A Conscious Universe

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm sorry, brother, that's a little too dl;dr for me. Forgive me if I cherry pick a couple points.

That's okay, it's a pretty big topic, after all. These are my favorite discussion regardless of what you decided to respond to and what you don't.

I won't work under a definition of "subjective" which means "localized" and nothing more. The word "subjective" means more than that.

It means far less than you seem to be hinting at as well - that has to be acknowledged. The usage you are toiling under is -loaded down- with stuff that may not really belong or apply.

Experience couldn't be other than it is. I'm asking you by what mechanism the brain unifies sight, sound and other senses into singel experiences, and I don't think I have an answer yet.

I don't know, no one does, we can point to a region, but thats it. Thing is...we see how other, simpler mechanical systems do it. That's all I;m trying to express. It isn't a proper mystery, more like a "how does a telephone work" kind of question - to the layman.

That's not how I see it. I already know about experience. You have a theory, which you state as fact, that consciousness is exclusively mechanistic. I want you to explain how that mechanism works.

I have a hypothesis (and it;s not properly my own, I'm just an advocate), that consciousness is a mechanistic process because I can see how other mechanisms accomplish the processes described to me -as consciousness- and I can see that we possess equipment capable of doing the same with the same principles (and much more, a neuron is more like a processor than a gate...and we have more neurons than computers have gates in total) - as well as having every impetus from our biological heritage to do so. I don't know any more about how the mechanism works than you, and I know far less than those specialized. I do, however, know how the mechanism -could- work. It can be done, we satisfy the requirements architecturally, and we have reason to do it..thus...seeing it done is not, to me, the great question it seems to be to you. I want a schem, I want to know how with a little h...you seem to be asking how with a big H, as in principle and requirement. For me, the big H is already in evidence.

What is it that you expect...is your hypothesis living up to this expectation more than my own? You don;t think mine is complete, or satisfactorily robust, thats okay - neither do I......but what is it being set in relation to? Have you ever taken the time to explain how data does data to data...and when you do...what could you possibly draw upon in that explanation? If I had to hazard a guess...you'd be drawing on the principles of computing - and this will always hinge upon mechanical implementation as a real world expression of a system......but I'm delighted at the prospect of being shown wrong in this regard.

Again, I think you are borrowing qualia words in explaining physical processes.

-because I'm explaining qualia -as- a mechanical process to a hostile audience...is this not to be expected? If the audience were friendly..I'd use different terms - which you'd balk at even harder.

The monitor doesn't see anything.

Neither does your brain or your mind (your eyes do the seeing).......except that it does, in the sense used, as does your brain or mind (and even your eyes).

We arrange for pixels to have electricity fed to them. I think you are implicitly begging the question in your vocabulary choice: you frequently use words designed to talk about our conscious experience, in reference to things we do not normally think of as conscious.

In order to challenge your unspoken assumptions, yes. I;ve rarely done more than scratch the surface of what I could do. I could describe the behavior, decision making, and risk taking of plants with unimpeachable language, demonstrable and repeatable observations both in the lab and field, and a description of the mechanisms by which all of this is achieved.......you're still unlikely to cal them conscious, no matter how similar the effect.....so first...I have to challenge assumptions, eh? As I;ve said before, I;m not aiming for a "Rhythm, fuck me you're right!" I just want to explain how a machine -could-...and how they -do- express these things which we call consciousness when we see ourselves (and things very much like us) doing them...even though we don't call them consciousness when we see other things doing them. Is that begging the question...or is the assumption that it's somehow different in our case, or in the case of conscious things, as opposed to non conscious things begging the qwuestion? I leave that up to you to decide. Im saying that they aren't different, or at the very least they don't -have to be different- by reference to working examples and the descriptions you offer, you're demanding that they be different -by fiat-, and also that I treat them as such. Is it even possible for me to offer an explanation to you if I accept this demand...and why would I...to begin with?

The implication, I think, is an inversion: that since any mechanical thing can "see," the human experience of sight is best thought of as purely mechanical.

Is it not......is there some part of sight that is best thought of as something other than mechanical? Feel free to enlighten me.

It may be so, but that doesn't mean that defining it so provides useful answers about the mechanism of human consciousness.

I disagree, question of your experience, the nature of that experience, and the mechanism that this experience is arrived at by -must- include these considerations. You are, in effect, removing from consideration anything that might answer the questions you ask in a manner that you do not wish for those questions to be answered in. Do you really think that a description and nod of the cap to our observational apparatus is not fundamental to any conversation of human consciousness, and that all I'm doing is "defining things as such" rather than explaining how things that I understand -within us-, are done...and things that I don't understand (that none of us understand) -can- be done......without reference to any more than the structures that we see both in ourselves and in other systems capable of similar (often identical) effect?

I simply cannot ignore that just because you demand that they be different as though a conversation is even possible under this demand. Im perfectly willing to accept, for the sake of conversation, that we may not be doing it this way at all. We can though, and the redundancy and ticks explicable by reference to the machine would be difficult to write off if -something- else was doing it, imo. If something else is at play, the machine is driving all over it, subverting it and consuming it and co-opting it at every turn. I'm not even sure what it would look like if that "else" just left the building....I;d expect the machine to keep doing what it does or can do, and for us to be unable to determine the difference. If the homunculous took a walk, would the eyes not see, would the body not duck......?