RE: Religion is a poor source of morality
October 7, 2015 at 4:08 pm
(This post was last modified: October 7, 2015 at 4:11 pm by Neo-Scholastic.)
I believe I have not been clear enough. In my own case, I do have a slightly different understanding of what it means when we say that something is objective. The objects of knowledge exist apart from any particular subject’s knowledge of them. As such, objects include, but are not limited to, sensible bodies. Facts about triangles are objective, but no one supposes that those facts depend on material examples to be true. Next, someone can attain knowledge about people without having any particular person in mind. Knowledge about humans, their biology, needs, wants, potentials and limits, are objective but the object of that knowledge, technically, is not about any particular material thing; but rather about the concept of what it means to be human, i.e. human nature.
Human nature is where I say people should look for objective moral standards. By studying human nature, people can come to an understanding of virtue in terms of optimal health, emotional stability, rational capacity, etc. I believe the ability to evaluate the moral import of consequences and intentions presupposes knowledge of what is harmful, neutral, or beneficial to people.
This idea has already been proposed as part of the non-theistic solutions. You must have an idea of what a human being is before you can understand what constitutes harm or benefit to one. You must have an idea of what normative and fully functioning human instincts are before you can speak about diminished capacities, like sociopaths with stunted empathy. Implementing some version of the ‘golden rule’ presupposes an essential commonality between otherwise unique individuals. I think theists and atheists could agree with these ideas on a purely pragmatic level.
The disagreement is over the relationship between particulars and universals. Nearly all believers subscribe, either expressly or tacitly, to some form of philosophical realism. For them, to be a human being means that an animal must have specific essential properties that are unique to humans. It also means that virtue and character can be objectively defined with reference to that essential human nature. Those atheists that subscribe to either nominalism or conceptualism view humanity as an abstraction based on the similarities of accidental properties. As such moral reasoning from a nominalist position depends on which arbitrary set of accidental properties is used to define humanity, i.e. whim.
Human nature is where I say people should look for objective moral standards. By studying human nature, people can come to an understanding of virtue in terms of optimal health, emotional stability, rational capacity, etc. I believe the ability to evaluate the moral import of consequences and intentions presupposes knowledge of what is harmful, neutral, or beneficial to people.
This idea has already been proposed as part of the non-theistic solutions. You must have an idea of what a human being is before you can understand what constitutes harm or benefit to one. You must have an idea of what normative and fully functioning human instincts are before you can speak about diminished capacities, like sociopaths with stunted empathy. Implementing some version of the ‘golden rule’ presupposes an essential commonality between otherwise unique individuals. I think theists and atheists could agree with these ideas on a purely pragmatic level.
The disagreement is over the relationship between particulars and universals. Nearly all believers subscribe, either expressly or tacitly, to some form of philosophical realism. For them, to be a human being means that an animal must have specific essential properties that are unique to humans. It also means that virtue and character can be objectively defined with reference to that essential human nature. Those atheists that subscribe to either nominalism or conceptualism view humanity as an abstraction based on the similarities of accidental properties. As such moral reasoning from a nominalist position depends on which arbitrary set of accidental properties is used to define humanity, i.e. whim.
