Christianity is heading for a full allegorization

[polymath257]

And, once again, suppose that we manage to find the neural correlates to all of these experiences. We can look at the neural activity and say 'this person is experiencing a vivid experience of red'. And, suppose we can do this across the board, for all experiences. Clearly we are quire far from this. But suppose we can. is that not sufficient to explain consciousness? We have the correlates and we know how those correlate to experiences (qualia, if you will). What else is required?

In your example, the explanation would be that certain neurons are firing in a particular pattern that corresponds to having a certain experience. That *is* the explanation.

You still need to bridge the gap between the physiological and the phenomenological. Chalmers is very clear on what the hard problem is. Even if you have all the necessary correlates, you still need to explain how those translate to experiences/qualia exactly.

And again, if you're an illusionist (I'm still not sure if you are or not), then you still have a hard problem to deal with. How is the seemingness of phenomenological experience coming about? Keith Frankish refers to it as the illusion problem (and he doesn't think that's a hard problem anymore), but I think it's still one and the same thing.

Well, I disagree with Chalmers on a number of points. For example, i don't see philosophical zombies as being coherent.

But, I also don't think that there is any need to go beyond the correspondences between neural correlates and conscious states. Those correspondences *are* the explanation of conscious  states, And if there is a way of translating neural behavior and conscious states, that linkage is all that is required to explain consciousness.

I no more have to give a mechanism for the connection than I have to give a mechanism linking charged particles and electric fields. Having the correlation *is* the explanation.

I am not an illusionist: I think that conscious states are real things. I just don't think there is a hard problem at all.

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I think this is a misunderstanding of how hings are explained in science. We cannot observe 'causes'. We can only observe correlations. The causal component is always in the theory. it is a construct, not a basic observation. And what constitutes a 'cause' depends on the theory.

So, when we say that charged particles cause electric fields, ALL we have is the correlation between charged particles and electric fields and a theory that describes how the two are correlated. The same is true for mass and gravity. The theory says that one causes the other, but that is a postulate of the theory, not some detailed mechanism.

Once we have underlying theories, we can 'explain' other things via causality, but when we do so we rely on that underlying theory.

So, we can explain chemical bonding in terms of 'electron sharing', more specifically in terms of the formation of molecular orbitals, but such an explanation relies on the deeper theory of quantum mechanics. We can explain how motors work, but only once we have the underlying theory of electromagnetism.

So, what I think will eventually happen is that we will have neural correlates to conscious experiences to the point that we could 'read minds' by looking at neural behavior. We could then point to specific neural activity and say that is the neural signature of the experience. This can even be tested by having subjects report their experiences.

And, my point is that this would be a perfectly good 'explanation' of conscious experiences in terms of neural behavior in the same way that we can say that the electrons in s system are an explanation for the electric fields observed. No deeper 'explanation' is required past the consistent correlation. What is required is exactly the 'translation table' between neural activity and conscious experience.

In other words, there is *only* a soft problem of consciousness, just like there is only a soft problem of electric fields or of gravity.

All I'm seeing here is that you're not concerned with the hard problem. But this does not mean therefore there is no hard problem.

In your physics/chemistry examples, correct me if I'm mistaken, but you're still able to explain how particles cause fields and such (it's just you need to accept the underlying theory first)? That's the thing though. When it comes to consciousness, whatever underlying theory we want to consider, how could that theory explain how neuron firings translate to qualia (or appearance of it)?

ETA: If you think a complete correlation map is sufficient to explain how X causes Y, then that's not a sufficient account. An explanation of causality would still be required, whether talking consciousness or not.

No, there is no explanation of 'how' charged cause fields. ALL that you have is that if there is a charge, there will be an electric field of a certain strength. You can also get an electric field when there is a changing magnetic field. But, again, there is no 'mechanism' involved in either case. The basic theory simply points out that these are consistently correlated.

Now, if *we* form a magnetic field and move it, then we have 'caused' an electric field because moving magnetic fields are correlated to electric fields. This is how generators work.

I think something very similar is quite enough for questions of consciousness. If we can identify the neural behaviors correlated to conscious states and if we artificially produce those neural behaviors and those conscious states occur, then we have established causality. There is nothing more to explain.