A Conscious Universe

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm treating qualia as a functional description of a thing, yes, a description of many things and the material interactions between them (those interactions are themselves things- the pulsing wire is material, the weighted pad on the paddle is material, the air between you and the tv is material...this is all stuff doing stuff, not ideas doing ideas). Not as a description of an idea divorced from a thing or separate from it somehow....I use explanations from digital and analog circuitry to show that the -things- we call ideas can properly -be things- (like Mario) in a physical monism....even if we do it some other way (lets say dualism or just "I don;t know"). That true, as per my last example, is a description of the state of a machine, not a free floating idea of an idea. I don't mind acknowledging that we have an incomplete description of qualia, what I mind is the insistence that there is some problem with qualia in a physical monism -in principle-...because there demonstrably is not, judging by the description I've accepted of what qualia is.

If qualia is experience alone (and not depth of experience, robustness of experience, breadth of experience, power of experience, accuracy of experience, awareness of experience, process of experience, all of these things and more), then there is no shortage of conditions which can be met by material things and material interactions to provide that -with no requirement for any "other"- and which only provide that with specific reference to material, and material interaction (any other state of a gate, any other physical arrangmenet of that particular machine is not "true"). Personally, I think that experience is a word so easily equivocated upon that it's likely Benny and I aren't even thinking of the same thing when we use it. Bricks experience drag when you throw them...in my world.

(of course the evidence in your head is "consciousness stuff" but even though it may not be the thing that it refers to, and even though you may not be able, individually, to refer to anything else, I'm proposing that it's still a thing, in the same way that mario may not be a little red man in suspenders but is still, demonstrably, a thing (or a collection of things, more accurately - and you -are- retreating into solipsism with this, btw) - and that there -is- a way to determine this which you likely accept in every other instance except, perhaps, this mind and consciousness business. You accept that there are things (and I use the word in this instance in a neutral way, things either material or conceptual) which exist independently of your individual consciousness, yes? Do you think that it's actually impossible to determine this, do you think, in short...that the world cannot be known?

I don't personally expect you to be able to offer me a truth which is beyond not only your specific abilities - but also beyond the capability of the equipment you use to reach that truth. If you expect me to be able to offer you something which you feel is beyond not only my ability, but also the capabilities of my machinery (regardless of whether it's material or "other") then I think that I might be operating with undue burden. If your mind stuff (whatever that is) can reach some truth about this world ala idealism - and what you offer is good enough reason for you in that regard....it shouldn't be incumbant upon me to offer anything more elaborate than that in reaching my truth about this world ala materialism. The incomplete nature of your proposition allows for my own to be incomplete - so I don't have to nail qualia to the wall for you at all....unless you can, for me. You shouldn't expect that from my end, if you accept less from your own. Best I can get out of you is "it's all ideas doing ideas to ideas"...and maybe you and I differ here, but that seems a whole hell of alot less involved and exacting that what I;v offered...even if what I've offered doesn't provide you with a complete explanation.

Now, I don't expect, nor would I demand that you will say "Fuck me rhythm, your right, qualia is the machine" I'm aiming lower...."well, I guess it could be the machine". My gripe is not with either of our incomplete descriptions, it is with this notion that qualia presents a problem for physical monism. I haven't heard any description of it which presents a problem -even with my limited ability to design physical systems-, though, obviously, I can't explain it to you to the level you seem to require for my position - but not your own. Hell, if I can;t hit that, I'd go for a "well..maybe qualia is more than just experience" as well. So now you know where I'm headed, all that I hope to establish or have ever attempted to establish.