The Philosophy of Mind: Zombies, "radical emergence" and evidence of non-experiential

[Edwardo Piet]

You have not shown that it has any utility at all... evolutionary or otherwise. All I can concede is perhaps the fact we can have a conversation about it is the only effect. If you want to call that a useful effect then go for it. But an evolutionary effect or any especially useful effect? You have not demonstrated any such thing. And how could you? Like I said, a behaviorally indistinguishable philosophical zombie can be conceived and that is precisely because it doesn't appear that consciousness is actually doing anything.

Sure, they could do that, and that would describe the evolutionary utility of however -they- did that...not at all unlike the evolutionary utility of an ant colony.  

So this is an admission that you were wrong then? Philosophical zombies could do all the things you previously said required consciousness.

Sure, and if it liked to fuck real girls more than dolls then being a real girl is selectively advantageous for the real girl. 

Being irrelevant again? As you can see, you are not addressing the fact that the robot would have every reason to like fucking the real girl if she was also a robot... and the whole point is that the robot wouldn't be able to tell the difference. You are equivocating: are you talking about a real girl that is real because it isn't a 'doll'? Or a real girl that is real because it isn't a philosophical zombie/robot? Your ambiguity is showing again.

Evolutionary utility isn't a matter of necessity.

Um... the entire point of the philosophical zombie argument that you are supposed to be addressing is a matter of that. The point is that there isn't necessarily any reason why consciousness had to evolve along with brains per se... as all behaviors could be achieved without consciousness. You keep failing to demonstrate the undemonstratable and continuing to claim that consciousness has a function without any actual or argument that supports otherwise (not surprised, such a thing isn't possible). Is this the part where you say "But in this case consciousness does perform that function" and simply miss the point and completely beg the question again?

  It's a matter of what you do with what you've got.  You don't need a birds wings to take flight.., there are other ways to achieve that effect. 

And yet... flight is actually does have evolutionary utility... unlike consciousness and unlike a moth killing itself on a lampshade. Just as the moth's navigation's system has utility but the suicidal behavior doesn't...  the brain is useful but consciousness isn't. Talking about the moth's navigation system being useful is just a failure to understand my analogy... and talking about flight and wings being useful is a crappy analogy of your own because both wings and flight are demonstrably useful... unlike consciousness or suicidal moth behavior.

Are you going to concede your crap analogy and your faulty interpretation of my analogy yet? Are you going to ignore the previous question altogether rather than concede it? Or are you going to double down and insist even harder that your analogy isn't crappy and/or you understood mine well. Are you going to ignore one point but not the other? Curious what approach you will take... but I doubt you'll concede all areas in which you are clearly wrong. Also, it seems clear to you that debates are largely about your own ego.

Nevertheless..if the way -you- do it involves wings...and taking flight is advantageous...that is a description of evolutionary utility.  

As already explained (many times and you keep ignoring it) this is a false analogy. There's evidence for both of those things having evolutionary utility... but there is no such case with consciousness (is this the part where you go and give more crappy examples like art and civilization when I already dealt with that but you ignored my question about the distinction between phenomena and noumena repeatedly? Or is this the part where you move onto another crappy example after failing to deal with the others? And after moving onto that crappy example will you answer my point about the distinction between phenomena and noumena then? Or will you ignore it again?)

A robot could fuck a real a girl or [produce] art.

Yes..there are many evolutionary pathways to commonly advantageous behaviors and abilities.  This isn't a problem for any given representative apparatus. 

This doesn't address the philosophical zombie argument at all. The entire point is that all behaviors can happen noumenally which means that phenomenal qualia doesn't appear to actually do anything because all entities are still behaving exactly the same <------- this is as concisely and clearly as I can possibly put it. But my guess is you'll probably ignore my clear point about the distinction between noumena and phenomena again.

Oh, cmon, that can't be entirely true.  You're an empathetic guy, you probably care..at least a little bit..how I feel. 

What I'm clearly saying is it's entirely irrelevant to this discussion.

Notice what it is that you actually say and that I am responding to when I say that it is irrelevant to the discussion. (as as a side note: No I am not an empathetic guy at all. I'm a very unempathetic guy. I'm a compassionate guy: There is a difference.

I think that it's more important than it may seem. 

Again, note what I actually said was irrelevant. That whether I care or not about how you feel is irrelevant our discussion about consciousness. So no, it clearly isn't more important than it may seem. It's entirely irrelevant. You are just on another red herring again. Whether I care about what you feel or not has nothing to do with my being interested in discussing consciousness with you.

AST posits consciousness as internal modeling, and also the ability to model other "selves".  If empathy is advantageous...and if consciousness is internal modeling...then this...again, is a description of evolutionary utility. 

Consciousness isn't required for empathy. Once again, the point is that all that can happen noumenally, without any phenomenal qualia at all. You have not demosntrated how qualia does (or even could) perform any function at all. The only conceivable effect appears to be the fact that because people have qualia they are able to talk about it. We wouldn't be having this discussion about qualia if we didn't have qualia to discuss. But the point is that all other behavior besides discussing or communicating about qualia itself... is performable without qualia. It appears to be an effect that has no effect besides allowing us to acknowledge that it exists. We can all talk about what red looks like to us... but our eyes could still do everything it needed to do without us actually having any seeing-red-experience to talk about.

It;s the former..not the latter..I'm commenting on, and I simply don't agree.  Perhaps..though, you could suggest some specific advantage that you'd consider a credible answer?

For consciousness? No of course not: in case you're completely logically blind (actually you are pretty close to that from my standpoint...) you should have noticed that my entire argument is about how such an example cannot be given. when are you going to address my point that the noumenal behavior and objects could still exist without the phenomenal aspect?

Again you have demonstrated nothing... along with making false analogies and red herrings. At least you've stopped strawmanning for a while (for now anyway).

But that's because it's hard to make a strawman out of an opponent when you're going on fall blown red herrings. It's hard to make a strawman out of someone's position when you're not even addressing anything like their position. It's all false analogies and red herrings now with you.

Oh god and the way you keep begging the question over and over lol. When it comes down to it, when you're really at the point where if this were a formal debate you'd have to concede your point... all you've got is basically saying "Of course consciousness is required for those things."

Here's my of course: of course you can't give examples in which qualia has any sort of evolutionary utility... because such a example can't even conceivably be given.