Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?

[The Grand Nudger]

Use all of the buttons! 
(I'm still down for that debate, btw...that you wanted to have, as I mentioned in my last post.)

[Anima]

Use all of the buttons! 
(I'm still down for that debate, btw...that you wanted to have, as I mentioned in my last post.)

Ha ha.  I am still considering your offer.  I am not opposed to arguing against my own argument.  That is how I came up with it in the first place. 

[The Grand Nudger]

Who said anything about -your- argument?  Do you expect me to ask you for your notes...lol?  

[bennyboy]

Which is why, by mean of philosophy, I have stated that adopting the position of disbelief without empirical evidence negates the existence of one's own "person".

Unsubstantiated.

I'm not sure I'd take that stance, since ideas about personhood must be considered positive assertions.  There is a mythology of the self, specifically of the importance of the self, which is based more on imagination than any observable reality.

HOWEVER, I'd argue that religious ideas, being based on a world view one adopts without empirical evidence, must therefore be considered an expression of the self, and not of objective reality.

Anima, I'd say that a belief in God, therefore, is clearly a superstitious belief.

[Anima]

Who said anything about -your- argument?  Do you expect me to ask you for your notes...lol?  

I figured you would just cut and paste. 

[Cyberman]

That's what figuring gets you.

[Anima]

Unsubstantiated.

I'm not sure I'd take that stance, since ideas about personhood must be considered positive assertions.  There is a mythology of the self, specifically of the importance of the self, which is based more on imagination than any observable reality.

HOWEVER, I'd argue that religious ideas, being based on a world view one adopts without empirical evidence, must therefore be considered an expression of the self, and not of objective reality.

Anima, I'd say that a belief in God, therefore, is clearly a superstitious belief.

I do not quite understand what you are saying here.  It seems that you are stating the idea of personhood is a positive assertions based on imagination rather than observable reality.

It then seems that you are saying religious positive assertions (without empirical evidence, which were equally lacking in assertions of personhood) is an expression of self and not the objective reality and would there by be of imagination as well.

However, I am not reaching your conclusion.  If I am understanding you so far than what we must both state is subjective assertions about our personhood or god do not necessarily (though they may coincidentally) express the objective reality.  We may further extend that to state that any subjective assertion does not necessarily express the objective reality, as any subjective assertion is merely an expression of the imaginary self.

Which I would agree is an inherent flaw in relativism and idealism.  Relativism contends the subjectivity of Subject A regarding Object C and the subjectivity of Subject B regarding Object C is hardly subjective at all such that the observations of Subject A and Subject B in regards to Object C may be considered Objective due to their uniformity.

However such a solution eliminates the validity of anything which is experienced and renders the entire objective universe as unknowable.

Rather I subscribed to realism where Object C exists independent of Subject A and B to which the ontological observations of Subject A and B correspond.  Thereby making positive assertions of experience expression of the objective reality (as may be subjectively perceived by A and B respectively).

---

In reference to the Sensus Communis (written by me three years ago in a paper)

A shared sense of perception presents an irresolvable paradox for advocates of the idealist schools. If the reality is subject to the subject’s subjectivity and no two subjects are the same subject than it must be stated that the subjective reality is different for each subject. Arguments built upon such a foundation are not justified in later inducing that the subjectivity of subject A is similar enough to the subjectivity of subject B to state that the subjectivity is shared as a form of sensus communis. The lack of a relating principal between subjects A and B leads to the paradox in question; the idealistic solution of which must be contradictory to the very concept of subjectivity by stipulation that reality while being totally subjected to the subjectivity of each subject approaches objectivity due to the lack of subjectiveness of the subjectivity of each subject. This is of course in total disregard to the subject as self, for self would be subjected to subjectivity and thus cannot be considered self as the definition of the subject, which is self is not fixed.

In order to stipulate that such a thing as sensus communis one must contend; as the realist schools; that there is an objective reality to which the subjectivity of subject A and the subjectivity of subject B correspond. The correspondence of subjectivity to the object, which is not dependent upon the subject, is what allows one to stipulate that there is sensus communis that exists among the subjects regarding the reality of the object.

[bennyboy]

I'm not sure I'd take that stance, since ideas about personhood must be considered positive assertions.  There is a mythology of the self, specifically of the importance of the self, which is based more on imagination than any observable reality.

HOWEVER, I'd argue that religious ideas, being based on a world view one adopts without empirical evidence, must therefore be considered an expression of the self, and not of objective reality.

Anima, I'd say that a belief in God, therefore, is clearly a superstitious belief.

I do not quite understand what you are saying here.  It seems that you are stating the idea of personhood is a positive assertions based on imagination rather than observable reality.

No, not the idea of personhood.  Ideas ABOUT personhood.  If pressed, I might be tempted to start defining terms: "self" as the general sense of sentience and awareness, and "personhood" as ideas about the self and its relationship with reality, perhaps.

It then seems that you are saying religious positive assertions (without empirical evidence, which were equally lacking in assertions of personhood) is an expression of self and not the objective reality and would there by be of imagination as well.

I'd say any assertions not based on objective observations would be expressions of one's (largely imaginary) ideas about one's personhood, yes.

However, I am not reaching your conclusion.  If I am understanding you so far than what we must both state is subjective assertions about our personhood or god do not necessarily (though they may coincidentally) express the objective reality.  We may further extend that to state that any subjective assertion does not necessarily express the objective reality, as any subjective assertion is merely an expression of the imaginary self.

I'm not sure what "subjective assertions" are.  Nor am I sure that the self is, at its essence, imaginary.  Could you elaborate?

A shared sense of perception presents an irresolvable paradox for advocates of the idealist schools.  If the reality is subject to the subject’s subjectivity and no two subjects are the same subject than it must be stated that the subjective reality is different for each subject.  Arguments built upon such a foundation are not justified in later inducing that the subjectivity of subject A is similar enough to the subjectivity of subject B to state that the subjectivity is shared as a form of sensus communis.  The lack of a relating principal between subjects A and B leads to the paradox in question; the idealistic solution of which must be contradictory to the very concept of subjectivity by stipulation that reality while being totally subjected to the subjectivity of each subject approaches objectivity due to the lack of subjectiveness of the subjectivity of each subject.  This is of course in total disregard to the subject as self, for self would be subjected to subjectivity and thus cannot be considered self as the definition of the subject, which is self is not fixed.

In order to stipulate that such a thing as sensus communis one must contend; as the realist schools; that there is an objective reality to which the subjectivity of subject A and the subjectivity of subject B correspond.  The correspondence of subjectivity to the object, which is not dependent upon the subject, is what allows one to stipulate that there is sensus communis that exists among the subjects regarding the reality of the object.

I don't consider idealism and objectivism to be mortal enemies.  If by idealism you mean solipsism, in which everything is a projection of the self, then the idea of communal agreement is moot.  If by idealism you mean that what appears to be objective reality is really all ideas under the hood, then you'd have sets and subsets, some of which overlap and some of which don't.

Consider the Matrix.  From the perspective of the normal Joe Schmoe in the Matrix, a car is a car and being hit by one will kill you.  Would Joe's observations of "car" be subjective or objective?  You and I, standing outside the system, know there's really no car there; however, since Joe doesn't have access to that perspective, he "knows" the car is really there. Now add Sally, Joe's wife. She has access to a view of objects in the Matrix that is different than Joe's. They can establish a communal understanding of things by communicating about them; specifically, that neither one of them has invented "car." That they are both wrong about the ultimate nature of "car" (it exists only as a collection of ideas) is irrelevant to whether their observations are objective or not.

[Anima]

[quote pid='949209' dateline='1432327088']

bennyboy

No, not the idea of personhood.  Ideas ABOUT personhood.  If pressed, I might be tempted to start defining terms: "self" as the general sense of sentience and awareness, and "personhood" as ideas about the self and its relationship with reality, perhaps.

As I understand Atheism Personhood, the noun, the thing, would need to have proof to be recognized as existing.  By proof what is meant is direct empirical evidence.  Personhood is metaphysical.  As such it may not be proven by direct empirical evidence.  At best it may only be "proven" by circumstantial empirical evidence (just like the matrix; because it seems to exist does not mean it actual does exist).  Since personhood cannot meet the common threashold of proof expressed by Atheist than under Atheism it (or any scientific knowledge) must not exist .

I'd say any assertions not based on objective observations would be expressions of one's (largely imaginary) ideas about one's personhood, yes.

As such, under Atheism, any reference to the self, sentience, the conscience, or your person either directly or indirectly would be assertions that are not based on objective observations and thereby largely imaginary .

I'm not sure what "subjective assertions" are.  Nor am I sure that the self is, at its essence, imaginary.  Could you elaborate?

Subjective assertions are any assertions made by the subjective observer or person, which as expressed above does not exist due to lack of sufficient "proof" according to atheism.

I don't consider idealism and objectivism to be mortal enemies.  If by idealism you mean solipsism, in which everything is a projection of the self, then the idea of communal agreement is moot.  If by idealism you mean that what appears to be objective reality is really all ideas under the hood, then you'd have sets and subsets, some of which overlap and some of which don't.

Consider the Matrix.  From the perspective of the normal Joe Schmoe in the Matrix, a car is a car and being hit by one will kill you.  Would Joe's observations of "car" be subjective or objective?  You and I, standing outside the system, know there's really no car there; however, since Joe doesn't have access to that perspective, he "knows" the car is really there.  Now add Sally, Joe's wife.  She has access to a view of objects in the Matrix that is different than Joe's.  They can establish a communal understanding of things by communicating about them; specifically, that neither one of them has invented "car."  That they are both wrong about the ultimate nature of "car" (it exists only as a collection of ideas) is irrelevant to whether their observations are objective or not.

[/quote]
I do not mean solely solipsism.  Rather I am referring to the more general idealistic view that the object existence is dependent upon the subject.

In regards to your matrix analogy (which I found enjoyable) establishing a communal understanding of thing by communicating about them does not determine objectivity of the thing.  Your analogy is predicated on the observations of Joe, sally, and us all being inherent similar; you changed our perspectives, but you held the object and its definition as fixed.  In so doing you assure that we are all talking about "car" and that the summation of our varying perspectives of said car may be accumulated to approach an objective observation.

However, you have no idea what the perceptions of any participant are, much less that they may be similar to one another.  Joe may see a "car" as I suspect you define it.  Sally may see car as a hole in space.  I may see car as duckbill platypus.  None of us have any idea what the other sees.  We only know that we each see something different (under the argument of idealism).  We cannot then say that we are all agreed on what a car is and thus say we see car from different perspectives.  That would be doing just what I wrote.  Saying that each person has a unique view, but that their view are so similar as to not be unique.

Perhaps it may be easier to think of it in terms of color.  My blue is not your blue, which is not their blue.  We assume all of these blues are similar and that we thus are all speaking of the same thing.  But the truth is that while we all refer to something as blue that does not mean we all see the same color or shade of color.  Under idealism all it means is that what ever color or shade of color we see at that time we have called blue.  Thus there is no correlation of the knowledge such that the summation of that knowledge approaches objectivity.

[Angrboda]

FFS!!! GUYS!!
Use the BBcode editor! Click the rightmost button directly above the text box when replying to a post.
Nobody can understand what's going on!

Apologies.  I am still new to forums in general.  Do you mean the buttons near the"reply" button?  In which case the one furthest to the right which I see is the "report" button.

Is there a way you can give an image of the button you are referring too?