RE: Morality quiz, and objective moralities
January 29, 2016 at 10:26 am
(This post was last modified: January 29, 2016 at 10:30 am by Edwardo Piet.)
I don't think objective morality can 'exist' objectively. I don't believe in any moral ontology.
I do think that once there is a subjective consensus on how morality can be defined such as "more suffering is bad" and "more happiness is good", then there are objectively some things more moral and some things less moral than others by that definition. In that sense there can be an objective morality, that is not to say that it 'exists'.
This is analogous to health. There is no objective "good health" out there to be discovered: I don't believe there is a thing 'out there' that 'exists' called 'good health'. I don't believe in any ontologically objective "health", just as I don't believe in any ontologically objective morality.
What we do with health is we come to a consensus about what it is to be "healthy" and then there are objectively some things more healthy than others based on that definition. This makes scientifically good health epistemically objective as (opposed to ontologically objective). The same could, in theory, be done for morality.
So I don't believe in an ontologically objective morality, but I do believe that perhaps there can be an epistemically objective morality.
I do think that once there is a subjective consensus on how morality can be defined such as "more suffering is bad" and "more happiness is good", then there are objectively some things more moral and some things less moral than others by that definition. In that sense there can be an objective morality, that is not to say that it 'exists'.
This is analogous to health. There is no objective "good health" out there to be discovered: I don't believe there is a thing 'out there' that 'exists' called 'good health'. I don't believe in any ontologically objective "health", just as I don't believe in any ontologically objective morality.
What we do with health is we come to a consensus about what it is to be "healthy" and then there are objectively some things more healthy than others based on that definition. This makes scientifically good health epistemically objective as (opposed to ontologically objective). The same could, in theory, be done for morality.
So I don't believe in an ontologically objective morality, but I do believe that perhaps there can be an epistemically objective morality.
