Four arguments against the existence of God
September 20, 2014 at 11:58 pm
(This post was last modified: September 21, 2014 at 12:25 am by Mudhammam.)
1. God is ill-defined
2. God is hidden
3. The problem of evil
4. The failure of positive arguments for God's existence
I believe these four arguments are among the best reasons one can possibly offer for rejecting the existence of God.
(1) God is ill-defined; a problem anyone with a casual interest in theology almost immediately observes is the abundance of mutually exclusive claims made about God or gods. Even within very specific religious texts or revelatory claims multiple contradictions abound. Far worse in my view, the character traits of any given deity that are agreed upon--albeit arrived at for reasons that are necessarily arbitrary, wanting, or both--do not and cannot arise from original discovery but always resemble the fanciful projections of (a) interpersonal human relationships and (b) the gradually evolving ideals, insecurities, and fears of our species, abstracted and projected in the extreme. If the concept of God as imagined in most theistic traditions is valid, God cannot be ill-defined or misunderstood as it/he/she is, and as this is indeed the case, it is reasonable to hold such conceptions to be invalid. The reason for the difficulties posed by (1) is a direct result of
(2); God is hidden. Unlike the Gods depicted in specific strands of theism, where the divinities persuasively earn the title Almighty through clear, unnatural, public displays of power, the God of philosophical disputes never seems to make any distinguishable appearances that are not better explained and understood by strictly natural and all too common phenomena of the mind--including the projections mentioned briefly in (1) as well as psychological peculiarities which exist across the wide spectrum of human experiences. Any God that warrants the traditional depictions offered by theists appears confined to ancient--that is, largely unverifiable and hence, unreliable--writings or creeds, or the subjective realm as in classic mystical states. These are more readily and satisfactorily explained by centuries of accumulated scientific knowledge of the brain, especially in terms of the variety of forms these mental states take and their inevitable connections to particular circumstances, cultures, and biological dispositions. On the other hand, theism must posit the mixed explanation of natural phenomena and/or "demonic spirits" to render intelligible the overwhelming inconsistencies, the latter of which is ultimately unjustified and the former of which is highly telling. If theism is true, it must deny scientific explanations such as those provided by psychological, neurological, and sociological research (to suggest a few relevant fields of inquiry), or explain why those are only sufficient for certain religious experiences while others are given license to assert grandiose metaphysical suppositions about the cosmos.
(3) The problem of evil has been the most popular argument against the dominating traditions of theism since Epicurus first sought use of it in its most recognized form, which will not repeated here; suffice to say, theists have put forth different theodicies with limited success. Certainly one can neuter aspects of their deity to avoid the logical pitfalls supplied by most philosophical and theological interpretations of the supreme being, though such a move would prove both unattractive and destructive to the vast majority of historical and modern religious thought. This, however, remains a possibility. Another option is to remove the discussion away from the domain of reason and into faith, which some do by suggesting that we simply trust God to ultimately demonstrate a benevolent purpose for the abundance of suffering in the world. Note that to admit this is to surrender the rigorous utility of reason which is to give away the only tool theists can pretend to possess considering (2). Even to admit the possibility of logical consistency between God in the traditional theistic sense and the problem of evil, the theistic position still does not prove favorable, as implausibility remains an ever-persisting opposition.
(4) Granted that points 1-3 somehow fail, it cannot be denied that the burden of proof lies with the theist who is putting forth a positive explanation where either direct or indirect observation has yet to reach a decisive conclusion rather than admitting ignorance or uncertainty. It is a historical fact that since Kant, the traditional arguments for God's existence have largely fallen to the waste bin in philosophical circles with certain exceptions. If arguments for God's existence cannot prove decisive, and it is my view that given their reliance on logical fallacies they cannot, then the default position must be admitted, which is at the very least agnosticism, and it is fair to say that this involves a lack of belief, which is atheistic in the trust sense.
These are the four best arguments that I can think of for denying theisitic belief. What other arguments do you find persuasive?
2. God is hidden
3. The problem of evil
4. The failure of positive arguments for God's existence
I believe these four arguments are among the best reasons one can possibly offer for rejecting the existence of God.
(1) God is ill-defined; a problem anyone with a casual interest in theology almost immediately observes is the abundance of mutually exclusive claims made about God or gods. Even within very specific religious texts or revelatory claims multiple contradictions abound. Far worse in my view, the character traits of any given deity that are agreed upon--albeit arrived at for reasons that are necessarily arbitrary, wanting, or both--do not and cannot arise from original discovery but always resemble the fanciful projections of (a) interpersonal human relationships and (b) the gradually evolving ideals, insecurities, and fears of our species, abstracted and projected in the extreme. If the concept of God as imagined in most theistic traditions is valid, God cannot be ill-defined or misunderstood as it/he/she is, and as this is indeed the case, it is reasonable to hold such conceptions to be invalid. The reason for the difficulties posed by (1) is a direct result of
(2); God is hidden. Unlike the Gods depicted in specific strands of theism, where the divinities persuasively earn the title Almighty through clear, unnatural, public displays of power, the God of philosophical disputes never seems to make any distinguishable appearances that are not better explained and understood by strictly natural and all too common phenomena of the mind--including the projections mentioned briefly in (1) as well as psychological peculiarities which exist across the wide spectrum of human experiences. Any God that warrants the traditional depictions offered by theists appears confined to ancient--that is, largely unverifiable and hence, unreliable--writings or creeds, or the subjective realm as in classic mystical states. These are more readily and satisfactorily explained by centuries of accumulated scientific knowledge of the brain, especially in terms of the variety of forms these mental states take and their inevitable connections to particular circumstances, cultures, and biological dispositions. On the other hand, theism must posit the mixed explanation of natural phenomena and/or "demonic spirits" to render intelligible the overwhelming inconsistencies, the latter of which is ultimately unjustified and the former of which is highly telling. If theism is true, it must deny scientific explanations such as those provided by psychological, neurological, and sociological research (to suggest a few relevant fields of inquiry), or explain why those are only sufficient for certain religious experiences while others are given license to assert grandiose metaphysical suppositions about the cosmos.
(3) The problem of evil has been the most popular argument against the dominating traditions of theism since Epicurus first sought use of it in its most recognized form, which will not repeated here; suffice to say, theists have put forth different theodicies with limited success. Certainly one can neuter aspects of their deity to avoid the logical pitfalls supplied by most philosophical and theological interpretations of the supreme being, though such a move would prove both unattractive and destructive to the vast majority of historical and modern religious thought. This, however, remains a possibility. Another option is to remove the discussion away from the domain of reason and into faith, which some do by suggesting that we simply trust God to ultimately demonstrate a benevolent purpose for the abundance of suffering in the world. Note that to admit this is to surrender the rigorous utility of reason which is to give away the only tool theists can pretend to possess considering (2). Even to admit the possibility of logical consistency between God in the traditional theistic sense and the problem of evil, the theistic position still does not prove favorable, as implausibility remains an ever-persisting opposition.
(4) Granted that points 1-3 somehow fail, it cannot be denied that the burden of proof lies with the theist who is putting forth a positive explanation where either direct or indirect observation has yet to reach a decisive conclusion rather than admitting ignorance or uncertainty. It is a historical fact that since Kant, the traditional arguments for God's existence have largely fallen to the waste bin in philosophical circles with certain exceptions. If arguments for God's existence cannot prove decisive, and it is my view that given their reliance on logical fallacies they cannot, then the default position must be admitted, which is at the very least agnosticism, and it is fair to say that this involves a lack of belief, which is atheistic in the trust sense.
These are the four best arguments that I can think of for denying theisitic belief. What other arguments do you find persuasive?
He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return - Baruch Spinoza
