Another Free-will poll, please bear with me!

[Pyrrho]

umm can I get a list of available terms and definitions?

Sure.

For the purposes of this poll,
Determinism would mean lack of meaning free-will.  Hard or soft, quantum randomness can included in this one. Your actions are determined by factors outside your control.
Libertarian free-will would mean free-will without any constraints, you may chose anything regardless of things like genetics or social situations.
Compatibilism would be free will constrained by the things that determine your choices. 

These are over simplified, but work for a layman's definitions I think.  I'm sure one of our local philosophy majors could explain them better

Edited to add this paragraph:  Soft determinism is a form of compatibilism.  See:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_determinism

There is no need to try to come up with a new explanation; this should be adequate for present purposes:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

Here are a few quotes from that:

There are many different positions on the problem, broadly divided into two types. Incompatibilists hold that free will is not compatible with determinism. The two main incompatibilist positions are metaphysical libertarianism, the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible; and hard determinism, the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible.[3] Compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is necessary for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of howchoices will turn out.[4][5] 

Determinism is a broad term with a variety of meanings.[56] Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem for free will.[57] Hard determinism is the claim that determinism is true, and that it is incompatible with free will, so free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to nomological determinism (see causal determinism below), it can include all forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety.[58] Relevant forms of determinism include:

• Causal determinism— the idea that everything is caused by prior conditions, making it impossible for anything else to happen.[59] In its most common form, nomological (or scientific) determinism, future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the thought experiment of Laplace's demon. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. If the laws of nature were determinate, then such an entity would be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.[60][61]
  
  
• Logical determinism—the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present.[57]
  
  
• Theological determinism—the idea that the future is already determined, either by a creator deity decreeing or knowing its outcome in advance.[51][62]The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free if there is a being who has determined them for us in advance, or if they are already set in time.
  
  

Metaphysical libertarianism is one philosophical view point under that of incompatibilism. Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires that the agent be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.

Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, which requires that the world is not closed under physics. This includes interactionist dualism, which claims that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality. Physical determinism implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. As consequent of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with physicalism require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior – theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require; uncaused events, non-deterministically caused events, and agent/substance-caused events.[64]

Compatibilists maintain that determinism is compatible with free will. It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define "free will" in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism (in the same way that incompatibilists define "free will" such that it cannot). Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in a situation for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics. For instance, courts of law make judgments about whether individuals are acting under their own free will under certain circumstances without bringing in metaphysics. Similarly, political liberty is a non-metaphysical concept.[citation needed] Likewise, compatibilists define free will as freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals. So for example Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics,[112] and the Stoic Chrysippus.[113] In contrast, the incompatibilist positions are concerned with a sort of "metaphysically free will", which compatibilists claim has never been coherently defined. Compatibilists argue that determinism does not matter; what matters is that individuals' wills are the result of their own desires and are not overridden by some external force.[114][115] To be a compatibilist, one need not endorse any particular conception of free will, but only deny that determinism is at odds with free will.[116]

Although there are various impediments to exercising one's choices, free will does not imply freedom of action. Freedom of choice (freedom to select one's will) is logically separate from freedom to implement that choice (freedom to enact one's will), although not all writers observe this distinction.[26]Nonetheless, some philosophers have defined free will as the absence of various impediments. Some "modern compatibilists", such as Harry Frankfurt and Daniel Dennett, argue free will is simply freely choosing to do what constraints allow one to do. In other words, a coerced agent's choices can still be free if such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires.[40][117]


Free will as lack of physical restraint[edit]


Most "classical compatibilists", such as Thomas Hobbes, claim that a person is acting on the person's own will only when it is the desire of that person to do the act, and also possible for the person to be able to do otherwise, if the person had decided to. Hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist freedom to each individual and not to some abstract notion of will, asserting, for example, that "no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [sic]."[115] In articulating this crucial proviso, David Hume writes, "this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains."[114] Similarly, Voltaire, in his Dictionnaire philosophique, claimed that "Liberty then is only and can be only the power to do what one will." He asked, "would you have everything at the pleasure of a million blind caprices?" For him, free will or liberty is "only the power of acting, what is this power? It is the effect of the constitution and present state of our organs."

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I believe that the only variable is quantum randomness, if indeed it is random. If it's not, then things are purely predictable. Does that count as determinism under your definition? Deterministic but not fatalistic.

That only excludes libertarian free will (unless you try to extract your "free will" from that quantum randomness).  You could be either a determinist or a compatibilist with what you have stated.  (Or both, as being a compatibilist means that one regards free will as being compatible with determinism; a compatibilist may be a determinist.)  Which of those will be most appropriate for you depends on how you define the phrase "free will."  See post 11.

[robvalue]

Sure. I went by the definition given me on the poll I don't understand enough about quantum randomness to know what the implications are.

Benny: It is a weird thought that someone without free will could "figure out" that they have no free will. But then, they've just followed the path they were going to follow to make that conclusion. If you really don't have free will, you can't "act like" anything, although you may think you are doing so. I don't know if it can ever be possible to prove conclusively there is no free will. It may be possible to make a probability judgement on it in the future, which is all science does anyway.

With free will it all comes down to definitions, and I think as a general phrase it is a red herring. It's extremely vague. If it is just quantum randomness, then it's just the outcome of randomness. Calling those outcomes "choices" seems bizarre.

[Dystopia]

Determinism. I don't need to explain it, proponents of free will need to make a case for it with evidence. Everything I do has a preemptive cause, I'm conditioned since birth by biology and sociological barriers - All I do is pre-scheduled by variables that lead me to the result.

I have a problem with people switching perspectives, and cherry picking too much. For example, if free will is not real, then responsibility is meaningless, and the idea of a legal justice system has to go out the window. But I've seen people argue in one thread that free will is an illusion, all is deterministic, and then on another thread say that a child rapist should be executed or something like that.

Because the only thing that can go out the window is the punitive side of the justice system - The rehabilitation procedure, the prevention and coercion needn't go away. I may not apply punitive/retributive measures to anyone, but I can still execute them if I believe they'll inevitably commit more crimes (or imprison them for life, whatever). Your argument would only apply if a justice system was based purely on bronze age divine retribution (an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth) - Since it isn't (and it shouldn't be), acknowledging there is no free will does not mean we need to abolish the justice system because the purpose of justice is not to "hurt" people but to ensure peaceful living conditions for society and to give each person what's rightfully theirs.

[Cato]

Determinism. I don't need to explain it, proponents of free will need to make a case for it with evidence. Everything I do has a preemptive cause, I'm conditioned since birth by biology and sociological barriers - All I do is pre-scheduled by variables that lead me to the result.

The declaration that determinism doesn't require an explanation or demonstration is preposterous.

[Whateverist]

Determinism. I don't need to explain it, proponents of free will need to make a case for it with evidence. Everything I do has a preemptive cause, I'm conditioned since birth by biology and sociological barriers - All I do is pre-scheduled by variables that lead me to the result.

Why not (to the part I bolded)?  What makes determinism the default position barring an adequate defense of free will?  I should probably just counter with free will, because.


The free will we seem to have we really do have.  However the freewill we seem to have is highly constrained by environmental, formative factors.  We don't choose the desires and values which animate our choices.  We can take note of them, reflect on them and sometimes even act to change one of them.  Of course in doing so we aren't acting from some spurious 'free' choice.  We are merely acting to achieve better harmony between our desires.  You might say our free will amounts to those of a referee in the ring of our desires.

I chose other because "free will" is too often thought of as disembodied, unhindered random choosing.  That doesn't describe what anyone would think of as free will.  The self is not a blank slate on which we scribble graffiti on a whim.  We embodied humans who manage symbolic language and have the capacity to move our limbs deliberately are not home alone.  Beneath and supporting the portions of our brain which provide us with the sense of free will are many unconscious mental acts upon which we are dependent - but not determined.  

Memory is not a muscle to be flexed when we say.  It is provided and selected at a level beyond our direct control.  It's a gift that can be withdrawn.  The very choice of which memories are the relevant ones is likewise chosen pre-consciously.  We are not in charge of the whole show so we lack the means to be purely free.

But given that our conscious minds are dependent, does that alone mean we are determined?  Of course not.  We are not as in charge as we might like to believe but neither are we zombies.  We have highly constrained and conditional free will.  Nothing more or less.  The extremes to either side of my position break down in their ability to describe the life we actually do experience and border on conspiracy theories.

[The Grand Nudger]

Other - though, technically, on the spectrum of determinism. I think that our traditional folklore regarding this topic has tainted the well, leading us to propose hypothetical explanations for non-sensical questions.   I do not think that free-will exists as we so often describe it, or that our decision making process -as we describe it- is representative of the actual method employed (as such there's nothing to be compatable -with-).  However, I do not think that determinism removes our ability to "make decisions", I think that we have framed the discussion in such a way as to dismiss what we actually do -as- "making decisions", instead, preferring the folklore explanation of how a decision can be made, or what must be true in order for a decision -to be possible-. 

-"If determinism holds, is true, then we are incapable of making decisions"
This would be nonsense, regardless of whether or not determinism holds we still have that experience. I propose that we do not require free will in order to possess that attribute or to have that experience.

[Aroura]

Thank you to those clarifying my poor definitions Pyrrho and Whateverish, and others. I know there are other more specific variations of each kind. Again, this poll was to determine if determinism WAS an outlier, and also which belief is the most common on this forum, as I was honestly curious. I'm actually a tad surprised, but in a good way, that determinism not only ISN"T an outlier, it's ahead in the poll.

I never assumed soft determinism to be a form of compatibilism because randomness does not = free-will, I just don't see how. But I'm open to that definition if others think it fits better.

So...as I thought though, Libertarian free-will has few votes, and no one who voted for that posted in the thread. I'd like to know though, if the people are honest enough to step forward, if both of those votes so far were made by theists or deists or who?

[Cephus]

It may be the case that if we had a perfect understanding of everything that ever happened down to the quantum level, we might be able to understand what everyone is going to do with perfect clarity, in reality, we all experience free will every single day and therefore, this argument really has no value at all. It's yet another philosophical waste of time.

[Aroura]

Determinism. I don't need to explain it, proponents of free will need to make a case for it with evidence. Everything I do has a preemptive cause, I'm conditioned since birth by biology and sociological barriers - All I do is pre-scheduled by variables that lead me to the result.

I have a problem with people switching perspectives, and cherry picking too much. For example, if free will is not real, then responsibility is meaningless, and the idea of a legal justice system has to go out the window. But I've seen people argue in one thread that free will is an illusion, all is deterministic, and then on another thread say that a child rapist should be executed or something like that.

Because the only thing that can go out the window is the punitive side of the justice system - The rehabilitation procedure, the prevention and coercion needn't go away. I may not apply punitive/retributive measures to anyone, but I can still execute them if I believe they'll inevitably commit more crimes (or imprison them for life, whatever). Your argument would only apply if a justice system was based purely on bronze age divine retribution (an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth) - Since it isn't (and it shouldn't be), acknowledging there is no free will does not mean we need to abolish the justice system because the purpose of justice is not to "hurt" people but to ensure peaceful living conditions for society and to give each person what's rightfully theirs.

I'd like to point out that I think this post need more Kudo's! 
I hear this argument so often, and you gave a very succinct and accurate view as to how determinism would actually make appositive change to our legal system (so it's not mere mental masturbation), and why determinism actually leads people to behave more humanely, I think.  Contrary to popular opinion, which seems to be that determinism somehow would lead to nihilism, or at best just apathy. 

Also for anyone interested and who has an hour to spend, here is Sam Harris giving a great speech on the topic.  He says he finds people are often more resistant to the idea of determinism than they are to atheism, even.  It's really worth a listen if you have time.

[Angrboda]

I have a problem with people switching perspectives, and cherry picking too much. For example, if free will is not real, then responsibility is meaningless, and the idea of a legal justice system has to go out the window. But I've seen people argue in one thread that free will is an illusion, all is deterministic, and then on another thread say that a child rapist should be executed or something like that.

Because the only thing that can go out the window is the punitive side of the justice system - The rehabilitation procedure, the prevention and coercion needn't go away. I may not apply punitive/retributive measures to anyone, but I can still execute them if I believe they'll inevitably commit more crimes (or imprison them for life, whatever). Your argument would only apply if a justice system was based purely on bronze age divine retribution (an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth) - Since it isn't (and it shouldn't be), acknowledging there is no free will does not mean we need to abolish the justice system because the purpose of justice is not to "hurt" people but to ensure peaceful living conditions for society and to give each person what's rightfully theirs.

I think an equivalent case can be made on the reward side of the equation. We reward good performance, in school, in the workplace, and in the home. People who perform well are rewarded with greater responsibility in the long run, so we start rewarding performance early to 'school' individuals both to desire to perform well and to work on the skills which lead to performing well. This is because we want the truly good performers to be promoted to situations of responsibility for the benefit of the whole. We would not want to promote someone who performs poorly on the job to a position of authority, as they would make worse decisions than someone who does perform well. Thus in the situation of 'rewards', we don't need to endorse a view of merit which depends on free will; we reward merit because doing so is fitting the right tool to the right job — we want performers in situations where performance matters. This view works in the case of promoting executives, and it also makes sense of schooling; we want to put those individuals who, through earning a degree, have the right skills (ability to perform) to handle the tasks of a job. We wouldn't reward a music major with an engineering job; schooling makes certain that people with the right necessary skills end up in the right positions of responsibility. It need not be based on a metaphysical view that good performers have 'earned' the right to a position of responsibility.