A Conscious Universe

[Mudhammam]

Okay. If QM particles (or whatever underlies them) turn out not to be unamibiguously representable in space and time (which I believe to be the case), then I'd say the QM particles represent a mathematical idea than real stuff, and that macroscopic bodies represent a complex interaction among these elemental ideas.

You're putting the cart before the horse. Mathematical ideas are nothing more than curiosities until experimentation in the physical world confirms their correlation to the actual processes under measurement. That reality may be utterly different than our conception of physical existence when it is divided into its most fundamental constituents is not indication that thoughts provide the building blocks of matter, time, or space. It rather signifies the narrow-mindedness of our ideas.

[Alex K]

I think, bennyboy, your notion what is real stuff and what not, is more prejudice and a result of the evolution of our perception of the "macroscopic" world, than based on a clear criterion for what is real. There are only gradations of uncertainty in quantum physics, and hence in current physics. At which point one starts to call something real must necessarily be an arbitrary convention.

Also I agree with Pickup. I'd add that history has shown that the mathematical structures we use to successfully describe nature often turn out to not correspond exactly to the actual structure of natural phenomena. The examples are the usual ones - newtonian point masses work wonderfully, until you hit quantum theory and special relativity. Then it turns out that space isn't really flat because of general relativity. We may have to abandon point masses in favor of strings to accommodate this fact, or maybe something else we haven't thought of. And so on and so forth. Why should this now be different for quantum theory? Prima la fisica, poi le parole. The mathematics follows nature.

Even if we decide to believe that it is in principle possible to model nature exactly in a theory of everything using mathematics, we can never know empirically when we have truly reached this goal. The insight is therefore of limited value. Those who believe that mathematical structures are real in the sense that they correspond to structures in nature exactly in some way, may be right but have in my opinion no good evidence for this view.

[bennyboy]

Okay. If QM particles (or whatever underlies them) turn out not to be unamibiguously representable in space and time (which I believe to be the case), then I'd say the QM particles represent a mathematical idea than real stuff, and that macroscopic bodies represent a complex interaction among these elemental ideas.

You're putting the cart before the horse. Mathematical ideas are nothing more than curiosities until experimentation in the physical world confirms their correlation to the actual processes under measurement. That reality may be utterly different than our conception of physical existence when it is divided into its most fundamental constituents is not indication that thoughts provide the building blocks of matter, time, or space. It rather signifies the narrow-mindedness of our ideas.

When I say ideas in the context of a candidate for reality, I don't mean ideas, like me sitting around thinking up stuff. I mean those elemental principles which make up the framework by which "stuff" operates, and of which stuff is better said to be an expression than vice versa.

I don't mean we think up ideas with our monkey brains, and that suddenly becomes our reality.

[ManMachine]

On a QM level there is no difference between 'stuff' and 'ideas'. That is a distinction that can only occur in the macro world.

MM

That is a bold claim, please show the evidence for it.

This is an extrapolation from available evidence. I accept there is talk at the moment that some fundamental particles may be divisible, notwithstanding that for the moment (ultimately it doesn't change my position just the make-up of the standard model) the standard model is considered to be the fundamental building blocks of the universe.

Electromagnetic force is part of the standard model and is part of what makes up of what we perceive of as 'matter' (such as the human brain), it also provides the electrical impulses that are our thoughts, however they manifest. Unless you are suggesting a more metaphysical construction, in which case I simply don't agree with you. That may seem like reductionism but the standard model is anything but simple.

MM

[Mudhammam]

When I say ideas in the context of a candidate for reality, I don't mean ideas, like me sitting around thinking up stuff. I mean those elemental principles which make up the framework by which "stuff" operates, and of which stuff is better said to be an expression than vice versa.

I don't mean we think up ideas with our monkey brains, and that suddenly becomes our reality.

Okay... so you're not really advocating idealism here at all, which, as I understand it (and to quote a dictionary definition), asserts that "objects of knowledge are held to be in some way dependent on the activity of mind." Perhaps what you're trying to express is more similar to the neutral monism of two of my favorite thinkers, William James and Bertrand Russell?

[bennyboy]

When I say ideas in the context of a candidate for reality, I don't mean ideas, like me sitting around thinking up stuff. I mean those elemental principles which make up the framework by which "stuff" operates, and of which stuff is better said to be an expression than vice versa.

I don't mean we think up ideas with our monkey brains, and that suddenly becomes our reality.

Okay... so you're not really advocating idealism here at all, which, as I understand it (and to quote a dictionary definition), asserts that "objects of knowledge are held to be in some way dependent on the activity of mind." Perhaps what you're trying to express is more similar to the neutral monism of two of my favorite thinkers, William James and Bertrand Russell?

I think I will have to study neutral monism before I can comment intelligently on how it relates to my views. Since my reason for selecting idealism is that I think some parts of QM and some philosophical issues with mind aren't compatible with physical monism, then whether I'd accept a neutral monism would depend on their view on those issues. I'm sure Russel didn't have much to say about QM, but I'll bet he said a lot about mind. Thanks for the heads up.

---

Even if we decide to believe that it is in principle possible to model nature exactly in a theory of everything using mathematics, we can never know empirically when we have truly reached this goal. The insight is therefore of limited value. Those who believe that mathematical structures are real in the sense that they correspond to structures in nature exactly in some way, may be right but have in my opinion no good evidence for this view.

Discussion of this stuff is a little complicated, because there are a lot of equivocations and semantic confusions possible with the way we are using words-- in particular, the words "idea" and the word "real."

My view is that there is an underlying idea, principle or formula, and that particles and supervenient objects are a realization of those ideas. We then infer through the particles or objects those underlying rules, which are the deepest layer of reality, and which are themselves not "things." And because the things we observe are imperfect representations of those underlying perfect truths, there's never a perfect match. An example would be a wave on water. I think there's a perfect wave, which would be the resolution independent (i.e. contiguous) interplay between gravity and other forces, then there's the "actual" wave, in which water molecules are approximately aligned to that perfect wave, and then there's the forumulaic wave which we infer, which is also perfect, at least in principle.

---

I wouldn't say that you're "experiencing brain chemistry", I'd say that "brain chemistry -is- experience". Until you can really let that sink in I don't think you understand my position at all.

All day we can do this. I'll explain the difference between subjective and objective, which of course you already know, and you'll argue the difference is semantic. But at the end of the day, when I'm watching little Mario jump around, that's my experience. I'm agnostic about the mechanical state of the computer-- and there's no way I can infer that state without stepping out of that game experience. In real life, there's no way to step out of the system and see what's driving it: ideas about the source of experiences can only be assumed.

It is because of QM, in which I don't see ideas to represent what can usefully be called "a thing," and because of qualia, which I also don't think can be resolved unambiguously in geometric space, that I break from that mundane view.

You seem to have some strange beliefs about QM, as others have mentioned. That qualia -can be- resolved in geometric space is precisely what any of my explanations are trying to bring you to

That's fantastic news! Show me how "redness" resolves in geometric space.

If I ask you to think about the color red, a very material collection of things is going to start doing work - and we can observe that to occur, and that's precisely what happens when you ask an NES to make Mario jump.

I can do that with a computer, too: hook up a breadboard to a USB adapter, shine a blue light on it, and observe what memory registers change when I do so. Have I now established that the computer is experiencing qualia?

If so, then qualia means nothing, and the fact that everything I do, including making observations, is through qualia, represents a serious philsophical quandary. You may be disinterested in this quandary, and wave it away with a nod toward the brain (or the computer), but I have a sincere interest in the nature of my experiences, and the reason for their existence, that isn't answered by "Duhhh, you're stupid. It's in the brain, of course!"

[The Grand Nudger]

All day we can do this. I'll explain the difference between subjective and objective, which of course you already know, and you'll argue the difference is semantic.

I'd be unlikely to argue any such thing, as I doubt it would be required or relevant.

But at the end of the day, when I'm watching little Mario jump around, that's my experience. I'm agnostic about the mechanical state of the computer--

Only by choice and commitment, you don't have to be agnostic about a mechanical state Benny........belief isn't a requirement or even relevant to mechanical states. If you want, and I've already mentioned this, I can provide you with schems and IOs. I think you're grossly misusing the term agnostic.

and there's no way I can infer that state without stepping out of that game experience.

What...the fuck....are you talking about man?

In real life, there's no way to step out of the system and see what's driving it: ideas about the source of experiences can only be assumed.

That's quite the assertion. I don't trust your assertions regarding this subject Benny.

That's fantastic news! Show me how "redness" resolves in geometric space.

You wouldn't survive the measurement, but lets not pretend it couldn't be made...eh? If you'd like to hand over your CNS and associated peripherals to be weighed and measured....while someone somewhere would greatly appreciate that - I don;t think you'd ever get the satisfaction of the final numbers.

I can do that with a computer, too: hook up a breadboard to a USB adapter, shine a blue light on it, and observe what memory registers change when I do so. Have I now established that the computer is experiencing qualia?

You'd need photoreceptors, of course (like your eyes)- but I wouldn't know, I'm only going by your description of qualia....and if that description is accurate, and you claim qualia...then yeah, seems to me like you have. For my part, I doubt that qualia can be competently and thoroughly described so simply as "experience" - I think theres more to it than all of that (your brain and nerves and eyes aren't what I'd call simple machines...after all)...but maybe I'm wrong, maybe it -is- that simple.

If so, then qualia means nothing, and the fact that everything I do, including making observations, is through qualia, represents a serious philsophical quandary.

It would mean quite a bit, but maybe not what you want it to mean....hrugs:

You may be disinterested in this quandary, and wave it away with a nod toward the brain (or the computer), but I have a sincere interest in the nature of my experiences, and the reason for their existence, that isn't answered by "Duhhh, you're stupid. It's in the brain, of course!"

Not exactly a very kind or accurate description of my interest or participation. Brains -and- computers are, to me, the most fascinating machines in existence - in any implementation. Nor am I in the habit of waving anything, I provide descriptions, explanations....outright and upfront proclamations of uncertainty and difference between systems and interactions....honestly, Benny.....if I'm handwaving...wtf are -you- doing? BTW, you did it again, its:

"Duh, you're stupid. It -is- the brain, of course." Not -in- -is-....repeat that to yourself until it sticks and then think about all of the ways the conversation is changed. I really want you to consider that deeply, because all of your language implies a split, a dichotomy. If your objections imply a dichotomy or an issue with that dichotomy, then they do not speak to -my- position.

Maybe this will work. When I say an AND gate is true...that doesn't mean that there is truth -in- the AND gate, floating around, doing truthy shit. It means that the AND gate is in one of two very particular configurations bounded on all sides, facilitated, and exhaustively described by the material interaction of it's component parts. The information isn't "in the gate"...the information is a description -of- the gate. If it were in any other material state, it would be -not true-.

[Surgenator]

That is a bold claim, please show the evidence for it.

This is an extrapolation from available evidence. I accept there is talk at the moment that some fundamental particles may be divisible, notwithstanding that for the moment (ultimately it doesn't change my position just the make-up of the standard model) the standard model is considered to be the fundamental building blocks of the universe.

Electromagnetic force is part of the standard model and is part of what makes up of what we perceive of as 'matter' (such as the human brain), it also provides the electrical impulses that are our thoughts, however they manifest. Unless you are suggesting a more metaphysical construction, in which case I simply don't agree with you. That may seem like reductionism but the standard model is anything but simple.

MM

A thought/idea is a series of electrochemical processes in the brain. A fundamental particle is a thing. A process is fundamentally different from a thing. Eventhough a process is a composite of things, the things do not get the same properties as the process because the process requires interactions between things.

[bennyboy]

You wouldn't survive the measurement, but lets not pretend it couldn't be made...eh? If you'd like to hand over your CNS and associated peripherals to be weighed and measured....while someone somewhere would greatly appreciate that - I don;t think you'd ever get the satisfaction of the final numbers.

In the name of science, I donate my brain. Now, tell me how you are going to show how the qualia of "redness" is manifested in geographical space. See, I think you will (maybe 100 years from now), have a brain-monitoring device of sufficient resolution that you will follow the chain of events from the eyes into the brain, and map out the neurons that fire. If I'm right, then answer this-- if I reproduce that neural structure EXACTLY, and remove everything else, will I have a machine that does nothing else but experience redness? If I remove or remap some of those neurons, will this machine still be experiencing redness? Let's do some observational science here.

You'd need photoreceptors, of course (like your eyes)- but I wouldn't know, I'm only going by your description of qualia....and if that description is accurate, and you claim qualia...then yeah, seems to me like you have. For my part, I doubt that qualia can be competently and thoroughly described so simply as "experience" - I think theres more to it than all of that (your brain and nerves and eyes aren't what I'd call simple machines...after all)...but maybe I'm wrong, maybe it -is- that simple.

For a guy who knows so little about what makes qualia, you sure have made a lot of confident positive assertions about it. From where does this confidence come? Could it be that you already "know" the answer, so you're perfectly content filling in the blanks with unsupported assertions? Rhythm, meet Heywood.

"Duh, you're stupid. It -is- the brain, of course." Not -in- -is-....repeat that to yourself until it sticks and then think about all of the ways the conversation is changed.

Qualia IS the brain? If this is true, then that means the brain is qualia, and I would thank you for supporting my position. Unfortunately, it's not true, and instead of making you do a song and dance about it, let's just agree you didn't mean what you said, here. Even a staunch physicalist would say that it is certain brain functions which are qualia, not the brain itself-- unless you are asserting that an unconscious or dead brain is still experiencing qualia. And unless you think the experience of redness requires the use of ALL the brain, it is IN the brain. Care to restate?

[ManMachine]

This is an extrapolation from available evidence. I accept there is talk at the moment that some fundamental particles may be divisible, notwithstanding that for the moment (ultimately it doesn't change my position just the make-up of the standard model) the standard model is considered to be the fundamental building blocks of the universe.

Electromagnetic force is part of the standard model and is part of what makes up of what we perceive of as 'matter' (such as the human brain), it also provides the electrical impulses that are our thoughts, however they manifest. Unless you are suggesting a more metaphysical construction, in which case I simply don't agree with you. That may seem like reductionism but the standard model is anything but simple.

MM

A thought/idea is a series of electrochemical processes in the brain. A fundamental particle is a thing. A process is fundamentally different from a thing. Eventhough a process is a composite of things, the things do not get the same properties as the process because the process requires interactions between things.

What arrant nonsense.

You need matter (or energy) to create a process

INPUT -> ACTION -> OUTPUT = PROCESS

When the INPUT is electrochemical, the ACTION is electrochemical/biochemical and the OUTPUT is electrochemical/biochemical how can thought not be made up of fundamental particles?

What results from this process is nothing more than can result from this process, regardless of whether or not we understand it. If you are suggesting a 'thought process' has some magical property not possessed by the interaction of its constituent parts then you're just making things up, and if you're not then you have no point to make.

MM