RE: The Philosophy of Mind: Zombies, "radical emergence" and evidence of non-experiential
April 21, 2018 at 6:34 pm
(This post was last modified: April 21, 2018 at 6:38 pm by Edwardo Piet.)
Well you're simply wrong. It's not begging the question to note that a possibility is possible. That's not what begging the question is. Even Jor knows that, and yet she completely missed it. The quote I quoted wasn't Strawson trying to prove anything. I quoted that to point out to Khem that consciousness isn't required to do those things... the fact we have to experience those things that way is irrelevant to the whole point. The philosophical zombie argument is about the possibility of them, no one is saying that anyone is actually a zombie (except Dennett because he redefines stuff and acts like he's also addressing the original point when he can't be because he's redefined it).
Which makes you sound like a theist if you think there's a problem with admitting you don't know. Ironic really.
You know what begging the question is, so you should know that he's not doing it. You have to actually try and prove X in order to beg X.
(April 21, 2018 at 5:54 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: Strawson is simply begging the question here. Perhaps it's possible, perhaps it isn't. He doesn't know
Which makes you sound like a theist if you think there's a problem with admitting you don't know. Ironic really.
You know what begging the question is, so you should know that he's not doing it. You have to actually try and prove X in order to beg X.
