Does anyone own "The Moral Landscape"?

[Little lunch]

I own the moral landscape.
I'm willing to swap it for an immoral landscape, if you have one.

[The Grand Nudger]

Khemical and I seem to have agreed that I’m a moral realist, even though by all accounts I still call morality subjective. I’m not going to argue about this language further. I feel I’ve made a good effort to describe my position and no more progress is going to be made on this front. Like I’ve always said, there are an infinite number of possible objective moralities to pick from. One can simply check for internal consistency.

Internal consistency does not make for a fact.  The contents of a fantasy may be internally consistent - but that wont make the existence of the dragon factual.  At best, you would be making factual statements about the system. Don;t get me wrong, that's useful as well...however.

-moral system x says stealing lolipops from children is bad
and
-stealing lolipops from children is bad

.......are not equivalent propositions. Nestled within moral realism, as a consequence of it...being the notion that some moral statements are true, is that many (perhaps most) moral statements are false, or at least not objectively true. Now it may be the case that the two statements above, one about a moral system, and one about a moral conclusion, both arrive at truth - but it doesn't mean that they both do so objectively, or that the moral system x doesn't make other non-factual moral statements.

I still suspect that realism is meant to be saying more than this, that there are statements about morality itself that can be said to be true or false, not just for any moral system. I’m surprised Vulcan agrees with Khem, since he seemed to be adopting this latter position.

It says more than what you mentioned up above sure.  It says that some moral statements are facts, not..merely, that they are consistent with the system from which they were derived.  

The possible objections to true or false moral statements, even after allowing morality to be defined as you will, seems to be more to do with epistemology or the parsing of logic rather than morality itself. Objections can of course be raised at any stage, and with validity, and I tend to acknowledge these but then apply a "behaves as if..." principle of pragmatism to move on.

Well, sure, true and false statements, what we can confidently say of them, are grounded in logic, in epistemology.  If there were moral facts, they would be just like any other fact.

I’ll do some more reading on all these subjects to see if I can understand more. Thanks so much to everyone for your input so far!

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PS: It was my understanding that moral realism supported one, "correct" morality. To me, that is what most people mean by "objective morality", not "morality that becomes objective once you announce what morality means to you".

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Neither of those things are what moral realism contends. One is a common use of the term where nit witted believers are concerned, the other is a trivial expression of semantic coherence (also common for nit witted believers "magic books says x, which is consistent with magic book!"). If I declare that my moral system is pickles, then the comments that follow from pickles and are consistent with pickles don't automatically become those comments that a moral realist is allowing for.

For a minor aside that might go further to answering an earlier question you had - about why it mattered, what it's utility was, and I can do that with respect to the notions above and a current issue we have here in Ameriland. There are things that a trumpist might say..which are consistent with trumpism and have a moral component. These would be the alleged moral facts of trumpism. These facts would inform trumpist policies. I find it -incredibly amusing- that the believing set...long warning others of the dangers of budding moral relativism and subjectivity in our society...now find themselves in the boat constructed out of an obvious terminus for both. The drive to make everything politics is nothing other than the drive to make everything an opinion. The bad hombres are criminals. CRIM_MIN_NULS! They deserve the treatment that they and their children are receiving. If you disagree, well..that's just your libtarded opinion. To some extent, they were primed to take this position, even as they railed against it, as their concept of objective morality was already based more on the need for their ethics to be the right ethics...for their semantic coherence to outline truth. In their defence, they think they've been cultured warred in precisely this way, because they never understood that comments about their moral positions as opinions were a polite way of saying "fuck off nitwit".

It's no surprise that the position of secular humanism, for example..is at odds with the body politic of believers in Murrica, at present. They're fighting to maintain their traditional normative authority, looking to die on the hill of being pricks to people they don't like. Whores, fags, and filthy browns. A moral realist can call that objectively immoral, demonstrably and factual wrong. Or, you know..it's "just politics", "just an opinion". 50/50.

[robvalue]

I’ll probably write more horse shit in the future, but a quick summary:

We have reached the point (as a species) where we are aware of our motivations and can take a step back to examine the big picture. We can ask what we "should do" in a more general sense. That’s the starting point.

I think of this in two phases:

1) Decide what our values and goals are. If we refuse to think about this, we're essentially wasting our ability to think outside of our primitive tribalism. What is important to you, in general? Why is it important? How important are these things relative to each other? Do your values make sense, as a whole? Are you casting your net wide enough?

This section is what I would call subjective, and it’s the essence of morality. This is where the hard work is done, and everything stems from this. There are no right and wrong answers. It’s for each person to decide, and for societies to try and compromise on. Of course, being human, there will likely be some common themes between most people. We can investigate and finesse our values and goals, but we can’t arbitrarily alter them at will. They are going to be heavily influenced by our evolution as a cooperative species. But the more we think about all this, the more we may realise the importance of other things. Or not. As I said, this is an individual process. Discussion with others is how common ground can be reached, and minds can potentially be changed. The results are obviously going to vary between people according to how their values vary, and by how much.

I think the assumption that particular values must be in place, and that they implicitly govern any other values, is where a lot of misunderstandings occur; and where my disagreements with moral realism most likely crop up. The idea that there are correct values is entirely circular, in my opinion. This is why I reject the notion of "morality" as some absolute, because it’s essentially some arbitrary announcement or a popular best compromise. Goals must be agreed first, however that is achieved. Just because two people use the same word, it doesn’t mean they are talking about the same thing.

2) Put our values and goals into practice. This is where science comes in. Logical, evidence based approaches can often help us achieve the best results. This is where things get much more objective. However, it will often be the case that some goals and values come into conflict with others. Although some consideration will have been given to relative weights in part 1, it’s very hard to codify this, and it will likely be beneficial to go back and assess how it all adds up in this particular situation. Once we have determined the best compromise, we can again use the most objective processes available to achieve it.

This is a very general description. If someone wants to call "morality" a much narrower consideration, then they are welcome to. It’s just a word, after all.

[robvalue]

To add to this...

I feel like when any kind of "objective morality" is being proposed, step 1 here just gets missed out. The word "morality" is used as if it represents an automatic monolith; and that anyone who disagrees with what it is "obviously about" is just disregarded. Sometimes these goals or values are announced; sometimes they aren’t even mentioned, as if the word "morality" has some cosmic meaning. This is what happens with religion most of the time, and it seems to me that this is maybe what is happening with moral realism. I’m not sure. I thought I had reached some understanding of it, but now I don’t know what’s going on again.

So I’m trying to find out if moral realism is proposing this "true morality" kind of thinking. I feel I’m getting mixed responses depending on where I look. If it is the case, then it’s simply talking about some subset of morality in general, as I would call it. A focus on what I can only assume to be the "wellbeing" approach. It would still suffer greatly from any attempt to codify wellbeing, and to decide whose wellbeing exactly is being considered, and in what proportions. The extremely human-centric nature of it worries me a lot.

[The Grand Nudger]

I’ll probably write more horse shit in the future, but a quick summary:

We have reached the point (as a species) where we are aware of our motivations and can take a step back to examine the big picture. We can ask what we "should do" in a more general sense. That’s the starting point.

I think of this in two phases:

1) Decide what our values and goals are. If we refuse to think about this, we're essentially wasting our ability to think outside of our primitive tribalism. What is important to you, in general? Why is it important? How important are these things relative to each other? Do your values make sense, as a whole? Are you casting your net wide enough?

Sure, we need to know what's important to us. Individually, as a group, as a society.  Just knowing whats important to us won't help us to reach an objective moral conclusion, though.  Hell, it might be objectively immoral.  Even if some moral thing -weren't- important to us, that wouldn't make it less moral. Or..so...a moral realist contends.

This section is what I would call subjective, and it’s the essence of morality.

This is where the hard work is done, and everything stems from this. There are no right and wrong answers. It’s for each person to decide, and for societies to try and compromise on. Of course, being human, there will likely be some common themes between most people. We can investigate and finesse our values and goals, but we can’t arbitrarily alter them at will. They are going to be heavily influenced by our evolution as a cooperative species. But the more we think about all this, the more we may realise the importance of other things. Or not. As I said, this is an individual process. Discussion with others is how common ground can be reached, and minds can potentially be changed. The results are obviously going to vary between people according to how their values vary, and by how much.

Sure, if you're asking a person what's important to them, the answers will be different...but we're discussing morality, not whatever may or may not be important to an individual or society.  It may be that what's important to a given individual or society is immoral.  The Master Race comes to mind. 

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I think the assumption that particular values must be in place, and that they implicitly govern any other values, is where a lot of misunderstandings occur; and where my disagreements with moral realism most likely crop up. The idea that there are correct values is entirely circular, in my opinion. This is why I reject the notion of "morality" as some absolute, because it’s essentially some arbitrary announcement or a popular best compromise. Goals must be agreed first, however that is achieved. Just because two people use the same word, it doesn’t mean they are talking about the same thing.

We're discussing an objective morality, not an absolutist -or- arbitrarity morality, and yes there will be compromises.  That's the main utility of an objective morality, it provides a basis for assessing competing moral claims and compulsions. 

2) Put our values and goals into practice. This is where science comes in. Logical, evidence based approaches can often help us achieve the best results. This is where things get much more objective. However, it will often be the case that some goals and values come into conflict with others. Although some consideration will have been given to relative weights in part 1, it’s very hard to codify this, and it will likely be beneficial to go back and assess how it all adds up in this particular situation. Once we have determined the best compromise, we can again use the most objective processes available to achieve it.

Putting our values and goals into practice is what a utilitatrian system would do..but not all values are objective, and not all goals are worthy, and we certainly don't -need- an objective system to do so.   

This is a very general description. If someone wants to call "morality" a much narrower consideration, then they are welcome to. It’s just a word, after all.

Sure, I could call an elephant a poodle..too.........

To add to this...

I feel like when any kind of "objective morality" is being proposed, step 1 here just gets missed out. The word "morality" is used as if it represents an automatic monolith; and that anyone who disagrees with what it is "obviously about" is just disregarded. Sometimes these goals or values are announced; sometimes they aren’t even mentioned, as if the word "morality" has some cosmic meaning. This is what happens with religion most of the time, and it seems to me that this is maybe what is happening with moral realism. I’m not sure. I thought I had reached some understanding of it, but now I don’t know what’s going on again.

That would be worrying about some consequence of it's existence (regardless of whether those actually were consequences of an objective moral system), not arguing against the existence or possibility of such a system.  Ideally, an objective moral system would be able to address and minimize those behaviors that people engage in based upon a subjective but certain approach to the same issues.  The religious, for example..disregard those people who do not agree with their religious strictures - but a moral realist would remind them that their religious strictures do not qualify for inclusion within the set.  Those are the subjective opinions and demands of their god, as reported by their subjective beliefs about gods.  

So I’m trying to find out if moral realism is proposing this "true morality" kind of thinking. I feel I’m getting mixed responses depending on where I look. If it is the case, then it’s simply talking about some subset of morality in general, as I would call it. A focus on what I can only assume to be the "wellbeing" approach. It would still suffer greatly from any attempt to codify wellbeing, and to decide whose wellbeing exactly is being considered, and in what proportions. The extremely human-centric nature of it worries me a lot.

More like -a- truth -to- morality.  Moral realism makes no claim to there being only one "true system" - be it a system of evaluation or the base values themselves.  

So, consider this.  There's nothing in an objective moral system that doesn't allow for competing moral conclusions, or even for a dilemma between what is objectively good, and what is subjectively valued.   This is a fun one that I think you'll like.  We have this notion that people "deserve y".  It can be positive or negative.  Is it always the case, however...that for a given x, a person deserves y?  Even deeper down the rabbit hole, and this is the part where things go sideways...is it always the case that for a given x, a person deserves y, and a second person (or we..societaly) z must ensure that they get what they deserve?  What are -our- responsibilities with regards to the desert of some other agent?  An exploration here provides all sorts of fun examples depending on how we answer.  Perhaps you could suggest a set of answers to that question?  I'll lead off with one down below.

 A focus on what I can only assume to be the "wellbeing" approach. It would still suffer greatly from any attempt to codify wellbeing, and to decide whose wellbeing exactly is being considered, and in what proportions. The extremely human-centric nature of it worries me a lot.

Wellbeing is one approach.  Survival another.  Duty fullfillment another.  General disposition or satisfaction another.  Some would be more human-centric than others..but wellbeing doesn't seem like the best example.  Wellbeing applies to any creature or entity capable of being well.  It would be arbitrary to limit it to ourselves.  Similarly, limiting it to ourselves in furtherance of some goal would be meaningfully subjective.  It may be that wellbeing puts us into conflict with some other creature capable of wellbeing.  This could be, objectively...true or false for any species.  
[/quote]

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But, perhaps..you'd like to start all the way at the bottom.  So I did a big hide tag up there. 

I have opinions, you have opinions, we all have opinions. (The standard preamble, lol)

Is it just our opinion that when we discuss morality..we're talking about something?  If we changed our opinion, would it change the nature of the discussion?  Is wellbeing, at least....among the things being discussed?  For any act that we contend negatively impacts wellbeing, is that impact a matter of our opinion?  If we changed our opinion...would that change necessitate some change in the nature of the act itself?  

If I decided that hitting you in the face wasn't immoral - would it hurt any less?  

So, yes we all have opinions - but what is our opinion capable of changing about moral discussion, wellbeing, or what impacts wellbeing - and whether that impact is positive or negative?  I can change my opinion of the moral status of hitting you in the face, but no matter what set of opinions I choose....the actual event of your being hit in the face will play out the same way.  

With me so far?

[Angrboda]

1) Decide what our values and goals are. If we refuse to think about this, we're essentially wasting our ability to think outside of our primitive tribalism. What is important to you, in general? Why is it important? How important are these things relative to each other? Do your values make sense, as a whole? Are you casting your net wide enough?

This section is what I would call subjective, and it’s the essence of morality. This is where the hard work is done, and everything stems from this. There are no right and wrong answers. It’s for each person to decide, and for societies to try and compromise on. Of course, being human, there will likely be some common themes between most people. We can investigate and finesse our values and goals, but we can’t arbitrarily alter them at will. They are going to be heavily influenced by our evolution as a cooperative species. But the more we think about all this, the more we may realise the importance of other things. Or not. As I said, this is an individual process. Discussion with others is how common ground can be reached, and minds can potentially be changed. The results are obviously going to vary between people according to how their values vary, and by how much.

I think the assumption that particular values must be in place, and that they implicitly govern any other values, is where a lot of misunderstandings occur; and where my disagreements with moral realism most likely crop up. The idea that there are correct values is entirely circular, in my opinion. This is why I reject the notion of "morality" as some absolute, because it’s essentially some arbitrary announcement or a popular best compromise. Goals must be agreed first, however that is achieved. Just because two people use the same word, it doesn’t mean they are talking about the same thing.

While people do appeal to particular values and goals to justify belief in particular morals, it isn't necessary for the moral realist to do so, as it isn't the satisfaction of those values or goals which makes a moral fact true or false, but solely the existence of a moral fact. We may use appeals to how a particular moral or framework satisfies certain values or goals as evidence that such a moral fact exists, but it isn't the satisfaction of those values or goals which necessarily makes a particular moral fact a moral fact. Take the objective nature of God as the highest good. He is not justified as being the highest good with an appeal to the utility of his values in achieving this or that desirable situation, his nature is good in and of itself, whether or not it satisfies any particularly worthwhile goal. So I think in one sense, you are misunderstanding moral realism. As a practical matter, it is moral subjectivists and relativists who need to appeal to values and goals to justify the adoption of their morals. So in a sense you've got it backwards. A moral realist may appeal to utility of specific goals and values as a polemical tool, but the existence of his or her moral facts does not depend upon that appeal unless they explicitly make that the case. If they do, then you can argue your belief that such views aren't objective at all and therefore moral realism isn't justifiable on those grounds, but you have to get to that point first. As demonstrated in the case of God, all that moral realism requires is that certain things either are or are not moral, not necessarily why they are moral. We have no explanation for God's nature, yet it is simply assumed to be perfectly good. That is the stopping point for the theist, not an appeal to the utility of God's values and goals.

Take as an analogous example that of the alleged reality of numbers. P.A.M. Dirac said the following:

It was not until some weeks later that I realized there is no need to restrict oneself to 2 by 2 matrices. One could go on to 4 by 4 matrices, and the problem is then easily soluable. In retrospect, it seems strange that one can be so much held up over such an elementary point. The resulting wave equation for the electron turned out to be very successful. It led to correct values for the spin and the magnetic moment. This was quite unexpected. The work all followed from a study of pretty mathematics, without any thought being given to these physical properties of the electron.

So, according to Dirac, they were able to predict certain things about electron spin and magnetic moment from following the mathematics alone. Note however, it wasn't or isn't Dirac's being able to predict such values from mathematics which makes mathematics in that case real, the fact of being able to predict those values from following the mathematics simply gives us confidence in our belief that mathematics itself is in some sense objective and real. As with morals, one can posit that this or that axiom is necessarily true, such as the axiom of choice, and that as a consequence of doing so, the mathematics corresponds to specific facts of reality. However, it is not our having chosen those specific axioms which makes the math reflected in them objective and real. The choice of axioms and our reasons for doing so reflect an attempt to provide a description of something real, not the underlying foundation as to why those things which correspond to our description are in fact real.

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ETA:

Another way to look at it would be to examine how moral realism intersects with moral paradox. Let's take Sam Harris' argument that well-being is the index of what is and isn't moral. According to this view, things which maximize well-being would be moral, regardless of whether our instincts agree with it or not. But this can become problematic when we consider moral dilemma's such as the trolley problem. In the first case, we save 5 people by throwing a switch that diverts the trolley onto a track that only has one person on it. Most people are perfectly comfortable with this solution. However, if the resolution involves pushing that one person off a bridge and onto the track to cause the trolley to derail, many people would be uncomfortable with this solution. Now it's not immediately obvious that there is any difference in terms of overall well-being, though there may be some which are simply not intuitively obvious. For example, it could be that setting the precedent of solving such moral dilemmas by initiating actions such as pushing the person off the bridge could result in more harm to overall well-being in the long term, it's not clear one way or the other. However, presuming that no such hidden effects exist, it would seem that we make a distinction between the morality of our action in the first case and that in the second case. So there appear to be two things at work here. First, it would appear on the surface of things that Harris is wrong in believing that maximization of well-being accurately describes morality. But secondly, we would have to conclude, presuming the integrity and the health of the test subjects, that the diffference between the two scenarios constitutes a moral fact, even though we can find no description of morals, no over-riding goal or value, which necessarily explains that moral fact.

A similar set of questions could be asked about the scenario in which five people in a hospital emergency room could be saved by sacrificing one person who is otherwise healthy, or, at least, not in danger of dying. This would plausibly result in an increase in overall well-being, even if we take into account the loss to the individual who is cut up for their organs, as the five other people would presumably gain an equal amount that they otherwise would lose without the healthy person's organs. Yet something about the scenario screams out at us that this would be wrong, and it would be wrong whether or not there are hidden factors such as in the trolley scenario which ultimately justify not sacrificing the healthy person due to long term or other incidental effects. Our intuition is that it is just wrong, regardless of any rational. We don't need to figure out the pluses and minuses to know that it is wrong and that this is an objective truth. We just 'know' it, independent of any framework explaining it. Thus the moral realist isn't required to appeal to justifications in terms of values and goals to justify their belief that actual moral facts exist. Our intuition seems to be telling us that this is the case. The challenge for the moral skeptic is to show that there is another explanation for our intuition in these mattters other than the objective existence of real, objective moral facts. It is the moral skeptic who needs an explanation in terms of goals or values, presumably hard-wired into us, to explain that intuition. And when the moral skeptic attempts to provide that explanation, at least according to the consensus of philosophers, he fails to provide a convincing counter-argument. YMMV.

[DLJ]

Rob,

I'm completely with you on this.  

I think the miscommunication comes from semantics.  I'm seeing equivocation (not deliberate, I think) in the use of the term 'objective' and there is some fluffiness around the terms 'moral', 'a moral', 'be moral', 'framework', 'truth' etc.  It might we worth trying to pin those down.  

Examples:

...
The moral realist contends that morals are real... much the same way that the house is real. But there is a problem. Moral facts are not empirical facts, and so can't be subjected to the rigors of science. Let me ask you this: is justice real? If one of your loved ones was wrongfully accused of a crime, you would want the investigation to be fair and just, wouldn't you? And in conceiving of what this "justice" concerning your friends treatment would be like, you would also see objectivity involved, right? You wouldn't just wish that the proceedings were "subjectively" in your friend's favor. You wouldn't just think "I hope the judge is in a good enough mood to let my innocent friend go." You'd wish that real objective justice was done.
...

If morals are real in the same way that the house is real but relevant facts cannot be tested/measured in the same way, to avoid fluffiness, it might be worth delineating between the two e.g virtual reality vs. physical reality or perhaps ideas reality vs. material reality.  

"... you would want the investigation [and legal process] to be fair and just" ... meaning what: Transparent, same, consistent, equal?... this relates to process.

"you would also see objectivity involved, right?"  In this case, 'objectivity' relates to "the extent to which information is unbiased, unprejudiced and impartial." (best practice definition). These are 'intrinsic' qualities.

"You'd wish that real objective justice was done." Again this refers to the intrinsic qualities but the problem is that not everyone agrees on what justice is.  Book 1 of The Republic showed us this.  It was so long ago that I read it that can't remember what they decided but I do remember the Socratic method of inquiry as the big message and of course that Socrates himself was quite possibly antiquity's biggest super-troll.  Full credit.

Had it been resolved, then we wouldn't still be arguing about it today.  Rawls says that justice is fairness.  The god-fearing will argue that justice (like retribution) is divine.  

As children we learn first what 'unfairness' feels like, then we develop notions of 'sameness' and later we grasp the notion of 'proportionality' (apologies for using an americanizationalism).

One of the girls from our village was raped by one of the boys from your village.  To achieve justice, you need to offer one of the girls from your village to be raped by one of the boys from our village.  Yup, seems fair.  

Here's the crux:

...
Sure, we need to know what's important to us. Individually, as a group, as a society.  Just knowing what[']s important to us won't help us to reach an objective moral conclusion, though. 
...

You and I, Rob, see this as 'consensus' rather than 'objective'...   As different people value different things we cannot reach the same kind of objectivity (impartially etc.) that we can with two or more scientists agreeing about the facts about the house or quantity of water in the jug.  

...
Sure, if you're asking a person what's important to them, the answers will be different...but we're discussing morality, not whatever may or may not be important to an individual or society.   
...

Again, you and I, Rob, are not seeing how one can divorce morality from the individual.  We are seeing morality as having an innate, intrinsic biological element.  Someone earlier asked about 'is it moral to let your family starve?'  If not, then stealing a loaf of bread would be moral for that individual but not necessarily for the baker.

[cue Les Miserable]

...
With me so far?

Short answer: Nope.

There is a species of common sense of a particularly noble quality that is called moral sense and which the Shogun defines, thus: The moral sense is the common sense of the soul; it is the superior power of reasoning which stands before us that we may be prevented from passively following our instincts.  It is by its assistance that we succeed without too much difficulty in climbing the steep paths of duty.

This sense discerns an important quality which puts us on our guard against the danger of certain theories whose brilliancy might seduce us.  It is the moral sense which indicates to us the point of delimitation separating legitimate concessions from forbidden licence.  It allows us to go as far the dangerous place where the understanding with conscience might become compromised and by reasoning proves to us that there would be serious danger in proceeding further.

It is the moral sense which distinguishes civilised man from the brute.  It is the regulator of the movements of the soul and the faithful indicator of the actions which depend on it.  We must really pity those who are deprived of moral sense for they are the prey of all the impulses created in them by the brute nature which sleeps in the depths of each human creature.

The man whose moral sense is developed will live at peace with himself for he will only know the evil of doubt when he realises the satisfaction of having conquered it.  

Moral sense, like common sense, is formed by reasoning and is fostered by the practice of constant application.  It is the property of those who avoid evil as others avoid the spatter of mud through horror of the stains which result from it.  Those who do not have this apprehension flounder about, cover themselves in mud, sink in it, and finally are swallowed up.

I kinda like that.  

OK, we don't do 'souls' anymore and back then "common sense" is what we would nowadays call 'critical thinking' but it has a subtle mix of the biological event-process (sense), thresholds (conscience), duty, values and consequentialism; it also includes a focus on continual improvements of maturity and capability.  

Importantly it identifies what is actually at the root of a morality system... our sense of balance / equilibrium.

[Angrboda]

Importantly it identifies what is actually at the root of a morality system... our sense of balance / equilibrium.

Just curious, but could you illustrate how one would solve the trolley problem by appealing to our sense of balance/equilibrium?

[DLJ]

Importantly it identifies what is actually at the root of a morality system... our sense of balance / equilibrium.

Just curious, but could you illustrate how one would solve the trolley problem by appealing to our sense of balance/equilibrium?

Sure, no problem.

Which option (the one or the five) do you take, reflexively, that will allow you to sleep at night? Do that.

The fat bloke on the bridge... that's an easier one. Once you've determined that the fat bloke is a catholic priest...

[The Grand Nudger]

Here's the crux:

...
Sure, we need to know what's important to us. Individually, as a group, as a society.  Just knowing what[']s important to us won't help us to reach an objective moral conclusion, though. 
...

You and I, Rob, see this as 'consensus' rather than 'objective'...   As different people value different things we cannot reach the same kind of objectivity (impartially etc.) that we can with two or more scientists agreeing about the facts about the house or quantity of water in the jug.  

It's possible for people to reach a consensus..it becomes more plausible when we posit that there may be moral facts, however, those moral facts are not based upon that consensus.  

To put it even more briefly.  That there is a consensus (if there is) is far less important than how any consensus is reached. 

...
With me so far?

Short answer: Nope.

Well, if I can't get you to agree that we're talking about something, if I can't get you to agree on at least one of what those things are, and I can't get you to agree that some statements may be true or false...how can we have a discussion about -anything-?

I kinda like that.  

OK, we don't do 'souls' anymore and back then "common sense" is what we would nowadays call 'critical thinking' but it has a subtle mix of the biological event-process (sense), thresholds (conscience), duty, values and consequentialism; it also includes a focus on continual improvements of maturity and capability.  

Importantly it identifies what is actually at the root of a morality system... our sense of balance / equilibrium.

Is that an objective statement..or just your opinion?