On Hell and Forgiveness

[SteveII]

Wow. Do you realize that reality would not even hold together without what we call 'causality.' You cannot even conceive of a world without the causal principle if you tried. Stating that science does not need a notion of causality is...just...wow. Do you understand that in order to interpret reality, you need a metaphysical system in which to process the inputs. Perhaps this will help:

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the essence of a thing. This includes questions of being, becoming, existence, and reality.[1] The word "metaphysics" comes from the Greek words that literally mean "beyond nature". "Nature" in this sense refers to the nature of a thing, such as its cause and purpose. Metaphysics then studies questions of a thing beyond or above questions of its nature, in particular its essence or its qualities of being. Metaphysics seeks to answer, in a "suitably abstract and fully general manner", the questions:[2]

1. What is there?
   
   
2. And what is it like?
   

Topics of metaphysical investigation include existence, objects and their properties, space and time, cause and effect, and possibility.

Epistemological foundation[edit]

Like mathematics, metaphysics is a non-empirical study which is conducted using analytical thought alone. Like foundational mathematics (which is sometimes considered a special case of metaphysics applied to the existence of number), it tries to give a coherent account of the structure of the world, capable of explaining our everyday and scientific perception of the world, and being free from contradictions. In mathematics, there are many different ways to define numbers; similarly in metaphysics there are many different ways to define objects, properties, concepts, and other entities which are claimed to make up the world. While metaphysics may, as a special case, study the entities postulated by fundamental science such as atoms and superstrings, its core topic is the set of categories such as object, property and causality which those scientific theories assume. For example: claiming that "electrons have charge" is a scientific theory; while exploring what it means for electrons to be (or at least, to be perceived as) "objects", charge to be a "property", and for both to exist in a topological entity called "space" is the task of metaphysics.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics

While everything I pasted is very important, note the underlined section and the example that follows it. You not only blur the lines between science and metaphysics, you seem to just deny the function of metaphysics. 

Which, I might add, is why metaphysics tends to be *absolutely useless* for understanding anything about the real world. In order to get anything approaching real knowledge, you need to actually do observations. Just sitting and thinking isn't going to be close to enough. So, what tends to happen is that philosophers convince themselves they are doing something deep when they are actually doing non-sense.

Math, like I said, is a *language* and has enough expressibility to help us make models of our observations.

But I reject wholeheartedly that knowledge can be gained without observation. At best, you can get arbitrary definitions, but that doesn't lead to knowledge.

In NO way is metaphysics knowledge.

That position is called Logical Positivism (and taken to the extreme you do--Scientism) and is the view that all real knowledge is empirical knowledge—that there is no rational, objective form of inquiry that is not a branch of science. At least four main problems/points:

1. Scientism is too restrictive a theory of knowledge. If science is the only path to truth, then there are no moral truths, no aesthetic truths, no philosophical truths (like human rights). Mathematics and logic are not scientific--they are presupposed as true *before* science even begins--how does is work that the only path to truth relies on other truths to get off the ground!?!?

2. Further regarding philosophy of science, scientific inquiry itself rests on a number of philosophical assumptions: that there is an objective world external to the minds of scientists; that this world is governed by causal regularities; that the human intellect can uncover and accurately describe these regularities; and so forth. Since science presupposes these things, it cannot attempt to justify them without arguing in a circle.

3. The claim that positivism is true is not itself a scientific claim, not something that can be established using scientific or empirical methods. That science is even a rational form of inquiry (let alone the only rational form of inquiry) is not something that can be established scientifically. So, it is self-refuting philosophy.

4. The entire philosophy was rejected by nearly everyone by the middle of the 20th century.

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Yeah, I don't see how resurrecting Frege's failed project adds any light to the discussion.

Of particular note, Steve, you apparently didn't read far enough, the Wikipedia article you quote states, "Although Bertrand Russell later found a major flaw in Frege's work (this flaw is known as Russell's paradox, which is resolved by axiomatic set theory), the book was influential in subsequent developments, such as Principia Mathematica." So the problems with Frege's concepts was resolved by appeal to set theory.  Even ignoring that for the moment, unless you can argue Frege's point independently of Frege, all you're doing is making an appeal to authority which, for various reasons, is unsuccessful.  But if you want to argue Frege on his own terms, knowing that he was ultimately unsuccessful, I'm more than happy to listen.

I stand by my prior arguments.

Wait a minute. I did read to the bottom. The actual article was on his entire work: The Foundations of Arithmetic. It is irrelevant that some of his theories had problems. It says nowhere that his concept of numbers is wrong (the subject at hand). You left off the second half of that paragraph: "The book [Frege's Foundation of Arithmetic] can also be considered the starting point in analytic philosophy, since it revolves mainly around the analysis of language, with the goal of clarifying the concept of number. Frege's views on mathematics are also a starting point on the philosophy of mathematics, since it introduces an innovative account on the epistemology of numbers and math in general, known as logicism."

Now since this is not my area of expertise, perhaps if you explained why Frege's concept of numbers is wrong or has been supplanted...

Your point about the concept of numbers being parts of a whole seem refuted when we consider that numbers at their root are a one-to-one correspondence--not assembled by some addition.

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After a little research...

We don't reason from parts to a whole with numbers. Frege did a lot of work still respected today in the field of philosophy of mathematics and write an important work (in that field anyway) called The Foundation of Arithmetic.  All references from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Founda...Arithmetic

Psychologistic accounts of mathematics[edit]

Frege objects to any account of mathematics based on psychologism, that is the view that math and numbers are relative to the subjective thoughts of the people who think of them. According to Frege, psychological accounts appeal to what is subjective, while mathematics is purely objective: mathematics are completely independent from human thought. Mathematical entities, according to Frege, have objective properties regardless of humans thinking of them: it is not possible to think of mathematical statements as something that evolved naturally through human history and evolution. He sees a fundamental distinction between logic (and its extension, according to Frege, math) and psychology. Logic explains necessary facts, whereas psychology studies certain thought processes in individual minds.[2]

Jorm, specific to your point above, I think this is an interesting point:

Frege roundly criticizes the empiricism of John Stuart Mill.[6][7] He claims that Mill's idea that numbers correspond to the various ways of splitting collections of objects into subcollections is inconsistent with confidence in calculations involving large numbers.[8][9] He also denies that Mill's philosophy deals adequately with the concept of zero.[10] He goes on to argue that the operation of addition cannot be understood as referring to physical quantities, and that Mill's confusion on this point is a symptom of a larger problem of confounding the applications of arithmetic for arithmetic itself.
 
...further down...

Frege's definition of a number[edit]

Frege argues that numbers are objects and assert something about a concept. Frege defines numbers as extensions of concepts. 'The number of F's' is defined as the extension of the concept G is a concept that is equinumerous to F. The concept in question leads to an equivalence class of all concepts that have the number of F (including F). Frege defines 0 as the extension of the concept being non self-identical. So, the number of this concept is the extension of the concept of all concepts that have no objects falling under them. The number 1 is the extension of being identical with 0. 

You also might be interested in the paragraph labeled KANT, there this is discussed: He criticizes him mainly on the grounds that numerical statements are not synthetic-a-priori-, but rather analytic-a priori.

Very good. Now go ahead a bit and see how he reacted to Russell's paradox, which showed his whole system was self-contradictory.

The *concepts* are not objective. 

And yes, mathematics is analytic a priori: to the extent it has knowledge, it is all contained in the basic assumptions. It says NOTHING about the real world until we actually observe the real world.

Explain how Russell's Paradox undermines the one-to-one correspondence concept of numbers that Frege discussed above.

[polymath257]

Which, I might add, is why metaphysics tends to be *absolutely useless* for understanding anything about the real world. In order to get anything approaching real knowledge, you need to actually do observations. Just sitting and thinking isn't going to be close to enough. So, what tends to happen is that philosophers convince themselves they are doing something deep when they are actually doing non-sense.

Math, like I said, is a *language* and has enough expressibility to help us make models of our observations.

But I reject wholeheartedly that knowledge can be gained without observation. At best, you can get arbitrary definitions, but that doesn't lead to knowledge.

In NO way is metaphysics knowledge.

That position is called Logical Positivism (and taken to the extreme you do--Scientism) and is the view that all real knowledge is empirical knowledge—that there is no rational, objective form of inquiry that is not a branch of science. At least four main problems/points:

1. Scientism is too restrictive a theory of knowledge. If science is the only path to truth, then there are no moral truths, no aesthetic truths, no philosophical truths (like human rights). Mathematics and logic are not scientific--they are presupposed as true *before* science even begins--how does is work that the only path to truth relies on other truths to get off the ground!?!?

And I would agree with this. There are moral *opinions* and aesthetic *opinions*, etc, but there is nothing inherent in the universe that dictates these. They are a matter of how we 8want* to interact with the universe.

2. Further regarding philosophy of science, scientific inquiry itself rests on a number of philosophical assumptions: that there is an objective world external to the minds of scientists; that this world is governed by causal regularities; that the human intellect can uncover and accurately describe these regularities; and so forth. Since science presupposes these things, it cannot attempt to justify them without arguing in a circle.

Well, maybe the original positivists made these assumptions. I do not. I base science on observed regularities and correlations *NOT causality*. I can test to see if these correlations are maintained and formulate (in the best cases) mathematical models for such correlations. I don't ask whether the regularities are 'correctly described' because they are regularities in observations. I use the scientific method to modify or reject proposed models, thereby allowing science to be done. I gain confidence in the models through repeated testing, always acknowledging that any new observation may require a complete re-write.

3. The claim that positivism is true is not itself a scientific claim, not something that can be established using scientific or empirical methods. That science is even a rational form of inquiry (let alone the only rational form of inquiry) is not something that can be established scientifically. So, it is self-refuting philosophy.

4. The entire philosophy was rejected by nearly everyone by the middle of the 20th century.

Yes, this is the traditional take philosophers have taken. But, taken as a *hypothesis* that this is a good way of approaching our observations, we do, in fact, find a testable hypothesis that has passed the tests with flying colors. So, instead of being self-defeating, it has shown itself quite a useful way to approach the questions of knowledge.
[/quote]
And, once again, math is NOT an area of knowledge about the real world. It is a formal language that we can use to express our ideas and hypotheses about the real world.

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Explain how Russell's Paradox undermines the one-to-one correspondence concept of numbers that Frege discussed above.

Well, the issue is that the full correspondence requires proper classes to function as Frege required. And those proper classes have to be definable via arbitrary properties. And once you allow for that, Russell's paradox shows the system to be inconsistent.

There has been a partial rescue in the Von Neumann model of the ordinals (and thereby of the natural numbers) that uses a *specific* set of a certain cardinality as a model for the class Frege used. But that then allows for *any* set with that cardinality to be an equally good model, which destroys the objectivity.

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Yeah, I don't see how resurrecting Frege's failed project adds any light to the discussion.

Of particular note, Steve, you apparently didn't read far enough, the Wikipedia article you quote states, "Although Bertrand Russell later found a major flaw in Frege's work (this flaw is known as Russell's paradox, which is resolved by axiomatic set theory), the book was influential in subsequent developments, such as Principia Mathematica." So the problems with Frege's concepts was resolved by appeal to set theory.  Even ignoring that for the moment, unless you can argue Frege's point independently of Frege, all you're doing is making an appeal to authority which, for various reasons, is unsuccessful.  But if you want to argue Frege on his own terms, knowing that he was ultimately unsuccessful, I'm more than happy to listen.

I stand by my prior arguments.

Wait a minute. I did read to the bottom. The actual article was on his entire work: The Foundations of Arithmetic. It is irrelevant that some of his theories had problems. It says nowhere that his concept of numbers is wrong (the subject at hand). You left off the second half of that paragraph: "The book [Frege's Foundation of Arithmetic] can also be considered the starting point in analytic philosophy, since it revolves mainly around the analysis of language, with the goal of clarifying the concept of number. Frege's views on mathematics are also a starting point on the philosophy of mathematics, since it introduces an innovative account on the epistemology of numbers and math in general, known as logicism."

Now since this is not my area of expertise, perhaps if you explained why Frege's concept of numbers is wrong or has been supplanted...

Your point about the concept of numbers being parts of a whole seem refuted when we consider that numbers at their root are a one-to-one correspondence--not assembled by some addition.

Yes, Frege's ideas are the *starting point* of the modern views in mathematics. But the internal contradictions have to be dealt with for the subject to continue.
Instead of numbers *being* a one-to-one correspondence, which makes them 'too large' to be sets, the trick has been to pick a representative of the equivalence class of objects of that cardinality to 'stand in' for the number. But that opens up the possibility of having *different* sets that do this 'stand in' role. Which makes for the possibility that my version of 4 is not the same as yours (there is no identity because they are distinguishable as sets).

[Abaddon_ire]

This thread has drifted wildly from the OP.

"Hell" is entirelly imaginary place and now we are arguing number theory for reasons unexplained.

None of the godly protagonists can remotely point to any hell, so they are reduced to the distraction of "what does 4 mean".

Watching the flailing is sheer comedy.

[Angrboda]

Yeah, I don't see how resurrecting Frege's failed project adds any light to the discussion.

Of particular note, Steve, you apparently didn't read far enough, the Wikipedia article you quote states, "Although Bertrand Russell later found a major flaw in Frege's work (this flaw is known as Russell's paradox, which is resolved by axiomatic set theory), the book was influential in subsequent developments, such as Principia Mathematica." So the problems with Frege's concepts was resolved by appeal to set theory.  Even ignoring that for the moment, unless you can argue Frege's point independently of Frege, all you're doing is making an appeal to authority which, for various reasons, is unsuccessful.  But if you want to argue Frege on his own terms, knowing that he was ultimately unsuccessful, I'm more than happy to listen.

I stand by my prior arguments.

Wait a minute. I did read to the bottom. The actual article was on his entire work: The Foundations of Arithmetic. It is irrelevant that some of his theories had problems. It says nowhere that his concept of numbers is wrong (the subject at hand). You left off the second half of that paragraph: "The book [Frege's Foundation of Arithmetic] can also be considered the starting point in analytic philosophy, since it revolves mainly around the analysis of language, with the goal of clarifying the concept of number. Frege's views on mathematics are also a starting point on the philosophy of mathematics, since it introduces an innovative account on the epistemology of numbers and math in general, known as logicism."

Now since this is not my area of expertise, perhaps if you explained why Frege's concept of numbers is wrong or has been supplanted...

Not my argument to make, Steve. If you can't carry your own water, I'm not going to carry it for you.

You're attempting to shift the burden of proof fallaciously so that you can rely upon an empty argument from authority. Not gonna fly, Steve.

Your point about the concept of numbers being parts of a whole seem refuted when we consider that numbers at their root are a one-to-one correspondence--not assembled by some addition.

Correspondance is no less dependent on parts and wholes than sets are (e.g. the example of the set being simultaneously a one and a many), so this objection leads nowhere. (And I've not suggested that numbers are "assembled by some addition" so that is a straw man which won't feed the bulldog, either.) You've simply substituted one dependent construct for an equally dependent construct. So we have two problems here. First, you haven't really gotten under the issue and are simply making surface motions which don't address the deeper issues. Second, that you're struggling with my argument abets my initial point that your claim that no one considers numbers subjective, which Neo amended to, no rational person does, was simply hot air. People, serious philosophers and mathematicians, do consider the viewpoint, even if they ultimately conclude against it. I don't know what your original point to Poly was that you were supporting with that statement, but whatever it was, your support for it, at least on this point, appears to have collapsed.

Why don't you reframe whatever point you had been making towards Poly without the bankrupt appeal to what "everybody knows to be the case."

[LadyForCamus]

Yes, you appealed to human relationships in response to the question, ‘why did god create people’, implying that we can understand god’s reasons via our own intuitive understanding of loving human relationships, and the emotional rewards they bear.  But, then you dismiss it as a false analogy when it’s used to demonstrate that god does not behave in a way that is consistent with these human relationships as we understand and experience them.  So, why appeal to the analogy at all, if it is not fully accurate?  ‘Use it when it fits, but ditch it when it doesn’t’?  That’s either rationalization or dishonesty.

Mercy and forgiveness are not essential attributes of God. They are expressions of Love. Justice and Holiness seem to be inviolable standards.

God can’t change his own standards?  That’s beside the point, anyway. What is perfect justice?  How does god decide what is just?

It’s not so much an objection as a point. My point is that on the one hand, god’s message in life is absolutely, undeniably crystal clear, and yet on the other hand, there does seem to be some potential other, clearer mechanism he could use to reveal himself to us. My follow up question to this point is, why?  For what reason did god design levels of clarity? Why doesn’t he reveal himself in the clearest way possible to everyone on the planet right now?  What is his rationale?

Because a choice to choose God is a process that needs to have sincere roots.

Why?  Why does it need be a process?  What’s the reason?

There are verses that explain that God will prepare your heart for belief it you are receptive. Like I said before, it could be an experience, another person, circumstances in your life, etc. that get you to that point.  An advertisement in the sky would seem to undercut that part of the process/purpose.

You mean it would undercut the dramatic tension of the story, lol.  Look, if god’s ultimate goal and desire is to save as many souls as possible, then the only logical action for him to take is the one that would most efficiently and definitively secure that goal.  Obviously, that would be to show himself before the entire world right now; an action which he is perfectly capable of.  For god to take any action less straightforward than that would be in direct opposition of his expressed goal and desire. Creating some slow, lifelong test riddled with obstacles is about as logical as Dr. Evil locking Austin Powers in a fish tank, hidden behind a curtain, to be slowly killed by sharks with frickin’ laser beams.  

If we are uniquely designed for a physical existence, why is that physical existence finite? What is the reason for first, a finite existence, and then an infinite one? What logical reason is there for the construction of phases of life, and why such a disparity in their lengths? The whole thing reeks of a massive contrivance for the purposes of getting people to behave.

People have to be created. A certain amount of people will choose evil over good, themselves over God. Do you think that this earthly existence is not sufficient to choose God (some their whole lives)? Not to do many wonderful things for his glory? Not to live and experience a huge range of human experiences that shape who we are?

You didn’t answer a single one of my questions above.

A choice to choose God is necessarily finite because our entire universe is finite (and will die some day).  Our bodies break down and die. You seem to think that the relative brevity of life should have been longer. Why?

Oh, come on now, Steve.  Don’t be obtuse.  If our consciousness continues infinitely beyond our physical death, then our ability to make choices is obviously also infinite.  God is the one inserting arbitrary restrictions and ultimatums here. Why is that? 

Jesus' atonement is what wipes the slate clean. Are you saying the people should be forced to allow Jesus to take their place to pay for their sins? You would totally remove any sense of contrition, desire to stop, consequences, even awareness of our condition.  THAT does not make sense.

Why does god need Jesus to wipe our slate clean?  I notice you’re answering a lot of questions with questions.  I’m merely trying to get to the logical rationale behind these pillars of the Christian faith.

I’m still waiting for Steve to kindly address of few of the questions about his faith that I have posed above.

[The Grand Nudger]

Christ, I can't stand to watch these three stumble over their own dicks just to grind their own silly axes anymore.  

Allow me to demonstrate how this works, as a realist, as an objectivist.  As a pragmatic positivist.  

I accept and acknowledge your criticism of the foundations of a hypothetical natural teleology, Jorg.  You make valid points.  Do those points, however, meaningfully rub against the truth content of any statement I make as an objectivist, as a realist, as a pragmatic positivist..in service of a natural teleology?  If I contain myself to epistemic concerns, does mereological nihilism offer cogent comment on those things?  What meaningful difference is there between a world of x ontologically objective status...and a world in which the subjective ontological and objective epistemic status is equivalent to x?  Do I have -no- rational justification to contend that there is a correspondence between my subjective states and an objective reality?  

If I am necessarily limited to my ontologically subjective point of view (and I am), but my ontologically subjective point of view is capable of describing what at least could be an ontologically objective reality, and -is- an epistemic objective reality, of what utility is such a toothless criticism of it's contents - accepting, ofc, that I must be careful to remember that I alone and unaided cannot always discern between the two?

Long story short, ya knobs..the best defense against nihilism is to accept it, and then say "so what, if so". If our internal reality is the only reality we have access to it becomes epistemically indistinguishable from reality in a grander sense...and it's only through a question begging argument that the possibility is invoked - even if true. Nihilism is self defeating..on it's own grounds. It attempts to shift meaning and truth into an arena in which there may be no meaning and truth, but in doing so..it eradicates any meaning and truth....to nihilism. Now, mind...that doesn't mean that a nihilist is wrong..it just means that it wouldn't matter if they were right. Delicious irony.

In a single sentence - accepting the difference between ontological and epistemic objectivity and subjectivity, and that nihilism is a valid objection to ontology..does nihilism offer -any- valid argument to my epistemic claims - the foundation of my knowledge, including my knowledge of meaning?

[Angrboda]

Pragmatism has always been crap when it comes to epistemology. It's a useful philosophy but hardly a gold mine for those seeking knowledge.

[Amarok]

Pragmatism has always been crap when it comes to epistemology.  It's a useful philosophy but hardly a gold mine for those seeking knowledge.

Would you prefer Theism ?

[The Grand Nudger]

Pragmatism has always been crap when it comes to epistemology.  It's a useful philosophy but hardly a gold mine for those seeking knowledge.

Pragmatism is crap when it comes to ontology.  When something works 99 times out of 100......epistemically, it's as close to truth as counts or as we can know. That's how science and math are fundamentally arranged. Not ontologically, but epistemically, by aggregate of results and accuracy within stated boundary. We define our variables.

Knowledge, in a restrictive sense and with full acknowledgement, is epistemic by definition..even if it might not be ontologically accurate. It's no more and no less than the best we can do, it is provisional, and subject to revision at any time.

Epistemic correspondence/reference theories of truth completely walk around every nihilist objection and are accepted as-such by mereological nihilism because it cannot sensibly contend otherwise. A mereological nihilists strongest contetion is that some x is not literally true, acknowledging that it is meaningfully true within it's implicit and explicit boundaries. I offer this as an example..to our resident christer apologists as to how..if they could separate themselves from railing against their pet causes of "you atheists don't understand objectivity" / "you silly scientists" / "fucking secular morality!".... they could sidestep easy refutation. I appreciate that you may still not agree, Jorg...but handling it in this way puts you in a similar position to those same christers in the absence of such a device. Disagreeing..but for no obvious reason beyond prior ideological commitment.

After all...in handling it this way I can agree with everything you say and still assert myself, rationally.

[brewer]

Yoiks, why did I open this again?