Christianity is heading for a full allegorization

[polymath257]

So before I respond to this, I need to correct myself on one thing I said earlier: that zombies need not be metaphysically possible. This is not correct.

The zombie argument is as follows:

Zombies are logically possible (conceivable), therefore they are metaphysically possible, and therefore strict physicalism is false (consciousness is something on top of the physical).

And I don't think they are conceivable. I certainly cannot conceive of something that is physically identical to a conscious being that is not itself conscious. That seems nonsensical to me.

I would say that the mind is a process in the brain. It's closer to a running program than it is hardware.

So, if two things are physically identical and one is conscious, so is the other. The same physical processes are happening and so whatever is 'in the mind' of one is also 'in the mind' of the other.

Ok, that may be so under your worldview, but that doesn't mean therefore the zombie is incoherent under (say) a dualist worldview. So I take it that when you say "incoherent", you mean "incoherent under your worldview".

Anyway, let me briefly comment on what you said before:

You said earlier that it (the zombie) is conceivable, but that it's meaningless to go there because it's like saying that high temperature without the underlying molecules moving at high speeds is logically possible, even though it's not actually possible.

However, I would say that high temperature is intuitively reducible to the underlying molecules moving at high speeds (that's almost by definition if not actually by definition), while consciousness is not necessarily reducible to the workings of the brain. So that the former is not conceivable, but the latter is conceivable.

But that connection depends on our knowledge of that link. Previous to that, and even after molecules were known, it was certainly 'logically possible' that temperature was not the average kinetic energy of the molecules.

This is the problem of arguing what is possible without knowing what is actually the case.

Was it 'possible' 300 years ago that water was not H2O? Certainly, nobody at the time would have considered something like that to be a possibility.

So I dispute the use of that analogy.

I think it holds. We do not know the specifics of how neural activities correlate to conscious states. Until we do, saying what is and what is not possible is going to be fraught with dangers.

I would say that the neural activity *is* the conscious state, but from outside rather than inside. It is similar to saying that temperature *is* the average kinetic energy of the molecules. The two say exactly the same thing, just from different perspectives.

I would not say that neural activity is the conscious state.

OK, so how do we resolve this difference of opinions? How about by looking for those correlations and seeing if we can get to the place we can identify brain activity and conscious states?

Think of it like this. How does activity of the circuitry lead to running a program in a computer?

Not the same. You can theoretically explain how a program works in terms of the activity of the circuitry. Something to do with "switches" representing bits.

And if we can 'explain' how conscious states work by pointing to their correlates in neural activity?

Here is another aspect of the consciousness discussion: what, precisely, is a quale?

I have seen it defined as a 'unit of conscious experience'. But it isn't clear to me what that actually is.

It's hard for me to articulate or grasp what it is exactly, so cannot answer that.

For example, if I look at something red, is the sensation of redness the quale? Does the quale include the emotional response? Does it include whatever is in my peripheral vision? Does it include my expectations?

Except for expectations, I would say they're all qualia.

Regarding expectations, need to elaborate on what you mean exactly? Can I easily code expectations (per whatever the definition) into a computer program?

That said, I don't think the right way to look at conscious experience is to try to divide it into units.

How is a quale different than a sensory detection?

Depends what you mean by detection. Do you mean detection "in the dark" or the "vivid flashy type"?

I'm not sure what you mean here. If I detect something visual, it is 'vivid flashy'. Since I don't detect 'in the dark', if it is detected, it is not 'in the dark'. If I detect something auditory it is 'vivid soundy'.

What do you mean by detection 'in the dark'??

Here's a different question: if philosophical zombies are possible, How do I know whether *I* am one or not? How do I know if what I *think* I am experiencing is actually an experience?

If you're having [what appear to be] phenomenological experiences, you're not a zombie.

And how can I determine that?

A zombie does not have [what appear to be] phenomenological experiences.

And yet, for some reason, they *report* having such, just like their physically identical conscious counterparts do.

Now, why would they report this if it is not the case? And doesn't that show that zombies are an incoherent concept?

So, for example, I have aphantism: when I 'imagine' things, I have no visual component to my imagination. Does that mean I am a zombie? why or why not?

If you have any phenomenological experiences, or have what appear to be such, you are not a zombie. Even if you can't visualize imagery in your mind, you can still vividly see stuff around you, you can feel pain, etc.

How can I determine if I actually have 'phenomenological experiences'? What is the difference between 'seeing stuff' and 'vividly seeing stuff'? Is the alternative to 'dimly see stuff'?