Should we respect Religion?

[Ryantology]

Religion does not deserve respect.

And, as the major religions frequently and gleefully encourage bad behavior and scientific illiteracy, I see no reason to be tolerant of it.

[LarissaAnn]

How much have you read on Wicca? NOT Christian points of view either but from actual Wiccan sources?

Eh, not much...

"Magic (or magick)" doesn't come from rituals, gems, candles, repetitions or walking in reverse circles.

Some people know this, others don't.
To be honest, I think the use of any sort of "props" or whathave you just shows a lack of faith in one's ability.
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You should research things from the original source rather than go on things you've heard.
Most Atheists disagree with Christianity from reading the bible, not by reading Anti-Christian books.
Wiccan's believe karma will bite them in the ass if they do things like love spells and controlling others/taking away a persons free will.

[catfish]

Can a person harm a plant? Or do they not count?

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Maybe I don't get it. I see wicca as a quest for power.
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[Angrboda]

Most Atheists disagree with Christianity from reading the bible, not by reading Anti-Christian books.

And your source or evidence for this claim is what?



I'm not sure how I feel about this. My initial stab was that a "should" is a moral question, and ideally only applies to actions, not beliefs or ideas, lest we want to get into the area of thought crimes. However, nothing is ever that simple, and it does appear that the world "might" be better off with certain ideas absent rather than present, or certain supposedly free choices not allowed. (For example, it's well known that certain industries like pornography inevitably give rise to abuses. Religions in the world seem to have a pattern of effect which might reasonably be attributed to the nature of the beliefs themselves. I'm opposed to legalization of certain drugs because of the ambiguity of whether the choice to continue an addictive drug can be considered truly free and rational.) Anyway, I can't say I came to any conclusions going down that avenue, beyond my basic stance that morals are something to be decided by individual perception, theory, and belief, not on the basis of philosophical argument about objective good or bad.

However, I see another avenue of approaching the question. I'm of the opinion that most religious impulses have their root and sustenance in the way the brain deals with reality, as side effects of useful processes and cognitions. For example, when we see an individual move in a purposeful manner, talk in ways that make sense to us, and respond in speech or act in ways that are sensible to an agent, we attribute a mind to that "fleshy thing" in our world, even though we never actually "see" a mind, or any real mechanism that we identify as something that might give rise to mind. We see a body which we infer is possessed of a mind which is causing it's behaviors. We more than simply "conclude" that a mind is present, we perceive a thing animating that person which is as real to our perception as the table or the song played on a car stereo as it drives by. Other "people" aren't just abstractions or inferences, the other person becomes a composite of two "things" — a body and a mind, which is as real as the body. One can view the concept of a god as the application of the machinery in our brain which makes these inferences in a way that doesn't serve an obvious, social function of helping us to cooperate with other agents in our environment. But notice, we normally don't think about whether to attribute a mind to John or Sue, it's hard wired into us to have certain cognitions in response to similar stimuli in the environment. We don't really choose to attribute mind to a person, it happens below the decks of our consciousness, and therefore appears, to the mind, as an "objective fact of the world". Once our brain has concluded that P has a mind, it's hard to unmake that inference; it becomes "real". Likewise, I would argue that when this same machinery is invoked to lead us to infer that there is a disembodied mind that exists as a ghost or a spirit or a god, it isn't an abstract concept to the person who is persuaded of its existence; to them, it's real, not just in the sense that any true proposition "is real" to you, but in the sense that the person's mind makes it an objective fact of their world, just like other objective facts they take for granted. I guess in some ways, this resembles the case of the legalization of drugs, because, the person isn't completely free to believe or disbelieve based on any abstract consideration of the evidence: their ability to choose is constrained by their brains making the phenomenon "real to them" in a way that other propositions aren't so constrained. So I would argue that there needs to be some tolerance given or allowed because these ideas likely aren't pure ideas that they can take or leave based on rational consideration alone, as the brain of the believer is essentially being hijacked by itself, regardless of the conscious will.

Moreover, the bulk of religious conversions occur by the age of 15, and so religious belief is being built into the individual's world by the normal developmental processes of love and attachment and dependence which ultimately function to transmit the culture of our forefathers to our children. This is a much more thorough and deep "brainwashing" than is going to occur at any other time in the person's life. A westerner raised in a country where Christian belief is prominent will have a difficult time understanding the things someone raised in predominately Hindu India would. Those first 15 years set the stage for so much of what follows, not just in what to think, but also how to think and why. To treat those "decisions" about what to believe in terms of religion (which were made by their parents and society) as possessed of the same degree of freedom as choices and beliefs acquired independently as an adult is, I think, unfair and unrealistic. So, I think there, too, one has to temper one's feelings about the beliefs themselves with a certain allowance for the fact that most people who hold religious beliefs, and may largely be "stuck" in a religious mindset, are not that way strictly of their own choosing and free will.

While I wouldn't argue for according specific ideas, religious or not, special tolerance or treatment where those ideas are unreasonable and probably untrue, on the substance of the belief alone, I think one has to take into account the realities of when these ideas manifest themselves in people, under whose control, and whether they manifest as ideas that can be rationally, abstractly chosen or discarded. I think when you take such things into account, I think it cautions against treating religious beliefs and behaviors in the same moral framework as other beliefs. I don't know whether "respect" is or isn't appropriate, but I think when adjusting one's moral calculus in assessing the good or harm of religious beliefs and behaviors, these facts need to be put on the scale as well, to temper conclusions which would be reached in areas where these realities aren't in play. (Such as whether or not to respect someone's belief that Justin Bieber is dreamy or that heavily taxing the rich is a good thing.)

(It's probably appropriate to put in a word about the nature of belief and reason here. Modern psychology has availed us of truths about human behavior which we would not have suspected on the basis of "common sense" notions about human behavior. There are many aspects of human behavior which are counter-intuitive and defy our "common sense" expectations about how people work. One of the changes over the last few decades has been to enlarge the portion of our behavior attributed to non-reasoning influences on our behavior. As such, one can take a range of stances on what the "blend" of reason and non-reason is in our overall behavior. One can propose we are largely rational in our choices, beliefs and behaviors, such that the ratio of reason approaches 100% more closely than 0% rationality. Someone else, might put the ratio more in the middle, such that it's 50% reason, 50% non-reasoning causes. There are even theories which posit reason's contribution as close to 0%. Needless to say, where you place the ratio — whether closer to 100% or closer to 0% — you will adjust your views on how irrational behaviors of any kind should be weighed. It's worth observing that someone who places the ratio close to 0% would likely view a person who has come to a position of atheism as being every bit as "trapped" by that belief as someone who is "trapped" in a religious conclusion, and view the sides considerably differently in apportioning moral properties and such. I don't have a figure, but I definitely lean much farther toward the 0% estimate than the majority of my peers, here or elsewhere.)

[LarissaAnn]

Can a person harm a plant? Or do they not count?

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Maybe I don't get it. I see wicca as a quest for power.
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Is a plant a person?

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Most Atheists disagree with Christianity from reading the bible, not by reading Anti-Christian books.

And your source or evidence for this claim is what?

Key word is "most" not "all" That doesn't apply to everyone.

[Angrboda]

Most Atheists disagree with Christianity from reading the bible, not by reading Anti-Christian books.

And your source or evidence for this claim is what?

Key word is "most" not "all" That doesn't apply to everyone.

Keyword is "you pulled this out of your ass".

[mr.atheist]

Religion deserves nothing near respect.
I respect a persons right to be religious,they are welcome to their bit of insanity.But no I have no respect for religion.

[justin]

Respect? There are none of the world's religions that could really earn that word in my opinion.

Complete disregard for otherpeoples fantasies might be closer to the mark, if they want to believe I don't give a tinker's toss; and will quite happily strive to point out that their obsession of wandering about "spreading their fantasy dust" as quite infantile.

Funny, I read this this morning, seems like it needs to be here.... You have the choice of a long read or an hour of the 2007 presentation.

The Problem with Atheism - by Sam Harris

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To begin, I’d like to take a moment to acknowledge just how strange it is that a meeting like this is even necessary. The year is 2007, and we have all taken time out of our busy lives, and many of us have traveled considerable distance, so that we can strategize about how best to live in a world in which most people believe in an imaginary God. America is now a nation of 300 million people, wielding more influence than any people in human history, and yet this influence is being steadily corrupted, and is surely waning, because 240 million of these people apparently believe that Jesus will return someday and orchestrate the end of the world with his magic powers.

Of course, we may well wonder whether as many people believe these things as say they do. I know that Christopher [Hitchens] and Richard [Dawkins] are rather optimistic that our opinion polls are out of register with what people actually believe in the privacy of their own minds. But there is no question that most of our neighbors reliably profess that they believe these things, and such professions themselves have had a disastrous affect on our political discourse, on our public policy, on the teaching of science, and on our reputation in the world. And even if only a third or a quarter of our neighbors believe what most profess, it seems to me that we still have a problem worth worrying about.

Now, it is not often that I find myself in a room full of people who are more or less guaranteed to agree with me on the subject of religion. In thinking about what I could say to you all tonight, it seemed to me that I have a choice between throwing red meat to the lions of atheism or moving the conversation into areas where we actually might not agree. I’ve decided, at some risk to your mood, to take the second approach and to say a few things that might prove controversial in this context.

Given the absence of evidence for God, and the stupidity and suffering that still thrives under the mantle of religion, declaring oneself an “atheist” would seem the only appropriate response. And it is the stance that many of us have proudly and publicly adopted. Tonight, I’d like to try to make the case, that our use of this label is a mistake—and a mistake of some consequence.

My concern with the use of the term “atheism” is both philosophical and strategic. I’m speaking from a somewhat unusual and perhaps paradoxical position because, while I am now one of the public voices of atheism, I never thought of myself as an atheist before being inducted to speak as one. I didn’t even use the term in The End of Faith, which remains my most substantial criticism of religion.

And, as I argued briefly in Letter to a Christian Nation, I think that “atheist” is a term that we do not need, in the same way that we don’t need a word for someone who rejects astrology. We simply do not call people “non-astrologers.” All we need are words like “reason” and “evidence” and “common sense” and “bullshit” to put astrologers in their place, and so it could be with religion.

If the comparison with astrology seems too facile, consider the problem of racism. Racism was about as intractable a social problem as we have ever had in this country. We are talking about deeply held convictions. I’m sure you have all seen the photos of lynchings in the first half of the 20th century—where seemingly whole towns in the South, thousands of men, women and children—bankers, lawyers, doctors, teachers, church elders, newspaper editors, policemen, even the occasional Senator and Congressman—turned out as though for a carnival to watch some young man or woman be tortured to death and then strung up on a tree or lamppost for all to see.

Seeing the pictures of these people in their Sunday best, having arranged themselves for a postcard photo under a dangling, and lacerated, and often partially cremated person, is one thing, but realize that these genteel people, who were otherwise quite normal, we must presume—though unfailing religious—often took souvenirs of the body home to show their friends—teeth, ears, fingers, knee caps, internal organs—and sometimes displayed them at their places of business.

Of course, I’m not saying that racism is no longer a problem in this country, but anyone who thinks that the problem is as bad as it ever was has simply forgotten, or has never learned, how bad, in fact, it was.

So, we can now ask, how have people of good will and common sense gone about combating racism? There was a civil rights movement, of course. The KKK was gradually battered to the fringes of society. There have been important and, I think, irrevocable changes in the way we talk about race—our major newspapers no longer publish flagrantly racist articles and editorials as they did less than a century ago—but, ask yourself, how many people have had to identify themselves as “non-racists” to participate in this process? Is there a “non-racist alliance” somewhere for me to join?

Attaching a label to something carries real liabilities, especially if the thing you are naming isn’t really a thing at all. And atheism, I would argue, is not a thing. It is not a philosophy, just as “non-racism” is not one. Atheism is not a worldview—and yet most people imagine it to be one and attack it as such. We who do not believe in God are collaborating in this misunderstanding by consenting to be named and by even naming ourselves.

Another problem is that in accepting a label, particularly the label of “atheist,” it seems to me that we are consenting to be viewed as a cranky sub-culture. We are consenting to be viewed as a marginal interest group that meets in hotel ballrooms. I’m not saying that meetings like this aren’t important. I wouldn’t be here if I didn’t think it was important. But I am saying that as a matter of philosophy we are guilty of confusion, and as a matter of strategy, we have walked into a trap. It is a trap that has been, in many cases, deliberately set for us. And we have jumped into it with both feet.

While it is an honor to find myself continually assailed with Dan [Dennett], Richard [Dawkins], and Christopher [Hitchens] as though we were a single person with four heads, this whole notion of the “new atheists” or “militant atheists” has been used to keep our criticism of religion at arm’s length, and has allowed people to dismiss our arguments without meeting the burden of actually answering them. And while our books have gotten a fair amount of notice, I think this whole conversation about the conflict between faith and reason, and religion and science, has been, and will continue to be, successfully marginalized under the banner of atheism.

So, let me make my somewhat seditious proposal explicit: We should not call ourselves “atheists.” We should not call ourselves “secularists.” We should not call ourselves “humanists,” or “secular humanists,” or “naturalists,” or “skeptics,” or “anti-theists,” or “rationalists,” or “freethinkers,” or “brights.” We should not call ourselves anything. We should go under the radar—for the rest of our lives. And while there, we should be decent, responsible people who destroy bad ideas wherever we find them.

Now, it just so happens that religion has more than its fair share of bad ideas. And it remains the only system of thought, where the process of maintaining bad ideas in perpetual immunity from criticism is considered a sacred act. This is the act of faith. And I remain convinced that religious faith is one of the most perverse misuses of intelligence we have ever devised. So we will, inevitably, continue to criticize religious thinking. But we should not define ourselves and name ourselves in opposition to such thinking.

So what does this all mean in practical terms, apart from Margaret Downey having to change her letterhead? Well, rather than declare ourselves “atheists” in opposition to all religion, I think we should do nothing more than advocate reason and intellectual honesty—and where this advocacy causes us to collide with religion, as it inevitably will, we should observe that the points of impact are always with specific religious beliefs—not with religion in general. There is no religion in general.

The problem is that the concept of atheism imposes upon us a false burden of remaining fixated on people’s beliefs about God and remaining even-handed in our treatment of religion. But we shouldn’t be fixated, and we shouldn’t be even-handed. In fact, we should be quick to point out the differences among religions, for two reasons:

First, these differences make all religions look contingent, and therefore silly. Consider the unique features of Mormonism, which may have some relevance in the next Presidential election. Mormonism, it seems to me, is - objectively - just a little more idiotic than Christianity is. It has to be: because it is Christianity plus some very stupid ideas. For instance, the Mormons think Jesus is going to return to earth and administer his Thousand years of Peace, at least part of the time, from the state of Missouri. Why does this make Mormonism less likely to be true than Christianity? Because whatever probability you assign to Jesus’ coming back, you have to assign a lesser probability to his coming back and keeping a summer home in Jackson County, Missouri.

If Mitt Romney wants to be the next President of the United States, he should be made to feel the burden of our incredulity. We can make common cause with our Christian brothers and sisters on this point. Just what does the man believe? The world should know. And it is almost guaranteed to be embarrassing even to most people who believe in the biblical God.

The second reason to be attentive to the differences among the world’s religions is that these differences are actually a matter of life and death. There are very few of us who lie awake at night worrying about the Amish. This is not an accident. While I have no doubt that the Amish are mistreating their children, by not educating them adequately, they are not likely to hijack aircraft and fly them into buildings. But consider how we, as atheists, tend to talk about Islam. Christians often complain that atheists, and the secular world generally, balance every criticism of Muslim extremism with a mention of Christian extremism. The usual approach is to say that they have their jihadists, and we have people who kill abortion doctors. Our Christian neighbors, even the craziest of them, are right to be outraged by this pretense of even-handedness, because the truth is that Islam is quite a bit scarier and more culpable for needless human misery, than Christianity has been for a very, very long time. And the world must wake up to this fact. Muslims themselves must wake up to this fact. And they can.

You might remember that Thomas Friedman recently wrote an op-ed from Iraq, reporting that some Sunni militias are now fighting jihadists alongside American troops. When Friedman asked one Sunni militant why he was doing this, he said that he had recently watched a member of al-Qaeda decapitate an 8-year-old girl. This persuaded him that the American Crusader forces were the lesser of two evils.

Okay, so even some Sunni militants can discern the boundary between ordinary crazy Islam, and the utterly crazy, once it is drawn in the spilled blood of little girls. This is a basis for hope, of sorts. But we have to be honest—unremittingly honest—about what is on the other side of that line. This is what we and the rest of the civilized, and the semi-civilized world, are up against: utter religious lunacy and barbarism in the name of Islam—with, I’m unhappy to say, some mainstream theology to back it up.

To be even-handed when talking about the problem of Islam is to misconstrue the problem. The refrain, “all religions have their extremists,” is bullshit—and it is putting the West to sleep. All religions don’t have these extremists. Some religions have never had these extremists. And in the Muslim world, support for extremism is not extreme in the sense of being rare.

A recent poll showed that about a third of young British Muslims want to live under sharia law and believe that apostates should be killed for leaving the faith. These are British Muslims. Sixty-eight percent of British Muslims feel that their neighbors who insult Islam should be arrested and prosecuted, and seventy-eight percent think that the Danish cartoonists should be brought to justice. These people don’t have a clue about what constitutes a civil society. Reports of this kind coming out of the Muslim communities living in the West should worry us, before anything else about religion worries us.

Atheism is too blunt an instrument to use at moments like this. It’s as though we have a landscape of human ignorance and bewilderment—with peaks and valleys and local attractors—and the concept of atheism causes us to fixate one part of this landscape, the part related to theistic religion, and then just flattens it. Because to be consistent as atheists we must oppose, or seem to oppose, all faith claims equally. This is a waste of precious time and energy, and it squanders the trust of people who would otherwise agree with us on specific issues.

I’m not at all suggesting that we leave people’s core religious beliefs, or faith itself, unscathed—I’m still the kind of person who writes articles with rather sweeping titles like “Science must destroy religion”—but it seems to me that we should never lose sight of useful and important distinctions.

Another problem with calling ourselves “atheists” is that every religious person thinks he has a knockdown argument against atheism. We’ve all heard these arguments, and we are going to keep hearing them as long as we insist upon calling ourselves “atheists. Arguments like: atheists can’t prove that God doesn’t exist; atheists are claiming to know there is no God, and this is the most arrogant claim of all. As Rick Warren put it, when he and I debated for Newsweek—a reasonable man like himself “doesn’t have enough faith to be an atheist.” The idea that the universe could arise without a creator is, on his account, the most extravagant faith claim of all.

Of course, as an argument for the truth of any specific religious doctrine, this is a travesty. And we all know what to do in this situation: We have Russell’s teapot, and thousands of dead gods, and now a flying spaghetti monster, the nonexistence of which also cannot be proven, and yet belief in these things is acknowledged to be ridiculous by everyone. The problem is, we have to keep having this same argument, over and over again, and the argument is being generated to a significant degree, if not entirely, over our use of the term “atheism.”

So too with the “greatest crimes of the 20th century” argument. How many times are we going to have to counter the charge that Stalin, Hitler, and Pol Pot represent the endgame of atheism? I’ve got news for you, this meme is not going away. I argued against it in The End of Faith, and it was immediately thrown back at me in reviews of the book as though I had never mentioned it. So I tackled it again in the afterword to the paperback edition of The End of Faith; but this had no effect whatsoever; so at the risk of boring everyone, I brought it up again in Letter to a Christian Nation; and Richard did the same in The God Delusion; and Christopher took a mighty swing at it in God is Not Great. I can assure you that this bogus argument will be with us for as long as people label themselves “atheists.” And it really convinces religious people. It convinces moderates and liberals. It even convinces the occasional atheist.

Why should we fall into this trap? Why should we stand obediently in the space provided, in the space carved out by the conceptual scheme of theistic religion? It’s as though, before the debate even begins, our opponents draw the chalk-outline of a dead man on the sidewalk, and we just walk up and lie down in it.

Instead of doing this, consider what would happen if we simply used words like “reason” and “evidence.” What is the argument against reason? It’s true that a few people will bite the bullet here and argue that reason is itself a problem, that the Enlightenment was a failed project, etc. But the truth is that there are very few people, even among religious fundamentalists, who will happily admit to being enemies of reason. In fact, fundamentalists tend to think they are champions of reason and that they have very good reasons for believing in God. Nobody wants to believe things on bad evidence. The desire to know what is actually going on in world is very difficult to argue with. In so far as we represent that desire, we become difficult to argue with. And this desire is not reducible to an interest group. It’s not a club or an affiliation, and I think trying to make it one diminishes its power.

The last problem with atheism I’d like to talk about relates to the some of the experiences that lie at the core of many religious traditions, though perhaps not all, and which are testified to, with greater or lesser clarity in the world’s “spiritual” and “mystical” literature.

Those of you who have read The End of Faith, know that I don’t entirely line up with Dan, Richard, and Christopher in my treatment of these things. So I think I should take a little time to discuss this. While I always use terms like “spiritual” and “mystical” in scare quotes, and take some pains to denude them of metaphysics, the email I receive from my brothers and sisters in arms suggests that many of you find my interest in these topics problematic.

First, let me describe the general phenomenon I’m referring to. Here’s what happens, in the generic case: a person, in whatever culture he finds himself, begins to notice that life is difficult. He observes that even in the best of times—no one close to him has died, he’s healthy, there are no hostile armies massing in the distance, the fridge is stocked with beer, the weather is just so—even when things are as good as they can be, he notices that at the level of his moment to moment experience, at the level of his attention, he is perpetually on the move, seeking happiness and finding only temporary relief from his search.

We’ve all noticed this. We seek pleasant sights, and sounds, and tastes, and sensations, and attitudes. We satisfy our intellectual curiosities, and our desire for friendship and romance. We become connoisseurs of art and music and film—but our pleasures are, by their very nature, fleeting. And we can do nothing more than merely reiterate them as often as we are able.

If we enjoy some great professional success, our feelings of accomplishment remain vivid and intoxicating for about an hour, or maybe a day, but then people will begin to ask us “So, what are you going to do next? Don’t you have anything else in the pipeline?” Steve Jobs releases the IPhone, and I’m sure it wasn’t twenty minutes before someone asked, “when are you going to make this thing smaller?” Notice that very few people at this juncture, no matter what they’ve accomplished, say, “I’m done. I’ve met all my goals. Now I’m just going to stay here eat ice cream until I die in front of you.”

Even when everything has gone as well as it can go, the search for happiness continues, the effort required to keep doubt and dissatisfaction and boredom at bay continues, moment to moment. If nothing else, the reality of death and the experience of losing loved ones punctures even the most gratifying and well-ordered life.

In this context, certain people have traditionally wondered whether a deeper form of well-being exists. Is there, in other words, a form of happiness that is not contingent upon our merely reiterating our pleasures and successes and avoiding our pains. Is there a form of happiness that is not dependent upon having one’s favorite food always available to be placed on one’s tongue or having all one’s friends and loved ones within arm’s reach, or having good books to read, or having something to look forward to on the weekend? Is it possible to be utterly happy before anything happens, before one’s desires get gratified, in spite of life’s inevitable difficulties, in the very midst of physical pain, old age, disease, and death?

This question, I think, lies at the periphery of everyone’s consciousness. We are all, in some sense, living our answer to it—and many of us are living as though the answer is “no.” No, there is nothing more profound that repeating one’s pleasures and avoiding one’s pains; there is nothing more profound that seeking satisfaction, both sensory and intellectual. Many of us seem think that all we can do is just keep our foot on the gas until we run out of road.

But certain people, for whatever reason, are led to suspect that there is more to human experience than this. In fact, many of them are led to suspect this by religion—by the claims of people like the Buddha or Jesus or some other celebrated religious figures. And such a person may begin to practice various disciplines of attention—often called “meditation” or “contemplation”—as a means of examining his moment to moment experience closely enough to see if a deeper basis of well-being is there to be found.

Such a person might even hole himself up in a cave, or in a monastery, for months or years at a time to facilitate this process. Why would somebody do this? Well, it amounts to a very simple experiment. Here’s the logic of it: if there is a form of psychological well-being that isn’t contingent upon merely repeating one’s pleasures, then this happiness should be available even when all the obvious sources of pleasure and satisfaction have been removed. If it exists at all, this happiness should be available to a person who has renounced all her material possessions, and declined to marry her high school sweetheart, and gone off to a cave or to some other spot that would seem profoundly uncongenial to the satisfaction of ordinary desires and aspirations.

One clue as to how daunting most people would find such a project is the fact that solitary confinement—which is essentially what we are talking about—is considered a punishment even inside a prison. Even when cooped up with homicidal maniacs and rapists, most people still prefer the company of others to spending any significant amount of time alone in a box.

And yet, for thousands of years, contemplatives have claimed to find extraordinary depths of psychological well-being while spending vast stretches of time in total isolation. It seems to me that, as rational people, whether we call ourselves “atheists” or not, we have a choice to make in how we view this whole enterprise. Either the contemplative literature is a mere catalogue of religious delusion, deliberate fraud, and psychopathology, or people have been having interesting and even normative experiences under the name of “spirituality” and “mysticism” for millennia.

Now let me just assert, on the basis of my own study and experience, that there is no question in my mind that people have improved their emotional lives, and their self-understanding, and their ethical intuitions, and have even had important insights about the nature of subjectivity itself through a variety of traditional practices like meditation.

Leaving aside all the metaphysics and mythology and mumbo jumbo, what contemplatives and mystics over the millennia claim to have discovered is that there is an alternative to merely living at the mercy of the next neurotic thought that comes careening into consciousness. There is an alternative to being continuously spellbound by the conversation we are having with ourselves.

Most us think that if a person is walking down the street talking to himself—that is, not able to censor himself in front of other people—he’s probably mentally ill. But if we talk to ourselves all day long silently—thinking, thinking, thinking, rehearsing prior conversations, thinking about what we said, what we didn’t say, what we should have said, jabbering on to ourselves about what we hope is going to happen, what just happened, what almost happened, what should have happened, what may yet happen—but we just know enough to just keep this conversation private, this is perfectly normal. This is perfectly compatible with sanity. Well, this is not what the experience of millions of contemplatives suggests.

Of course, I am by no means denying the importance of thinking. There is no question that linguistic thought is indispensable for us. It is, in large part, what makes us human. It is the fabric of almost all culture and every social relationship. Needless to say, it is the basis of all science. And it is surely responsible for much rudimentary cognition—for integrating beliefs, planning, explicit learning, moral reasoning, and many other mental capacities. Even talking to oneself out loud may occasionally serve a useful function.

From the point of view of our contemplative traditions, however—to boil them all down to a cartoon version, that ignores the rather esoteric disputes among them—our habitual identification with discursive thought, our failure moment to moment to recognize thoughts as thoughts, is a primary source of human suffering. And when a person breaks this spell, an extraordinary kind of relief is available.

But the problem with a contemplative claim of this sort is that you can’t borrow someone else’s contemplative tools to test it. The problem is that to test such a claim—indeed, to even appreciate how distracted we tend to be in the first place, we have to build our own contemplative tools. Imagine where astronomy would be if everyone had to build his own telescope before he could even begin to see if astronomy was a legitimate enterprise. It wouldn’t make the sky any less worthy of investigation, but it would make it immensely more difficult for us to establish astronomy as a science.

To judge the empirical claims of contemplatives, you have to build your own telescope. Judging their metaphysical claims is another matter: many of these can be dismissed as bad science or bad philosophy by merely thinking about them. But to judge whether certain experiences are possible—and if possible, desirable—we have to be able to use our attention in the requisite ways. We have to be able to break our identification with discursive thought, if only for a few moments. This can take a tremendous amount of work. And it is not work that our culture knows much about.

One problem with atheism as a category of thought, is that it seems more or less synonymous with not being interested in what someone like the Buddha or Jesus may have actually experienced. In fact, many atheists reject such experiences out of hand, as either impossible, or if possible, not worth wanting. Another common mistake is to imagine that such experiences are necessarily equivalent to states of mind with which many of us are already familiar—the feeling of scientific awe, or ordinary states of aesthetic appreciation, artistic inspiration, etc.

As someone who has made his own modest efforts in this area, let me assure you, that when a person goes into solitude and trains himself in meditation for 15 or 18 hours a day, for months or years at a time, in silence, doing nothing else—not talking, not reading, not writing—just making a sustained moment to moment effort to merely observe the contents of consciousness and to not get lost in thought, he experiences things that most scientists and artists are not likely to have experienced, unless they have made precisely the same efforts at introspection. And these experiences have a lot to say about the plasticity of the human mind and about the possibilities of human happiness.

So, apart from just commending these phenomena to your attention, I’d like to point out that, as atheists, our neglect of this area of human experience puts us at a rhetorical disadvantage. Because millions of people have had these experiences, and many millions more have had glimmers of them, and we, as atheists, ignore such phenomena, almost in principle, because of their religious associations—and yet these experiences often constitute the most important and transformative moments in a person’s life. Not recognizing that such experiences are possible or important can make us appear less wise even than our craziest religious opponents.

My concern is that atheism can easily become the position of not being interested in certain possibilities in principle. I don’t know if our universe is, as JBS Haldane said, “not only stranger than we suppose, but stranger than we can suppose.” But I am sure that it is stranger than we, as “atheists,” tend to represent while advocating atheism. As “atheists” we give others, and even ourselves, the sense that we are well on our way toward purging the universe of mystery. As advocates of reason, we know that mystery is going to be with us for a very long time. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that mystery is ineradicable from our circumstance, because however much we know, it seems like there will always be brute facts that we cannot account for but which we must rely upon to explain everything else. This may be a problem for epistemology but it is not a problem for human life and for human solidarity. It does not rob our lives of meaning. And it is not a barrier to human happiness.

We are faced, however, with the challenge of communicating this view to others. We are faced with the monumental task of persuading a myth-infatuated world that love and curiosity are sufficient, and that we need not console or frighten ourselves or our children with Iron Age fairy tales. I don’t think there is a more important intellectual struggle to win; it has to be fought from a hundred sides, all at once, and continuously; but it seems to me that there is no reason for us to fight in well-ordered ranks, like the red coats of Atheism.

Finally, I think it’s useful to envision what victory will look like. Again, the analogy with racism seems instructive to me. What will victory against racism look like, should that happy day ever dawn? It certainly won’t be a world in which a majority of people profess that they are “nonracist.” Most likely, it will be a world in which the very concept of separate races has lost its meaning.

We will have won this war of ideas against religion when atheism is scarcely intelligible as a concept. We will simply find ourselves in a world in which people cease to praise one another for pretending to know things they do not know. This is certainly a future worth fighting for. It may be the only future compatible with our long-term survival as a species. But the only path between now and then, that I can see, is for us to be rigorously honest in the present. It seems to me that intellectual honesty is now, and will always be, deeper and more durable, and more easily spread, than “atheism.”

(This is an edited transcript of a talk given by Sam Harris at the Atheist Alliance conference in Washington D.C. on September 28th, 2007)

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http://youtu.be/ODz7kRS2XPs

loved the video. helped give me some insight on the preception i give when i call myself an atheist. thanks ya "old whore" lol

[ManMachine]

Yes.

I might not agree with it but it serves a need for some people, who knows what they'd get up to if they didn't have a god to bother?

[ManMachine]

Hi there, I was fascinated by your response and I wanted to address a few points.

… Anyway, I can't say I came to any conclusions going down that avenue, beyond my basic stance that morals are something to be decided by individual perception, theory, and belief, not on the basis of philosophical argument about objective good or bad.

How are you distinguishing ‘individual perception, theory and belief’ from ‘philosophical argument about objective good or bad’? It seems to me they are not mutually exclusive.

However, I see another avenue of approaching the question. I'm of the opinion that most religious impulses have their root and sustenance in the way the brain deals with reality, as side effects of useful processes and cognitions. For example, when we see an individual move in a purposeful manner, talk in ways that make sense to us, and respond in speech or act in ways that are sensible to an agent, we attribute a mind to that "fleshy thing" in our world, even though we never actually "see" a mind, or any real mechanism that we identify as something that might give rise to mind. We see a body which we infer is possessed of a mind which is causing it's behaviors. We more than simply "conclude" that a mind is present, we perceive a thing animating that person which is as real to our perception as the table or the song played on a car stereo as it drives by. Other "people" aren't just abstractions or inferences, the other person becomes a composite of two "things" — a body and a mind, which is as real as the body. One can view the concept of a god as the application of the machinery in our brain which makes these inferences in a way that doesn't serve an obvious, social function of helping us to cooperate with other agents in our environment. But notice, we normally don't think about whether to attribute a mind to John or Sue, it's hard wired into us to have certain cognitions in response to similar stimuli in the environment. We don't really choose to attribute mind to a person, it happens below the decks of our consciousness, and therefore appears, to the mind, as an "objective fact of the world". Once our brain has concluded that P has a mind, it's hard to unmake that inference; it becomes "real". Likewise, I would argue that when this same machinery is invoked to lead us to infer that there is a disembodied mind that exists as a ghost or a spirit or a god, it isn't an abstract concept to the person who is persuaded of its existence; to them, it's real, not just in the sense that any true proposition "is real" to you, but in the sense that the person's mind makes it an objective fact of their world, just like other objective facts they take for granted. I guess in some ways, this resembles the case of the legalization of drugs, because, the person isn't completely free to believe or disbelieve based on any abstract consideration of the evidence: their ability to choose is constrained by their brains making the phenomenon "real to them" in a way that other propositions aren't so constrained. So I would argue that there needs to be some tolerance given or allowed because these ideas likely aren't pure ideas that they can take or leave based on rational consideration alone, as the brain of the believer is essentially being hijacked by itself, regardless of the conscious will.

There has been some interesting research done in this area. Broadly speaking I would agree with you, although I arrive by a different route. I would separate out ‘god’ from ‘religion’ at this stage. We know from developmental psychology that children, when experimenting with causal reasoning, will spontaneously create disembodied sentience, such as the man in the moon (to make it move across the sky), bogeyman in the wardrobe (to make those wood creaking noises)and even god-like entities as the overall cause of the world/universe, but, a lone-god does not make a religion. The development of religious dogma has far more to do with group psychology and the evolution of proto-societies. That the two different strands come from two different areas is much more revealing.

Because of this, I would argue it is easier to be tolerant of god(s) because these ideas, as you put it, “… aren't pure ideas that [people] can take or leave based on rational consideration alone”.

Religion, however, is different and needs to be considered in light of it's social evolution.

Moreover, the bulk of religious conversions occur by the age of 15, and so religious belief is being built into the individual's world by the normal developmental processes of love and attachment and dependence which ultimately function to transmit the culture of our forefathers to our children. This is a much more thorough and deep "brainwashing" than is going to occur at any other time in the person's life.

I think what you are talking about here is libidinal cathexis. I have to be honest and say I’m not sure if age has an effect on libidinal cathexis, I’m fairly sure that whatever age this occurs at it is fairly difficult to undo.

A westerner raised in a country where Christian belief is prominent will have a difficult time understanding the things someone raised in predominately Hindu India would.

This is a bit too much of a generalisation for me. I think some people find it hard to understand alien cultural norms, others can assimilate them quickly and without problems. This would seem to be an intelligence issue for me (and I don’t mean education).

Those first 15 years set the stage for so much of what follows, not just in what to think, but also how to think and why. To treat those "decisions" about what to believe in terms of religion (which were made by their parents and society) as possessed of the same degree of freedom as choices and beliefs acquired independently as an adult is, I think, unfair and unrealistic. So, I think there, too, one has to temper one's feelings about the beliefs themselves with a certain allowance for the fact that most people who hold religious beliefs, and may largely be "stuck" in a religious mindset, are not that way strictly of their own choosing and free will.

I’m inclined to agree with the pressure created by social norms (including the teenage social norm of rebellion) but when we get into the realms of ‘free will’ I think there are too many assumptions in your statement, that opens up a more significant problem.

Neuroscience has all but determined free will doesn’t exist as we historically imagined and further research by social psychologists seems to suggest that the belief in free will (regardless of its nature) is more important to individuals and has social advantages. This then gets tantalisingly close to opening up another thread of debate. But let’s stick to the matter at hand. Suffice it to say the end of that last section seems to me to be considerably dismissive of a much broader issue.

While I wouldn't argue for according specific ideas, religious or not, special tolerance or treatment where those ideas are unreasonable and probably untrue, on the substance of the belief alone, I think one has to take into account the realities of when these ideas manifest themselves in people, under whose control, and whether they manifest as ideas that can be rationally, abstractly chosen or discarded. I think when you take such things into account, I think it cautions against treating religious beliefs and behaviors in the same moral framework as other beliefs. I don't know whether "respect" is or isn't appropriate, but I think when adjusting one's moral calculus in assessing the good or harm of religious beliefs and behaviors, these facts need to be put on the scale as well, to temper conclusions which would be reached in areas where these realities aren't in play. (Such as whether or not to respect someone's belief that Justin Bieber is dreamy or that heavily taxing the rich is a good thing.)

I am inclined to agree.

(It's probably appropriate to put in a word about the nature of belief and reason here. Modern psychology has availed us of truths about human behavior which we would not have suspected on the basis of "common sense" notions about human behavior. There are many aspects of human behavior which are counter-intuitive and defy our "common sense" expectations about how people work. One of the changes over the last few decades has been to enlarge the portion of our behavior attributed to non-reasoning influences on our behavior. As such, one can take a range of stances on what the "blend" of reason and non-reason is in our overall behavior. One can propose we are largely rational in our choices, beliefs and behaviors, such that the ratio of reason approaches 100% more closely than 0% rationality. Someone else, might put the ratio more in the middle, such that it's 50% reason, 50% non-reasoning causes. There are even theories which posit reason's contribution as close to 0%. Needless to say, where you place the ratio — whether closer to 100% or closer to 0% — you will adjust your views on how irrational behaviors of any kind should be weighed. It's worth observing that someone who places the ratio close to 0% would likely view a person who has come to a position of atheism as being every bit as "trapped" by that belief as someone who is "trapped" in a religious conclusion, and view the sides considerably differently in apportioning moral properties and such. I don't have a figure, but I definitely lean much farther toward the 0% estimate than the majority of my peers, here or elsewhere.)

I’d be interested in some references for the research mentioned in this section.

MM