A Conscious Universe

[bennyboy]

Hi bennyboy,

That doesn't say much about the framework in which brains exist, which is the question.

But it does address the question of where consciousness comes from: brains of sufficient complexity. The framework for that complexity is formally addressed by evolutionary biologists.

If the universe is idealistic, then everything in it, including humans and the human brain, are all idealistic as well. Nobody (I think) is here disputing that brains seem to be the seat of consiousness in human organism. What is disupted is the ultimate nature of reality.

Really? I'm surprised you don't understand that we're not solely reliant on our individual intuition in order to come to our conclusions. Serious study results in practical and theoretical experimentation. It's crucial to remember that the 'collection of information through the senses' is not done in isolation and we don't automatically trust our biological senses but instead create mechanisms & tools with which we can in/validate what we sense and intuit.

That's fine, but the shared experiences which we refer to as objective are not exclusive to objectivity. You could make observations in the Matrix, and establish consistent relationships between your perceptions, and confirm your hypotheses with third parties.

No, it's a statement of trust, earned trust, not just in the methodology which is being applied but also in response to the findings already made. It couldn't be further from 'faith'.

If you say science hasn't "yet" solved a problem, and there are no similar problems which science has solved, then the "yet" isn't merited. Science has solved the problems of how to build good bridges, how to vaccinate against some strains of flu, and how to land a man on the moon. None of these deal with anything deeply philosophical, like why things exist rather than not, or why objective material would have actual subjective experiences (rathing than just seeming to).

There's no plausible explanation of psychogony right now,

There's plenty plausible! Integrated Information Theory is starting to yield some interesting results. And just because there's no current, robust, comprehensive explanation doesn't mean we discount the progress that has been made.

I find it interesting that you consider IIT a strong argument against idealism. Is it just because it's a scientific theory?

nor has any similar problem been solved in the past which gives us reason to think that the question of mind will be solved at any point in the future.

Untrue. Many supernatural assertions have been overturned as a result of the application of methodological naturalism. So many, in fact, that I feel quietly confident saying that 'the question of mind' will likely yield similar results.

Hmmm. Equating human mind, the center of all that we know and experience, with "ghosts 'n' sich" doesn't seem so equal to me.

[The Grand Nudger]

Don't you think that an explanation of mind ought to hinge mostly on mind, rather than on redefining or casting suspicion on the very nature of reality? Must we actually redefine the "ultimate nature of reality" in order to escape a physical mind? That seems like an awfully roundabout way to go if we want to make some statement about mind and how it can or cannot be explained....don't you think? Personally, I prefer the "put one foot in front of the other" approach.....

[Cato]

Maybe I'm an idealistic dualist

Well played. I laughed.

No. I'm saying that our limitations mean we interface with reality, WHATEVER it is, through symbolic representations, i.e. ideas.

This is the process of knowledge: we have experiences, we categorize and examine them, draw inferences, and test those inferences. Physicalism is itself an idea-- a representation of the commonalities in experience which lead most people away from solipsism. But establishing consistent relationships between experiences is not the same as proving that those commonalities are the source of experience

One of you will have to explain how you go from objective experiential commonality ("You see that thing falling? Hey, so do I!") to the confident assertion that reality consists of physical mechanism and nothing else. That seems like a strange conclusion for purely experiential beings to arrive at.

I find it far more reasonable to conclude that something is actually falling independent of consciousness than all witnesses simultaneously imagining the falling object into existence or that some untethered consciousness is generating ideas resulting in the physical realm we experience.

Idealsim and dualism have yet to be demonstrated so I find physicalism superior simply because of its pragmatic utility. There have always been those claiming some non-scientific means of acquiring knowledge driven mostly by the application of a Cartesian skepticism to minimalize what we do know because of our perceptive and cognitive limitations. We are left with only assertions. Idealism and dualism have not improved our collective knowledge nor have they revealed a greater truth. Despite not having reached a final destination nor being able to assess how much further we have to go, physicalism can at least lay claim to having made advancements in our knowledge.

Imagine the claim that since a majority of the population is limited in their football skills that fantasy football is not only the real football, but brings into existence what we would call the actual football matches. Imperfect I know, but I think the analogy gets to the core of why I find idealism and dualism unsatisfying.

[The Grand Nudger]

Kind of a wtf request, btw, we haven't decided that reality consists of a physical mechanism on the basis of two people seeing something fall.....the discussion and investigation was -a tad bit- more involved than that, and at one point things falling wasn't thought of as a physical mechanism itself......still it's a fair bet to say that even then, when two people saw something falling, they agreed that it was.

[bennyboy]

Don't you think that an explanation of mind ought to hinge mostly on mind, rather than on redefining or casting suspicion on the very nature of reality? Must we actually redefine the "ultimate nature of reality" in order to escape a physical mind? That seems like an awfully roundabout way to go if we want to make some statement about mind and how it can or cannot be explained....don't you think? Personally, I prefer the "put one foot in front of the other" approach.....

I can feel the yin/yang wheel starting to spin. I'm going to keep explaining that my only interface with reality is through subjective experience, and you're going to keep waving at the brain and saying it's in there somewhere, we just haven't exactly figured it out yet.

Mind is not just one piece of the puzzle to add to the "to-do" list of science. It is the most central feature of human existence, and the biggest philosophical problem for a physical monist view of reality. If you think reality has been defined, then show how science explains the existence of qualia. Until then, I request that you not complain that ideas contrary to your own world view are "redefining reality."

[The Grand Nudger]

I can feel the yin/yang wheel starting to spin. I'm going to keep explaining that my only interface with reality is through subjective experience, and you're going to keep waving at the brain and saying it's in there somewhere, we just haven't exactly figured it out yet.

Well, we have figured that part out. If I removed your brain..you reckon you'd be doing any "interfacing"? It's not just "in there somehwre" it -is the there, and the somewhere. Your experiences are a description of a physical system.

Mind is not just one piece of the puzzle to add to the "to-do" list of science. It is the most central feature of human existence, and the biggest philosophical problem for a physical monist view of reality.

Except that it isn't unless you can give me some reason to think that it is. I see no problem. I've explained why I see no problem.

If you think reality has been defined, then show how science explains the existence of qualia. Until then, I request that you not complain that ideas contrary to your own world view are "redefining reality."

Reality isn't dependent on any individuals qualia, that's another "wtf" request. Offering an explanation is easy as pie, determining whether or not that explanation is accurate in terms of our experience, our qualia, not so much. I've offered a simple explanation of qualia many, many times to you. A "service" of a computational system, very physical - advanced diagnostics, if you will. Unless you're able to describe qualia in some way that I cannot model with any number of physical systems, there's no reason to assume that the existence of qualia requires the existence of some nebulous "else". It -can- be done in a monism...is that how we do it......I don't know. Can you see why this subtle distinction leaves the "qualia is a problem for a monism" statement at a -meh- spot for me? I can't explain the minutae of the human mind for you in excruciating detail (and if I could I'd probably be explaining it elsewhere, eh?)....but just because I can't explain that, this doesn't mean that your position regarding the problems of qualia and a monism are credible.

This is akin to claiming that because science can't explain -the aether- there must be something wrong with science, rather than -the aether-. Make one fewer assumption and there is no problem, eh.....and we see how that turned out for -the aether-.

[Mudhammam]

If I may slightly rephrase Socrates, "Does the consciousness of the universe as a whole provide for the sustenance of what is consciousness in our sphere, or is it the reverse, and the universe posseses and derives all the goods enumerated from ours?"

[Surgenator]

To me, an idealistic universe can support everything we call physical. Size, shape, energy, conservation, photons, gravity, Mom, apple pie: they are all perfectly comfortable in an idealistic space.

Really? Well I'm one of the individuals who cannot see how this is possible. Can you explain how paint dries in an idealistic universe? Please don't you in physical terms like water molecules evaporating into the air. Please use ideas, as that is the fundamental elements of an idealistic universe.

[Neo-Scholastic]

To elaborate on my brief post earlier, many of the dilemmas and paradoxes of modern ontology stem from Locke’s conflation of sensation and ideas. Sensations are subjective.

Sensation provides the raw data for the intellect. The intellect identifies the ideas from sensible bodies by disregarding all the accidental features and abstracting out the universal ideas present in all similar things. A chicken, a condor, and a one-legged kiwi, are all birds because each embodies the idea of a bird despite the accidental features of any particular bird.

Just as particulars instantiate ideas variously, ideas instantiate in individual intellects variously. The objectivity of ideas allows multiple people to recognize similar things even if the extent of their knowledge about ideas vary. For example, both the laymen and ornithologists abstract out the universal features present in all birds to know what makes a bird a bird, i.e. the idea of a bird. However the ornothologists’ knowledge of the idea will be fuller and more nuanced. Likewise everyone’s experience with circular things is unique, whereas everyone’s idea of circularity is the same.

When people think, they think using ideas. The intellect representation is of the same idea that is universally present in all particular examples. Thus various particulars, whether embodied or in the intellect, all partake of specific universal ideas.

[bennyboy]

Really? Well I'm one of the individuals who cannot see how this is possible. Can you explain how paint dries in an idealistic universe? Please don't you in physical terms like water molecules evaporating into the air. Please use ideas, as that is the fundamental elements of an idealistic universe.

I think you are biased toward thinking idealism is "but a dream," with no logic or consistency to it, but this isn't right. It does NOT mean that there's no chemistry, or molecules, or no process of evaporation. It means that the paint, the process of drying, and the universe in which it dries are ultimately reducible only to concepts. A physicalist sees information as descriptive of real things, but an idealistic sees information AS the reality, and "things" as a virtual expression of the underlying information. Or, I should say, I see it that way, and assume other modern idealists probably do, too.

We describe all these things, including QM particles, the four basic interactions, etc. in mathematical forms. You've heard the saying "It's turtles, all the way down. . ." Well, I'd say that in a math-based idealistic reality, "It's math, all the way down." Eventually, you give up on finding "things," and just say "Fuck it. . . it's math only from here on in." And I think we are probably at that point right now with QM.