Hypothetically, science proves free will isn't real

[Edwardo Piet]

1) If so, then 'we' are things with the ability to do different things (either self-determined or not).

Yes.

In other words, consider two actions (a) and (b). If both actions (a) and (b) are capable of obtaining through the agency of a human person (whether or not that agency is self-determined), then a human person 'could have done' (a) or (b) in the sense that human agency (whatever nature that agency may have) 'is able' to bring them about. People have the ability to bring about the existence of (a) or (b). 

Only if there is not only one physically possible future. If there is one physically possible future then either (a) or (b) is determined to be taken and the other is an illusory option.

In what manner do people bring them about? Do people 'self-determine' either (a) or (b), or does some other non-personal agency determine, through the persons natural and unintentional/impersonal operations that (a) or (b) obtains? <= Do you see how this last question is irrelevant to the question regarding the capacity for (a) or (b) to come about through human agency?

I'm not sure what you mean there. My point was that utlimately any self determining we do is determined by other sources. If determinism is true then utlimately the beginning of the universe determines everything that happens and everything everyone does.... there are no real options or alternatives only illusory ones... any time we do anything and we think we could have done differently we were actually predetermined to behave that way all along, regardless of whatever self-motivation we feel we have on the small scale. We could never have done otherwise, we were determined.

'could have done otherwise' only makes sense in indeterminism. 'Self-determining' only makes sense in determinism... therein lies the problem.

Two buttons, one red, one blue, one green. Is a red button the sort of thing that can be pushed by a human action? Yes. Is the blue button the sort of thing that can be pushed by a human action? Yes. Is the green button the sort of thing that can be pushed by a human action? Yes. Human action is able to push either the red, blue or green button. Which one will the human push, and how is that action determined? <= DIFFERENT question than the "If 'determinism' is true, and a human pushes the red button, then could that human have push the blue or green button?" <= depending on the sense of "could have" you can have two different answers, one being more fundamental and described above.

If there is one physically possible future at any given moment, then whatever button is pushed it logically entails from that that button press was part of the one possible future path.... so the person could not have pushed either of the other buttons at that one exact moment.

If indeterminism is true, any of the buttons could be pushed at any moment that it was possible to push one of those buttons. It may be more likely for the person to push one button than the other one.... but cause and effect is an illusion in indeterminism, it's all down to probability or randomness.

In indeterminism the person could have pushed otherwise or done otherwise, but only because the roll of the dice allowed them to. They had no say in the matter, no freedom, there is no freedom in indeterminism because there is no self-willing or self-determining. It's all an illusion.

Determinism means no one could have done otherwise, indeterminism means no one is more free than dice.

Determinism means we have a will, but it's not a free will. Indeterminism means we are free from a predetermined future, but we're no more free than dice, and hence our wills don't really do any willing, it's an illusion.

2) Yes, that is true, the present must actually have the potential conditions actually obtain so as to determine just that one future. However, as described above, if hypothetically removed from all external conditions and circumstances, a person has the intrinsic capacity to bring about either (a) or (b) given certain conditions, a person has the requisite powers required for pushing either a red, blue or green button. The intrinsic human potential for different action is real, and it is governed by many factors which contribute to the determination of which potential action will be the actual one. No action can be a future actual one unless it is presently a potential one (in the sense that the action can actual occur through human agency). 

Everyone has the ability to push 3 different buttons... no one is denying that, that's trivially true. The real question is why do some people mistakingly believe they not only could have pushed otherwise but that they could have willed otherwise?

Determinism means you could neither have willed nor done otherwise.

Indeterminism means you could have done otherwise but you could not have willed or freely chosen otherwise.

Neither allow for free will or free choice. Indeterminism means it's possible that there was a different path you could have taken, just not of your own will. There ultimately is no will in indeterminism because in indeterminism there isn't even any cause and effect.

Of course I know what those words mean, but I don't know what YOU mean by them. I asked what makes a choice free and you said if they are voluntary or not coerced. For me, not-coerced and voluntary are not identical, although not-coerced is certainly a part of voluntary. Because you seem to identify them with the other, I would like to know what you mean by them if this discussion will be in any way fruitful.

I only mean the standard dictionary definitions.

Yes they have different meanings. Some compatabilists think choices are free if they are voluntary, some thinks a choice is free if it is not coeereced, some think both are required. Some think it just means that they need to be able to avoid or respond.

My point was that all these things have one thing in common: These kind of choices are obviously part of life and trivially true.

What is not trivally true or true at all, is the ability to will otherwise. If determinism is true, we could not have done otherwise. If determinism is false, we could not have willed otherwise, there isn't even any cause and effect.

Some people think they can 'change the future' or choose what possible future path they take... but of course, it's either down to something they cannot determine, or to something that ultimately determines them in the big picture, regardless of what they determine in the small picture. They're either on one path that is determined from cause and effect, or cause and effect is false and they have no choice at all, ultimately, what path they end up on. It's all down to probability and correlation.

It's either laws of probability and correlation, or laws of cause and effect.

I get the example, so allow me to help out and turn your example into a working definition. An action is voluntary when that action is done according to how it is known and according to the known purpose for which it is done. In this case, what separates a voluntary action from an accidental action is synchronous knowledge of the done action and knowledge of the reason for which that known action is done. So... knowledge of the action and the action's purpose makes a choice free?

In a trivally true sense that no one doubts maybe. Still means no one could have willed or determined otherwise, ultimately.

1) We may not deny it, but we don't seem to be able to carefully explain or understand it. See above. Rather than put it in a descriptive proposition, you used an example everyone can agree with, but not many people can explain exactly what is intentional or voluntary.

The point is intentional and voluntary actions do exist, and if that's all free will is, then there's no question it exists. It's trivally true.

Of course, that still means we don't have the free will a lot of people think we have that goes way way way beyond trivially true facts.

Remember those philosophers you said were strangely interrupted by the compatibilists? Do you ever wonder which philosophical discussion those philosophers strangely interrupted? What do you know about William of Ockham?

The point is it's a different question.

To me the conversation goes like this:

Hard Incompatabilist: If determinism is true, then whenever we make a choice we could not have done otherwise.

Compatablist: Yes but it doesn't matter because our normal human will has some freedom to an extent anyway.

Hard Incompatabilist: Well if that is what you call free will, then I believe in that. But that's not what I was talking about.

Compatabilist: Okay.

Hard Incompatabilist: Okay.

Layperson: Hi guys! I believe in free will.

Hard incompatabilist: Do you think when you make a choice you could have done otherwise?

Layperson: of course!

Hard Incompatablist: So, do you think that people deserve to suffer when they do very immoral things because they placed themselves on that path of their own free will?

Layperson: Yep. I am in favor the death penalty for this reason.

Hard Incompatabilist: So the question of whether you could have done otherwise has moral relevance to you?

Layperson: Yes of course! If I stopped believing in free will I would change my mind about a lot of ethical issues
.
Hard Incompatabilist: Just checking.

Compatabilist: Hey guys! Layperson, you do have free will. Look, free will is not about whether you can do otherwise, it's about whether our will has freedom. Of course it's about whether our will has freedom. What else could it be about? Your will does have freedom, so you do have free will!

Layperson: Excellent! So this means I am justified in thinking people deserve punishment. You gave me such an easy answer, you make a lot more sense than that confusing Hard Incompatabilist guy.

Hard Incompatabilist: Hey! I heard that. Look, remember you still can't actually do otherwise if determinism is true, and so like we agreed in the first place... if you cannot do otherwise then you are not justified in thinking people deserve retribution just because they deserve it, because they could have done otherwise. If determinism is true, you could not have done otherwise when you make a decision and so if determinism is true your whole mind should change about a lot of ethical issues, as you said it would.

Layperson: Now I'm confused! But my will is free!

Compatabilist: Yes it is, your will is free, it has freedom. No one doubts this. The Hard incompatabilist has a silly definition of free will... who cares if the future is determined? If people's wills are free then they are responsible and deserve to be punished if they do wrong.

Hard Incompatabilist: Look, Compatabilist, if they deserve to be punished it's only because it's better for anyone because it teaches them to learn their lesson right?

Compatabilist: Of course.

Hard Incompatabilist: So it's not because they actually intrisically deserve it.

Compatabilist: Yes but I never said it was.

Hard Incompatabilist: No, you didn't. I know you didn't, but you're misleading Layperson... he thinks when you say that that you mean the person has a free will so they intrinstically deserve punishment and he gets confused and thinks that he could have done otherwise because most people who believe in free will think they can. You're allowing him to dodge lots of important implications by giving him an easy answer.

Compatabilist: I'm offering him hope. I'm showing that he can still have free will.

Incompatabilist: Misleading hope with trivial truths you mean.

What would constitute coercion?

A gun to the head is an example.

Let me restate that. "This terminology is lazy and imprecise"

It isn't imprecise. Do you mean it's lazy because I haven't explained it to you well enough and I am continuing to use it?

It's a lot easier to say "compatabilism" than to say "the view that free will is compatabile with determinism" considering the amount of times I am going to have to mention if when we talk about this.

^ Here is an example of the imprecision I was referring to. Something as simple as saying "we cannot" is being equivocated. Suppose (a) obtained through human agency in the deterministic sense. I ask, "Could (b) have obtained instead?". I might mean two different things: 1) Is (b) the sort of thing, in general, which can come about through human agency in those circumstances (e.g. given a different person)? or 2) Can (b) have come about at all in those particular circumstances given that particular human and its causal history?

I'm confused. If determinism is true there is no "could have been obtained instead". If determinism is true there is only one possible future.

If (b) is the sort of thing which IS able, in general, to come about through human agency in the same circumstances in which (a) came about, then (a) came about in a determined but contingent way.

In general means not the same circumstances, it means similar circumstances. When we talk about the same circumstances we talk about specific circumstances.

In other words, if (a) occurs in a contingent but determined way, then determinism cannot be equivocated with 'necessity', and we begin to see the imprecision lurking in this often strange discussion.

There isn't an equivocation I am making about determinism. When I speak of determinism I mean the view that there is only one possible future.

If we do the determining then ultimately we have to be determined too and so ultimately we don't do the determining.

Can you elaborate?

Sure. Our conscious will is what we will with and what we determine with. That is the 'us' that does the determining. We ask where our choices come from and we say "our conscious will". Then we also have to ask where our conscious will comes from and the answer is "somewhere beyond that" so ultimately any determining we do, is determined by outside sources.

[Neo-Scholastic]

...I will go off a slightly different branch here. The whole free will thing is in itself proof that god doesn't make exist. We have freewill to do as we please, he can't make us do anything correct? So then how does he have a plan?

Divine Providence doesn't require complete control over human agency to play out. Free-will/determinism need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. Saint Peter's thrice denial of Christ was necessary for the Divine Plan. Likewise, the hardening of Pharoah's heart. If need be, the Lord can intervene on select occasions. That doesn't mean must do it all the time.

[mlmooney89]

...I will go off a slightly different branch here. The whole free will thing is in itself proof that god doesn't make exist. We have freewill to do as we please, he can't make us do anything correct? So then how does he have a plan?

Divine Providence doesn't require complete control over human agency to play out. Free-will/determinism need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. Saint Peter's thrice denial of Christ was necessary for the Divine Plan. Likewise, the hardening of Pharoah's heart. If need be, the Lord can intervene on select occasions. That doesn't mean must do it all the time.

So he just picks and chooses when to force someone to do something? At any given time if I am in his plan he can take over my freewill?

[Ignorant]

Only if there is not only one physically possible future. If there is one physically possible future [1] then either (a) or (b) is determined to be taken and the other is an illusory option. [2]

I'm confused. If determinism is true there is no "could have been obtained instead". If determinism is true there is only one possible future.

This illustrates how unhelpful the artificial boundaries of the determinist/compatibilist argument have become.

1) This is the case if a person is actually in the presence of determining conditions. I am asking you to consider the potential of a human agent in the hypothetical abstract, free-from-condition sense. If you care to engage in that thought exercise, then we can move on to:

2) Given hypothetical conditions (x) surrounding person (I), only action (a) will obtain through the agency of person (I).

Given hypothetical conditions (y) surrounding person (I), only action (b) will obtain through the agency of person (I).

If that is true, either action(a) or action(b) IS ABLE to obtain through the agency of person(I), depending on the surrounding conditions. If that is true, the agency of person(I) IS ABLE to bring about action(a) or (b) depending on the circumstances. In other words, person(I) is the sort of thing able to do action(a) or (b).

That means that person (I) can do either (a) or (b) (they have the intrinsic power to do so) but the ACTUAL doing of one or the other depends on circumstances. Given circumstances(x), action(a) obtains WHILE THE POTENTIAL FOR ACTION(b) REMAINS WITHIN THE PERSON.

This is simple contingency vs. necessity, which the modern debate conflates with non-coerced choice vs determinism, respectfully.

Everyone has the ability to push 3 different buttons... no one is denying that, that's trivially true.

Ya, I know it's trivially true. So why is it not so evidently and trivially true in the moment only one button is pressed? When a person presses a red button, did they lost the ability to press a blue or green one?

The real question is why do some people mistakenly believe they not only could have pushed otherwise but that they could have willed otherwise?

Because the discussions like this one don't care to distinguish concepts properly. The 'willing' is a possible determining factor of the pushing. Whether or not the 'willing' is an ACTUAL determining factor in bringing the action about is irrelevant to the separate but important question regarding the logical potential that the action has at all.

1) Suppose X => Y in a way which is not conditioned by any external influence. If that is the case, then there is no set of circumstances in which X does not => Y. If that is the case, then X => Y happens necessarily.

2) Now suppose that X => Y in a way which is conditional upon the simultaneous Z => X. If that is the case, then in the absence of Z, X does not => Y. If that is the case, then X => Y happens contingently. 

If human action is more like 2, then any determined human action (it doesn't matter by what/who the action is determined) happens in BOTH in a determined AND in a contingent manner.

Does this say anything about the nature of 'willing' or its place in determining action? No. You can't even begin to approach that question until there more fundamental distinctions are made.

Necessity as distinguished from determinism

Contingency as distinguished from choice or options or freedom etc.

Determinism means you could neither have willed nor done otherwise.

Indeterminism means you could have done otherwise but you could not have willed or freely chosen otherwise.

That seems like an unhelpful way to define this idea. 

Determinism means you could neither have [determined to do, or in fact done, otherwise].

Indeterminism means you could not [have determined otherwise, but you could have done otherwise].

Wouldn't this be better:

Determinism means that everything but you determine human actions.

Indeterminism means that nothing determines human actions.

Better still:

Human determinism means that both the observed environment and personal rational operations contribute to the determination of human action within that environment.

Cosmic determinism means that there is no personal human contribution to the determination of human action

What is not trivally true or true at all, is the ability to will otherwise. If determinism is true, we could not have done otherwise. If determinism is false, we could not have willed otherwise, there isn't even any cause and effect.

See above. How can we talk about the 'will' as a potential contributor to determining action when we haven't even agreed on how to talk about those actions in the first place?

If I am able to do A or B, I may do A even while retaining the 'ability' to do B. <= Contingency, irrelevant to the reality of determinism vs. indeterminism

If I am able to will A or B, I may will A while retaining the 'ability' to will B. <= Still contingency, irrelevant to determinism/indeterminism

If I am able to will A or B, what contributes to my 'willing' A rather than B? <= Different question entirely relevant to determinism/indeterminism

The point is intentional and voluntary actions do exist, and if that's all free will is, then there's no question it exists. It's trivally true. 

It doesn't seem so trivial when you are the person getting intentionally stepped on. That things happen in a deterministic sense does not mean that they happen in a necessary sense. 

Your whole imaginary discussion (which I enjoyed) ignores that problem.

A gun to the head is an example [of coercion].

Are external determining influences coercion?

It's a lot easier to say "compatabilism" than to say "the view that free will is compatabile with determinism" considering the amount of times I am going to have to mention if when we talk about this.

I am saying that the compatibilism vs. determinism discussion inherits and ignores conflations and equivocations which ultimately perpetuate the discussion indefinitely. The concept of necessity is rolled into determinism and the concept of contingency is rolled into choice and freedom. An action cannot occur as necessary and contingent at the same time. An action CAN occur as determined and contingent at the same time. See the problem?

[Neo-Scholastic]

Weren't you the one who quoted Aquinas that there is nothing in the mind which doesn't first appear in the senses? You seem to be shifting your argument.

You may be confusing Aquinas’s epistemology with his ontology. Knowledge of a thing still depends on its prior existence.

… it is not possible for reason to overcome its limits no matter what your existential commitment…there is no way to tell if we are or are not at the last layer of the onion. It could go on further for all we know. Your commitments don't resolve that quandary. Reason, ultimately, cannot provide justification for itself.

Not sure if we are debating whether human beings imperfectly apply reason or whether reason itself is faulty. I agree that humans are flawed beings, but I say that we can overcome those flaws with reason. Do you doubt this? I also believe that first-principles are truly self-evident. You seem to be suggesting that they may only appear to be self-evident. If first principles are up for grabs then pretty much everything is. Do you disagree?

… your argument that these paradoxes and seeming absurdities are a problem is at heart an argument from ignorance…

Paradoxes serve as indications that something is wrong with the theories that produce them. In the absence of a plausible theory, one that doesn’t resolve the paradox, more inquiry is required. But that’s not what’s happening here. These are not questions that yield to empirical findings. Some lines of reasoning are true dead ends. Moderate realism avoids paradox whereas the known alternatives do not. It makes no sense to reject a plausible theory when there is no good reason to oppose it, just because you think someday, maybe an undiscovered alternative will appear to redeem your doubt.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Divine Providence doesn't require complete control over human agency to play out. Free-will/determinism need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. Saint Peter's thrice denial of Christ was necessary for the Divine Plan. Likewise, the hardening of Pharoah's heart. If need be, the Lord can intervene on select occasions. That doesn't mean must do it all the time.

So he just picks and chooses when to force someone to do something? At any given time if I am in his plan he can take over my freewill?

Yes. However, because He is just and merciful, He would not hold you accountable.

[Neo-Scholastic]

This illustrates how unhelpful the artificial boundaries of the determinist/compatibilist argument have become.

To me it's just maintaining a difference without a difference.

[Angrboda]

… it is not possible for reason to overcome its limits no matter what your existential commitment…there is no way to tell if we are or are not at the last layer of the onion.  It could go on further for all we know.  Your commitments don't resolve that quandary.  Reason, ultimately, cannot provide justification for itself.

Not sure if we are debating whether human beings imperfectly apply reason or whether reason itself is faulty.

Not sure what you see as the difference. I would argue that reason is both reliable and faulty. It is reliable in that it can produce consistent answers within its domain. It is faulty in that cognitive biases and irrational impulses tend to determine the conclusions of reason more than do those aspects within our conscious, reasoning apprehension.

I also believe that first-principles are truly self-evident. You seem to be suggesting that they may only appear to be self-evident. If first principles are up for grabs then pretty much everything is. Do you disagree?

They default to self-evident because they cannot be justified, but our intuition tells us they are true. That isn't in the bailiwick of reason. They may appear self-evident, but that tells us little about their connection to reality. The assumptions behind local realism appear self evident, nonetheless the postulates of local realism are at odds with quantum mechanical experiments, so one of them is wrong. Self-evidence is no guard against error.

… your argument that these paradoxes and seeming absurdities are a problem is at heart an argument from ignorance…

Paradoxes serve as indications that something is wrong with the theories that produce them. In the absence of a plausible theory, one that doesn’t resolve the paradox, more inquiry is required. But that’s not what’s happening here. These are not questions that yield to empirical findings. Some lines of reasoning are true dead ends. Moderate realism avoids paradox whereas the known alternatives do not.  It makes no sense to reject a plausible theory when there is no good reason to oppose it, just because you think someday, maybe an undiscovered alternative will appear to redeem your doubt.

From what I've seen of moderate realism, it doesn't resolve the paradoxes so much as covers them over. In that it is no less a flawed theory than alternatives. Regardless, it doesn't change the fact that your line of argument is based on ignorance, and therefore your conclusions are unreliable.

[henryp]

For religious folks, would you pack it in?  If they, in the future, could map out 'decision making', and show it's got nothing to do with 'choosing', that pretty much is game over for the foundation of all major religions, right?

Would you consider this to be proof that your God doesn't exist?

Why would we do that? the bible tells us we are slaves to sin with no will of our own..

You are confusing church doctrine (based off a greek philosphy) with what the bible actually says.

I'm not talking about the bible at all.  I'm talking about the idea that people aren't responsible for their actions, and how most religions that I'm aware of are based on the idea people are responsible for their actions.

[Drich]

Why would we do that? the bible tells us we are slaves to sin with no will of our own..

You are confusing church doctrine (based off a greek philosphy) with what the bible actually says.

I'm not talking about the bible at all.

So Christianity (that which is based on the bible) is not a Religion?

 I'm talking about the idea that people aren't responsible for their actions, and how most religions that I'm aware of are based on the idea people are responsible for their actions.

Again according to what we learned from the likes of Jesus and Paul we are all slaves to sin. Meaning we are not responsible for our actions/We may not be the source of desire, origin for our acts, but yet we are still held to account for them Unless we have obtained the atonement in which Christ offers.