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Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 17, 2022 at 7:44 pm)HappySkeptic Wrote:
(January 17, 2022 at 7:33 pm)GrandizerII Wrote: You still need to bridge the gap between the physiological and the phenomenological. Chalmers is very clear on what the hard problem is. Even if you have all the necessary correlates, you still need to explain how those translate to experiences/qualia exactly.

I just don't see this as being a "hard problem".  Qualia are what the conscious mind experiences - full stop.  The conscious mind must have some experience - it might as well be the qualia we know.  It could be different qualia if we had different brains or different senses, but it has to be something.

Now, identity and a sense of self is a bit of a mystery, but I feel that is an illusion created by our mind.  If we were part of the Borg collective, we wouldn't experience a singular identity.  Our separateness and our memories creates the sense of self.

It's not that easy though. Just examine two competing theories of mind: functionalism and biological naturalism. Both theories are materialistic (ie. physicalist). Both theories posit that conscious experiences are causally dependent on brain functioning. They agree there. But, otherwise, they arrive at two different conclusions concerning what consciousness is.

One theory (functionalism) states that conscious states arise due to the information feedback that happens with brain function. According to this theory, a computer could have conscious experiences if it somehow transmitted the same information your brain does when say, eating a hamburger.

The biological naturalist disagrees. The biological naturalist says you can transmit that information in a computer system and the computer will not experience eating a burger. To the biological naturalist, consciousness is a product of the physical features of neurons. If you wanted to create an artificial consciousness, you'd need to create a physical object that does the same physical thing that a neuron does when it fires. (A whole bunch of them actually.) Then you'd need to get them to fire in one of the myriad ways a neuron can fire when hamburger-eating is being done.

Who of us can say which of these theories is correct? Each has its merits. Each has its problems.

So while, yes, our conscious experience has to be something ... exactly what that something is eludes us. Hence, questions about consciousness are worth exploring. And the problem is indeed hard.

***

As for identity, I tend to agree with you. It's a key assumption of many that "self" is an actual unified thing to begin with. I think Locke put together a fine explanation with continuity. Hume's thoughts are good too (self is illusory). But, at the end of the day, we don't want to dispense with the notion of THIS person or THAT person. I know I don't. And if we want to make such distinctions, we ought to be able to explain ourselves.
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 17, 2022 at 7:33 pm)GrandizerII Wrote:
(January 17, 2022 at 3:06 pm)polymath257 Wrote: And, once again, suppose that we manage to find the neural correlates to all of these experiences. We can look at the neural activity and say 'this person is experiencing a vivid experience of red'. And, suppose we can do this across the board, for all experiences. Clearly we are quire far from this. But suppose we can. is that not sufficient to explain consciousness? We have the correlates and we know how those correlate to experiences (qualia, if you will). What else is required?

In your example, the explanation would be that certain neurons are firing in a particular pattern that corresponds to having a certain experience. That *is* the explanation.

You still need to bridge the gap between the physiological and the phenomenological. Chalmers is very clear on what the hard problem is. Even if you have all the necessary correlates, you still need to explain how those translate to experiences/qualia exactly.

And again, if you're an illusionist (I'm still not sure if you are or not), then you still have a hard problem to deal with. How is the seemingness of phenomenological experience coming about? Keith Frankish refers to it as the illusion problem (and he doesn't think that's a hard problem anymore), but I think it's still one and the same thing.

Well, I disagree with Chalmers on a number of points. For example, i don't see philosophical zombies as being coherent.

But, I also don't think that there is any need to go beyond the correspondences between neural correlates and conscious states. Those correspondences *are* the explanation of conscious  states, And if there is a way of translating neural behavior and conscious states, that linkage is all that is required to explain consciousness.

I no more have to give a mechanism for the connection than I have to give a mechanism linking charged particles and electric fields. Having the correlation *is* the explanation.

I am not an illusionist: I think that conscious states are real things. I just don't think there is a hard problem at all.

Quote:
(January 17, 2022 at 5:48 pm)polymath257 Wrote: I think this is a misunderstanding of how hings are explained in science. We cannot observe 'causes'. We can only observe correlations. The causal component is always in the theory. it is a construct, not a basic observation. And what constitutes a 'cause' depends on the theory.

So, when we say that charged particles cause electric fields, ALL we have is the correlation between charged particles and electric fields and a theory that describes how the two are correlated. The same is true for mass and gravity. The theory says that one causes the other, but that is a postulate of the theory, not some detailed mechanism.

Once we have underlying theories, we can 'explain' other things via causality, but when we do so we rely on that underlying theory.

So, we can explain chemical bonding in terms of 'electron sharing', more specifically in terms of the formation of molecular orbitals, but such an explanation relies on the deeper theory of quantum mechanics. We can explain how motors work, but only once we have the underlying theory of electromagnetism.

So, what I think will eventually happen is that we will have neural correlates to conscious experiences to the point that we could 'read minds' by looking at neural behavior. We could then point to specific neural activity and say that is the neural signature of the experience. This can even be tested by having subjects report their experiences.

And, my point is that this would be a perfectly good 'explanation' of conscious experiences in terms of neural behavior in the same way that we can say that the electrons in s system are an explanation for the electric fields observed. No deeper 'explanation' is required past the consistent correlation. What is required is exactly the 'translation table' between neural activity and conscious experience.

In other words, there is *only* a soft problem of consciousness, just like there is only a soft problem of electric fields or of gravity.

All I'm seeing here is that you're not concerned with the hard problem. But this does not mean therefore there is no hard problem.

In your physics/chemistry examples, correct me if I'm mistaken, but you're still able to explain how particles cause fields and such (it's just you need to accept the underlying theory first)? That's the thing though. When it comes to consciousness, whatever underlying theory we want to consider, how could that theory explain how neuron firings translate to qualia (or appearance of it)?

ETA: If you think a complete correlation map is sufficient to explain how X causes Y, then that's not a sufficient account. An explanation of causality would still be required, whether talking consciousness or not.

No, there is no explanation of 'how' charged cause fields. ALL that you have is that if there is a charge, there will be an electric field of a certain strength. You can also get an electric field when there is a changing magnetic field. But, again, there is no 'mechanism' involved in either case. The basic theory simply points out that these are consistently correlated.

Now, if *we* form a magnetic field and move it, then we have 'caused' an electric field because moving magnetic fields are correlated to electric fields. This is how generators work.

I think something very similar is quite enough for questions of consciousness. If we can identify the neural behaviors correlated to conscious states and if we artificially produce those neural behaviors and those conscious states occur, then we have established causality. There is nothing more to explain.
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
@GrandizerII

Are you the Grandizer that I knew from before? If so, nice to see you back!
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 17, 2022 at 8:32 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote:
(January 17, 2022 at 7:44 pm)HappySkeptic Wrote: I just don't see this as being a "hard problem".  Qualia are what the conscious mind experiences - full stop.  The conscious mind must have some experience - it might as well be the qualia we know.  It could be different qualia if we had different brains or different senses, but it has to be something.

Now, identity and a sense of self is a bit of a mystery, but I feel that is an illusion created by our mind.  If we were part of the Borg collective, we wouldn't experience a singular identity.  Our separateness and our memories creates the sense of self.

It's not that easy though. Just examine two competing theories of mind: functionalism and biological naturalism. Both theories are materialistic (ie. physicalist). Both theories posit that conscious experiences are causally dependent on brain functioning. They agree there. But, otherwise, they arrive at two different conclusions concerning what consciousness is.

One theory (functionalism) states that conscious states arise due to the information feedback that happens with brain function. According to this theory, a computer could have conscious experiences if it somehow transmitted the same information your brain does when say, eating a hamburger.

The biological naturalist disagrees. The biological naturalist says you can transmit that information in a computer system and the computer will not experience eating a burger. To the biological naturalist, consciousness is a product of the physical features of neurons. If you wanted to create an artificial consciousness, you'd need to create a physical object that does the same physical thing that a neuron does when it fires. (A whole bunch of them actually.) Then you'd need to get them to fire in one of the myriad ways a neuron can fire when hamburger-eating is being done.

Who of us can say which of these theories is correct? Each has its merits. Each has its problems.

So while, yes, our conscious experience has to be something ... exactly what that something is eludes us. Hence, questions about consciousness are worth exploring. And the problem is indeed hard.

***

As for identity, I tend to agree with you. It's a key assumption of many that "self" is an actual unified thing to begin with. I think Locke put together a fine explanation with continuity. Hume's thoughts are good too (self is illusory). But, at the end of the day, we don't want to dispense with the notion of THIS person or THAT person. I know I don't. And if we want to make such distinctions, we ought to be able to explain ourselves.

I'd guess that the differences between those two physicalist theories would have to be resolved by observation.

Do the particular neural events correlated with conscious states depend on extensive feedback mechanisms or not? If we find 'isomorphic' systems with other substrates, do they show the types of behavior that we want to classify as 'conscious'? Sort of like whether or not we want to classify Pluto as a planet or not.

No, we cannot resolve this question at this time because we don't have those neural correlates. Having those would certainly help in the resolution, though.

One of the problems in studying consciousness, I think, is that we can't seem to agree on classification. is a bacterium conscious? How about an earthworm? How about a dog? How about a plant? a fungus? an atom?

Maybe we need to expand our vocabulary to encompass *and* distinguish all of these. Without an agreed upon classification, no progress can be made determining when each of the different processes is involved and how they relate.
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 17, 2022 at 5:48 pm)polymath257 Wrote:
(January 17, 2022 at 3:46 pm)Angrboda Wrote: Scientific theories do more than simply find correlations, they need to explain the behavior.  Correlations don't imply causation.  Otherwise, the hypothesis that ice cream trucks cause drownings would be a confirmed scientific theory.

I think this is a misunderstanding of how hings are explained in science. We cannot observe 'causes'. We can only observe correlations. The causal component is always in the theory. it is a construct, not a basic observation. And what constitutes a 'cause' depends on the theory.

So, when we say that charged particles cause electric fields, ALL we have is the correlation between charged particles and electric fields and a theory that describes how the two are correlated. The same is true for mass and gravity. The theory says that one causes the other, but that is a postulate of the theory, not some detailed mechanism.

Once we have underlying theories, we can 'explain' other things via causality, but when we do so we rely on that underlying theory.

So, we can explain chemical bonding in terms of 'electron sharing', more specifically in terms of the formation of molecular orbitals, but such an explanation relies on the deeper theory of quantum mechanics. We can explain how motors work, but only once we have the underlying theory of electromagnetism.

So, what I think will eventually happen is that we will have neural correlates to conscious experiences to the point that we could 'read minds' by looking at neural behavior. We could then point to specific neural activity and say that is the neural signature of the experience. This can even be tested by having subjects report their experiences.

And, my point is that this would be a perfectly good 'explanation' of conscious experiences in terms of neural behavior in the same way that we can say that the electrons in s system are an explanation for the electric fields observed. No deeper 'explanation' is required past the consistent correlation. What is required is exactly the 'translation table' between neural activity and conscious experience.

In other words, there is *only* a soft problem of consciousness, just like there is only a soft problem of electric fields or of gravity.

Okay. Then explain to me how we know that ice cream trucks don't cause drownings?
[Image: extraordinarywoo-sig.jpg]
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 17, 2022 at 9:45 pm)Angrboda Wrote:
(January 17, 2022 at 5:48 pm)polymath257 Wrote: I think this is a misunderstanding of how hings are explained in science. We cannot observe 'causes'. We can only observe correlations. The causal component is always in the theory. it is a construct, not a basic observation. And what constitutes a 'cause' depends on the theory.

So, when we say that charged particles cause electric fields, ALL we have is the correlation between charged particles and electric fields and a theory that describes how the two are correlated. The same is true for mass and gravity. The theory says that one causes the other, but that is a postulate of the theory, not some detailed mechanism.

Once we have underlying theories, we can 'explain' other things via causality, but when we do so we rely on that underlying theory.

So, we can explain chemical bonding in terms of 'electron sharing', more specifically in terms of the formation of molecular orbitals, but such an explanation relies on the deeper theory of quantum mechanics. We can explain how motors work, but only once we have the underlying theory of electromagnetism.

So, what I think will eventually happen is that we will have neural correlates to conscious experiences to the point that we could 'read minds' by looking at neural behavior. We could then point to specific neural activity and say that is the neural signature of the experience. This can even be tested by having subjects report their experiences.

And, my point is that this would be a perfectly good 'explanation' of conscious experiences in terms of neural behavior in the same way that we can say that the electrons in s system are an explanation for the electric fields observed. No deeper 'explanation' is required past the consistent correlation. What is required is exactly the 'translation table' between neural activity and conscious experience.

In other words, there is *only* a soft problem of consciousness, just like there is only a soft problem of electric fields or of gravity.

Okay.  Then explain to me how we know that ice cream trucks don't cause drownings?

Well, what is the data that suggests that they do? How localized is the correlation? How good is the correlation? Does it work at the level of individual ice cream trucks? How far away are the drownings and the trucks? What alternative hypotheses have been proposed? Do other types of trucks also correlate? Does geography matter?

More generally, suppose that I hypothesize that ice cream trucks cause drownings, what sort of data would test that hypothesis? And have we collected data in that context?

And if the hypothesis passes all tests that have been proposed to show it wrong, in what sense can we say that there is no causality?

If the correlation is strong, universal, and consistent, then maybe we actually do have evidence that there is causality.
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 17, 2022 at 11:11 pm)polymath257 Wrote:
(January 17, 2022 at 9:45 pm)Angrboda Wrote: Okay.  Then explain to me how we know that ice cream trucks don't cause drownings?

Well, what is the data that suggests that they do? How localized is the correlation? How good is the correlation? Does it work at the level of individual ice cream trucks? How far away are the drownings and the trucks?

More specifically, suppose that I hypothesize that ice cream trucks cause drownings, what sort of data would e that hypothesis? And have we collected data in that context?

How does any of that matter? Every summer drownings correlate with ice cream trucks being in the neighborhood. It being local or not is irrelevant because the speed of light need not be violated by the causative effect of ice cream trucks. QM postulates statistical effects so the idea that ice cream trucks correlates with drownings need not occur at the individual level. Additionally, that assumes that 100% of drownings are caused by ice cream trucks and that there is no delay, fixed or random, in the mechanism. It hypothesizes exactly what we see, a rise in frequency of nearby ice cream trucks correlating to a rise in drownings. The fact is things correlate with other things regardless of how near or far, aggregate or individual, or any of this other crap. You're trying to add other factors on top of correlation as being necessary to establish causation, but your prior argument doesn't allow for that. Your Humean skepticism has led you to a dead-end in which you can't rule out anything as a cause of anything else. I just burped. Somewhere in the world, somebody fell off a building. And according to you, I caused that, because my burp correlated with them falling off a building.
[Image: extraordinarywoo-sig.jpg]
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 17, 2022 at 8:32 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote:
(January 17, 2022 at 7:44 pm)HappySkeptic Wrote: I just don't see this as being a "hard problem".  Qualia are what the conscious mind experiences - full stop.  The conscious mind must have some experience - it might as well be the qualia we know.  It could be different qualia if we had different brains or different senses, but it has to be something.

Now, identity and a sense of self is a bit of a mystery, but I feel that is an illusion created by our mind.  If we were part of the Borg collective, we wouldn't experience a singular identity.  Our separateness and our memories creates the sense of self.

It's not that easy though. Just examine two competing theories of mind: functionalism and biological naturalism. Both theories are materialistic (ie. physicalist). Both theories posit that conscious experiences are causally dependent on brain functioning. They agree there. But, otherwise, they arrive at two different conclusions concerning what consciousness is.

One theory (functionalism) states that conscious states arise due to the information feedback that happens with brain function. According to this theory, a computer could have conscious experiences if it somehow transmitted the same information your brain does when say, eating a hamburger.

The biological naturalist disagrees. The biological naturalist says you can transmit that information in a computer system and the computer will not experience eating a burger. To the biological naturalist, consciousness is a product of the physical features of neurons. If you wanted to create an artificial consciousness, you'd need to create a physical object that does the same physical thing that a neuron does when it fires. (A whole bunch of them actually.) Then you'd need to get them to fire in one of the myriad ways a neuron can fire when hamburger-eating is being done.

Who of us can say which of these theories is correct? Each has its merits. Each has its problems.

So while, yes, our conscious experience has to be something ... exactly what that something is eludes us. Hence, questions about consciousness are worth exploring. And the problem is indeed hard.

***

As for identity, I tend to agree with you. It's a key assumption of many that "self" is an actual unified thing to begin with. I think Locke put together a fine explanation with continuity. Hume's thoughts are good too (self is illusory). But, at the end of the day, we don't want to dispense with the notion of THIS person or THAT person. I know I don't. And if we want to make such distinctions, we ought to be able to explain ourselves.

The functionalism version seems to be the correct one.

1. If I can accurately model the interaction of a single electron and a single proton via software, wouldn’t I be able to bring them together and have a virtual hydrogen atom? Wouldn’t I be able to predict its bonding properties, its electron energy levels and the energy levels inside the nucleus?

2. If I can do it for a single hydrogen atom, why not do it for a group of H2 molecules?
Would I be able to determine the melting point and boiling point of hydrogen purely via software? Would I be able to predict all of hydrogen’s macro properties?

3. Would I be able to simulate any molecule via software? Can I design any structure, such as a neuron and run a software simulation?

4. Can I simulate the entire planet Earth, including every single atom in my software?

There are software that simulate atoms/molecule. I believe that it is often used in the pharmaceutical industry to figure out molecule to molecule interactions.

Sometimes, you don’t need to simulate every molecule. The electronics industry designs digital circuits via software. The CPUs and GPUs that we have in our PCs are entirely designed via software. Some of the designing is done via software. Some of the optimizing is done via software.
I think that they run simulations to see if the CPU would work well at a certain clock before they build one.

Quote:One theory (functionalism) states that conscious states arise due to the information feedback that happens with brain function. According to this theory, a computer could have conscious experiences if it somehow transmitted the same information your brain does when say, eating a hamburger.

Hmmm. There is feedback but that is not going to magically give you consciousness. It very much has to do with the very large scale circuits that brains have.
It’s not the computer that would have consciousness. It is the software.
Of course, whatever you design via software for a general purpose CPU, you can also implement it as a specialized IC.
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
[Image: q54sO25.png]

Science can handle the possibility that correlations are false. If the correlation between drownings and phenomenon x becomes apparent, the next step is to formulate a new hypothesis that can be falsified and continue testing.

For example: more people swim in the summer. Also more ice cream trucks rolling around in the summer. Let's see if "it being summer" (or something else) doesn't better explain the supposed correlation.

If poly is taking up the mantle of Humean skepticism, then I think your criticisms are apt. But I don't think these criticisms are good criticisms of science in general. If only one experiment could be done ever, then yes... a false correlation is devastating to gnosis. But science can take hundreds of cracks at a problem. So one bad result doesn't seem like an issue to me.
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RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
(January 17, 2022 at 11:39 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: [Image: q54sO25.png]

Science can handle the possibility that correlations are false. If the correlation between drownings and phenomenon x becomes apparent, the next step is to formulate a new hypothesis that can be falsified and continue testing.

For example: more people swim in the summer. Also more ice cream trucks rolling around in the summer. Let's see if "it being summer" (or something else) doesn't better explain the supposed correlation.

If poly is taking up the mantle of Humean skepticism, then I think your criticisms are apt. But I don't think these criticisms are good criticisms of science in general. If only one experiment could be done ever, then yes... a false correlation is devastating to gnosis. But science can take hundreds of cracks at a problem. So one bad result doesn't seem like an issue to me.

How do you falsify a correlation? Typically, confounding factors are considered better explanations because lower-level phenomena correlate with drownings in a way that ice cream trucks do not. But this requires assuming that the causative mechanism of the confounding factor is lower level than that of ice cream trucks, which is a conclusion you can only reach through an argument from ignorance. If correlation is causation, then the concept of a confounding factor evaporates and you have no way to privilege the confounding factors as explanations over that of the ice cream trucks.
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