free will paradox

[justin]

does the fact that i didn`t choose to have free will mean that i don`t have free will?

[Angrboda]

Put down the crack pipe and back away slowly....

[justin]

BUT IT FEELS SO RIGHT AND THE VOICES ARE HAPPY WHEN I`M HAPPY!!!!!

[Esquilax]

Okay, I officially like this guy, he's a keeper.

[fr0d0]

Hehe no you don't have free will. You are a free agent. Common misnomer.

[Angrboda]

Future contingent propositions (or simply, future contingents) are statements about states of affairs in the future that are neither necessarily true nor necessarily false.

The problem of future contingents seems to have been first discussed by Aristotle in chapter 9 of his On Interpretation (De Interpretatione), using the famous sea-battle example. Roughly a generation later, Diodorus Cronus from the Megarian school of philosophy stated a version of the problem in his notorious Master Argument. The problem was later discussed by Leibniz. Deleuze used it to oppose a "logic of the event" to a "logic of signification".

The problem can be expressed as follows. Suppose that a sea-battle will not be fought tomorrow. Then it was also true yesterday (and the week before, and last year) that it will not be fought, since any true statement about what will be the case was also true in the past. But all past truths are necessary truths, therefore it was necessarily true in the past that the battle will not be fought, and thus that the statement that it will be fought is necessarily false. Therefore it is not possible that the battle will be fought. In general, if something will not be the case, it is not possible for it to be the case. This conflicts with the idea of our own free will: that we have the power to determine the course of events in the future, which seems impossible if what happens, or does not happen, was necessarily going to happen, or not happen.

— Wikipedia:

[FKHansen]

God's omnipotence and God's omniscience contradict the possibility of free will since every birth would have a known path.

[justin]

yeah and since there is no evidence of a god you`re arugment is useless.

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Future contingent propositions (or simply, future contingents) are statements about states of affairs in the future that are neither necessarily true nor necessarily false.

The problem of future contingents seems to have been first discussed by Aristotle in chapter 9 of his On Interpretation (De Interpretatione), using the famous sea-battle example. Roughly a generation later, Diodorus Cronus from the Megarian school of philosophy stated a version of the problem in his notorious Master Argument. The problem was later discussed by Leibniz. Deleuze used it to oppose a "logic of the event" to a "logic of signification".

The problem can be expressed as follows. Suppose that a sea-battle will not be fought tomorrow. Then it was also true yesterday (and the week before, and last year) that it will not be fought, since any true statement about what will be the case was also true in the past. But all past truths are necessary truths, therefore it was necessarily true in the past that the battle will not be fought, and thus that the statement that it will be fought is necessarily false. Therefore it is not possible that the battle will be fought. In general, if something will not be the case, it is not possible for it to be the case. This conflicts with the idea of our own free will: that we have the power to determine the course of events in the future, which seems impossible if what happens, or does not happen, was necessarily going to happen, or not happen.

— Wikipedia:

thanks for the link

[fr0d0]

God's omnipotence and God's omniscience contradict the possibility of free will since every birth would have a known path.

Not known to the individual concerned though, so he is still free to choose to do whatever he wants right?

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and since there is no evidence

You're talking about physical evidence for a non physical being right? Gotcha

[FKHansen]

God's omnipotence and God's omniscience contradict the possibility of free will since every birth would have a known path.

Not known to the individual concerned though, so he is still free to choose to do whatever he wants right?

He may have the impression of free will, but his course is already set. His lack of knowing does not change the fact.