Is Russia about to invade Ukraine?

[Jello]

Yeah, that's the usual narrative.  It helped that their tank design was fucking visionary, too (since you mentioned tanks).  The 34 and IS were monstrous.  German armor didn't stand a chance (a fact which was immediately realized by german tank commanders and generals).

Someone who understands WW2. Thank you. 
The T-34 was pretty insane. Sure, the Tigers and panthers took it down a notch, but at the start of the war with russia, the 37mm guns on the german tanks couldn't penetrate it's armour in the slightest.

[The Grand Nudger]

@Purple
We've managed to have them and not use them pretty often.  Most doctrines regards their use as self defeating, they exist as deterrents, but only work as deterrents if they aren't utilized. If russia, for example, nuked the uk as their opening salvo in a bid for the ukraine, russia would be royally screwed. You might even say that it would take an actual madman to use those types of weapons in our present global climate.

[Jello]

If he's going to do something like that, Ukraine isn't his end goal, europe as a whole is. And depending on the speed of his forces, it is entirely possible they could pull it off relatively successfully.

WW2 armies didnt have tactical nukes. People sincerely hate each other, we always have been killing each other. But how you can you start a massive war when there are chemical, biological and nuclear WMDs?

Nuclear weapons are unlikely to be used. Everyone knows it's not worthwhile. They exist as a threat, and only a threat.

[account_inactive]

Russia should at least give me a warning before they nuke us.

So I can finish my cup of tea first.

[Jello]

That would make for a badass photo. Calmly drinking a cup of tea with a nuclear explosion in the background

[account_inactive]

That would make for a badass photo. Calmly drinking a cup of tea with a nuclear explosion in the background

Haha yeah  

[purplepurpose]

WW2 armies didnt have tactical nukes. People sincerely hate each other, we always have been killing each other. But how you can you start a massive war when there are chemical, biological and nuclear WMDs?

Nuclear weapons are unlikely to be used. Everyone knows it's not worthwhile. They exist as a threat, and only a threat.

Everyone knows that its better to trade and build up relations, but in reality we get constant big and small wars, so, one group could steal from the other and ease their pain.

[Jello]

Nuclear weapons are unlikely to be used. Everyone knows it's not worthwhile. They exist as a threat, and only a threat.

Everyone knows that its better to trade and build up relations, but in reality we get constant big and small wars, so, one group could steal from the other and ease their pain.

Not quite following what you mean in the context we're talking here

[Anomalocaris]

I am not sure you entirely understand why the Russians would be the first ones to clearly perceive that blitzkrieg won't work.

Worked on western europe pretty solidly. Just because the Russians managed to beat it, doesn't mean they don't see it's strengths.
The only reasons it didn't work in Russia was due to A) crappy supply lines and B), unlike every other country, Russia chucked everybody they had at them, instead of surrendering. Chuck enough bodies under a tank's tracks and eventually it is gonna get stuck,

Uh, no. I think that's the myopic tactical view.  It is embraced by Wehrmacht apologists because it glosses over the fundamental failing of blitzkrieg.  At a deeper level, blitzkrieg failed as an operational doctrine because it contained no provisions for sustaining and prolonging the initial German superiority in speed of action and reaction, and pushed that burden off to training and equipment.   Initially Germans acted and reacted faster then the French and the Russians due to superior training and surprise.   Starting from late 1942, the Russians had become able to react as fast as the Germans could act on an operational level.  That's why blitzkrieg as a operational concept stopped working.   The Germans realized blitzkrieg won't work again after early 1943, that's why they didn't try it again in the middle of 1943.  Instead they settled for a big set piece battle at Kursk.   After middle of 1943, the Russians were consistently able to act faster than the Germans could react on a operational level.  That's why after 1943, the Germans had their asses headed to them in every major battle on the eastern front.  

The reason they Germans had a superiority in speed of action and then lost it, where as the Russians eventually gained a superiority in speed of action and kept it for the rest of the war, is the soviets actually had a much more robust, cohesive mobile armored warfare operational doctrine, which paid systematic attention to how to maintain superiority in speed of action and reaction on an operational level, since before Germans even fielded their first ever operational tanks. It was called "deep battle".    Stalin purged that operational doctrine along with his best officers during the great purge of 1937-1940.  This was the reason why the soviet army faired so badly in 1941-1942.   Starting from 1943, The Germans knew the concept had ran its course and wouldn't work again in Russia.  But What the Soviet did was to restore the operational doctrine of "deep battle" to doctrinal primacy at the same time.  Just as the Germans lost the ability to act faster than the Russians could react, the Russians put in place a systematic doctrine to ensure the Russians could act faster than the Germans could react.  The soviets then beat the Germans in every large scale maneuver battle after July 1943, using the doctrine of deep battle.   The key to the success of deep battle is it approach the problem how to keep ahead of the enemy in the observe, orient, decide and act loop on an operational level in a systematic way.  The Germans tried to think up many tactical solutions to blunt deep battle, but they never succeeded in countering it on operational level, so tactical solutions all basically missed the point.

The Russians as well as everyone else since the end of WWII have studied blitzkrieg and know its weaknesses and how to deploy to beat it.   Russian deep battle, if properly conducted, is much more difficult to beat on an strategic and operational level.   But currently the fact that Russian forces and NATO forces are not forward deployed across their entire frontier means key criteria for success of deep battle isn't there.  The Russians can not successfully diversity the danger facing NATO along the entire frontier, so the Russians can't actively prevent NATO from concentrating reserves to meet any possible breakthrough the Russians can conduct.  Also, currently Russia simply don't have enough men under arms to form the sort of stavka reserve which is central to success in deep battle.

[Anomalocaris]

Yeah, that's the usual narrative.  It helped that their tank design was fucking visionary, too (since you mentioned tanks).  The 34 and IS were monstrous.  German armor didn't stand a chance (a fact which was immediately realized by german tank commanders and generals).

Not quite true. T-34 held a firepower, armor and mobility advantage until mid-1943. But by mid 1942, Germans were deploying updated panzers III and IVs that would defeat it, although not equal it. After July 1943 German Panther came into service, and substantially surpassed t-34 in armor and firepower, and matched it in tactical mobility. Panther held German qualitative superiority in medium tanks for the rest of the war. Panther was also a near match for IS heavy tank in effective (not nominal) armor and firepower, and superiori to IS in tactical mobility. The king tiger, which came into service in mid 1944, was significantly superior to any Russian tank in effective firepower and armor for the duration of the war.

But the important thing to remember is neither the Panther nor the king tiger were blitzkrieg tanks. They had decent tactical mobility for maneuvering on the battlefield, but lacked strategic mobility to conduct truly mobile operational level maneuvers. After 1943, the German army was no longer trying to equip itself for further blitzkrieg style operations. Both Panther and the king tiger were designed for head to head, set piece battles.

In many ways, the role of the T-34 in second half of the war mirrored the role of older German panzers iii and panzer iv during early war. Just as t-34 was materially inferior in a tactical sense to Later German tanks after 1943, panzer iii and panzer iv were materially inferior to t-34 in the tactical sense before 1943. But on the reverse side, even as t-34 was inferior in a tactical sense after 1943, it was superior for the purpose of operational level maneuvers after 1943, and succeeded against the Germans who were no longer organized or equipped for highly flexible mobile operations. The same applied panzer iii and iv before 1943, when even as they were tactically inferior, they succeeded against a Russian army that was not organized and equipped for highly mobile warfare.

The other important thing to remember is the soviets never understood how the Germans trained their tank crews until near the end of the war, and as a result never closed the training gap with the Germans. So the rate of losses in tank on tank engagements were always lopsided, with soviets suffering much heavier losses than the Germans even when the t-34 held the material advantage.