Philosophical zombies

[robvalue]

@Atlas: I think you're misunderstanding this question. You're assuming you will see different results because of this lack of consciousness, because the brain isn't working properly or something. It is working absolutely fine, the person is not brain-dead. It will successfully mimic any and all actions and decisions that a "conscious" person would make.

It sounds to me like you'd diagnose half the people you meet as being zombies. I'm not being flippant, it's just an observantion. I expect you would decide that I am one.

It's also important to note that a brain could go badly wrong, a person could go "crazy", and yet still be conscious. So examining their decision making for any sort of rationality isn't going to work here.

I'm having an objectively fantastic day today because I had a wisdom tooth removed that was causing me agony every day so I've gone from agony to zero pain. And I feel huge amounts of physical relief.

And I'd like to take this opportunity to apologize to Khem and Jor for being a rude and condescending jerkass to them in this thread. And I also apologize to Polymath for being a little condescending towards him. I also ended putting Khem on ignore which was intensely pathetic of me to do. I'll take him off ignore now.

This is a very interesting topic and hence I'm sorry for shitting up your thread, Rob.

To end this post with something on topic... if the only possible definition of a philosophical zombie that is considered acceptable is a insentient person with a brain physically identical to a sentient person... then I do indeed think philosophical zombies are impossible.

However my question to put to those who hold that opinion is the following question: If you have two people with different brains and one of them is sentient and one of them is not... but despite having different brains... science is unable to tell who is sentient and who isn't... what would you call the person who isn't sentient? And if you have no name for such a person... do you agree with me that such a person would be just as interesting as a philosophical zombie if a philosophical zombie were possible for exactly the same reasons? And if you do agree with that... can you understand why I am tempted to call that sort of person a kind of philosophical zombie?

No worries I'm glad you're feeling better!

Sure, I understand what you're saying. I think the problem is again defining what "sentient" really means. Informally, we all understand what a zombie would be; but scientifically, trying to state what this difference is seems pretty much impossible. This makes me suspect that our idea of what this supposed difference is may be is fundamentally flawed.

Trying to be objective about our own subjective "experiences" is an extremely difficult task.

[The Grand Nudger]

If they have meaningfully different brains then we would likely refer to that meaningful difference as a possible explanation between the two.  If whatever meaningful difference they have produces no discernible effect..such as we cannot otherwise tell between the two which is the control and who is the outlier....then we might suppose that specific disparity between us is functionally inconsequential to consciousness in the first place. 

I think the problem with that view is that it ignores the possibility that the difference is very much to do with the difference in consciousness... and despite the fact you can tell that the difference is the explanation for the difference in consciousness.... the vital point is [i]you still don't know [u]which one is conscious or why that one and not the other. And is that not a possible hard problem?

There is only -the- hard problem.  The hard problem of consciousness is the notion that consciousness is not (or may not be) explicable by reference to a functional definition of the operation of a physical system.

What you are discussing is considered a soft problem. Determining which physical system, or which parts of two comparable systems, are the relevant bits to consciousness. Between us, and between those who seek to explain consciousness, a "difference in consciousness" is explained by a difference in the system that produces it.  Individual brains, individual consciousness.  If it is understood that, broadly, brain type x produces consciousness as we know it, that we are all meaningfully type x..but that one subject is type y.  Either type y is also conscious..as n they are both conscious, type x is not conscious (and the rest of us are not conscious), the very difference between x and y describes and defines which of the two would be conscious and unconscious, or the specified difference is immaterial to consciousness.  

Okay so you wouldn't consider such a person a P-Zed because P-Zeds are specifically postulated in an attempt to argue against physicalism. Is that a fair summary of what you just said, for you?

P-zeds are designed specifically to have no physical difference between anyone else in comparison.  Not that we're unaware of what it is, that there literally isn't one.  Identification and classification are soft problems.  The objection they're meant to express (whether used to argue against physicalism or not) doesn't work otherwise...and it's useful to remember that it exists only by fiat in the thought experiment.  

And still, what would you call a person who isn't a P-Zed but has no consciousness and yet behaves exactly the same as we do, despite having a different brain, but not different enough for us to not wrongly dismiss it as normal brain variation?

If they have normal brain variation we would expect normal brain function.  If they do not, we do not (we're sometimes surprised on this count, ofc).  If the "disqualifying" variation falls below some detection threshold then you are no longer referring to a brain with a discernible difference....but, instead, a brain that at least seems as normal as any other.  Nevertheless, the difference does exist. So, if we were deadset on declaring one concsious and the other notm or in fact knew (somehow - such as a fiat declaration in a thought experiment) that one was and one wasn't..we'd likely point to the non-heterodox brain as the odd man out.

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And the point is the physical difference is that the person isn't conscious.... but we are unable to tell they're not. So they're not a P-zombie, but what are they?

A behaviorally convincing mimic existing in a world without a functional definition of consciousness? Probably don;t have to be a p-zed or anything like it to qualify for that title, either. A chatbot could already qualify. If it fools anyone, then it;s met the relevant metrics for consideration in your proposition despite having no brain (or body) whatsoever, let alone a similar one that would be expected to perform a similar range of function anyway.

[polymath257]

The definition I would use to determine sentience would say that isn't possible.

The problem is that you are elevating an epistemological stance to an ontological certainty.

I am using the exact same operational definition that I use for ordinary people: if they act like they are aware, then they are. I don't consider the question to even be meaningful otherwise.

Someone else mentioned conscious sedation. While that is a very interesting phenomenon, in practice it is *very* easy to tell the difference between ordinary behavior and conscious sedation.

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I think the problem with that view is that it ignores the possibility that the difference is very much to do with the difference in consciousness... and despite the fact you can tell that the difference is the explanation for the difference in consciousness.... the vital point is [i]you still don't know [u]which one is conscious or why that one and not the other. And is that not a possible hard problem?

There is only -the- hard problem.  The hard problem of consciousness is the notion that consciousness is not (or may not be) explicable by reference to a functional definition of the operation of a physical system.  

What you are discussing is considered a soft problem. Determining which physical system, or which parts of two comparable systems, are the relevant bits to consciousness.   Between us, and between those who seek to explain consciousness, a "difference in consciousness" is explained by a difference in the system that produces it.  Individual brains, individual consciousness.  If it is understood that, broadly, brain type x produces consciousness as we know it, that we are all meaningfully type x..but that one subject is type y.  Either type y is also conscious..as n they are both conscious, type x is not conscious (and the rest of us are not conscious), the very difference between x and y describes and defines which of the two would be conscious and unconscious, or the specified difference is immaterial to consciousness.   

OK, so we start with a collection of people who we know (or assume) are conscious. We compare them to others that we know (or assume) are not conscious (say, they are asleep---does that qualify?). We do very precise brain scans and find the differences in how the brains operate between those accepted as conscious and those not.

If we find such differences, and they consistently give the correct answers for those we all agree about, how is that *not* an explanation of consciousness?

Yes, it is the 'soft' problem of consciousness, but how does that NOT solve the supposed 'hard' problem? We have then found the *mechanism* for consciousness, right?

Now, I am NOT saying this is where we are currently (although I suspect we are much closer than many philosophers would think). But is that not a way to solve the questions of consciousness?

Simply saying it is an internal state doesn't mean it isn't produced by an operationally detectable collection of events.

[robvalue]

I've wondered before if there aren't meant to be any experiences going on at all, and I am some sort of glitch. If anyone has god's email, maybe I could confirm this. I'm the most important person ever. I'm all that matters.

If this is true, does this give me a free pass to do whatever the hell I want? Funnily enough, it wouldn't be likely to affect my behaviour very much anyway. I'd either carry on pretty much as I am now, or I'd be able to do myself in without feeling guilty about it.

[The Grand Nudger]

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OK, so we start with a collection of people who we know (or assume) are conscious. We compare them to others that we know (or assume) are not conscious (say, they are asleep---does that qualify?). We do very precise brain scans and find the differences in how the brains operate between those accepted as conscious and those not.

If we find such differences, and they consistently give the correct answers for those we all agree about, how is that *not* an explanation of consciousness?

Yes, it is the 'soft' problem of consciousness, but how does that NOT solve the supposed 'hard' problem? We have then found the *mechanism* for consciousness, right?

I would think so, yes...at least the mechanism for our own consciousness.  Fundamentally, the hard problem is un-resolvable, as asserted. It's usually referred to in order to posit some nonphysical or nonmechanical aspect to consciousness. In doing so, it implicitly posits a potential second stuff. However, what explains the effects of the second stuff? Third stuff. Third stuff? The fourth stuff. Fifth stuff?

So on and so forth, or at least until we reach a point where a person wants to make an immediate exemption for the rule they just asserted.

[emjay]

The way I see the Philosophical Zombie problem is that since everything we can notice in consciousness... be it what we deem external to us - 'out there' (objects in the environment) - or what we deem internal/meta - 'in here' (colours themselves, thoughts themselves etc)... is something we can can reference by association, whether that be in the sense of naming/labelling things... in which case we associate a word with something we've noticed... or just implicitly: 'that thing I noticed the other day'... either way requires association. That implies to me that everything we can notice in or about consciousness has to have a 'neurally accessible representation' in order to be associated with other neurally accessible representations. As such, the way I view a philosophical zombie world... as in a world without phenomenal consciousness... is where there is absolutely no physical difference whatsoever between that world and this world; people still argue about consciousness, there is still Facebook, there is still everything we associate with conscious activity... because the same neurally accessible representations are being activated and their consequences physically/behavioural manifested in space. The only difference would be that there was no phenomenal consciousness to perceive any of it or phenomenally give any of it meaning. So it remains the question to me why there is phenomenal consciousness when under this view it has no bearing whatsoever on the physical universe.

[polymath257]

The way I see the Philosophical Zombie problem is that since everything we can notice in consciousness... be it what we deem external to us - 'out there' (objects in the environment) - or what we deem internal/meta - 'in here' (colours themselves, thoughts themselves etc)... is something we can can reference by association, whether that be in the sense of naming/labelling things... in which case we associate a word with something we've noticed... or just implicitly: 'that thing I noticed the other day'... either way requires association. That implies to me that everything we can notice in or about consciousness has to have a 'neurally accessible representation' in order to be associated with other neurally accessible representations. As such, the way I view a philosophical zombie world... as in a world without phenomenal consciousness... is where there is absolutely no physical difference whatsoever between that world and this world; people still argue about consciousness, there is still Facebook, there is still everything we associate with conscious activity... because the same neurally accessible representations are being activated and their consequences physically/behavioural manifested in space. The only difference would be that there was no phenomenal consciousness to perceive any of it or phenomenally give any of it meaning. So it remains the question to me why there is phenomenal consciousness when under this view it has no bearing whatsoever on the physical universe.

And my position is that with all of these things, the phenomenal aspects would be there automatically: that they are part of how the brain functions. I have a first person experience because it is *my* brain that is doing things.

[emjay]

The way I see the Philosophical Zombie problem is that since everything we can notice in consciousness... be it what we deem external to us - 'out there' (objects in the environment) - or what we deem internal/meta - 'in here' (colours themselves, thoughts themselves etc)... is something we can can reference by association, whether that be in the sense of naming/labelling things... in which case we associate a word with something we've noticed... or just implicitly: 'that thing I noticed the other day'... either way requires association. That implies to me that everything we can notice in or about consciousness has to have a 'neurally accessible representation' in order to be associated with other neurally accessible representations. As such, the way I view a philosophical zombie world... as in a world without phenomenal consciousness... is where there is absolutely no physical difference whatsoever between that world and this world; people still argue about consciousness, there is still Facebook, there is still everything we associate with conscious activity... because the same neurally accessible representations are being activated and their consequences physically/behavioural manifested in space. The only difference would be that there was no phenomenal consciousness to perceive any of it or phenomenally give any of it meaning. So it remains the question to me why there is phenomenal consciousness when under this view it has no bearing whatsoever on the physical universe.

And my position is that with all of these things, the phenomenal aspects would be there automatically: that they are part of how the brain functions. I have a first person experience because it is *my* brain that is doing things.

I just can't get to that in my thinking... not saying I think you're wrong or anything... I just can't get there. Maybe I'm just thinking about it wrong... probably... I just can't see anything, at all, that implies the necessity for it. That for instance a PZ would still 'scream' if it was in 'pain'... pain would still be represented neurally and the physical manifestations of it would still be detected and processed by other PZ's... no different physically than with phenomenal consciousness.

[polymath257]

And my position is that with all of these things, the phenomenal aspects would be there automatically: that they are part of how the brain functions. I have a first person experience because it is *my* brain that is doing things.

I just can't get to that in my thinking... not saying I think you're wrong or anything... I just can't get there. Maybe I'm just thinking about it wrong... probably... I just can't see anything, at all, that implies the necessity for it. That for instance a PZ would still 'scream' if it was in 'pain'... pain would still be represented neurally and the physical manifestations of it would still be detected and processed by other PZ's... no different physically than with phenomenal consciousness.

Exactly. And that PZ's brain would 'experience' that pain, right? I.e, produce that experience?

[emjay]

I just can't get to that in my thinking... not saying I think you're wrong or anything... I just can't get there. Maybe I'm just thinking about it wrong... probably... I just can't see anything, at all, that implies the necessity for it. That for instance a PZ would still 'scream' if it was in 'pain'... pain would still be represented neurally and the physical manifestations of it would still be detected and processed by other PZ's... no different physically than with phenomenal consciousness.

Exactly. And that PZ's brain would 'experience' that pain, right? I.e, produce that experience?

That's just what I can't get my head round; the PZ would produce the physical correlates of that experience, yes, but I can't in my own head, separate the word 'experience' from phenomenal consciousness, so I can't 'get to' that it can 'experience' anything purely physically. And part of the problem of that is in envisioning a physical world without phenomenal consciousness in the first place; basically that there is no PZ in the physical universe... no entities of any kind just a maelstrom of stuff interacting with other stuff in space (that's how I picture it anyway, and probably part of the problem)... so in consciousness we have this perception of unity... of a single thing that can experience... but in the physical world, any given state of consciousness would be represented by a certain physical state of many different interacting particles etc; nowhere to pin it down to any 'thing' experiencing. So that's why I can't get my head around it... I'm sure you're probably right... I just can't get my head around it.