The Philosophy of Mind: Zombies, "radical emergence" and evidence of non-experiential

[Edwardo Piet]

Well, then that's our impasse. You don't think that these things are expressions of and derived from our experience. I can't see them as anything other-than.

You can't see Strawson's point.

I don't care whether you think consciousness has a function or not, but by saying it does when there's no evidence that it does, and there's evidence to the contrary, puts the burden of proof in your camp. To say that "in this case consciousness is how it's performed" just begs the question, because the entire point is that there's no evidence that it actually peforms a function, and you're just saying "Of course it does why can't you see that?" which isn't actually an argument.

You don't seem to understand the distinction between, for example, behaviorally reacting as if in pain when attacked, and having the subjective experience of pain, the qualia. The entire point is that creatures could behave the same way without the qualia, as there doesn't appear to be any evidence that qualia actually does anything... and there are some experiments with evidence to the contrary.

Your point, and I'm being generous in calling it that, is that consciousness doesn't serve a particular function that you obsess over.  It's a point on which we're in agreement, but not a point that supports a lack of -evolutionary- utility.

You don't even understand my point, so I was being generous when I said you were being incredulous. Or perhaps, you do understand it but you're missing it on purpose because you're disingeuous.

There's a clear distinction, that you seem unable to spot. There's a difference between behaving as if conscious, and being consciousness. Yes, in our case, evolution has lead us to behaving the way we do, and then consciousnss is a by product. There is evidence, at least, of consciousness as a by product of other features.

Once again you're being vague, irrelevant and equivocal. It is not clear whatsoever what you mean by us agreeing that consciousness performs an evolutionary function but not evolutionary utility. You're just pretending to agree on certain points, or agreeing about trivial stuff we obviously agree on, to fake being reasonable, while pretending to make some other vague point that doesn't actually say anything. It is not clear at all what you mean by there being no function but there still being utility. And you have repeatedly ignored my question as to what you mean by consciousness.

Call it evolutionary function, call it evolutionary utility, I don't care. Either way, consciousness doesn't appear to have any use, or function. Consciousness as qualia, as I have repeatedly said (and you have repeatedly ignored my question as to what you mean by consciousness). You're supposed to be addressing mine. Now you've stopped rambling unclearly about computational consciousness and saying my issues with Dennett and my issues with Dennett, all while you appear to be talking about Dennett's version of consciousness... as soon as you've pretended to interact with my version of consciousness... the best you can do is vaguely say that you agree there is no function but you don't agree there is no utility.

Instead of being unclear and vague, say what you actually mean by that. There is no function or utility, for qualia, it seems to me, and it isn't just a matter of seeming. Again, you have no evidence that qualia does have a function, and again, the experiments show evidence to the contrary.

Yeah, the shit we paint on canvass and then seek to instantiate in the world. 

Again, you're not being clear whether you're talking about the phenomenal objects or noumenol objects.

You're just an equivocating mess if you carry on like this. Art would still exist as noumenal objects, but there obviously wouldn't be any phenomenol objects without conscious experience. Do you get what I'm actually saying here? If you don't understand, please say so.

The shit we form elaborate ethical and legal systems around.  What we kill and die for.  

Selectively neutral?

You really don't seem to understand what I'm saying at all. All that stuff could exist without qualia, it just wouldn't exist as objects of appearances. Paintings would still exist in one sense if no one was there to experience their painting them, because they'd still be able to paint without being aware of their painting it... the same way that a non-conscious robot could paint a painting without being aware of it.... and the 'painting' wouldn't actually exist as a painting to the robot. It wouldn't be what we see or know to be a painting, but it would be the noumenological equivalent of the same object that we, as conscious beings, see as a 'painting'.

If that was the entire point you could stop at that..but you didn't because it isn't.  You've been asserting that there is no evolutionary utility to consciousness.

That's what I just said. There's no evidence of it, and there's evidence to the contrary. The onus is on you to show that there is (I'm not expecting you to be capable of doing that). The point is that your position is most likely the incorrect one, and goes against the evidence. 

That seems highly unlikely regardless of what consciousness is, how we arrive at it, or whatever else it doesn't do...or whether or not some legitimate philosophical zombie could achieve something similar some other way.

If by "seems highly unlikely" you mean to you it does and you're incredulous in face of all evidence to the contrary, then sure. I'll take that as an admission of your own irrationality then. You haven't actually got an argument, all you've got is your own incredulity.