The Philosophy of Mind: Zombies, "radical emergence" and evidence of non-experiential

[bennyboy]

A commonly referenced framework for an evolutionary theory of consciousness is AST.  Attention Schema Theory.  It posits that qualia is a form of internal modeling, and that the benefits of this internal modeling are not only observable in other physical systems...but also, in all likelihood, much farther back down the evolutionary branches than we might expect.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attention_schema_theory

(you should really browse the publications in reference - particularly the lit review)

Here's the thing, though.  You seem to be giving a final cause, which I'd say is a pretty idealistic view: "Well, consciousness helps an organism to thrive in its environment."  But the point of interest is how or why there can be such a thing as consciousness.

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What makes you think consciousness is required for that?

I don't think that.  I completely disagree with that definition of consciousness.  To me, consciousness means the experience of qualia, and only that.

What do you mean by "a mirroring of a state"?

Sorry maybe it's a clumsy turn of phrase.  I mean that rather than being a product OF brain function, some conflate the subjective experience and the brain function, saying they are one and the same. To me, this is unacceptable. One property is the experience of what things are like, and one is a collection of neurological processes that you can monitor and manipulate.

The consciousness I'm speaking of is qualia. I don't see how qualia is useful. As, for instance, it would be possible in principle for an organism to react to being damaged or attacked without actually experiencing pain.... and I can't think of any kind of senses that are any less evolutionary useful without qualia. Qualia appears to either be some sort of byproduct of brain complexity, or something more fundamental than that, to me.

Whatever qualia are, I believe that reality itself must have the capacity for experience.  I wouldn't say qualia are useful to a physical system, either-- because without the capacity for qualia, there can be no real use for anything.

True, unless those things are identical to qualia. The identity theory for instance. The idea being that, our first person experience is just those things in first person form. What is your view on that?

My view is that I can observe all the physical properties and functions of the brain, and still not have direct access to a person's qualia.  To me this is obvious: if I'm dreaming about a magic unicorn and want to cut off its horn, you can't hand me a hammer-- you have, perhaps, to stimulate a very particular set of neurons.

Well, I think the point is that consciousness may help creatures reproduce... it may be genetically selected for by natural selection.

I don't think it is. I think it's either part of the intrinsic nature of matter or it's a byproduct. I think perhaps human consciousness on a higher level is a byproduct, of brain complexity, but consciousness itself doesn't appear to have a function... it's just a by product of functioning.

I agree.  It wouldn't be hard to make a mathematical weighting system for robots, for example, which would determine the weighting between "Make new robots" behavior and "go to the repair shop" behaviors.