A Conscious Universe

[The Grand Nudger]

I feel like we're circumnavigating the argument here. Are you saying that computers experience qualia?

I don't know, I'm simply suggesting that if qualia is a biological implementation of computation then any system that can meet that range of function -even under some other implementation- is likely to experience an analog to qualia, may not be a mirror image, our qualia is, in some regards, implementation specific (however arrived at) - but, again, whatever difference there may be would only be window dressing. You experience sight referenced qualia based upon the range of light visible to the human eye, a comp with infrared spotting would experience something different, solely regarding the light. You may have a vast network of associations with any given color seen (but so may the comp with IR - take a look at drone targeting subroutines) - you may have a more robust awareness of process or range of function - but I think that the same principles are involved - and more than that, I know that they -can be-...so this isn't an open ended mystery with no explanation, for me. If we're doing it some other way then there are at least two ways to get to that point. Comp can get us there, or "other". Thing is, I don;t see the need for the "other" - which is why, even if i give you "idea world" I don;t think that mind has much to say on the matter. "Idea world" may be underpinning the physical world, but the physical world offers descriptions and capability enough to explain the effect, and evidence enough to accept a provisional claim. The brain is mind stuff, it is capable of computation (like many things are, by reference to their material structure), computation produces effects that -when described- can be explained -by- computation/are interchangeable /wq computation.

I don't know what these words mean.

Then google them and get back to me. I'm offering alot for no return.

Okay, look. You have confidently asserted that minds are brain,

That's the position in evidence, yes.

and that it is the ability to "compute" that we experience as mind.

That is one explanation for mind, that fits many descriptions that others give regarding what mind is, what it does, what they experience, what can be observed, and what we know of the interactions and structures involved in the whole bit, yes.

(it can only be taken so far, of course, because we aren't digital or analog comps - it;s an explanation of principle, not a tech schem - though hopefully one day we'll have both, regardless of how mind is achieved)

You have rejected counter-examples on the grounds that they represent no true Scotsman.

I've done no such thing. I've even indicated that I;m willing, in our conversation, to extend the designation onto things we might not normally think of as comp systems - but we still have to maintain some sort of specificity or else what are we talking about? This ball is and -has been- in your court. My only request thusfar has been that "everything" is neither a useful or accurate set of things to include within that designation -if, for now other reason (and there are plenty) than that in using it so that it means everything, it, effectively, means nothing.

I'm not really arguing against your view at this time, I frankly don't understand what you are talking about.

I was starting to figure that. But you'd -have to- to be able to claim that something about mind rules out a physical monism. You;d have to understand the current candidates for mind enough to know that they are indeed -not compatible- with a physical monism. Comp mind -is- compatible with a physical monism. It doesn't require that there be some underlying foundation of ideas or information, it is achieved -practically- by specific reference to the interaction of material structures capable of forming logical functions, accepting input, providing output ...however those systems were arrived at (no god req, no men req, no exterior intelligence req). If you don't understand this explanation then you have no grounds for your claim that mind cannot be unambiguosly expressed in geometric space. It can be...you just can't imagine how..........and after having had long discussions about this with you before...I'm willing to say that this is not -my- problem.

Now, understanding comp systems or comp mind is, in the context of our discussion, neutral. It would provide a way for you to conceptualize how ideas do ideas to ideas (you'll still need to work out the mechanics, but the principles can be leveraged)- just as readily as it allows me to offer an explanation of how "stuff" is "mind". It could help you to explain, for example, how ideas "make/are qualia". So there's always that (and I think that you do envision comp systems, or even the universe as a comp system - you simply may not be familiar /w the position). It's common ground between us, I think, but for the assumptions you make about how computers must be conscious, or "therefore gods" that are not part of this explanation, not requirements (though they aren't ruled out by them).

If the fundamental unit of the universe were ideas, and if ideas could be organized so that they could perform logical functions, then idea-comp systems would be possible. Describing them as I have, from a physical monism, explains how comp systems do the work that they demonstrably do, and what -could be- the work of comp systems (in areas like mind, where it;s up for discussion). That won't change, if it just so happens that matter is based on ideas - but we will need a new description of how ideas do comp, how do you reckon that works...if it doesn't work the way it appears to work?