A Conscious Universe

[Mudhammam]

It's like the value of i, the square root of -1. It is a meaningful idea, but cannot be manifested. We can't count that amount of things, and cannot manifest it in 3D space. And yet, we couldn't really model the universe without it. I believe that under the hood, all the building blocks of reality are like i in this way.

You've touched upon language. That's it. We couldn't do much of anything without language. I don't really see how the name our species of ape gives a physical being or process can have any bearing on the nature of that being or its processes themselves. Of course, you are strictly speaking in terms of value (mathematical, ethical, social, etc.), which, though essential, is also not considered a physical object on my view, but is "real" as an expression of physical states and how our beings are personally disposed towards them---but that's an example of an object that really does not exist independent of us. You may argue that no object can be known in of itself because of the way our percepts and concepts depend on a brain that organizes the data before it enters the domain of consciousness, or you may say for some other reason that the deepest problems in reality are in principle not solvable to human minds or the CPUs we construct to do the hard work for us, and further, that the most we can truly know about the world boils down to certain ideas that contain only a nugget of nature's most elaborate secrets, but in any case, you cannot justify that everything, and not just the activities humans concern themselves with, are reducible to ideas lacking physical representation and still maintain that they have any existence outside of your head. That would be to confuse ontology and epistemology. Now that may be enough for you, but there is, on the other hand, what we call total fiction, in which case...

I don't like the word "real." All experiences are intrinsically real. The difference is that some of them are consistent and sharable, making them worth organized study, and some are not. Experiences of density, color, size, momentum, etc. are sharable and worth organized study. Dreams about being a pretty, pretty dragon princess on planet Xargon probably are not.

That's where I disagree with you and thinkers such as St. Augustine who also adopted the Platonic notion that there is no distinction between "the real and the apparently real." There is. You are a "real" human being in that you meet all the qualifications for being human (assuming you're not a robot), such as the philosophical or biological benchmarks we might decide upon, you exist in a space in time (even if you're composed of mind-bogglingly small bits of "stuff" that take on a more surreal existence), and anybody who wants to confirm that you're real can find ways to do so. Harry Potter is not a real human being (or wizard). Harry Potter is "really" a fictional character, but in the context we described you, he is not real. I don't think anyone really has trouble understanding the distinction. If you have to act as if there is some blurred line between what experiences we should consider imaginary and those that have a definite existence known (as much as anything could be) on the basis of our physical relation to it, I won't lie, that's not attracting me to your argument.

[The Grand Nudger]

It's annoying that you guys are taking a Rain-man literalism to illustrative examples. Do you even know what point I was talking about, or did you just get excited about a chance to shout out the word "physical"?

I'm sorry, it's just that your every explanation is supposed to be metaphoric, or non-literal...and I'm starting to think that maybe your position is itself, metaphoric...and non-literal.

You say this is illustrative, and far be it from me to assume what you meant to illustrate, just tell me...and, maybe I'm just limited...but explain it to me in -literal terms- for a change?

What do you mean my "experience is the operation of a machine"?

That, for example, the "experience" of red is the operation of your eyes, which send a signal to your brain, that takes those signals and does work with associated neurons and regions.

[bennyboy]

What do you mean my "experience is the operation of a machine"?

That, for example, the "experience" of red is the operation of your eyes, which send a signal to your brain, that takes those signals and does work with associated neurons and regions.

Why do you put "quotes" around "experience?" I look at the pen on my desk, and I experience its redness. What's the "problem" with "that?" Could it be that when it comes to begging the question, the Rhythm doth protest too much, and you want to conflate experience, which is subjective, with brain function, which is objective?

You've made a lot of factual-sounding statements about the nature of experience. I'm intrigued-- tell me by what criteria you establish whether a given physical system is capable of qualia, and if so, what the nature of that qualia is? Tell me by what physical apparatus, measurements, or observations have you determined that even people experience qualia? And, once you've achieved this incredible feat, how do you tell what said systems or people are experiencing?

I can see where this is going-- for another trip around the same old merry-go-round. You are going to conflate the mechanism of experience with experience, I'm going to produce about a half-dozen examples showing that the mechanism of a phenomenon and the phenomenon are not identical. Then what? What new ground are we going to try to cover in this thread? What new angle will we find that will make the next 50 pages worthwhile?

[The Grand Nudger]

Because there's some disagreement between us as to what experience is, of course. You asked me to define a term and usage - which you put in quotes within a quote, I put the term I wish to define in quotations. Habit.

Depends on how you define "problem" and "that" -

(taking my son to get his shots, back in a bit - I'd love to be able to convince him that it;s really just the idea of a needle...and not a physical needle - so work on that for me, for next time, back in a few)

[bennyboy]

That's where I disagree with you and thinkers such as St. Augustine who also adopted the Platonic notion that there is no distinction between "the real and the apparently real." There is.

That's a strange comment, since not long ago I was arguing that information describing a "thing" could not be used to confidently establish the existence of that thing as more than information.

If you have to act as if there is some blurred line between what experiences we should consider imaginary and those that have a definite existence known (as much as anything could be) on the basis of our physical relation to it, I won't lie, that's not attracting me to your argument.

I don't think I've done what you think I've done. In fact, I've specifically stated that except at philosophical boundary conditions (specifically with regard to QM/QFT, to cosmogony and to psychogony), mundane observations are equivalent in either physicalist or idealist monism. Is it possible that you are reading your expectations of an idealistic argument into what I'm actually saying-- or maybe that I'm just not saying things effectively?

When I say all experiences are real, I mean AS EXPERIENCES. I include among my experiences a category of those which we all share: falling rocks, droning professors, getting drunk on Friday nights. I believe you would call those "real," and that the consistency of those experiences would lead you to infer that behind the experiences lay real objects. I would, too, when thinking in the normal context of every day life. However, as soon as the mind goes to QM, all that reality starts to look pretty shaky after all.

[Mudhammam]

When I say all experiences are real, I mean AS EXPERIENCES. I include among my experiences a category of those which we all share: falling rocks, droning professors, getting drunk on Friday nights. I believe you would call those "real," and that the consistency of those experiences would lead you to infer that behind the experiences lay real objects. I would, too, when thinking in the normal context of every day life. However, as soon as the mind goes to QM, all that reality starts to look pretty shaky after all.

It looks shaky? You talk as if QM denies the literal, physical existence of macroscopic bodies.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Bennyboy, to what do you attribute the consistency of experience across multiple minds?

Why is it that I can't access information on your computer, but we can both share information on the internet? It's context-- each of us is part of a whole, and some of that whole is available to us, and some is not.

Are you suggesting, like Berkeley, an overarching Supreme Intellect that supports the fullness of phenomenal reality?

[Surgenator]

Idealism sounds like the math is making the ball fly. Explain in as much detail as possible on how this works, because I don't see understand how information moves, interacts, or has location. The baseball scenerio in idealism terms sounds like "an information packet moving through space, does some math with another information packet to decide where it would move next." And I'm guessing that time and space are real things in idealism and not another packet of information.

No, I wouldn't say that space is real, not in the sense that you view it. In an idealistic view, I'd view space as conceptual. It represents part of the way in which objects are related.

So now information has keep track of how it is related to all other information? How does this not sound ridiculous? In physicalism, the particles don't give two shits what other particles are doing. The closeness of particles determine the probability of interactions (except int the case of the strong force). There maybe a higher probability of interaction that leads the particle in a specific direction, but thats it. This behavior is clearly visible in brownian motion.

I disagree that qualia is necessary. I don't believe it even exist. How do you know qualia is an illusion? Just because you experience something that doesn't mean your experiences reflect reality.

Did I say qualia was an illlusion? That really doesn't sound like something I'd say.

My mistake, too much self editing without a final check. What I meant to say was, "how do you know qualia is not an illusion?"

What I would say is that from the perspective of a physical monism, qualia is nonsense. You can't interact with it, manipulate it directly, or even know for sure it exists.

But it does. I know this for sure, because I experience it. Therefore, a system in which qualia is nonsense cannot be said to represent reality.

We agree at least that qualia is nonsense in physical monism. However, you give your experiences too much credit. You cannot know if your experiences are giving you accurate representation of reality, e.g. optical illusions. You don't know if you have direct access to the properties of your experiences, e.g. subliminal messaging. So you cannot trust your experiences to be accurate or objective, and you cannot trust your access to your experiences to be accurate or objective. Therefore using them as a foundation will lead you a faulty conclusion.

More importantly, how is the existence of qualia falsifable?

I'm not claiming we are co-creating anything. I'm pointing out that the source of the idea is not important for its existence like the source of the particle is not important for its existence. My mind is an idea generator yet my ideas do not manifest in reality. A partice generator creates particles in reality observable by all.

I think you are making an accidental equivocation of ideas as the building block of reality, and ideas as things people think about things. Your idea no more creates elemental ideas than your brain creates new matter.

Wait, there are two types of ideas, elemental and not elemental? Does your mind work on elemental ideas or non-elemental ideas? How is this not dualism?

I never said anything about imagination's limitations. The problem is that the mind can create ideas. If the fundamental element of the universe are ideas, then our imagination can create reality. Like a flashlight creates photons, our mind creates ideas.

First of all, I think it's a bit simplistic to say a flashlight creates photons. It releases them.

Anyway, the thing about ideas bringing forth something new into the universe is interesting-- but it happens not to represent my views on the universe.

Alex has already pointed out that flashlights create photons. I will not comment on it further since he did such a good job of it.

It is fine that you don't believe ideas bringing forth something. However, I see this is more of a problem with idealism itself. Here is the argument.

1) Idealism states the fundamental element of reality are ideas.
2) The sourse of an idea has no bearing on how ideas interact.
3) A mind can create ideas
4) I have a mind
5) Therefore, I can use my mind to create ideas in reality.

Where do you think is my mistake?

[The Grand Nudger]

You've made a lot of factual-sounding statements about the nature of experience.

Factual sounding...or factual? If you think there's a difference (gee you're huge on asserting these little dividing lines, lol) with regards to my statement, I'm all ears, truly.

I'm intrigued-- tell me by what criteria you establish whether a given physical system is capable of qualia, and if so, what the nature of that qualia is?

Well firstly I've simply assumed your explanation. It's your experience. I then form a functional description of what that means or could mean when I do not know, and then check whatever system we'd like to consider against that functional description. Often enough, in our conversations, using those initial criteria it seems to me that things which you do not think have -experience- show both the capability and effects of having -experience-.....as measured against yourself, or myself.

I think that your criteria is a description of computation, personally. So that, to me, would be the nature of qualia as you've described it (except you keep telling me that it's not.....)

Tell me by what physical apparatus, measurements, or observations have you determined that even people experience qualia?

I'm sure I've made it clear in all of our discussions that I haven't...I;m just running with what you tell me, until the things you tell me start to run at cross purposes to each other. You and I obviously have different ideas about qualia, so the measurements I would use to determine qualia would not be - and have not been- satisfying to you...even though they identify you as possessing qualia by accepting your description -of it- as well as determining that you at least possess a system capable of it...even if that's not where your qualia is or derives from (in the language you prefer).

And, once you've achieved this incredible feat, how do you tell what said systems or people are experiencing?

I can tell you what they -could be- experiencing, by reference to what is possible for them to experience. I often have. Explaining, just as one example, that those born blind do not report any qualia regarding color - unsurprising, while those with sight...even if they are now blind...do, also unsurprising. Functional descriptions of these mechanisms often entirely describe this qualia business....as you describe it. Whether or not you;re describing it accurately is irrelevant to me, whether or not you have it is irrelevant to me. The claim is credible. I accept it, from you, because I can see how it might be arrived at. Course, I don't speak plant....but they exhibit some behaviors that would be difficult to explain if we didn't also allow them qualia, and they have a system capable of it...and if we say that they don;t possess it...then I start to think that those grounds we offered to remove it from them would also remove it from us.

I can see where this is going-- for another trip around the same old merry-go-round. You are going to conflate the mechanism of experience with experience,

I'm not conflating, you're saying oh, this is -x-...and then I give its functional description, rather than it's folk description.

I'm going to produce about a half-dozen examples showing that the mechanism of a phenomenon and the phenomenon are not identical.

Produce a single one.

Then what?

I don;t know, we'll cross that bridge when we get there I guess?

What new ground are we going to try to cover in this thread? What new angle will we find that will make the next 50 pages worthwhile?

I'm always trying to make that happen. Tried to make that happen with the mario bit you just "disagreed". I mean....I'm putting in the work man, I'm explaining shit, in functional terms that you can check for yourself that don;t depend upon any assertion, that accept what we see for what it is but allow -if you wished to go that route- for us to be mistaken. There is plenty of room for you to manouver here - and plenty of common ground between us, the door is wide open.

I've mentioned this before, but I think that one small misstep (as with mario) is the source of the entirety of our difference. You think that the information or the experience - divorced for the sake of argument from the mechanism is "the thing"" (not in the material sense, in the sense of being the object) - whereas I see the experience or the information as a description of "the thing". I actually agree with most of what you say....I just don't think it means what you think it means...because of that one little tick - that has huge ripples and waves the further from it we extrapolate - the more meaning we try to squeeze from it.

(I am, btw, getting frustrated with the one-sidedness of your expectations in our conversations....you expect quite a bit of explanation from me...you offer none in return - I'd love to see some functional description from you, as to how this qualia business might be accomplished..after all this time explaining how it could be accomplished by material objects - with the constant allowance that this may not be how we do it, simply that it could be done..at some point...I would have expected you to return the courtesy)

[bennyboy]

Why is it that I can't access information on your computer, but we can both share information on the internet? It's context-- each of us is part of a whole, and some of that whole is available to us, and some is not.

Are you suggesting, like Berkeley, an overarching Supreme Intellect that supports the fullness of phenomenal reality?

I don't think so. As with cosmogony, the reason the fundamental building blocks are brought together in a framework is pretty much a mystery to me. I suppose if you wanted to, you could identify the Big Bang singularity with the logos: in the beginning was the word, and the word was with God and the word was God / God is the alpha and the omega, etc. I'm not making this argument, though.

To me, this seems like a category error, kind of like: parts of the universe think, therefore the universe is thinking.