The Meaninglessness of Meaning

[Pyrrho]

Starting with the first sentence there, what the hell do you mean?

Look, I value things.  Which is another way of saying, I care about things.  Or to say the same thing in other words, I have feelings.  That, however, is as nothing to the universe.  I am going to die, just like everyone else.  What I value makes no difference for the universe.  My valuing something tells you about me.  It tells you nothing about anything else.  Except insofar as learning about me tells you about other things similar to me.

When we say that humans value things, that tells us about humans generally, not about the universe as a whole or anything else.


For the "self," as usual, I refer you to David Hume.  I am a bundle of perceptions.  I do not perceive my self as a separate thing.  And when we look at Alzheimer's patients, and at senile people, and brain damaged people, all of the modern science seems to support Hume's contention, that you are not some magical thing, but can lose a part of you without losing all of you.

I guess what I'm trying to get at is what do our concepts of value, i.e. meaningfulness, really mean?

I think the answer to that question depends on the context or frame of reference.  From the standpoint of the universe, it is, in a manner of speaking, nothing.  At least, there is no value to it; it is just that there are things that do value things.  From my point of view, things have value, which is just another way of saying that I care about things.  I have an emotional response to things.  That I value something is more about me, not about the thing that is valued.  From an evolutionary standpoint, it is necessary that there be some motivating aspect to animals in order for the species to continue.  Otherwise, they would do nothing and just die.  Emotion is a motivating force.  Valuing things is necessary for you to do anything.  If you did not care about anything, you would not bother doing anything, and would just lie there and die.  This caring about things, this valuing of things, is pretty much automatic, and is a very basic part of you, not something that requires great concentration or thinking about things.  This is instinctual rather than intellectual.

This idea of a difference in perspective is somewhat illustrated in your post 4 with Hayakawa's levels 1 (atoms and such) and 2 (things as they normally appear).  When milking the cow, one does not require any understanding of level 1, just level 2.  Indeed, the description of milking the cow at level 1 is likely to be very complex, if it is in any kind of detail of what is going on.

According to my understanding of a worldview that takes everything to be ultimately reducible to the physical (a term that is difficult enough to define), we have to basically say that a process of events that are objectively meaningless involve structures through which experiences (or call them emergent properties, though l'm inclined to agree with Sam Harris that "this seems merely a placeholder for a miracle") occur,

A standard example is a clock telling time.  The parts of a clock thrown on a workbench do not tell time, but when the parts are properly arranged, then the clock tells time.  I would not call that a miracle.  Notice, though, that the totality of the clock is still just physical.

The same is true of a person.  When the parts are not arranged properly, the person does not have the motivating feelings that would be present if they were properly arranged.  ("Properly," in this context, merely means that the parts are arranged such that they work that way, not that there is some design to it.)  An extreme sort of example of this is what happens when one chops off a person's head.  They lose all feeling rather quickly.  Likewise, if you chop off an important bit of the clock, it no longer tells time.

within the abstraction of individuality, of a world that feels and appears largely non-physical; by this I include thoughts and memories, but also the sense of freedom to shape my future and to assign value however I choose, and of course, to immerse my nervous system in a state that some have described as transcendental . . .

I'm having trouble synthesizing this - the state of affairs we actually experience - with physicalism, is all.

It is good that you added another post, or I would not have understood your meaning.  Your next post:

I should say that the tension I feel between the alternatives of physicalism and idealism is like the choice of a red or blue pill. The red pill destroys myself but preserves the world; the blue pill preserves myself but destroys the world.

I posted about the alternatives of idealism and physicalism in another thread a while back, and will just provide a link rather than repost it here, as it is rather long:

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33518-po...#pid960350


If you like that, you might, though, find my entire exchange with Alex K interesting, starting here:

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33518-po...#pid958852

One of the things I really like about Uncle K is that he seems to have a very good understanding of the difference between physics and metaphysics.  Scientists who don't understand the difference often end up with bad metaphysics, though philosophers who don't understand the difference often end up with an even worse mess.


Feel free to quote anything I say in that thread and respond to it in this thread, if you wish (if you do, please keep a link to the original post, so that I can see the context of the comments you quote).

[robvalue]

Nestor: I read your reply but my brain isn't on the ball enough today for a proper response. If I'm up to it I'll try again soon! It's all going a bit over my head and I probably should stay out of it

In essence I was supposing that what we perceive as "meaning", in as far as it exists in reality at all, can only be represented by the corresponding image in the brains of those creating that meaning. This may be a tautology of sorts, and it assumes that our brains alone (perhaps coupled with whatever limited capacity the rest of our body has for memory) physically contains all our knowledge and ideas.

[Kingpin]

According to my understanding of a worldview that takes everything to be ultimately reducible to the physical (a term that is difficult enough to define), we have to basically say that a process of events that are objectively meaningless involve structures through which experiences (or call them emergent properties, though l'm inclined to agree with Sam Harris that "this seems merely a placeholder for a miracle") occur,

A standard example is a clock telling time.  The parts of a clock thrown on a workbench do not tell time, but when the parts are properly arranged, then the clock tells time.  I would not call that a miracle.  Notice, though, that the totality of the clock is still just physical.

The same is true of a person.  When the parts are not arranged properly, the person does not have the motivating feelings that would be present if they were properly arranged.  ("Properly," in this context, merely means that the parts are arranged such that they work that way, not that there is some design to it.)  An extreme sort of example of this is what happens when one chops off a person's head.  They lose all feeling rather quickly.  Likewise, if you chop off an important bit of the clock, it no longer tells time.

Pyrrho, I find your analogy about the clock parts being thrown on a workbench do not make it tell time very interesting. You say only when they are put in the right order. Are you saying that if you throw them on a workbench and it did tell time you would not classify that as a miracle? If not, would it be a pure anomaly? or basic statistical probability?

You say the right order, but is that right order defined by a mind or an unguided mindless process? You state "properly" does not necessitate design but if there is no design to it how can you say that is the proper arrangement? I find it odd that you can know with certainty that throwing clock parts on a workbench will never make it tell time (forgo the fact that the parts exist at all or that all of the "necessary" parts are being thrown together) but you can assume that the infinitely more complex human could be derived from being "thrown at a workbench". Doesn't make sense.

[Pyrrho]

A standard example is a clock telling time.  The parts of a clock thrown on a workbench do not tell time, but when the parts are properly arranged, then the clock tells time.  I would not call that a miracle.  Notice, though, that the totality of the clock is still just physical.

The same is true of a person.  When the parts are not arranged properly, the person does not have the motivating feelings that would be present if they were properly arranged.  ("Properly," in this context, merely means that the parts are arranged such that they work that way, not that there is some design to it.)  An extreme sort of example of this is what happens when one chops off a person's head.  They lose all feeling rather quickly.  Likewise, if you chop off an important bit of the clock, it no longer tells time.

Pyrrho, I find your analogy about the clock parts being thrown on a workbench do not make it tell time very interesting.  You say only when they are put in the right order.  Are you saying that if you throw them on a workbench and it did tell time you would not classify that as a miracle?  If not, would it be a pure anomaly? or basic statistical probability?

We can all pretty well know why you like this example, as it reminds you of Paley's watch.

The point though, it that stuff doing things and interacting with other things gives rise to additional properties not in the constituent parts separately.  A fire gives off heat, but the log before it burns may be cold, as may the oxygen necessary for burning to take place.  It is the chemical reaction that gives off heat, not the individual chemicals by themselves.

It is important to remember such things to avoid committing the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division.

You say the right order, but is that right order defined by a mind or an unguided mindless process?

The "right order" is defined in terms of whatever it takes for them to give the specified result.  Thus in the case of the clock example, whatever arrangement it is that would allow it to tell time.

As for your question about a mind or being unguided and mindless, it does not matter how the order occurs; a fire is a fire whether it occurs naturally or is made by a person who intends to make a fire.

 You state "properly" does not necessitate design but if there is no design to it how can you say that is the proper arrangement?

The "right order" is defined in terms of whatever is necessary for the specified result.  In order for there to be a fire, there needs to be fuel and oxygen and some catalyst to get the fire going.  A fire is a fire whether it occurs due to nature or design.

 I find it odd that you can know with certainty that throwing clock parts on a workbench will never make it tell time (forgo the fact that the parts exist at all or that all of the "necessary" parts are being thrown together) but you can assume that the infinitely more complex human could be derived from being "thrown at a workbench".  Doesn't make sense.

In the case of a clock, I know going into the matter that it is made by people and is not natural.  (Not to mention the fact that your statement of my claim goes beyond what I stated.)  In the case of people, the matter gets more complicated, but I seem to recall you indicating that you believe in evolution.  If so, this is a strange thing for you to be asking about, because evolution gives you the answer to how a human could come to be without being designed.

[Whateverist]

I don't always seek meaning, but when I do, I prefer meaning lite. Stay thirsty for meaning my friends.

[Kingpin]

Pyrrho, I find your analogy about the clock parts being thrown on a workbench do not make it tell time very interesting.  You say only when they are put in the right order.  Are you saying that if you throw them on a workbench and it did tell time you would not classify that as a miracle?  If not, would it be a pure anomaly? or basic statistical probability?

We can all pretty well know why you like this example, as it reminds you of Paley's watch.

The point though, it that stuff doing things and interacting with other things gives rise to additional properties not in the constituent parts separately.  A fire gives off heat, but the log before it burns may be cold, as may the oxygen necessary for burning to take place.  It is the chemical reaction that gives off heat, not the individual chemicals by themselves.

It is important to remember such things to avoid committing the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division.

You say the right order, but is that right order defined by a mind or an unguided mindless process?

The "right order" is defined in terms of whatever it takes for them to give the specified result.  Thus in the case of the clock example, whatever arrangement it is that would allow it to tell time.

As for your question about a mind or being unguided and mindless, it does not matter how the order occurs; a fire is a fire whether it occurs naturally or is made by a person who intends to make a fire.

 You state "properly" does not necessitate design but if there is no design to it how can you say that is the proper arrangement?

The "right order" is defined in terms of whatever is necessary for the specified result.  In order for there to be a fire, there needs to be fuel and oxygen and some catalyst to get the fire going.  A fire is a fire whether it occurs due to nature or design.

 I find it odd that you can know with certainty that throwing clock parts on a workbench will never make it tell time (forgo the fact that the parts exist at all or that all of the "necessary" parts are being thrown together) but you can assume that the infinitely more complex human could be derived from being "thrown at a workbench".  Doesn't make sense.

In the case of a clock, I know going into the matter that it is made by people and is not natural.  (Not to mention the fact that your statement of my claim goes beyond what I stated.)  In the case of people, the matter gets more complicated, but I seem to recall you indicating that you believe in evolution.  If so, this is a strange thing for you to be asking about, because evolution gives you the answer to how a human could come to be without being designed.

I'm glad to see at the end you see the difference between your fire analogy and the watch.  Not to mention fire in itself is not making something more beneficial or new.  My point being is that in your use of the watch analogy you found it preposterous that it would be able to tell time if thrown at a workbench.  I was likening that to the big bang theory of this universe being "thrown at a workbench" and out of that, comes immense order and complexity.  You found it absurd in the watch, but wholly accept it as plausible in something infinitely more complex as the universe.   

I do not find macroevolution convincing by any means, there are a lot of assumptions and leaps there.  Evolution and natural selection in describing variations within a species, yes.  The pure mathematical probability of beneficial mutations in single cell organisms giving rise to more complex ones leaves me highly suspicious.

[Mudhammam]

I do not find macroevolution convincing by any means, there are a lot of assumptions and leaps there.  Evolution and natural selection in describing variations within a species, yes.  The pure mathematical probability of beneficial mutations in single cell organisms giving rise to more complex ones leaves me highly suspicious.

So, what do you think would happen if a variation were isolated from its parent species and continued in its minute changes for a million years, under different ecological pressures? I think you don't give enough thought to how long a million - or a billion - years, really is.

[ignoramus]

Nestor, maybe you haven't given it enough thought!
Surely these can't all be fake! I rest my case!

[Kingpin]

I do not find macroevolution convincing by any means, there are a lot of assumptions and leaps there.  Evolution and natural selection in describing variations within a species, yes.  The pure mathematical probability of beneficial mutations in single cell organisms giving rise to more complex ones leaves me highly suspicious.

So, what do you think would happen if a variation were isolated from its parent species and continued in its minute changes for a million years, under different ecological pressures? I think you don't give enough thought to how long a million - or a billion - years, really is.

The extrapolation of macroevolution being possible because "there is enough time" is a presupposition that falls flat on its face.  There have been many discussions regarding it.  I understand it's still a highly debated topic, but I firmly believe it is based on unfounded assumptions.  Here is a good scientific peer reviewed article discussing it:

http://bio-complexity.org/ojs/index.php/...O-C.2012.4

Little snippet:

"Converting an enzyme to a new function is the kind of thing that should have occurred thousands of time in the course of evolution, given the vast array of biochemical functions carried out by extant enzymes. Yet recent work has shown that converting an enzyme encoded by a 1,200-nucleotide gene to a genuinely new function4 is likely to require seven or more coordinated mutations. This is true even though the starting and target enzymes have common three-dimensional proteinfolds and active-site chemistries— just no shared reaction [29].5 Getting seven specific changes in a gene 1,200 nucleotides long is a 1-in-10^22 event, not a 1-in-10,000 event. Even then it is by no means clear that significant changes in gene function can be had with just seven base substitutions."

In 2007, Durrett and Schmidt estimated in the journal Genetics that for a single mutation to occur in a nucleotide-binding site and be fixed in a primate lineage would require a waiting time of six million years. The same authors later estimated it would take 216 million years for the binding site to acquire two mutations, if the first mutation was neutral in its effect.  But six million years is the entire time allotted for the transition from our last common ancestor with chimps to us according to the standard evolutionary timescale. Two hundred and sixteen million years takes us back to the Triassic, when the very first mammals appeared. One or two mutations simply aren’t sufficient to produce the necessary changes— sixteen anatomical features—in the time available. At most, a new binding site might affect the regulation of one or two genes.

[robvalue]

I'm no expert, but it is my understanding that there is no serious debate about evolution; it's been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Macro and micro evolution are the same thing, just looking at different time frames.