have in the moment, assuming the person(s) considering as much are competent to begin with. I think that's why we've had heuristic lists of do's and don'ts more often than systematic and specific exploration of moral content on real time. Why we say "because god said so you twat" rather than remake a moral case anew for every request.

Here's a list and god signed it, is, in my view, a moral expedient - and not explicitly referent to facts of the purported matters as harm and harm consideration are.

If I've understood you, then I think we concur on this, but given we both are atheists that's perhaps not a surprise here. So even though they claim god X has made objectively moral claims, and these are absolutes, they are simply wrong, as the claims are subjective absolutes that are not supported by objective facts? It becomes more problematic for theists when the immutable moral truths are contradictory of course, either in some indirect way, or in an unequivocal way. 

Correct, though being wrong isn't what makes them subjectivist.  Objectivist claims can also be wrong and still be objectivist claims. Just as a fun aside...contradictory moral absolutes are not a problem for metaethical subjectivism.  I mentioned this before.  In a truly subjective world, all genuinely held moral claims are as true as any other and all for the same reasons none of which having anything to do with the specific content of the claims or the nature of their expression, even contradictory claims are all simultaneously true.  

I think this then would the kind of subjective axiom I am talking about. A basis for objective claims about morality, that is itself subjective. 

We can add health and the badness of crack addiction to the pile with flatness and immorality. 
 

I think this leads down to why we bother with morality at all, leaving aside the precursors are likely in our evolved past, societal cohesion without some understanding, or some ability to learn what is and is not acceptable behaviour to the group. This would explain why we find including harm in a morality expedient, though I think it is still a subjective axiom when we examine the reason, or go deeper as you say. When I asked earlier you said that without including harm in moral discourse, morality would be meaningless. So in a way we form a priori subjective opinion we use as a moral axiom, on which to base our moral worldview. 

Immorality is a linguistic axiom, in that sense, no matter which metaethical theory is true.  Like flat, like health.  

They overlap in their conclusions of course, most human societies no matter how disparate they appear, tend to have some moral moratorium on certain behaviours. I am just not sure that this makes labelling them wrong objectively true, with an a priori subjective moral axiom. I would suggest they stem emotionally from our evolved past, we have evolved the ability to reason, and to make objective claims about the world, and these all combine to form our moral worldview, which is ultimately based a subjective view we consider a moral axiom, perhaps for expedience, or because it is emotionally intuitive. Hearing a child or baby cry is almost unbearable, and it's not hard to see why this trait evolved. 

More than one way to skin a cat, more than one road into a town, sure.  Society's moral moratoriums are, on their own, relativist rather than subjectivist or objectivist in a metaethical sense. Moral statements that are misreported emotions are not cognitivist at all.  Cannot be subjective, relative, or objective.  They are not truth alike, they just masquerade as such.  But let's add it to the pile.  Emotivism and relativism are all subjective as well.

Yes but the reason we consider X an objective fact, and y an entirely unsupported subjective opinion is because of those epistemological limits. I am not a scientist, but if I can see that there is universal consensus among elite biologist that evolution is objectively true, then I am inclined to accept this, as they are best placed to understand the evidence, and the methodology is designed to expose and discard subjective bias as much as is possible. 
No amount of consensus will sway me, in the absence of sufficient objective evidence, it's simply a bare appeal to numbers. 
Anyway I have to go out now, so thanks, I will catch up later if anyone still wants to discuss this.

You accept the consensus of experts in their fields -except- when it comes to ethics, it seems, even though those professional ethicists also have scientific evidence to support their logical assertions.  Now we can add all of that to the pile too.  Words, word use, explicitly distinct and disparate cognitive and noncognitivist basis, health, harm, expert consensus, logical demonstration, and empirical evidence are all "subjective".  

This is what I mean when I say that repeating "everything is subjective" is not a good argument against objectivity (or for subjectivity, for that matter).  A word that means everything means nothing in particular.  We can't accurately communicate our respective beliefs using that term in this way, you can't even consistently communicate your own beliefs using the term this way. You don't actually believe or communicate as though you believe that these things are subjective, they're collateral damage in maintaining the assertion about moral assertions. I want to stress here that this isn't me saying you're a fuckup - it's reiterating the issue of metaethical objectivity's homefield advantage if truth makers are objective and empirical facts in a rational conversation. Rightly or wrongly, that's exactly what moral realism says morality is about, that this is what we're trying (and constantly failing) to do. They're saying that we can make moral considerations that are like those statements, or, if they're different, that they're not different in an obvious way. Your skepticism is all recognizable and acknowledgeable from within an objectivists viewpoint....as a list of human moral/rational failures and the fundamentally compromised nature of human agents as moral/rational agents. Moral realists can easily and enthusiastically agree with you that "things are all subjective" in this way, but that's not a comment on moral content exclusively, or metaethical reality specifically, and it's accurate of a great many things.

Do you believe that your assertions that morality (and any other poor dead soldier already discussed or yet to be discussed) is subjective....are objectively true..... or is that also subjective? Is it absolutely objectively/subjectively true, or conditionally subjectively/objectively true?

[Sheldon]

It seems like you're suggesting that moral arguments, even from objectivists, are presuppositional? Apologies if I have misunderstood, but if not then I agree, we must base our moral worldview on some axiom, even if it is subjective. Then we can make objectively true claims about how best to be "moral", but the word moral then defines a subjective position at it's core. I have already said for example, that I have no problem encompassing harm into moral discourse, as it is expedient to do so. Though this I think remains a subjective view. 

I was asking you if the moralizers use of the term immoral was equivalent to the round earthers use of the term flat. 

No, not equivalent, subjectivity / objectivity is a scale, not a binary condition. 

I think you're wrong about expediency, btw. I think it takes a hell of alot of time and effort to fully consider harm. 

Though very little to see the consequences of leaving harm out of moral discourse. The expedient part is avoiding the consequences of leaving harm out of moral discourse. I also don't think it's possible, as it is likely hardwired in us by evolution, both stopping it (unnecessary) and using it (necessary). 

1. Objectivist claims can also be wrong and still be objectivist claims. Just as a fun aside...2 contradictory moral absolutes are not a problem for metaethical subjectivism. 

1, What makes them wrong if not lacking sufficient objective evidence, or being subjective? 
2. No, I can see that, I find absolute claims far less useful than subjective ones based on a careful examination of the consequences of our actions, but then I would. 

 In a truly subjective world, all genuinely held moral claims are as true as any other and all for the same reasons none of which having anything to do with the specific content of the claims or the nature of their expression, even contradictory claims are all simultaneously true.  

Well I think this is true for the subjective axioms we decide to base our morals on, I don't see any way around that. A perhaps more troubling thought, is that moral progress is not possible in any objective way. What would we be measuring it against? 

Sheldon I think this then would the kind of subjective axiom I am talking about. A basis for objective claims about morality, that is itself subjective. 

We can add health and the badness of crack addiction to the pile with flatness and immorality. 

Flatness can objectively measured, as an apprentice I learned this the hard way, when asked to hand scrape a surface table. I don't know how to objectively measure moral claims, without subjective axioms. Just as we can objectively measure the physiological harm of crack use / addiction, so I still think this is a false equivalence. 

I think this leads down to why we bother with morality at all, leaving aside the precursors are likely in our evolved past, societal cohesion without some understanding, or some ability to learn what is and is not acceptable behaviour to the group. This would explain why we find including harm in a morality expedient, though I think it is still a subjective axiom when we examine the reason, or go deeper as you say. When I asked earlier you said that without including harm in moral discourse, morality would be meaningless. So in a way we form a priori subjective opinion we use as a moral axiom, on which to base our moral worldview. 

Immorality is a linguistic axiom, in that sense, no matter which metaethical theory is true. 

I agree, but those axioms vary, from person to person, place to place, across time, and cultures etc..

More than one way to skin a cat, more than one road into a town, sure.  Society's moral moratoriums are, on their own, relativist rather than subjectivist or objectivist in a metaethical sense. Moral statements that are misreported emotions are not cognitivist at all.  Cannot be subjective, relative, or objective.  They are not truth alike, they just masquerade as such.  But let's add it to the pile.  Emotivism and relativism are all subjective as well.

I struggle here, as while I understand that metaethical relativism and subjectivism are two distinct philosophies, something can be both relative and subjective, so they overlap in some ways. As we discussed, the exclusion of moral absolutes for example. 

You accept the consensus of experts in their fields -except- when it comes to ethics, it seems, even though those professional ethicists also have scientific evidence to support their logical assertions. 

Ethics is not a scientific discipline of course, though it can be studied as a subject of social-scientific study. 

Words, word use, explicitly distinct and disparate cognitive and noncognitivist basis, health, harm, expert consensus, logical demonstration, and empirical evidence are all "subjective".  

I agree, but they are not equally subjective. 

This is what I mean when I say that repeating "everything is subjective" is not a good argument against objectivity 

I am not sure where anyone thinks I said this? I know what an argumentum ad ignorantiam fallacy is, and I try to avoid them. I am simply saying that when people make what they call objective moral claims, in my experience they rest ultimately on subjective axioms. The claims the world is flat and the world is not flat, may both be subjective, but they are not equally subjective, and for a reason. 

Do you believe that your assertions that morality (and any other poor dead soldier already discussed or yet to be discussed) is subjective....are objectively true..... or is that also subjective? Is it absolutely objectively/subjectively true, or conditionally subjectively/objectively true?

I don't believe we can make moral assertions that don't ultimately rest on subjective claims. There is a significant epistemological difference between disbelieving a claim, and making a contrary claim. I try not to overstep when it is unwarranted, but am always prepared to recant claims if I think they are unsafe. 

“variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between groups and classes within a complex community… make it difficult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of objective truths” 

John Mackie
I am inclined to agree, and there are many others of course.

[The Grand Nudger]

I was asking you if the moralizers use of the term immoral was equivalent to the round earthers use of the term flat. 

No, not equivalent, subjectivity / objectivity is a scale, not a binary condition. 

This is where we're talking past each other.  You're talking about the quality of the claim.  On a scale of true-false objective-subjective.  Metaethical theories and analytic semantics are propositions about kinds.  Within each of the cognitivist theories moral assertions can be more or less true.  The different terms refer to different referent contents.  

Though very little to see the consequences of leaving harm out of moral discourse. The expedient part is avoiding the consequences of leaving harm out of moral discourse. I also don't think it's possible, as it is likely hardwired in us by evolution, both stopping it (unnecessary) and using it (necessary). 

We also survive and thrive by harm, so there's always a compelling impulse and tendency to leave it out or leave bits of it out or leave bits of it so long as it's to those other people out.  When we know about it in the first place - our faculties here are limited.  

1, What makes them wrong if not lacking sufficient objective evidence, or being subjective? 

By being wrong-in-fact.  So, for example, if I express myself as informing you about a fact of some object like it's color, and I say it's green when it's red.  I'm talking about the thing, I'm making a valid color claim, and I'm wrong.  I'm likely colorblind.  A biological avenue for subjective errors in any claim of this kind.  Errors specific to some fact about the reporting subject in a cognitive process or claim.  

Well I think this is true for the subjective axioms we decide to base our morals on, I don't see any way around that. A perhaps more troubling thought, is that moral progress is not possible in any objective way. What would we be measuring it against? 

I have no way to answer that question or engage in any rational conversation about this subject or any other without referring to an underlying mountain of axioms.  

Flatness can objectively measured, as an apprentice I learned this the hard way, when asked to hand scrape a surface table. I don't know how to objectively measure moral claims, without subjective axioms. Just as we can objectively measure the physiological harm of crack use / addiction, so I still think this is a false equivalence. 

Corpseness can also be objectively measured.  Your units of measure are axiomatic.  The words you use to describe those units of measure, axiomatic.  The logic underlying any claim you make or argument you present...axiomatic.  

I agree, but those axioms vary, from person to person, place to place, across time, and cultures etc..

b-mine

This would be relativism.  If relativism is true subjectivism is false.   Meanwhile, the answer to 42x=126 varies from middle schooler to middle schooler.  I call this thing on the desk a cat and somebody else calls it gato.  We can add math and cats to the pile of subjective things.

I struggle here, as while I understand that metaethical relativism and subjectivism are two distinct philosophies, something can be both relative and subjective, so they overlap in some ways. As we discussed, the exclusion of moral absolutes for example. 

Not in a logically or descriptively true sense, no.  They are often mashed together, in practice, nevertheless....to moral realism this is a compounding error.  

Ethics is not a scientific discipline of course, though it can be studied as a subject of social-scientific study. 

Pour one out for the experts.  Their science isn't sciencey enough.  

I agree, but they are not equally subjective. 

There's no sense clawing back scorched earth, it's already burnt.  Suffice to say, the idea that all of those listed things and now more listed things are all subjective is not even a laymans understanding of subjectivity.  We can dispense entirely with academic philosophy on that point. It may be the metaethical reality but I feel like morality is the least of the casualties in question at this point.

I am not sure where anyone thinks I said this? I know what an argumentum ad ignorantiam fallacy is, and I try to avoid them. I am simply saying that when people make what they call objective moral claims, in my experience they rest ultimately on subjective axioms. The claims the world is flat and the world is not flat, may both be subjective, but they are not equally subjective, and for a reason. 

The list keeps growing.  It now includes the idea that a round earth is a subjective claim.  I have to ask, more or less subjective than the claim the earth is flat, and what possible metrics could we use to determine that which weren't also subjective in this way?

“variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between groups and classes within a complex community… make it difficult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of objective truths” 

John Mackie
I am inclined to agree, and there are many others of course.

I agree as well, as an objectivist. Moral relativism is in error. The judgements of our societies are not the truth making properties of assertions. This has been much more simply put as might does not make right. As an objectivist, I think that the truth making properties of moral assertions are to be found in facts about the object of the assertion itself. Not the reporting subject or the reporting subjects society.

[Sheldon]

No, not equivalent, subjectivity / objectivity is a scale, not a binary condition. 

You're talking about the quality of the claim.  On a scale of true-false objective-subjective.  

Well of course, your question asked if a claim was "equivalent to" another claim, if truth making properties differ on a scale of objective evidence and epistemological knowledge then the two claims need not be equal, but sufficiently dubious to withhold belief from. 

Sheldon:  What makes them wrong if not lacking sufficient objective evidence, or being subjective? 

By being wrong-in-fact. 

This doesn't really help, would you agree that the more subjective bias we can remove from, and the more objective evidence we can demonstrate for, a claim, the more reliable belief in that claim becomes? If someone tells me the world is not flat, I know what this means, and know the objective evidence supporting it is overwhelming. Accepted scientific theories like gravity would have to be wrong for the world to be flat. 
Now conversely if someone say harming someone is immoral, this seems subjective to me. Especially as it is also relative, as it is not always considered immoral. 

Well I think this is true for the subjective axioms we decide to base our morals on, I don't see any way around that. A perhaps more troubling thought, is that moral progress is not possible in any objective way. What would we be measuring it against? 

I have no way to answer that question or engage in any rational conversation about this subject or any other without referring to an underlying mountain of axioms.  

I agree, but axioms are essential in this sense, but they need not be equally true, religious apologists often cite the existence of a perfectly moral deity as an axiom. 

Sheldon: Flatness can objectively measured, as an apprentice I learned this the hard way, when asked to hand scrape a surface table. I don't know how to objectively measure moral claims, without subjective axioms. Just as we can objectively measure the physiological harm of crack use / addiction, so I still think this is a false equivalence. 

Corpseness can also be objectively measured.  Your units of measure are axiomatic.

I don't know what corpseness means sorry, but my point is that flatness is not necessarily  a subjective term, rather it is contextual, in this context, the world is not flat is an objective fact, underpinned by a massive amount of objectively verifiable evidence. Flat earther have to deny the theory of gravity, on what basis then are they accepting any scientific facts. 

Sheldon: I agree, but those axioms vary, from person to person, place to place, across time, and cultures etc..

This would be relativism.  If relativism is true subjectivism is false.  

That's only partially correct, relativism and subjectivism are often linked, though they are not the same thing. Relativism does not necessarily mean subjectivism is false, but it places the basis of truth within a broader context like a culture or group, rather than solely within the individual's subjective experience. Though this seems to have ignored the fact, that this considered a strong argument against moral objectivism. 

Sheldon: metaethical relativism and subjectivism are two distinct philosophies, something can be both relative and subjective, so they overlap in some ways. As we discussed, the exclusion of moral absolutes for example. 

Not in a logically or descriptively true sense, no.

They cannot both be true, but nor are they entirely mutually exclusive. Since they both exclude moral absolutes for example. More importantly the fact cultural perceptions of morality change over time and from place to place, is a strong argument against moral objectivism. 

Pour one out for the experts.  Their science isn't sciencey enough.  

Well, we are back to the epistemological reliability of claims, and even were I to accept ethics is a science of some character, it is true that not all scientific disciplines are equally reliable. So when we choose to believe or disbelieve, the claims must reach the threshold we set for credulity, though this is an arbitrary choice of course. 

I am not sure where anyone thinks I said this? I know what an argumentum ad ignorantiam fallacy is, and I try to avoid them. I am simply saying that when people make what they call objective moral claims, in my experience they rest ultimately on subjective axioms. The claims the world is flat and the world is not flat, may both be subjective, but they are not equally subjective, and for a reason. 

The list keeps growing.  It now includes the idea that a round earth is a subjective claim.  I have to ask, more or less subjective than the claim the earth is flat, and what possible metrics could we use to determine that which weren't also subjective in this way?

If I implied that then I didn't mean to, it is an objective fact that the earth is round and not flat, I as just addressing your points about flatness being subjective. I don't have enough information to answer the question, but assuming I wanted to set a bar for credulity that most reliably achieved believing only true claims, then the more subjective bias ti removes the more reliable it would be. Perhaps you disagree? 

Sheldon: “variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between groups and classes within a complex community… make it difficult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of objective truths” 

John Mackie

I am inclined to agree, and there are many others of course.

I agree as well, as an objectivist. Moral relativism is in error. 

He has offered that as argument against moral objectivism. 

The judgements of our societies are not the truth making properties of assertions. 

I agree, which is why though they represent moral relativism, they are also subjective. They differ mainly in the the derivation of the subjective claims, from cultures and societies rather than from individuals, it's not hard to see how these can overlap though. 

As an objectivist, I think that the truth making properties of moral assertions are to be found in facts about the object of the assertion itself. 

I guess we simply disagree there, as we are back to an assertion that is factual, X causes harm - for example, then drawing a subjective conclusion, harm is immoral, which is what I see, since even an individual who accepts causing harm can be immoral, need not always consider it immoral, and it is not universally accepted as a moral axiom of course, so the claim still seems both subjective and relative to me.
Anyway this has been interesting, but I sense we are just going over the same points of contention now. Thanks for your time on this.

[The Grand Nudger]

Yeah man, anytime.