A Conscious Universe

[Pizza]

Stop saying there's no difference between physical and mental in idealism. Nobody's saying that, unless you are. Are you?

If ontological idealism is true then what we call physical things are in fact mental things/mentally constructed. "As an ontological doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit."

But maybe I'm getting this thread confused with another? There many threads about idealism. I'm sorry if I am.

[The Grand Nudger]

Stop saying there's no difference between physical and mental in idealism. Nobody's saying that, unless you are. Are you?

Differences -that make a difference-. I'll say it, if no one else wants to. It does seem as though there is very little difference between your idealism and my materialism. So much so that if, for example, your idealism were true then the description of mind, consciousness, qualia (everything, really) that I'm offering via computation by physical objects still holds as a proof of concept for how information machines do information to information.

Methodologically identical, though we still have the nagging solidity of kicked stones to explain away.

[Mudhammam]

But maybe I'm getting this thread confused with another? There many threads about idealism. I'm sorry if I am.

I will admit that I admire benny's attempt to justify idealism along the lines of what Nietzsche called an "unconquerable distrust of the possibility of self-knowledge," writing that, at least on epistemological grounds, "we should agree with these skeptical anti-realists and knowledge microscopists of today"---I mean his posts are leagues above the so-called idealists who merely attempt to smuggle in their notion of god by conflating consciousness with everything. However, it seems they both fail in the respect Nietzsche also pointed out: "To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist that the sense organs are not phenomena in the sense of idealistic philosophy; as such they could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as a regulative hypothesis, if not as a heuristic principle.— What? And others even say that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be—the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete reductio ad absurdum: assuming that the concept of a causa sui is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, is the external world not the work of our organs—?"

[bennyboy]

Stop saying there's no difference between physical and mental in idealism. Nobody's saying that, unless you are. Are you?

If ontological idealism is true then what we call physical things are in fact mental things/mentally constructed. "As an ontological doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit."

But maybe I'm getting this thread confused with another? There many threads about idealism. I'm sorry if I am.

oic

I guess you could say that both idealism and physicalism include each other as subsets. Idealists see all existence as mind, and the experiences from which an objective physical reality is inferred as a special category of ideas (or at least I do). Physicalists see all existence as material, and mind as a special category of physical function.

So how would you go about determining whether one of these positions is true? And if this is impossible, how would you go about establishing which position, if either, should be the dafault position?

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[. . .] it seems they both fail in the respect Nietzsche also pointed out: "To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist that the sense organs are not phenomena in the sense of idealistic philosophy; as such they could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as a regulative hypothesis, if not as a heuristic principle.— What? And others even say that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be—the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete reductio ad absurdum: assuming that the concept of a causa sui is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, is the external world not the work of our organs—?"

I don't take the position Nietzsche is talking about, if I indeed understand it. It is not my position that reality is an expression of the HUMAN mind / minds, which to me would be a kind of collective solipsism (if I may abuse the roots of that word here). It is my position that everything is an expression of the interaction of underlying ideas: i.e. that everything reduces down to something expressible only as idea-- not because of human limitations in observation, but due to ambiguities intrinsic to the marriage of observed reality and any model which includes a geographic 3D space as a component.

It's funny to see Nietzsche talking this way about idealism, because I feel much the same way about physicalist thought. We "know" that reality is objectively physical, and that mind is therefore nothing more than a physical process, because. . . our experiences lead us to form ideas along these lines. I'm not sure if I'd say that way of reasoning is circular, or paradoxical.

[Mudhammam]

So how would you go about determining whether one of these positions is true? And if this is impossible, how would you go about establishing which position, if either, should be the dafault position?

By mapping out the brain and having a full understanding of the mechanisms by which external stimuli produce a conceptualized order of sensation within an individual experience. Of course, the gap that still exists in asking what things are "in-themselves" may be forever unknowable and allow a certain type of cynic to continually peddle nonsense under the banner of philosophy.

[bennyboy]

Stop saying there's no difference between physical and mental in idealism. Nobody's saying that, unless you are. Are you?

Differences -that make a difference-. I'll say it, if no one else wants to. It does seem as though there is very little difference between your idealism and my materialism. So much so that if, for example, your idealism were true then the description of mind, consciousness, qualia (everything, really) that I'm offering via computation by physical objects still holds as a proof of concept for how information machines do information to information.

Methodologically identical, though we still have the nagging solidity of kicked stones to explain away.

As I've said, I think for mundane life, there really is little difference. Even if I'm just the awareness of a brain of its own function, I still enjoy the experience surfing the net with my morning coffee sitting next to me. And even if the universe is only ideas, the feel of sand between your toes, or the sun on your face, is real enough.

It is at philosophical (and now, scientific) boundary conditions that these views really differ: what the hell IS a photon, for example?

However, it seems to me that at those boundary conditions, philosophy and science are beginning to merge together. Science challenges our understanding of what it even MEANS to say something is "real." And here's where I think the difference in world views will really matter: in deciding WHAT hypotheses to put forward as candidates, and what models to filter new information through.

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So how would you go about determining whether one of these positions is true? And if this is impossible, how would you go about establishing which position, if either, should be the dafault position?

By mapping out the brain and having a full understanding of the mechanisms by which external stimuli produce a conceptualized order of sensation within an individual experience. Of course, the gap that still exists in asking what things are "in-themselves" may be forever unknowable and allow a certain type of cynic to continually peddle nonsense under the banner of philosophy.

Okay. Let's say we've completely mapped the brain. Let's say that given any subjective description I can give of my experience at a given moment, you can show me a high-res image of the related brain activity, right down to the individual dendrites in each neuron in my brain.

Let's even say that the measurement equipment is so fast and precise that you can show me a movie, record in holographic perfection my brain function at every given moment, and then formulate a new experience by stimulating individual nerves.

How do you feel this would establish that the universe resolves down to physical reality, about which ideas are merely a description, rather than ideas, of which matter is merely an expression?

[Pizza]

If ontological idealism is true then what we call physical things are in fact mental things/mentally constructed. "As an ontological doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit."

But maybe I'm getting this thread confused with another? There many threads about idealism. I'm sorry if I am.

oic

I guess you could say that both idealism and physicalism include each other as subsets. Idealists see all existence as mind, and the experiences from which an objective physical reality is inferred as a special category of ideas (or at least I do). Physicalists see all existence as material, and mind as a special category of physical function.

So how would you go about determining whether one of these positions is true? And if this is impossible, how would you go about establishing which position, if either, should be the default position?

I'm glad you asked this. I don't think either of them are default positions. I'm extremely pessimistic regarding metaphysics. I'm agnostic about whether the physicalism vs idealism debate is intelligible. I'm not saying it is unintelligible. I'm saying I haven't decided whether I think it's intelligible or not. If it is intelligible then I still would question if there is a significant metaphysical debate to be had.

I'm agnostic about the intelligibility and significant of physicalism vs idealism, especially if they include each other as subsets.

[bennyboy]

Okay, then your previous comment about hot air did in fact represent your feelings about taking either position. This makes more sense, now.

It is my position (obviously) that the default position would be to assume reality is as you experience it, i.e. solipsism. However, since I don't plan to test this position by spending my life masturbating on buses or jumping off buildings, then what's the next-simplest explanation? To me, since I experience reality in terms of ideas, then reality AS a collection of ideas requires the fewest additional constructs.

[Surgenator]

So how would you go about determining whether one of these positions is true? And if this is impossible, how would you go about establishing which position, if either, should be the dafault position?

What people are arguing is not what is default position, but what position is more practical or rational. Both views are unprovable. However, physicism gives more explanatory power than idealism, as demonstated with the how paint dries question. Hence, physicism is prefered for practical purposes.

As for which is more rational, it would make sense that a more accurate representation of reality will provide more accurate predictions. As far as I'm aware, idealism only predicts qualitative observations, nothing quantitative. Physicism makes quantitative and qualitative predictions. Hence, physicism is more rational because it's predictive capability is higher.

[bennyboy]

As for which is more rational, it would make sense that a more accurate representation of reality will provide more accurate predictions. As far as I'm aware, idealism only predicts qualitative observations, nothing quantitative.

Why? Numbers are ideas. So, as we experience them, are gravity, objects, and their interactions. Every measurement we make involves a subjective experience: holding a ruler, looking at it, etc. Unless you are saying the ego interacts directly with a ruler, then even a physicalist view of objects as we experience them is that they are mental representations, i.e. ideas. The question, at its core, is whether ideas are just descriptions of underlying "stuff," or the "stuff" is the experiential expression of underlying ideas. It seems to me that things like gravitational fields support the latter view better than the former.

Physicism makes quantitative and qualitative predictions. Hence, physicism is more rational because it's predictive capability is higher.

Maybe. But there's a qualia-sized hole in the physical view of reality. This is not surprising: an explicitly objective model of reality is going to have a hard time explaining subjective reality.