A Conscious Universe

[Angrboda]

Quantum mechanics accurately predicts the behavior of what we normally term reality. Whether that reality is stuff behaving according to the equations of QM, or ideas behaving like stuff according to the equations of QM is to me a difference without a difference. You seem to have ideas behaving like stuff in the macro world, and yet on the other hand you have ideas behaving like ideas in the mind. The sleight of hand of calling them both "idea" does not disguise the seeming fact that you have two distinctly different kinds of idea stuff that has to meet somewhere in the middle. This is the classic interface problem of substance dualism, and I don't see that you've solved it except metaphorically or semantically with vague talk of "context".

I find it odd that you pose challenges to physicalism such as identifying what things are capable of qualia that you can't resolve in the context of idealism. Is a cat capable of experiencing qualia? How does Idealism help us answer this question?

Wherever you go across the spectrum, physicalism provides evidence for its position; Idealism just assumes, hand waves, or engages in flowery metaphor that is no more explanatory than "It's magic!" or "Goddidit!"

Physicalism provides compelling, if not conclusive, evidence of the link between brain matter and qualia.

Wherever we find creatures that claim to have qualia, we find brains.

All the qualia we are capable of experiencing has corresponding sensory organs in the body, from sight to hearing to a network of muscoloskeletal sensors which tell us how are limbs are arranged and give rise to a body image. How does Idealism explain that coincidence? It's almost as if there were a relationship between the physical and the mental.

Evidence from the experience of drug use such as alcohol, rohypnol, and LSD seems to suggest that manipulation of brain chemistry brings about concomitant manipulation of the experience of mind. How does Idealism explain that?

Evidence from neurological conditions such as cerebral achromatopsia, blindness denial, hemi-neglect, frontal lobe trauma, and countless other neurological conditions show that manipulating the brain results in manipulating the experiences of mind (or if you prefer, manipulating the ideas that make up our "brain-like stuff" results in manipulation of our "idea stuff"). (Especially in cerebral achromatopsia where the patient loses the ability to experience color, even in their imagination, while retaining the ability for visual imagination.)

Evidence from split-brain studies and alien hand syndrome suggest that our experience of a single, unitary consciousness may not accurately reflect the way our minds actually work. If consciousness isn't unitary but is only experienced as unitary; what else is consciousness lying to itself about?

In sum, I don't care what is "under the hood" so long as it behaves according to the equations of QM. Whether it's ideas behaving like stuff, or stuff acting like stuff, I don't care. What I do care about is how this maneuver of making stuff into ideas explains consciousness (ideas as ideas), how it explains the physicalist evidence, and how the interaction between "ideas that behave like stuff" and "ideas that behave like ideas" occurs. Please explain these things in terms of your Idealism. Be as literal as you possibly can.

[bennyboy]

It looks shaky? You talk as if QM denies the literal, physical existence of macroscopic bodies.

Okay. If QM particles (or whatever underlies them) turn out not to be unamibiguously representable in space and time (which I believe to be the case), then I'd say the QM particles represent a mathematical idea than real stuff, and that macroscopic bodies represent a complex interaction among these elemental ideas.

[ManMachine]

We are all just patterns in the void.

MM

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Quantum mechanics accurately predicts the behavior of what we normally term reality. Whether that reality is stuff behaving according to the equations of QM, or ideas behaving like stuff according to the equations of QM is to me a difference without a difference. You seem to have ideas behaving like stuff in the macro world, and yet on the other hand you have ideas behaving like ideas in the mind. The sleight of hand of calling them both "idea" does not disguise the seeming fact that you have two distinctly different kinds of idea stuff that has to meet somewhere in the middle. This is the classic interface problem of substance dualism, and I don't see that you've solved it except metaphorically or semantically with vague talk of "context".

I find it odd that you pose challenges to physicalism such as identifying what things are capable of qualia that you can't resolve in the context of idealism. Is a cat capable of experiencing qualia? How does Idealism help us answer this question?

Wherever you go across the spectrum, physicalism provides evidence for its position; Idealism just assumes, hand waves, or engages in flowery metaphor that is no more explanatory than "It's magic!" or "Goddidit!"

Physicalism provides compelling, if not conclusive, evidence of the link between brain matter and qualia.

Wherever we find creatures that claim to have qualia, we find brains.

All the qualia we are capable of experiencing has corresponding sensory organs in the body, from sight to hearing to a network of muscoloskeletal sensors which tell us how are limbs are arranged and give rise to a body image. How does Idealism explain that coincidence? It's almost as if there were a relationship between the physical and the mental.

Evidence from the experience of drug use such as alcohol, rohypnol, and LSD seems to suggest that manipulation of brain chemistry brings about concomitant manipulation of the experience of mind. How does Idealism explain that?

Evidence from neurological conditions such as cerebral achromatopsia, blindness denial, hemi-neglect, frontal lobe trauma, and countless other neurological conditions show that manipulating the brain results in manipulating the experiences of mind (or if you prefer, manipulating the ideas that make up our "brain-like stuff" results in manipulation of our "idea stuff"). (Especially in cerebral achromatopsia where the patient loses the ability to experience color, even in their imagination, while retaining the ability for visual imagination.)

Evidence from split-brain studies and alien hand syndrome suggest that our experience of a single, unitary consciousness may not accurately reflect the way our minds actually work. If consciousness isn't unitary but is only experienced as unitary; what else is consciousness lying to itself about?

In sum, I don't care what is "under the hood" so long as it behaves according to the equations of QM. Whether it's ideas behaving like stuff, or stuff acting like stuff, I don't care. What I do care about is how this maneuver of making stuff into ideas explains consciousness (ideas as ideas), how it explains the physicalist evidence, and how the interaction between "ideas that behave like stuff" and "ideas that behave like ideas" occurs. Please explain these things in terms of your Idealism. Be as literal as you possibly can.

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On a QM level there is no difference between 'stuff' and 'ideas'. That is a distinction that can only occur in the macro world.

MM

[Surgenator]

On a QM level there is no difference between 'stuff' and 'ideas'. That is a distinction that can only occur in the macro world.

MM

That is a bold claim, please show the evidence for it.

[bennyboy]

The sleight of hand of calling them both "idea" does not disguise the seeming fact that you have two distinctly different kinds of idea stuff that has to meet somewhere in the middle. This is the classic interface problem of substance dualism, and I don't see that you've solved it except metaphorically or semantically with vague talk of "context".

Yeah, we've had problems with this equivocation already, but I'm not trying to make it. My definition of "idea" in the context of an idealistic universe is that a concept cannot be resolved unambiguously in geometric space.

I find it odd that you pose challenges to physicalism such as identifying what things are capable of qualia that you can't resolve in the context of idealism. Is a cat capable of experiencing qualia? How does Idealism help us answer this question?

It doesn't. Rhythm (I believe) was making a series of positive assertions about the nature of qualia, and I wanted him to support them. If I make explanations about exactly how qualia work in an idealistic universe, then I'm going to be in the same boat. I wasn't attempting to support what you think I was attempting to support with that line.

Wherever you go across the spectrum, physicalism provides evidence for its position; Idealism just assumes, hand waves, or engages in flowery metaphor that is no more explanatory than "It's magic!" or "Goddidit!"

I disagree with this, obviously. Observation provides evidence for the consistency of experience in the context of mundane life: gravity makes things fall down, chemistry makes things interact in certain ways, etc. There is nothing about any of that that establishes the underlying nature of those experiences.

Physicalism provides compelling, if not conclusive, evidence of the link between brain matter and qualia.
Wherever we find creatures that claim to have qualia, we find brains.

1. That's a little Heywoodian for my taste. "All evolutionary systems we've observed to be implemented are created by intellects (humans), therefore all evolutionary systems are created by intellects." <--> "All systems of qualia we've been able to communicate with have brains (humans), therefore all qualia is created by brains." That's a false syllogism spawned by our complete inability to perceive the qualia of others.

2. I don't have a problem with the brain and its relationship with qualia, because my view of idealism is more about what's "under the hood." Brains are observable, and we can manipulate people's experience by giving them drugs. I don't see how, under any world view, anyone could sensibly argue otherwise.

All the qualia we are capable of experiencing has corresponding sensory organs in the body, from sight to hearing to a network of muscoloskeletal sensors which tell us how are limbs are arranged and give rise to a body image. How does Idealism explain that coincidence? It's almost as if there were a relationship between the physical and the mental.

I explain all this the same way you do: the conglomeration of molecules into proteins, the evolution of genetics over time in response to statistical pressures, etc.

Evidence from the experience of drug use such as alcohol, rohypnol, and LSD seems to suggest that manipulation of brain chemistry brings about concomitant manipulation of the experience of mind. How does Idealism explain that?

Again, I don't want to piss off big-I idealists by representing their positions badly, or wrongly. It is my view that the universe is rediclbe to concepts which cannot be realized unambiguously in a space time framework.

I've edited out most of the rest of your post, because I don't disagree with any of it, except that it necessitates a physical monist position.

In sum, I don't care what is "under the hood" so long as it behaves according to the equations of QM.

Fair enough.

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It is fine that you don't believe ideas bringing forth something. However, I see this is more of a problem with idealism itself. Here is the argument.

1) Idealism states the fundamental element of reality are ideas.
2) The sourse of an idea has no bearing on how ideas interact.
3) A mind can create ideas
4) I have a mind
5) Therefore, I can use my mind to create ideas in reality.

Where do you think is my mistake?

It's an equivocation on two different meanings of "idea." I can create a car, in the sense that there's a car when there wasn't previously a car. But that doesn't mean that my act of creation created a car out of nothing.

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Wait, there are two types of ideas, elemental and not elemental? Does your mind work on elemental ideas or non-elemental ideas? How is this not dualism?

Do you not hold that both the brain and the QM particles of which it is made are both "things"? Would you claim that your brain is dualistic because it is made up of "both" QM particles and brain tissue?

[Surgenator]

It is fine that you don't believe ideas bringing forth something. However, I see this is more of a problem with idealism itself. Here is the argument.

1) Idealism states the fundamental element of reality are ideas.
2) The sourse of an idea has no bearing on how ideas interact.
3) A mind can create ideas
4) I have a mind
5) Therefore, I can use my mind to create ideas in reality.

Where do you think is my mistake?

It's an equivocation on two different meanings of "idea." I can create a car, in the sense that there's a car when there wasn't previously a car. But that doesn't mean that my act of creation created a car out of nothing.

Nowhere did I say that I'm creating something out of nothing. If it is equivocation on the definition of idea, then please point out which definition you're using and where I switch definitions. Here is the dictionary. I'm using #1a as my definition.

[bennyboy]

I'm going to produce about a half-dozen examples showing that the mechanism of a phenomenon and the phenomenon are not identical.

Produce a single one.

I can produce an unlimited number of examples. I'll say that "redness" is an experience, and you'll say I'm experiencing brain chemistry. I'll say that no, in fact, I'm experiencing redness-- that the experience of brain chemistry would involve an fMRI or something. Then we'll rinse and repeat for 20 pages. But let's not do that. There are other ideas in this thread that are worth discussing.

I've mentioned this before, but I think that one small misstep (as with mario) is the source of the entirety of our difference. You think that the information or the experience - divorced for the sake of argument from the mechanism is "the thing"" (not in the material sense, in the sense of being the object) - whereas I see the experience or the information as a description of "the thing".

Fair enough. And in my view of idealism, the two views are a chicken-and-egg issue: for the most part irrelevant. It is because of QM, in which I don't see ideas to represent what can usefully be called "a thing," and because of qualia, which I also don't think can be resolved unambiguously in geometric space, that I break from that mundane view.

(I am, btw, getting frustrated with the one-sidedness of your expectations in our conversations....you expect quite a bit of explanation from me...you offer none in return - I'd love to see some functional description from you, as to how this qualia business might be accomplished..after all this time explaining how it could be accomplished by material objects - with the constant allowance that this may not be how we do it, simply that it could be done..at some point...I would have expected you to return the courtesy)

I don't pretend to know the mechanism of qualia. You, however, gave an explicit physical description of what qualia are, and how they are brought into existence, and I wanted you to support those assertions.

[Surgenator]

Wait, there are two types of ideas, elemental and not elemental? Does your mind work on elemental ideas or non-elemental ideas? How is this not dualism?

Do you not hold that both the brain and the QM particles of which it is made are both "things"? Would you claim that your brain is dualistic because it is made up of "both" QM particles and brain tissue?

I have no idea what lead you to intepret my statement the way you did. Yes, the brain is made out of QM particles, both are things. In idealism, are there elemental ideas ad non-elemental ideas? Are the non-elemental ideas composed out of elemental ideas? If not, you have dualism. If so, you still have the problem of why the mind's ideas aren't manifested in reality.

[bennyboy]

Do you not hold that both the brain and the QM particles of which it is made are both "things"? Would you claim that your brain is dualistic because it is made up of "both" QM particles and brain tissue?

I have no idea what lead you to intepret my statement the way you did. Yes, the brain is made out of QM particles, both are things. In idealism, are there elemental ideas ad non-elemental ideas? Are the non-elemental ideas composed out of elemental ideas? If not, you have dualism.

Hmmmm, I may have misread you, or read into your statement something you didn't intend.

In my view of idealism, yes. Complex ideas are composed by a relationship among multiple elemental ideas. The ideas formed by the human mind are clearly non-elemental.

[The Grand Nudger]

I can produce an unlimited number of examples. I'll say that "redness" is an experience, and you'll say I'm experiencing brain chemistry. I'll say that no, in fact, I'm experiencing redness-- that the experience of brain chemistry would involve an fMRI or something. Then we'll rinse and repeat for 20 pages. But let's not do that. There are other ideas in this thread that are worth discussing.

Not unless this one is, I don't think so - because it all stems from this. You know what though, fuck this nonsense man...lol, that's stonewalling reassertion, not an example. I wouldn't say that you're "experiencing brain chemistry", I'd say that "brain chemistry -is- experience". Until you can really let that sink in I don't think you understand my position at all. That you imagine that I would respond to that in a manner that you might.....shows me that you still haven't grasped why this is such an important nuance. We don't just have ideas -about- things...the ideas themselves -are- things.

Fair enough. And in my view of idealism, the two views are a chicken-and-egg issue: for the most part irrelevant.

Convenient, that a difference between us on the very foundation of our disagreement would be irrelevant.

It is because of QM, in which I don't see ideas to represent what can usefully be called "a thing," and because of qualia, which I also don't think can be resolved unambiguously in geometric space, that I break from that mundane view.

You seem to have some strange beliefs about QM, as others have mentioned. That qualia -can be- resolved in geometric space is precisely what any of my explanations are trying to bring you to...-even if that's not the way we do it-. You have described something that unambiguously, and demonstrably -can be- resolved in this way. You don't think that resolution is good enough, even if it satisfies your description....qualia, to you, is "more" or "other" or "else".......but I still don't see why you think this. Look, I get it if you don't find our explanations to be thorough, we know less than we'd like - but to consider this unresolvable, ambiguous, or even impossible from the standpoint of material reduction or geometric space is just absurd. Maybe physical stuff with mass and location and structure isn't "generating qualia" in our heads- but that whats in our heads is capable of doing so(and specifically with reference to it's size, it's structure) under it's own steam with no hidden variables or special sauce isn't actually all that difficult to demonstrate-......unless, of course, you've given me an inadequate description of qualia.

I don't pretend to know the mechanism of qualia. You, however, gave an explicit physical description of what qualia are,

What they could be, if your description is accurate.

and how they are brought into existence,

How they could be, if your description is accurate.

and I wanted you to support those assertions.

-which I did....and which was deemed irrelevant when provided. Qualia, if you ask me, -and judging by your description of it- is a description of a material thing (an immense collection of material things, to be more accurate), in the same way that Mario is a description of a material thing. In either box and all space in between. Qualia poses no more of a challenge for a monism, or material reduction than Mario does-as you've described it. If I ask you to think about the color red, a very material collection of things is going to start doing work - and we can observe that to occur, and that's precisely what happens when you ask an NES to make Mario jump. Your description of qualia is both linguistically and mechanical equivalent to the output of a fucking nintendo man.....and hilariously...you even have qualia of -that- output, that simple machine is interacting with your qualia damned near directly and to incredible effect! So perhaps you can see why above, I wondered for a moment, whether or not you might be holding a little back in your description of qualia. It all seems too simple for there to be some intractable problem in my framework, when it comes to explaining what qualia is, and how it could be achieved.

I'm wondering, btw, whether or not the next time you see "Mario" jumping around like a douche...you'll have a momentary glimpse of tiny little machines doing work, current passing between them....if you'll -see- Mario that way, if that will be your new qualia, as regards Mario, rather than as a little italian man in red suspenders? Will you see Mario as he is, for what he is, or will you continue to see him as you see yourself? What's the difference, between you and he, anyway? Could you, from the point of view of what you take idealism to mean, say something to the effect of "nothing, ultimately, we're the same sort of stuff - generated by the same principles and mechanics."?