Is evidentialism a dead philosophy?

[Angrboda]

You have evidence of other minds? I'd like to see that. I don't think it's provable by evidence that other people have conscious experience, but we believe it anyway. Also, we can prove that other humans have cognitive abilities, I'm a physicalist so I think that consciousness is a product of cognition, but I'm having a hard time seeing how we could actually prove with evidence that is the case. I've tried arguing with evidence found from neuroscience that our consciousness is the product of physical processes, but they won't budge. He says that just proves 'actions' are depended on brain activity, not that that physical processes actually give rise to consciousness. I think it logically follows from physicalism that if we can prove a person has cognitive functions, this proves they have consciousness. But I'm having a hard time trying to prove physicalism, and this religious person I am arguing with is not even trying to make a case for a soul.

You don't need to prove physicalism to show that we have 'evidence' for other minds. All you need is the hypothesis that your consciousness is a behavior you have as a result of your biology. We can provide evidence for this belief, without needing to prove it. We know that imbibing alcohol changes the way our consciousness behaves. Drugs can also affect your mind. And we have evidence that our biological nature is responsible for our complex behaviors. Animals, human or not, display complex behaviors. Rocks and tables do not. A computer, a type of complex thinking organism, also displays complex behaviors by virtue of its nature. Thus we have evidence that our biology gives rise to complex behaviors. We have evidence that our mind is a complex behavior that is dependent on our biology. We also have evidence that others share the same biology which we possess. Thus, it is reasonable, given the evidence, to hypothesize that others who share the same biology as us, and given that our complex behavior of mind appears dependent on biology, we have 'evidence' that these other beings have minds like us. (Evidence, not proof.)

[tor]

You have evidence of other minds? I'd like to see that. I don't think it's provable by evidence that other people have conscious experience, but we believe it anyway. Also, we can prove that other humans have cognitive abilities, I'm a physicalist so I think that consciousness is a product of cognition, but I'm having a hard time seeing how we could actually prove with evidence that is the case. I've tried arguing with evidence found from neuroscience that our consciousness is the product of physical processes, but they won't budge. He says that just proves 'actions' are depended on brain activity, not that that physical processes actually give rise to consciousness. I think it logically follows from physicalism that if we can prove a person has cognitive functions, this proves they have consciousness. But I'm having a hard time trying to prove physicalism, and this religious person I am arguing with is not even trying to make a case for a soul.

You don't need to prove physicalism to show that we have 'evidence' for other minds. All you need is the hypothesis that your consciousness is a behavior you have as a result of your biology. We can provide evidence for this belief, without needing to prove it. We know that imbibing alcohol changes the way our consciousness behaves. Drugs can also affect your mind. And we have evidence that our biological nature is responsible for our complex behaviors. Animals, human or not, display complex behaviors. Rocks and tables do not. A computer, a type of complex thinking organism, also displays complex behaviors by virtue of its nature. Thus we have evidence that our biology gives rise to complex behaviors. We have evidence that our mind is a complex behavior that is dependent on our biology. We also have evidence that others share the same biology which we possess. Thus, it is reasonable, given the evidence, to hypothesize that others who share the same biology as us, and given that our complex behavior of mind appears dependent on biology, we have 'evidence' that these other beings have minds like us. (Evidence, not proof.)

Good girl

[ManMachine]

Interesting statement. Actually I didn't bring up Hume's problem of induction at all, you did. But fair enough, I'm game.

What 'assumption about induction and the uniformity of nature' do you think my message 'came with'?

MM

Accept you did:

Scientists and people who adhere to scientific theory believe that the results of their observations will be repeated in the future, there is no evidence of this yet the belief persists.

That's basically Hume's problem of induction, that we have no valid basis for the belief that the future will resemble the past. We rely on induction for even that, making it circular.

As for your assumption about the uniformity of nature (UoN), I was pointing out that in even making that message, you too assumed the UoN, because you assumed that your desire to create that message would result in you actually making your body do so. The point of this being that it isn't just science or scientists who must fallaciously assume induction, but that everyone must do so in any usage of practical reasoning.

I was curious to see where you were going with this but as it happens you haven't said anything I didn't (albeit with my cyber-tongue in my cyber-cheek).

I accept that there are broader issues and that inductive reasoning has a certain ubiquity, hence my closing remark,

"There's a lot of it about'.

MM

[Freedom of thought]

Particularly the arguments about how we believe in the existence of other minds, yet we don't really have evidence for that belief.

1. Go and have a conversation with a friend.
2. Go and have a conversation with a rock.

Depending on your friend, one will be more satisfying than the other.

I don't think you understand how much more complex this issue is. Are you familiar with something called a 'philosophical zombie'? A philosophical zombie has no conscious experience, yet behaves like one of my friends.

[Mystic]

I think a better example would be faith in morality, goodness, justice, and honor. These things are unseen, and from an Atheistic point of view, exist within our minds and are created within our minds, yet having a meaningful reality to us. I think that takes faith, for one can easily believe, that our evolution made us believe they are meaningful and makes us take them seriously and act upon them, when there is no reason to and that they are illusions.

Atheists have faith in goodness. In the same way, I have faith in a soul. In the same way I have faith in God. Evidence is good, but most meaningful part of human experience, is not based on evidence, but is of the subjective experience that is stems more so from our innate nature.

[Freedom of thought]

I think a better example would be faith in morality, goodness, justice, and honor. These things are unseen, and from an Atheistic point of view, exist within our minds and are created within our minds, yet having a meaningful reality to us. I think that takes faith, for one can easily believe, that our evolution made us believe they are meaningful and makes us take them seriously and act upon them, when there is no reason to and that they are illusions.

Atheists have faith in goodness. In the same way, I have faith in a soul. In the same way I have faith in God. Evidence is good, but most meaningful part of human experience, is not based on evidence, but is of the subjective experience that is stems more so from our innate nature.

Language is created within our minds, does that mean that language doesn't exist? Do you have faith in the existence of language? I doubt it.

---

You have evidence of other minds? I'd like to see that. I don't think it's provable by evidence that other people have conscious experience, but we believe it anyway. Also, we can prove that other humans have cognitive abilities, I'm a physicalist so I think that consciousness is a product of cognition, but I'm having a hard time seeing how we could actually prove with evidence that is the case. I've tried arguing with evidence found from neuroscience that our consciousness is the product of physical processes, but they won't budge. He says that just proves 'actions' are depended on brain activity, not that that physical processes actually give rise to consciousness. I think it logically follows from physicalism that if we can prove a person has cognitive functions, this proves they have consciousness. But I'm having a hard time trying to prove physicalism, and this religious person I am arguing with is not even trying to make a case for a soul.

You don't need to prove physicalism to show that we have 'evidence' for other minds. All you need is the hypothesis that your consciousness is a behavior you have as a result of your biology. We can provide evidence for this belief, without needing to prove it. We know that imbibing alcohol changes the way our consciousness behaves. Drugs can also affect your mind. And we have evidence that our biological nature is responsible for our complex behaviors. Animals, human or not, display complex behaviors. Rocks and tables do not. A computer, a type of complex thinking organism, also displays complex behaviors by virtue of its nature. Thus we have evidence that our biology gives rise to complex behaviors. We have evidence that our mind is a complex behavior that is dependent on our biology. We also have evidence that others share the same biology which we possess. Thus, it is reasonable, given the evidence, to hypothesize that others who share the same biology as us, and given that our complex behavior of mind appears dependent on biology, we have 'evidence' that these other beings have minds like us. (Evidence, not proof.)

The problem with this though, is it doesn't take into account the concept of philosophical zombies: Which is a person which seems like they have consciousness, but they really don't have consciousness. I agree though that physicalism plus our observations makes it reasonable to believe in other minds.

[Angrboda]

The problem with this though, is it doesn't take into account the concept of philosophical zombies: Which is a person which seems like they have consciousness, but they really don't have consciousness. I agree though that physicalism plus our observations makes it reasonable to believe in other minds.

Evidence, not proof. The introduction of the concept of philosophical zombies shifts the burden of proof to those who suggest there can be such a thing. Failing that, we fall back on uniformitarianism which is generally assumed.

[bennyboy]

Evidence, not proof. The introduction of the concept of philosophical zombies shifts the burden of proof to those who suggest there can be such a thing. Failing that, we fall back on uniformitarianism which is generally assumed.

Proof and evidence have a complicated relationship with context-- the context set by philosophical assumptions. Mundane proofs must be viewed with suspicioun when the philosophical context is changed.

For example, does gravity affect all physical objects? Evidence for this idea is obvious-- that many objects have been seen to be affected by gravity, and very few not. But this truth only works in the context of a world view in which objects and their properties exist as more than my experiences.

Is there an objective world, which is not dependend on my experience of it? It would seem so-- I often have experiences which I did not expect, which is quite the mental feat if I'm God of a universe of my own making. Yet this truth only works in the context where my perceptions are considered a valid measure or indicator of anything at all.

The case of consciousness is a special one, right here, right now. That's because we look to certain behaviors as evidence supporting non-philosophical-zombiism, and because we are approaching the point at which man-made machines will be able to mimic those behaviors more and more effectively. Will this shift in available evidence change what philosophical assumptions we're willing to make? Are we just going to throw up our hands and extend "rights" to every physical system which can tug at our evolved heartstrings?

[Anomalocaris]

It seems to me that some of the arguments against evidentialism from Alvin Plantinga have dealt a huge blow to evidentialism.

Particularly the arguments about how we believe in the existence of other minds, yet we don't really have evidence for that belief. Or the existence of the external world, the only way we can verify if the external world exists is through our senses, and who's to say our perceptions are completely incorrect, and we're actually a brain in a vat, dreaming all of this?

I know, that these arguments do not prove god, it just justifies believing in god without evidence, but I don't think we can just let that slide. How can you believe in a god without evidence, and be called rational? Sure, we may believe in the existence of other minds without evidence, but the existence of a god is not nearly as obvious, nor serves any practical relevance. You can't be justified in a belief in god because 'it's obvious to me', I think it needs to be obvious to everyone in order for it to be justified. If god's existence is 'just obvious', why is it not obvious to a large percentage of the population? If there were a god, wouldn't there be evidence of his existence? If so, why do they need to resort to making certain beliefs justified without evidence in order to make their case?

Scientists and people who adhere to scientific theory believe that the results of their observations will be repeated in the future, there is no evidence of this yet the belief persists.

There's a lot of it about.

MM

Really, that results of their observations have in fact been repeated in the future is not evidence of this?

[Angrboda]

The case of consciousness is a special one, right here, right now. That's because we look to certain behaviors as evidence supporting non-philosophical-zombiism, and because we are approaching the point at which man-made machines will be able to mimic those behaviors more and more effectively. Will this shift in available evidence change what philosophical assumptions we're willing to make? Are we just going to throw up our hands and extend "rights" to every physical system which can tug at our evolved heartstrings?

If you'd actually read my initial post, the argument was based on physical similarity, not behavioral similarity. But in answer to your question, yes we will likely accord rights based on similarity of behavioral capability. A robot soldier may not be accorded the right not to be shut off, but depending on its demonstrated ability to make appropriate decisions of who to kill and when, it may be afforded the autonomy to operate unsupervised in a war zone. The Amazon recommendation engine is an example of machine intelligence. We know, in general, how it arrives at its recommendations, but as to the specifics, its behavior is unknown and unpredictable. Yet the recommendation engine performs its job well enough that Amazon includes its decisions and recommendations along with human created promotional material. It has been granted the right to sell products for Amazon, based on its past behavior, even though we can't completely predict its future behavior.