Christianity is heading for a full allegorization

[GrandizerII]

The zombie is meant to be a thought experiment, nothing more. Chalmers' point is that, logically speaking, one can have all the "outward appearance" of a conscious person and behave like such, and yet still lack qualia. If it's even logically possible (even if perhaps not metaphysically possible) for a p-zombie to exist, then this lends credence to the hard problem.

And I don't think it is logically possible in a way that leads to a hard problem.

It is sort of like asking if it is logically possible to have a high temperature without the underlying molecules moving at high speeds.

Sure, it is *logically possible*, but the actual fact  is that it is physically impossible because temperature *is* the motion of those molecules. But that is what we have found out through a lot of investigation.

Our ignorance doesn't mean it is logically possible for it to be otherwise.

Ok, let's go back a bit then.

The mind being the brain or some such is a position you hold to (which I think is safe to say given what you have said to me), but is that why you think p-zombies are incoherent? I just want to be clear I'm getting you right here.

And I think that the idea that a mechanism is *required* is a philosophical mistake. There will be things that simply don't have deeper explanations. And that might *be* the explanation.

I certainly agree that at some point you must hit a dead end epistemically, but I don't agree we should therefore give up on trying to go as deep as we can seeking further explanations.

And what, precisely, is required? If that link between neural activity and conscious states is testable, predictable, and universal, what else is actually required?

An explanation as to how neural activity leads to conscious states ... in the same way that we know how neural activity leads to, say, physical reflexes.

[polymath257]

And I don't think it is logically possible in a way that leads to a hard problem.

It is sort of like asking if it is logically possible to have a high temperature without the underlying molecules moving at high speeds.

Sure, it is *logically possible*, but the actual fact  is that it is physically impossible because temperature *is* the motion of those molecules. But that is what we have found out through a lot of investigation.

Our ignorance doesn't mean it is logically possible for it to be otherwise.

Ok, let's go back a bit then.

The mind being the brain or some such is a position you hold to (which I think is safe to say given what you have said to me), but is that why you think p-zombies are incoherent? I just want to be clear I'm getting you right here.

I would say that the mind is a process in the brain. It's closer to a running program than it is hardware.

So, if two things are physically identical and one is conscious, so is the other. The same physical processes are happening and so whatever is 'in the mind' of one is also 'in the mind' of the other.

And I think that the idea that a mechanism is *required* is a philosophical mistake. There will be things that simply don't have deeper explanations. And that might *be* the explanation.

I certainly agree that at some point you must hit a dead end epistemically, but I don't agree we should therefore give up on trying to go as deep as we can seeking further explanations.

And I would agree with that. But, in the absence of such, the correlation is the explanation.

And what, precisely, is required? If that link between neural activity and conscious states is testable, predictable, and universal, what else is actually required?

An explanation as to how neural activity leads to conscious states ... in the same way that we know how neural activity leads to, say, physical reflexes.

I would say that the neural activity *is* the conscious state, but from outside rather than inside. It is similar to saying that temperature *is* the average kinetic energy of the molecules. The two say exactly the same thing, just from different perspectives.

Think of it like this. How does activity of the circuitry lead to running a program in a computer?

The question itself is the problem. The activity of the circuitry and the running of the program are *the same thing* from different perspectives. We can say that a certain pattern of activity in the circuits is the same as the computer carrying out a certain line in a program. And, just like different computers will have different specific circuitry and perhaps very different machine language, but we can still say they are running the same program, it seems possible, even likely that two people can have different circuitry and different hardware and be thinking the 'same thought'. It does not have to be a one-to-one correspondence.

---

Here is another aspect of the consciousness discussion: what, precisely, is a quale?

I have seen it defined as a 'unit of conscious experience'. But it isn't clear to me what that actually is.

For example, if I look at something red, is the sensation of redness the quale? Does the quale include the emotional response? Does it include whatever is in my peripheral vision? Does it include my expectations?

How is a quale different than a sensory detection?

Here's a different question: if philosophical zombies are possible, How do I know whether *I* am one or not? How do I know if what I *think* I am experiencing is actually an experience?

So, for example, I have aphantasia: when I 'imagine' things, I have no visual component to my imagination. Does that mean I am a zombie? why or why not?

[GrandizerII]

So before I respond to this, I need to correct myself on one thing I said earlier: that zombies need not be metaphysically possible. This is not correct.

The zombie argument is as follows:

Zombies are logically possible (conceivable), therefore they are metaphysically possible, and therefore strict physicalism is false (consciousness is something on top of the physical).

I would say that the mind is a process in the brain. It's closer to a running program than it is hardware.

So, if two things are physically identical and one is conscious, so is the other. The same physical processes are happening and so whatever is 'in the mind' of one is also 'in the mind' of the other.

Ok, that may be so under your worldview, but that doesn't mean therefore the zombie is incoherent under (say) a dualist worldview. So I take it that when you say "incoherent", you mean "incoherent under your worldview".

Anyway, let me briefly comment on what you said before:

You said earlier that it (the zombie) is conceivable, but that it's meaningless to go there because it's like saying that high temperature without the underlying molecules moving at high speeds is logically possible, even though it's not actually possible.

However, I would say that high temperature is intuitively reducible to the underlying molecules moving at high speeds (that's almost by definition if not actually by definition), while consciousness is not necessarily reducible to the workings of the brain. So that the former is not conceivable, but the latter is conceivable.

So I dispute the use of that analogy.

I would say that the neural activity *is* the conscious state, but from outside rather than inside. It is similar to saying that temperature *is* the average kinetic energy of the molecules. The two say exactly the same thing, just from different perspectives.

I would not say that neural activity is the conscious state.

Think of it like this. How does activity of the circuitry lead to running a program in a computer?

Not the same. You can theoretically explain how a program works in terms of the activity of the circuitry. Something to do with "switches" representing bits.

Here is another aspect of the consciousness discussion: what, precisely, is a quale?

I have seen it defined as a 'unit of conscious experience'. But it isn't clear to me what that actually is.

It's hard for me to articulate or grasp what it is exactly, so cannot answer that.

For example, if I look at something red, is the sensation of redness the quale? Does the quale include the emotional response? Does it include whatever is in my peripheral vision? Does it include my expectations?

Except for expectations, I would say they're all qualia.

Regarding expectations, need to elaborate on what you mean exactly? Can I easily code expectations (per whatever the definition) into a computer program?

That said, I don't think the right way to look at conscious experience is to try to divide it into units.

How is a quale different than a sensory detection?

Depends what you mean by detection. Do you mean detection "in the dark" or the "vivid flashy type"?

Here's a different question: if philosophical zombies are possible, How do I know whether *I* am one or not? How do I know if what I *think* I am experiencing is actually an experience?

If you're having [what appear to be] phenomenological experiences, you're not a zombie.

A zombie does not have [what appear to be] phenomenological experiences.

So, for example, I have aphantism: when I 'imagine' things, I have no visual component to my imagination. Does that mean I am a zombie? why or why not?

If you have any phenomenological experiences, or have what appear to be such, you are not a zombie. Even if you can't visualize imagery in your mind, you can still vividly see stuff around you, you can feel pain, etc.

[polymath257]

So before I respond to this, I need to correct myself on one thing I said earlier: that zombies need not be metaphysically possible. This is not correct.

The zombie argument is as follows:

Zombies are logically possible (conceivable), therefore they are metaphysically possible, and therefore strict physicalism is false (consciousness is something on top of the physical).

And I don't think they are conceivable. I certainly cannot conceive of something that is physically identical to a conscious being that is not itself conscious. That seems nonsensical to me.

I would say that the mind is a process in the brain. It's closer to a running program than it is hardware.

So, if two things are physically identical and one is conscious, so is the other. The same physical processes are happening and so whatever is 'in the mind' of one is also 'in the mind' of the other.

Ok, that may be so under your worldview, but that doesn't mean therefore the zombie is incoherent under (say) a dualist worldview. So I take it that when you say "incoherent", you mean "incoherent under your worldview".

Anyway, let me briefly comment on what you said before:

You said earlier that it (the zombie) is conceivable, but that it's meaningless to go there because it's like saying that high temperature without the underlying molecules moving at high speeds is logically possible, even though it's not actually possible.

However, I would say that high temperature is intuitively reducible to the underlying molecules moving at high speeds (that's almost by definition if not actually by definition), while consciousness is not necessarily reducible to the workings of the brain. So that the former is not conceivable, but the latter is conceivable.

But that connection depends on our knowledge of that link. Previous to that, and even after molecules were known, it was certainly 'logically possible' that temperature was not the average kinetic energy of the molecules.

This is the problem of arguing what is possible without knowing what is actually the case.

Was it 'possible' 300 years ago that water was not H2O? Certainly, nobody at the time would have considered something like that to be a possibility.

So I dispute the use of that analogy.

I think it holds. We do not know the specifics of how neural activities correlate to conscious states. Until we do, saying what is and what is not possible is going to be fraught with dangers.

I would say that the neural activity *is* the conscious state, but from outside rather than inside. It is similar to saying that temperature *is* the average kinetic energy of the molecules. The two say exactly the same thing, just from different perspectives.

I would not say that neural activity is the conscious state.

OK, so how do we resolve this difference of opinions? How about by looking for those correlations and seeing if we can get to the place we can identify brain activity and conscious states?

Think of it like this. How does activity of the circuitry lead to running a program in a computer?

Not the same. You can theoretically explain how a program works in terms of the activity of the circuitry. Something to do with "switches" representing bits.

And if we can 'explain' how conscious states work by pointing to their correlates in neural activity?

Here is another aspect of the consciousness discussion: what, precisely, is a quale?

I have seen it defined as a 'unit of conscious experience'. But it isn't clear to me what that actually is.

It's hard for me to articulate or grasp what it is exactly, so cannot answer that.

For example, if I look at something red, is the sensation of redness the quale? Does the quale include the emotional response? Does it include whatever is in my peripheral vision? Does it include my expectations?

Except for expectations, I would say they're all qualia.

Regarding expectations, need to elaborate on what you mean exactly? Can I easily code expectations (per whatever the definition) into a computer program?

That said, I don't think the right way to look at conscious experience is to try to divide it into units.

How is a quale different than a sensory detection?

Depends what you mean by detection. Do you mean detection "in the dark" or the "vivid flashy type"?

I'm not sure what you mean here. If I detect something visual, it is 'vivid flashy'. Since I don't detect 'in the dark', if it is detected, it is not 'in the dark'. If I detect something auditory it is 'vivid soundy'.

What do you mean by detection 'in the dark'??

Here's a different question: if philosophical zombies are possible, How do I know whether *I* am one or not? How do I know if what I *think* I am experiencing is actually an experience?

If you're having [what appear to be] phenomenological experiences, you're not a zombie.

And how can I determine that?

A zombie does not have [what appear to be] phenomenological experiences.

And yet, for some reason, they *report* having such, just like their physically identical conscious counterparts do.

Now, why would they report this if it is not the case? And doesn't that show that zombies are an incoherent concept?

So, for example, I have aphantism: when I 'imagine' things, I have no visual component to my imagination. Does that mean I am a zombie? why or why not?

If you have any phenomenological experiences, or have what appear to be such, you are not a zombie. Even if you can't visualize imagery in your mind, you can still vividly see stuff around you, you can feel pain, etc.

How can I determine if I actually have 'phenomenological experiences'? What is the difference between 'seeing stuff' and 'vividly seeing stuff'? Is the alternative to 'dimly see stuff'?

[emjay]

It's an interesting conversation you guys are having. Philosophical zombies have always been a major sticking point for me in questions about consciousness... ie basically why are we not PZs? It's very interesting to see you @polymath257 saying you don't think they're a coherent concept... I'm not sure either way really, but they certainly seem paradoxical in some ways, which might indeed mean that they are incoherent.

Taking a PZ to mean a being that has no phenomenal consciousness despite having the same brain structure as one with consciousness. Ie just to be clear, I'm not talking about a lack of consciousness in the sense of deprived consciousness through structural differences or damage etc, but rather a brain that has all the usual neural correlates of consciousness, but no phenomenal consciousness, if such a thing is possible. That's what I personally mean when I'm talking about PZs. This sort of PZ would be completely physically indistinguishable... and thus undetectable - in all objectively observable respects, be they behaviour or brain structure - from another like being with phenomenal consciousness... such beings would for instance talk about emotional states and consciousness just as much as their phenomenally conscious equivalents, and do so because their brains still represent exactly the same information and processes, including motor outputs leading to verbal reports etc.

The main paradox for me, and what really boggles my mind, is if phenomenal consciousness is basically a mirror (or emergent property or whatever) of let's call it 'neural consciousness' (ie the neural correlates of consciousness)... if both are identical but viewed from different perspectives... just two sides of the same coin... (which is how I see it, and it looks like you do similarly as well)... then it's curious if we would treat them differently depending on if they had or did not have phenomenal consciousness. And intuitively I think we would treat them differently because (ie a non-PZ or PZ interacting with a hypothetically confirmed PZ (even though there'd be no way to confirm it, but just for argument's sake say it was confirmed somehow)) we feel empathy and sympathy for others based on not wanting them to feel pain, but feeling pain we intuitively see (or at least I see) as a purely phenomenal aspect of consciousness... ie sure there are distributed physical and neural correlates of that consciousness, and thus that pain... our brain state that is mirrored (for want of a better term) in/by consciousness, but nonetheless, I cannot intuitively look at those distributed processes in isolation, which is what the concept of a pZ is about, and feel the same sort of emotional response to it, in the sense of empathy/sympathy, as I would for imagining a phenomenally conscious state.

So that's basically the main crux of the problem for me... though it may just turn out to be sloppy thinking, I don't know. All that I have described above may be incoherent and/or circular in places... it's just the rabbit hole my mind goes into on these issues... so it might be inherent in that, under closer analysis, why the concept of a PZ is incoherent, if it is. So basically I'm leaving it as an open question whether it even makes sense, but ultimately it doesn't really matter and is only a philosophical problem, because like I said if such a PZ existed there'd be no way to detect it, so given our own experience of our own consciousness and the fact that we can reasonably assume that is equally the case for other similar beings, there's no reason to assume the presence of PZs in our reality, and in the presence of any such doubt on that score - such as for very small/simple organisms, it makes much more sense I think, from an ethical point of view, to err on the side of assuming consciousness, even when it's not as intuitively obvious that there would be consciousness. So basically, it's not that I think there are PZs out there, because personal experience obviously tells me otherwise (even if you have no way of knowing if I'm a PZ or not ), but just that given that we do have phenomenal consciousness, why do we have it when it seems superfluous and with no causal power? (ie looking at it from a physical determinism point of view, obviously referring to the neural side as being physically determined (albeit with whatever quantum implications, but whatever they may be, I don't think they affect the thrust of what I'm saying)). I'm not expecting an answer here, just detailing my thought process on all this (though feel free to add your thoughts if you're interested)... the way I'm picturing PZs might just turn out to be incoherent... or not... but it's interesting seeing someone who does see them as incoherent... basically whatever way it goes, it's all food for thought

[LadyForCamus]

I’m having a hard time with the claim that something is logically possible simply because I can imagine it.

[The Grand Nudger]

And how can I determine that?

Same way the pzombie does, you think it.  Each of you utterly incapable of discerning any difference between reality and your claims.

[emjay]

I’m having a hard time with the claim that something is logically possible simply because I can imagine it.

Just to be clear, whenever I'm talking about PZs, it's rarely in the context of that quoted argument against physicalism... I mean I know/think that's where the term originated (?Chalmers), but that doesn't mean that's the only place that concept can be used. Just wanted to make that clear in case it looked like I was arguing that same case, because I'm not; my use of the term PZ was strictly in the context of the post I wrote, and for those reasons only... ie if it has any bearing on the so-called 'zombie argument' it is entirely coincidental So in other words, what you say here about that argument's claim about logical possibility following conceivably, didn't factor in the slightest in my own thinking on the subject of PZs... to me they were just something that naturally and logically followed from my own idiosyncratic perspectives on the brain, consciousness, metaphysics etc... but I fully accept that any of that thinking could be wrong/incoherent/irrational (and that other people with different perspectives may not come to the same conclusions)... thus potentially leading me down all sorts of rabbit holes in the way I think about these sorts of questions... and thus ultimately why it can only really remain an open question to me whether my concept of PZ is even coherent or not; it's coherent enough to be a long-standing metaphysical question for me, but at the same time, as with much of philosophy, it could just be a badly framed question... ie finding the right question is half the battle.

[LadyForCamus]

@emjay it wasn’t anything in response to your personal take on PZ’s; I just always hear the argument prefaced with that assumption and I’m not quite sure I entirely follow it, that’s all. 🙂 Like, I can imagine a rainbow-farting unicorn. How does it follow that because I can conceive of it, a unicorn that farts rainbows is logically possible? I don’t get it.

[emjay]

@emjay it wasn’t anything in response to your personal take on PZ’s; I just always hear the argument prefaced with that assumption and I’m not quite sure I entirely follow it, that’s all. 🙂 Like, I can imagine a rainbow-farting unicorn. How does it follow that because I can conceive of it, a unicorn that farts rainbows is logically possible? I don’t get it.

Yeah, no worries... I just said that just in case... just to clear up any possible confusion And yeah I think I agree with what you're saying... especially perhaps because our conceptions are often fuzzy for want of a better word, so just from a brain imagery point of view, just because we can imagine something doesn't make it a logically coherent concept. But if conception means creating a logically coherent concept, then I'd think that by definition it would be logically possible? Not necessarily feasible/probable but possible, yes? Or am I misunderstanding you?