Is evidentialism a dead philosophy?

[Angrboda]

Without Plantinga's actual argument, it's hard to assess whether it has any merit. I take it he's trying to deflate evidentialism with a reductio similar to that which deflates logical positivism. However, since we only have your subjective impression that his argument works, there isn't much to debate.

[ManMachine]

The philosophy you employ to justify your belief is not in question.

I'm pretty sure that is actually the whole point of the thread.

Not at all. The thread is a question on the validity of evidentialism, in particular the OP asks 'How can you believe in a god without evidence, and be called rational?'

I pointed out that this is not dissimilar to a position taken up those who chose to believe in scientific theory.

The OP then came back with a justification as to why someone might chose to believe in scientific theory without evidence. I have no issue with that justification. It illuminates my point quite nicely and ties it back to the original question.

I felt there was nothing else to add.

MM

[Mister Agenda]

It seems to me that some of the arguments against evidentialism from Alvin Plantinga have dealt a huge blow to evidentialism.

Would you please describe which of Plantinga's arguments you feel was most effective in doing so?

Particularly the arguments about how we believe in the existence of other minds, yet we don't really have evidence for that belief.

Really? It seems to me that we DO have such evidence. Direct experience of our own minds coupled with indirect experience of other minds.

Or the existence of the external world, the only way we can verify if the external world exists is through our senses, and who's to say our perceptions are completely incorrect, and we're actually a brain in a vat, dreaming all of this?

This would actually be a good point if it didn't lead to solipsism, the most useless idea ever.

I know, that these arguments do not prove god, it just justifies believing in god without evidence, but I don't think we can just let that slide.

It's a desperation tactic. 'There's no evidence for God but we want to claim it's reasonable to believe anyway! What can we do? How about...we say it's okay to believe things without evidence because we can't prove reality is real anyway!'

How can you believe in a god without evidence, and be called rational? Sure, we may believe in the existence of other minds without evidence, but the existence of a god is not nearly as obvious, nor serves any practical relevance.

I think you gave in too easy on the 'other minds' thing. Evidence isn't proof. You can't prove there are other minds, but there is evidence for them.

You can't be justified in a belief in god because 'it's obvious to me', I think it needs to be obvious to everyone in order for it to be justified. If god's existence is 'just obvious', why is it not obvious to a large percentage of the population? If there were a god, wouldn't there be evidence of his existence? If so, why do they need to resort to making certain beliefs justified without evidence in order to make their case?

Good questions, but if you accept that belief without evidence is justified, you can believe anything without justifying it at all.

[MindForgedManacle]

Scientists and people who adhere to scientific theory believe that the results of their observations will be repeated in the future, there is no evidence of this yet the belief persists.

There's a lot of it about.

MM

Before you say something stupid you should think about it. If you're going to bring up Hume's problem of induction, you should realize it's applicable to ALL usages of induction, not simply to science. The fact that you typed that message out came with several necessary assumptions about induction and the uniformity of nature for instance.

[MindForgedManacle]

Eh, it was shortsighted, not necessarily stupid. I'm always grumpier at night it seems. :/

[Freedom of thought]

I don't know about this specific counter-argument, but every time I hear about how awesome one of Plantiga's arguments is, it turns out to be total bullshit. In fact, I can think of plenty of evidence to believe in other minds, and that second part about about the verifiability of the external world and the fallibility of our senses is hardly a blow against evidentialism. It's actually a plus for skepticism and all the more reason for empirical evidence to be necessary, two things Mr. Platinga abhors.

The man appears to be less a philosopher than he is a justifier of his own pre-conceived beliefs, and I have seen nothing from him that wasn't just a bunch of hot wind. And no offense, but the fact that you take him seriously makes me wonder if you truly are an atheist.

I don't take him too seriously, but when I see a convincing argument against a position I have to take it seriously, in fact I laughed at his argument against evolution+naturalism. He has a horrible understanding of the evolutionary process. Keep in mind, Plantinga isn't trying to prove god here, or argue against atheism, but a position called evidentialism, that all beliefs must be substantiated by evidence. Even many atheists reject evidentialism, and I might go to reliabilism or weak evidentialism if I can't find any good replies to his arguments against evidentialism.

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It seems to me that some of the arguments against evidentialism from Alvin Plantinga have dealt a huge blow to evidentialism.

Would you please describe which of Plantinga's arguments you feel was most effective in doing so?

Particularly the arguments about how we believe in the existence of other minds, yet we don't really have evidence for that belief.

Really? It seems to me that we DO have such evidence. Direct experience of our own minds coupled with indirect experience of other minds.

Or the existence of the external world, the only way we can verify if the external world exists is through our senses, and who's to say our perceptions are completely incorrect, and we're actually a brain in a vat, dreaming all of this?

This would actually be a good point if it didn't lead to solipsism, the most useless idea ever.

I know, that these arguments do not prove god, it just justifies believing in god without evidence, but I don't think we can just let that slide.

It's a desperation tactic. 'There's no evidence for God but we want to claim it's reasonable to believe anyway! What can we do? How about...we say it's okay to believe things without evidence because we can't prove reality is real anyway!'

How can you believe in a god without evidence, and be called rational? Sure, we may believe in the existence of other minds without evidence, but the existence of a god is not nearly as obvious, nor serves any practical relevance.

I think you gave in too easy on the 'other minds' thing. Evidence isn't proof. You can't prove there are other minds, but there is evidence for them.

You can't be justified in a belief in god because 'it's obvious to me', I think it needs to be obvious to everyone in order for it to be justified. If god's existence is 'just obvious', why is it not obvious to a large percentage of the population? If there were a god, wouldn't there be evidence of his existence? If so, why do they need to resort to making certain beliefs justified without evidence in order to make their case?

Good questions, but if you accept that belief without evidence is justified, you can believe anything without justifying it at all.

You have evidence of other minds? I'd like to see that. I don't think it's provable by evidence that other people have conscious experience, but we believe it anyway. Also, we can prove that other humans have cognitive abilities, I'm a physicalist so I think that consciousness is a product of cognition, but I'm having a hard time seeing how we could actually prove with evidence that is the case. I've tried arguing with evidence found from neuroscience that our consciousness is the product of physical processes, but they won't budge. He says that just proves 'actions' are depended on brain activity, not that that physical processes actually give rise to consciousness. I think it logically follows from physicalism that if we can prove a person has cognitive functions, this proves they have consciousness. But I'm having a hard time trying to prove physicalism, and this religious person I am arguing with is not even trying to make a case for a soul.

Of course this sort of thinking leads to solopsism, but that's the entire point of the argument. How can you accept evidentialism, when you have no evidence you exist apart from referring to your own conscious experience? Is it not circular to do that? It seems to me, if this is the case solopsism is a product of being an evidentialist.

[Whateverist]

Evidently not.

[FreeTony]

Particularly the arguments about how we believe in the existence of other minds, yet we don't really have evidence for that belief.

1. Go and have a conversation with a friend.
2. Go and have a conversation with a rock.

Depending on your friend, one will be more satisfying than the other.

[ManMachine]

Scientists and people who adhere to scientific theory believe that the results of their observations will be repeated in the future, there is no evidence of this yet the belief persists.

There's a lot of it about.

MM

Before you say something stupid you should think about it. If you're going to bring up Hume's problem of induction, you should realize it's applicable to ALL usages of induction, not simply to science. The fact that you typed that message out came with several necessary assumptions about induction and the uniformity of nature for instance.

Interesting statement. Actually I didn't bring up Hume's problem of induction at all, you did. But fair enough, I'm game.

What 'assumption about induction and the uniformity of nature' do you think my message 'came with'?

MM

[MindForgedManacle]

Before you say something stupid you should think about it. If you're going to bring up Hume's problem of induction, you should realize it's applicable to ALL usages of induction, not simply to science. The fact that you typed that message out came with several necessary assumptions about induction and the uniformity of nature for instance.

Interesting statement. Actually I didn't bring up Hume's problem of induction at all, you did. But fair enough, I'm game.

What 'assumption about induction and the uniformity of nature' do you think my message 'came with'?

MM

Accept you did:

Scientists and people who adhere to scientific theory believe that the results of their observations will be repeated in the future, there is no evidence of this yet the belief persists.

That's basically Hume's problem of induction, that we have no valid basis for the belief that the future will resemble the past. We rely on induction for even that, making it circular.

As for your assumption about the uniformity of nature (UoN), I was pointing out that in even making that message, you too assumed the UoN, because you assumed that your desire to create that message would result in you actually making your body do so. The point of this being that it isn't just science or scientists who must fallaciously assume induction, but that everyone must do so in any usage of practical reasoning.

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You have evidence of other minds[/u? I'd like to see that. I [u]don't think it's provable by evidence that other people have conscious experience, but we believe it anyway. Also, we can prove that other humans have cognitive abilities, I'm a physicalist so I think that consciousness is a product of cognition, but I'm having a hard time seeing how we could actually prove with evidence that is the case. I've tried arguing with evidence found from neuroscience that our consciousness is the product of physical processes, but they won't budge. He says that just proves 'actions' are depended on brain activity, not that that physical processes actually give rise to consciousness. I think it logically follows from physicalism that if we can prove a person has cognitive functions, this proves they have consciousness. But I'm having a hard time trying to prove physicalism, and this religious person I am arguing with is not even trying to make a case for a soul.

You are actually equivocating here. We DO have evidence that there are other minds. The objects in question behave in much the same way I do in all manner of ways, reason similarly, etc. This IS evidence that they are the same kind of thing as I am. Your equivocation comes in thinking that by "evidence" we must mean that we "prove" something is the case, which is nonsense. To be evidence of something simply means that the existence of X implies Y is more likely true than it would have been otherwise.

Of course this sort of thinking leads to solopsism, but that's the entire point of the argument. How can you accept evidentialism, when you have no evidence you exist apart from referring to your own conscious experience? Is it not circular to do that? It seems to me, if this is the case solopsism is a product of being an evidentialist.

Evidentialists can easily accept their own existence via a proof by incorrigibility. That is to say, by evidence from propositions know to be indisputably true without further reflection. One such incorrigible proposition an evidentialist could appeal to is the belief that "There are thoughts". One cannot escape that this is true by mere virtue of it being considered.