How Can We Have Moral Direction If God Controls Everything?

[RoadRunner79]

And as I said, if you hold to materialism, that there is just space, time, and matter governed by the laws of physics, then you have no free will of any kind.   You don't have a moral free will, or even the ability to think about logical choices.   It's just a falling of the dominos, with no way to choose.   X conditions, are processed, and given Y result; regardless of truth or validity of the matter.  So as to the other part of the post, it appears that for a materialist view, that along with having no moral basis which which to say what is right or wrong, you couldn't decide it if there was.

 

Free will has nothing to do with materialism or determinism.  It is merely a question of, is an entity able to react to the environment in a way that has value?  This implies that the entity makes a choice based on its values (whether they be survival, moral, etc.).

Free will is a mode of operation of a conscious being -- the ability to make choices that benefits it.  Whether that choice is metaphysically pre-determined is outside the realm of knowledge of the being.  It acts as if it is free.

Consider the alternative to determinism -- quantum-mechanical chance.  This does not make an entity more "free" according to my definition.  It merely adds randomness to the operation of the consciousness.  I would argue that randomness introduces errors in choice, and does not improve a being's ability to make a choice.  I could be wrong -- randomness could actually help if an algorithm is designed to use it (as in a monte-carlo or annealing simulation).

Now, what does anything non-material add to the discussion?  If there is a soul making choices (instead of the brain), on what rules does the soul operate?  Is it deterministic, or random?  How can some sort of "free will" agency exist without a logical framework such as a brain?  Postulating a soul merely creates a new problem, of how the soul operates.

I would tend to agree with most of what you said here. I think that a soul, is what adds the will to the equation.

[Neo-Scholastic]

 

Free will has nothing to do with materialism or determinism.  It is merely a question of, is an entity able to react to the environment in a way that has value?  This implies that the entity makes a choice based on its values (whether they be survival, moral, etc.).

Free will is a mode of operation of a conscious being -- the ability to make choices that benefits it.  Whether that choice is metaphysically pre-determined is outside the realm of knowledge of the being.  It acts as if it is free.

Consider the alternative to determinism -- quantum-mechanical chance.  This does not make an entity more "free" according to my definition.  It merely adds randomness to the operation of the consciousness.  I would argue that randomness introduces errors in choice, and does not improve a being's ability to make a choice.  I could be wrong -- randomness could actually help if an algorithm is designed to use it (as in a monte-carlo or annealing simulation).

Now, what does anything non-material add to the discussion?  If there is a soul making choices (instead of the brain), on what rules does the soul operate?  Is it deterministic, or random?  How can some sort of "free will" agency exist without a logical framework such as a brain?  Postulating a soul merely creates a new problem, of how the soul operates.

I would tend to agree with most of what you said here. I think that a soul, is what adds the will to the equation.

Something like that. Happy is simply making an argument from ignorance. The only options presented are mechanical determinism or randomness? Are those truly the only two options? And is either of those nuanced enough? There is a distinction it seems between determined by circumstances and a willful act of determination. If there is a chance element then perhaps there is an option to load the dice in favor of a preferred outcome.

[RoadRunner79]

I would tend to agree with most of what you said here. I think that a soul, is what adds the will to the equation.

Something like that. Happy is simply making an argument from ignorance.  The only options presented are mechanical determinism or randomness? Are those truly the only two options? And is either of those nuanced enough? There is a distinction it seems between determined by circumstances and a willful act of determination.  If there is a chance element then perhaps there is an option to load the dice in favor of a preferred outcome.

That is the issue of the problem of mind/consciencness.

[Rhondazvous]

One persistent question is this. If my deeds are inevitable why is the illusion of consciously deliberation and control even needed? Thoughts and feelings would be just along for the ride, so to speak. Personally, I agree with Sartre (or was it Camus, not sure) that Man is condemned to be free. I cannot imagine what it would be like to live under the presumption that my entire being follows mechanically from the initial conditions of the physical universe. YMMV.

(my bold)

Certain aspects of our lives are illusory. It's a matter of fact. I don't see the point in asking "Why the illusion?" It's like asking, If the Earth revolves around the sun, why is the illusion that the sun revolves around the earth even needed?

I'm not super familiar with Sartre. But I think he is the one who said man is condemned to be free. He also emphasized taking responsibility for one's actions as a way to find meaning in life.

I'm a tad more familiar with Camus. His point was that life is innately absurd, and that trying to find any meaning at all is a waste of time.

The very idea of "needed" suggests a purpose—intelligent or otherwise design. Without a designer, what exists simply exists. It's only our unfortunate foundation in theism that makes us unsatisfied with that. Otherwise, we would have long ago created our own meaning based on whatt is useful.

[vulcanlogician]

Free will has nothing to do with materialism or determinism.

I'm not sure I agree with this statement in particular, although I think I see where you are coming from. My guess is that you are arguing the hard incompatibilist stance; you say that if one's choices are caused by antecedent states and events then one's will is not free will. (In which case, I agree with your position. I am a hard incompatibilist.)

But the matter is hardly settled. Libertarian free willists argue that because the universe is essentially not deterministic but --because of quantum mechanics-- choice is a wave function. And this wave function collapses when the observer becomes conscious of his choice. So, to the libertarian, the absence of determinism makes free will possible. I find the libertarian free willists' position quite implausible, but (still) this metaphysical dispute is far from being solved.

Dualism is another way that free will could occur in the universe, provided that souls do not operate under the same laws of cause and effect that material substances do. Dualism itself is a highly problematic metaphysical theory, but if it did turn out to be true, then we'd have to find some way of studying souls to determine if they were free agents of some kind. Some, like Sam Harris, disagree with me here, but I think dualistic free willists have a point.

I'm hoping not to have missed the point of your post altogether (which is quite possible). Let me know if I have.

[HappySkeptic]

Free will has nothing to do with materialism or determinism.

I'm not sure I agree with this statement in particular, although I think I see where you are coming from. My guess is that you are arguing the hard incompatibilist stance; you say that if one's choices are caused by antecedent states and events then one's will is not free will. (In which case, I agree with your position. I am a hard incompatibilist.)

But the matter is hardly settled. Libertarian free willists argue that because the universe is essentially not deterministic but --because of quantum mechanics-- choice is a wave function. And this wave function collapses when the observer becomes conscious of his choice. So, to the libertarian, the absence of determinism makes free will possible. I find the libertarian free willists' position quite implausible, but (still) this metaphysical dispute is far from being solved.

Dualism is another way that free will could occur in the universe, provided that souls do not operate under the same laws of cause and effect that material substances do. Dualism itself is a highly problematic metaphysical theory, but if it did turn out to be true, then we'd have to find some way of studying souls to determine if they were free agents of some kind. Some, like Sam Harris, disagree with me here, but I think dualistic free willists have a point.

I'm hoping not to have missed the point of your post altogether (which is quite possible). Let me know if I have.

Nice post.  I didn't know the term "incompatibilist", but of the three options you have pointed out, I would put myself in that category.

I recognize the possibility of quantum-mechanics having something to do with free will, but as a physicist, I lean against it being a primary cause.  The idea that "consciousness causes collapse" hasn't been mainstream thought for probably 70 years.

I am strongly against dualism.  To me, it supposes an alternate universe of souls that operate on some mysterious parallel basis (or no basis at all).  There is no reason for this idea beyond religious belief.  We should look for answers within the universe, not imagine things that are outside it.

---

I would tend to agree with most of what you said here. I think that a soul, is what adds the will to the equation.

Something like that. Happy is simply making an argument from ignorance.  The only options presented are mechanical determinism or randomness? Are those truly the only two options? And is either of those nuanced enough? There is a distinction it seems between determined by circumstances and a willful act of determination.  If there is a chance element then perhaps there is an option to load the dice in favor of a preferred outcome.

Are you suggesting that a deity loads the dice?  Or that a supernatural soul loads the dice? 

I am implicitly rejecting dualism, and quantum-mechanics clearly says that randomness is truly random (you can't "will" a quantum-mechanical outcome). I recognize that people like Roger Penrose have thoughts about quantum-mechanics and consciousness, but I think they are way off in the realm of pseudo-science.

[vulcanlogician]

The idea that "consciousness causes collapse" hasn't been mainstream thought for probably 70 years.

I suppose that, since (AFAIK) the Copenhagen interpretation has never been successfully refuted, we'll have to deal with arguments propped up against what follows from it. Nice to hear you are a physicist. (I hope you don't mind: that means I'll occasionally ask you questions now.)

I am strongly against dualism.  To me, it supposes an alternate universe of souls that operate on some mysterious parallel basis (or no basis at all).  There is no reason for this idea beyond religious belief.  We should look for answers within the universe, not imagine things that are outside it.

I also reject dualism, but I would argue that there are reasons to accept it outside of religious thinking. (Of course, theists LOVE dualism because it supports their idea of a soul, but that's apart from the issue.) Essentially, dualism explains the mind/body problem. In fact, it was the first explanation that philosophers got (Descartes' Meditations). I think that dualism and the mind/body problem are particularly significant (at least historically) because they spurred people to start thinking the right way. One great example is Spinoza, an early proponent of materialism, who was highly inspired by Descartes' thinking on the issue. You don't get outright statements that only physical matter exists unless someone first postulates that some sort of "non-physical" substance exists. Thus materialism was born. In it's own way, dualism helped us get to materialism.

[HappySkeptic]

The idea that "consciousness causes collapse" hasn't been mainstream thought for probably 70 years.

I suppose that, since (AFAIK) the Copenhagen interpretation has never been successfully refuted, we'll have to deal with arguments propped up against what follows from it. Nice to hear you are a physicist. (I hope you don't mind: that means I'll occasionally ask you questions now.)

I'm happy to talk physics

Quantum Mechanical interpretations is an interest of mine, and I have used a few of them in my work. To me, they each can be useful, as long as you don't take them too seriously. Copenhagen is the first one that students are usually taught, as it is easiest. It is also the least useful, because it promotes the fallacy of instantaneous collapse, when the reality is a complex network of superposition with the environment, leading to decoherence.

Quantum Mechanics has a collapse problem. There is no way around it. There is no model for collapse in the theory. It is simply assumed, and something like collapse must occur at some point, or we would not have a single macroscopic history of reality. We just don't know how or why.

I am strongly against dualism.  To me, it supposes an alternate universe of souls that operate on some mysterious parallel basis (or no basis at all).  There is no reason for this idea beyond religious belief.  We should look for answers within the universe, not imagine things that are outside it.

I also reject dualism, but I would argue that there are reasons to accept it outside of religious thinking. (Of course, theists LOVE dualism because it supports their idea of a soul, but that's apart from the issue.) Essentially, dualism explains the mind/body problem. In fact, it was the first explanation that philosophers got (Descartes' Meditations). I think that dualism and the mind/body problem are particularly significant (at least historically) because they spurred people to start thinking the right way. One great example is Spinoza, an early proponent of materialism, who was highly inspired by Descartes' thinking on the issue. You don't get outright statements that only physical matter exists unless someone first postulates that some sort of "non-physical" substance exists. Thus materialism was born. In it's own way, dualism helped us get to materialism.

I think dualism is the way humans see themselves. They see a body and mind.

To me, consciousness is a process. That process requires a "machine" to support its operation. Imagining a soul is to imagine something that doesn't require a machine to support its operation, or else is supported by a machine in some alternate reality. Neither seems even remotely likely to me.

[GrandizerII]

I'm happy to talk physics

Quantum Mechanical interpretations is an interest of mine, and I have used a few of them in my work.  To me, they each can be useful, as long as you don't take them too seriously.  Copenhagen is the first one that students are usually taught, as it is easiest.  It is also the least useful, because it promotes the fallacy of instantaneous collapse, when the reality is a complex network of superposition with the environment, leading to decoherence.

Quantum Mechanics has a collapse problem.  There is no way around it.  There is no model for collapse in the theory.  It is simply assumed, and something like collapse must occur at some point, or we would not have a single macroscopic history of reality.  We just don't know how or why.

What do you think of Hugh Everett's Many-Worlds Interpretation?

[HappySkeptic]

What do you think of Hugh Everett's Many-Worlds Interpretation?

I don't like it

It is invents a "real" multiverse of parallel universes, branching infinitely.  It has two main problems

1) there is no description of when the branches occur (there could be an infinite number, just for one quantum event), and
2) it doesn't solve the collapse problem (though neither do any other interpretations, except the self-collapse models that actually say that QM is slightly wrong).  i.e. in an Everett universe, there is no explanation for why you find yourself in only one of those branches (and why that particular branch), and aren't still entangled with the other ones.

My favorite interpretation is the Montevedeo interpretation, because it proposes an "apparent" collapse due to the effect of quantum gravity and our ability to measure.

It is funny that one reviewer thought that it was similar to Many-Worlds.  I disagree.  Instead of having many universes, interpretations like this say that all those variations on reality actually exist within our own universes.  Is there a difference, or are they indistinguishable?  I'm not sure.